SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 31930/96 by I.F. against Italy

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 September 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis, President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr B. Conforti , Mr G. Bonello , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska , Mr A. Kovler , judges ,

and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 22 November 1995 and registered on 17 June 1996,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1941 and living in Florence.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In 1964, the applicant inherited from her father the title ( nuda proprietà ) over an apartment in Florence; her mother L. inherited a life and controlling interest ( usufrutto ) in that apartment, i.e. the right to use it and derive any benefits therefrom. L. let the apartment to L.P. The lease was due to expire on 31 December 1987. In a writ served on the tenant on 10 January 1986, L. communicated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate ( pretore ).

On 27 January 1986, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. That decision was made enforceable on 21 March 1988.

On 20 May 1989, L. served notice ( precetto ) on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. On 14 November 1990, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff ( significazione di sfratto ) on 21 November 1990.

On 28 February 1991, the applicant in her capacity as the owner of the apartment made a statutory declaration ( dichiarazione di urgente necessità ) that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her son.

Between 21 November 1990 and 22 January 1999, the bailiff made 16 attempts to recover possession, on 21 November 1990, 30 October 1991, 10 April 1992, 12 May 1993, 22 September 1993, 3 February 1994, 28 September 1994, 11 May 1995, 10 November 1995, 27 March 1996, 10 October 1996, 17 March 1997, 9 October 1997, 5 March 1998, 3 September 1998 and 22 January 1999. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as L. was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.

In the meantime, on 28 November 1996, L. died and the applicant acquired the interest in the apartment. She pursued the proceedings, without however becoming herself a party thereto.

Under the newly enacted Law 431/1998, the tenant proposed to the applicant that they enter into a new lease. On 6 July 1999, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to repossess the apartment.

On 10 July 1999, the tenant requested the Florence District Court, under Section 6 of Law 431/98, to set a new date for the eviction.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains about her prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of her apartment.

2. The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that her inability to recover possession of the apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The applicant underlines that, after such a long wait, she is still in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether or when she will be able to repossess the apartment.

The Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. The burden imposed on the applicant is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursed by the legislation at issue.

The Court considers that this part of the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring this complaint inadmissible has been established.

2. The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal ...”

The Court recalls that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, individuals applying to the Court must allege to be “victims” of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or in the Protocols thereto.

In the present case, the Court observes that, although the applicant had a title over the apartment in question, it was her mother who had a life and controlling interest in it. It was her mother who issued the proceedings against the tenant. The applicant was never a party to these proceedings, not even after her mother’s death (see, mutatis mutandis , Accardo and others v. Italy (dec.), No. 44814/98, unreported).

In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant cannot claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECLARES ADMISSIBLE , without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President