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RIZZI v. ITALY

Doc ref: 31259/96 • ECHR ID: 001-5787

Document date: March 22, 2001

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RIZZI v. ITALY

Doc ref: 31259/96 • ECHR ID: 001-5787

Document date: March 22, 2001

Cited paragraphs only

SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 31259/96 by Silvana RIZZI against Italy

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) , sitting on 22 March 2001 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr G. Bonello , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska , Mr E. Levits , Mr A. Kovler , judges , and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 19 February 1996 and registered on 30 April 1996,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Italian national, born in 1943 and living in Milan. Sh e is represented before the Court by Mrs G. Minoli, a lawyer practising in Milan.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:

M.C., G.G. and C.L.G. were the owners of an apartment in Milan, which they had let to C.N.

In a writ served on the tenant on 5 December 1987, they communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.

By a decision of 15 December 1987, which was made enforceable on 17 February 1988, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.

On 11 April 1988, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.

On 9 June 1989, she served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.

On 3 July 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 July 1989.

Between 21 July 1989 and 14 December 1999, the bailiff made 46 attempts to recover possession, on 21 July 1989, 11 October 1989, 16 November 1989, 15 December 1989, 16 February 1990, 19 March 1990, 20 April 1990, 11 June 1990, 12 July 1990, 21 September 1990, 26 October 1990, 24 January 1991, 15 March 1991, 14 May 1991, 23 September 1991, 19 November 1991, 16 January 1992, 16 March 1992, 21 May 1992, 22 July 1992, 12 March 1993, 27 May 1993, 14 September 1993, 26 November 1993, 8 February 1994, 18 April 1994, 25 June 1994, 27 September 1994, 26 January 1995, 18 April 1995, 29 June 1995, 26 October 1995, 30 January 1996, 19 April 1996, 22 July 1996, 28 October 1996, 10 January 1997, 10 April 1997, 24 June 1997, 17 September 1997, 16 December 1997, 10 December 1998, 8 March 1999, 13 July 1999, 19 October 1999 and 14 December 1999.

Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.

On 4 February 2000, the tenant vacated the premises.

B. Relevant domestic law

The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35, ECHR-V.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about her prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of her apartment.

2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.

The applicant argues that the impossibility to repossess her apartment during 10 years and 6 months from the issue of the order for possession amounts to a violation of her right under Article 1 of Protocol No.1.

As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.

The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2025

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