SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 45599/99 by Sándor CSERJÉS against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section) , sitting on 5 April 2001 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr G. Bonello , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mr M. Fischbach , Mr A. Kovler , judges , and Mr E. F ribergh , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 1 December 1998 and registered on 21 January 1999,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Sándor Cserjés , is a Hungarian national, born in 1949 and living in Baja , Hungary. He is a judge.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

In 1996 criminal proceedings on charges of corruption were instituted against a Baja police officer, Mr. V., and, on charges of larceny, against a Mr. P., and their accomplices.

At the Baja District Court the cases were assigned to the applicant who subsequently requested to be allowed to retire from the proceedings since he felt biased.

On 14 October and 12 December 1996, respectively, the Bács-Kiskun County Regional Court decided not to release the applicant from the cases in question. The Regional Court pointed out that the simple facts that, in the case against the police officers, the applicant had had some official acquaintance of the defendants or that, in the case against Mr. P., the latter had insulted him once verbally, were not such as to justify his declarations of bias. On 10 June 1997 the President of the Criminal Section of the Regional Court likewise refused to exempt the applicant from his duty to proceed with the cases.

On 7 October 1997, following a motion for bias by Mr. P. himself, the Regional Court appointed the Kiskunhalas District Court to proceed with this case. However, the applicant remained in charge of the case against the police officers.

On 16 January 1998 the Disciplinary Court of the Regional Court issued a reprimand against the applicant, in accordance with Sections 21, 30(1), 63(a) and 79(1a) of Act no. 67 of 1997 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges. The Disciplinary Court held that the fact that the applicant had not proceeded at all with the proceedings in question – not one hearing had taken place – resulted in an undue procedural delay and amounted to a disciplinary offence. The Disciplinary Court noted, on the one hand, that a defendant in the delayed case had been in pre-trial detention, and, on the other hand, that the applicant’s omission had been due to his personal conviction rather than negligence and that he had had no record of disciplinary offences.

On 26 June 1998 the Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Court pointed out that, according to the relevant rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant should have proceeded with the proceedings in question once he had learnt that his declaration of bias had cogently been dismissed.

According to Section 74 of Act no. 67 of 1997, disciplinary proceedings against judges take place in camera .

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 9 of the Convention that the reprimand issued against him amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of conscience and, under Article 6, that the disciplinary proceedings against him were not fair and were not public.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the reprimand imposed by the Disciplinary Courts amounted to a limitation on his freedom to manifest his beliefs, in breach of Article 9 of the Convention.

Article 9 provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The Court recalls that Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of private, personal beliefs, and not every act in the public sphere which is dictated by such convictions (application no. 22838/93, Commission decision of 22 February 1995, DR 80, p. 147).

The present case concerns a disciplinary reprimand which the Disciplinary Courts imposed on the applicant on account of his deliberate non-observance of his professional duties cogently established by the competent Regional Court. The Court considers that the reasoned rejection of the applicant’s declaration of bias does not amount to an interference with his rights under Article 9 of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

2. The applicant further complains that the disciplinary proceedings against him were not fair and were not public, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Article 6 § 1, in so far as relevant, provides:

“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...”

The Court considers that neither the way in which the reprimand in question is classified in domestic law, nor its nature can suffice to give the proceedings complained of the character of proceedings to determine a criminal charge (cf. Ravnsborg v. Sweden judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A no. 283-B, pp. 28 to 31, §§ 30 to 35; Engel and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 33, § 80 et seq .; application no. 18598/91, Commission decision of 18 May 1994, DR 78, p. 71). Moreover, for the Court, no element in the case would bring them under the civil head of that Article, either.

It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Erik F ribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President