UTHKE v. POLAND
Doc ref: 48684/99 • ECHR ID: 001-22127
Document date: December 4, 2001
- Inbound citations: 0
- •
- Cited paragraphs: 0
- •
- Outbound citations: 1
FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48684/99 by Anna UTHKE against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting on 4 December 2001 as a Chamber composed of
Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mr M. Pellonpää , Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo , Mr J. Makarczyk , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr R. Maruste , Mr S. Pavlovschi , judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar ,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 7 December 1998 and registered on 9 June 1999,
Having regard to the partial decision of 28 September 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Anna Uthke , is a Polish national, who was born in 1924 and lives in Łowicz , Poland.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is an owner of an apartment house located in Warsaw, at 73 Różana Street.
On 30 July 1992 the applicant’s husband lodged with the Warsaw District Court an eviction claim against two of his tenants, T.M. and S.P.
The first hearing took place on 18 December 1992. In 1993 hearings were held on the following dates: 15 January, 24 March, 6 and 18 May, 16 and 21 June, 16 July, 12 August, 24 September, 20 October, 17 and 30 November and 21 December.
On 22 December 1992 the applicant’s husband died and, accordingly, on 24 March 1993 the court stayed the proceedings invoking Article 174 § 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
On 14 April 1993 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees.
On 6 May 1993 the applicant requested the court to resume the stayed proceedings.
On 27 May 1993 the applicant revoked the power of attorney of her lawyer A.J.
On 16 June 1993 the applicant submitted all the documents requested by the defendants.
At the hearing which took place 30 November 1993 the court fixed 21 days’ time-limit for the tenant T.M. to institute administrative proceedings, to have her tenancy rights, apparently originating from an administrative decision given in the 1940s or 1950s, confirmed.
On 24 March 1994 the Mokotów Housing Administration, in reply to a query submitted by the court, informed it that administrative proceedings had been instituted in respect of T. M. and S. P. who had requested to have their tenancy rights, apparently originating from administrative decisions, confirmed.
On an unspecified date defendant T. M. appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against a decision by which the relevant authorities had discontinued proceedings in which she had requested that an administrative decision be taken awarding her administrative tenancy rights. Likewise, on an unspecified date S. P. filed an appeal with the same court against a decision by which his request for confirmation of his tenancy rights had been refused.
On 14 April 1994 the Warsaw District Court stayed the eviction proceedings until the end of administrative proceedings instituted by the defendants and later on, by a decision of 14 July 1994, refused to resume the proceedings. On 28 July 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. The case-file was forwarded to the Regional Court on 25 August 1994. The appeal was dismissed on 28 December 1994 by the Warsaw Regional Court.
On 24 April 1995 the Warsaw District Court refused the applicant’s further request of 18 February 1995 to resume the stayed proceedings as the administrative proceedings concerning the tenancy entitlements of her tenants had not come to the end and remained pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.
On 26 June 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court informed the applicant that the administrative proceedings instituted by the defendants T.M. and S.P. could not be speeded up.
On 23 August 1995 the Warsaw District Court refused the applicant’s next request to resume the stayed proceedings, as the administrative proceedings concerning the administrative tenancy entitlements of her tenants remained pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.
On 30 August 1995 the applicant complained to the President of the District Court about the excessive length of proceedings.
On 29 January 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal lodged by T. M. against a decision by which she had been refused to grant, by way of an administrative decision, the right to a lease of the apartment in question.
On 29 August 1996 the Warsaw District Court refused to resume the stayed eviction proceedings as the second defendant S. P. had appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against the first-instance administrative decision, which had been given in his case on 10 June 1996. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Warsaw Regional Court.
By a letter of 19 November 1996 the President of the Regional Court informed the applicant, in reply to her complaint, that the length of the proceedings had been caused by the fact that the administrative proceedings concerning the housing entitlements of S.P. still remained pending.
On 16 December 1996 the court resumed the proceedings with respect to T.M. and on 22 January 1997 the proceedings were also resumed with respect to S.P. , despite the fact that the administrative proceedings in respect of his tenancy rights remained pending.
During the hearing on 25 February 1997 the applicant was requested to specify her claim and to submit all necessary documentation within one-month. On 17 March 1997 the applicant’s new lawyer specified her claims.
On 24 April 1997 the next hearing was held before the Warsaw District Court.
In a letter of 1 July 1997 the President of the Civil Division of the District Court informed the applicant, in reply to her complaint of 4 June 1997, that the proceedings in her case did not appear to be excessively lengthy.
A hearing to be held on 3 July 1997 was adjourned as the summons to the defendant T.M. had not been duly served on him by the post.
In a letter of 7 July 1997 the President of the District Court informed the applicant that the proceedings would most probably come to end at the hearing scheduled for 16 October 1997, as the taking of evidence had almost been completed. A hearing was held on that day.
In 1997 the applicant requested the Ombudsman to intervene in her case. The Ombudsman, by a letter of 12 November 1997, informed her that he lacked competence to intervene in pending civil cases as to the merits. However, as the applicant had complained about the excessive length of the proceedings, the Ombudsman had requested the president of the District Court to provide him with relevant information. In reply, the Ombudsman had been informed that the proceedings were about to be concluded, as the taking of evidence had been completed and only the parties were to be questioned.
On 18 November 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the second defendant S.P. against an administrative decision discontinuing the proceedings instituted at his request for an administrative decision, awarding him a tenancy contract. The court considered that these proceedings had to be discontinued as under the Tenancy Act of 1994 tenancy contracts established by way of administrative decisions had ceased to exist. The court further observed that under applicable legal provisions, any disputes as to the existence and scope of tenancy rights had to be brought before civil courts.
On 23 March 1998 and 7 July 1998 hearings were adjourned as the court had not received a postal confirmation that the summonses had been served on the defendants.
On 8 July 1998 the applicant complained about the length of the proceedings to the Ministry of Justice.
The next hearing was scheduled for 8 October 1998 and before 5 August 1998 the court received the postal confirmation that the summonses had duly been served on the defendants. Apparently, a hearing was held on that date.
In a letter of 5 August 1998 the President of the District Court stated, in reply to the applicant’s complaint about the protracted character of the proceedings, that she could not fully share the applicant’s view.
On 16 October 1998 the applicant complained to the Minister of Internal Affairs about the excessive length of the proceedings. On 20 October 1998 her complaint was transmitted to the Ministry of Justice. On 22 October 1998 a similar complaint, lodged with the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, was transmitted to the same Ministry.
On 1 December 1998 the Warsaw District Court submitted a complaint to the Regional Bar Association about the unexplained absence of M.B. , the defendant S.P’s lawyer, at a hearing.
On 12 December 1998 the defendant T.M. died.
On 28 December 1998 another hearing took place before the Warsaw District Court. The defendant S.P’s lawyer M.B. failed to attend it. The applicant withdrew her eviction claim with respect to T.M.
On 7 January 1999 the defendant S.P. lodged with the Warsaw District Court a claim to assert a right of adverse possession of the apartment in issue. Apparently on the same day, he lodged with the same court a request to re-open the proceedings concerning the applicant’s eviction claim, in which the hearings had closed at the hearing of 28 December 1998, arguing that the outcome of the newly instituted proceedings would be decisive for the eviction proceedings, which should therefore be stayed again.
On 11 January 1999 the hearings in the eviction case were re-opened. On 7 April 1999 the Warsaw District Court stayed the eviction proceedings until the end of the proceedings instituted by the defendant S. P. asserting a right of adverse possession, and discontinued the proceedings in respect of T. M. as the applicant had withdrawn her eviction claim in view of her death.
On 20 May 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision.
The subsequent hearings in the proceedings concerning S.P.’s claim asserting the right of prescription took place on 8 December 1999, 22 March 2000 and 6 July 2000.
On 17 July 2000 the Warsaw District Court dismissed S.P’s claim, finding that the apartment where he lived had never constituted a separate tenement.
On 7 September 2000 S.P. appealed against the above decision to the Warsaw Regional Court.
The eviction proceedings and the prescription proceedings are still pending.
B. Relevant domestic law
The code of Civil Proceedings provides:
Article 174 § 1 (1)
“The court shall stay the proceedings in case of the death of the party of the proceedings.”
Article 177 § 1 (3)
“The court may stay the proceedings if its decision on the merits on the case depends on an earlier decision of the administrative authority.”
Article 180 § 1 (4)
“The court shall resume the stayed civil proceedings if the final decision in administrative proceedings was given. The court may however, according to the circumstances of the case, resume the civil proceedings before the final administrative decision is given.”
THE LAW
The applicant’s complaint relates to the length of the proceedings, which began on 30 July 1992 with the Warsaw District Court and are still pending. They have therefore already lasted nine years and three months.
a) The Court recalls that Poland recognised the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to receive individual applications "from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of the rights recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event occurring after 30 April 1993". According to Article 6 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, this limitation shall remain valid for the jurisdiction of the Court under that Protocol. It follows that the Court is not competent to examine complaints relating to violations of the Convention by acts, decisions or events that have occurred prior to 1 May 1993.
Hence, the Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began not on 30 July 1992, when the applicant’s husband lodged his action with the Warsaw District Court, but on 1 May 1993, when the declaration whereby Poland recognised the right of individual petition took effect.
However, in cases where it can, by reason of its competence ratione temporis , only examine part of the proceedings, it may take into account, in order to assess the length, the stage reached in the proceedings at the beginning of the period under consideration (see the Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, § 53).
It follows that the Court is competent ratione temporis to examine the applicant’s complaint insofar as it relates to the proceedings after 30 April 1993, taking into consideration the stage of the proceedings reached at this date.
b) According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government reject the allegation.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible the remainder of the application, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Michael O’Boyle Nicolas Bratza Registrar President
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
