FIRST SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 47863/99 by Draško ŠOĆ against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 17 January 2002 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mrs F. Tulkens , Mr G. Bonello , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mrs N. Vajić , Mrs S. Botoucharova , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , judges , and Mr E. F RI BergH , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 23 October 1996 and registered on 3 May 1999,

Having regard to the Court’s partial decision of 29 June 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Draško Šoć , is a Croatian citizen, who was born in 1954. He is a lawyer and lives in Zagreb . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent Ms Lidija Lukina-Karajković .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Proceedings relevant to the applicant’s right of freedom of movement

The applicant was born in 1954 in Cetinje , Montenegro, then a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter the “SFRY”). In 1983 he moved to Croatia, then also a part of the SFRY. He was in possession of a Yugoslav passport.

On an unspecified date in 1993 the applicant acquired the status of a permanent resident in Croatia. On 23 November 1993 he obtained an identification card for foreign citizens with expiration date on 23 November 1998.

According to the applicant, on 27 January 1993 and 5 February 1993 he filed applications for a travel document for foreign citizens ( putni list za stranca ) with the Dubrovnik Police Department ( Policijska uprava dubrovačka ). He has never received any reply.

According to the Government the applicant has never filed any such application with the Dubrovnik Police Department.

According to the Government the applicant filed an application for a travel document for foreign citizens with the Zagreb Police Department ( Policijska uprava zagrebačka ) on 27 February 1995. On 9 March 1995 he was invited to the Zagreb Police Department where he stated that he did not want a travel document for foreign citizens but a regular passport. He was told then that he could not obtain a regular passport since he was not a Croatian citizen.

The Government further submit that the applicant again filed a similar application with the Zagreb Police Department on 24 April 1995. He was invited to the Police Department on 10 May 1995 where he was informed that he could obtain a restricted travel document for foreign citizens with an exit visa which would have allowed him to exit Croatia. In order to obtain such a travel document he should have submitted certain documents which he had failed to do. On 26 May 1995 the applicant informed the authorities that he had no intention of travelling abroad at that time.

According to the applicant, his application of 27 February 1995 has never been examined by the Croatian authorities and he was not invited to the Zagreb Police Department on 9 March 1995. As to his request of 24 April 1995, he did receive a letter from the Zagreb Police Department informing him that he could obtain a travel document for foreign citizens. Subsequently, when he went to the Zagreb Police Department in order to have such a document issued, he was informed that he could obtain a restricted travel document for foreign citizens which would only have allowed him to leave Croatia. The applicant refused such a document.

On 4 September 1995 the applicant relinquished his previous citizenship of Montenegro. However, he had not at the same time obtained a guarantee from the Croatian authorities that he would be granted Croatian citizenship. Thus, he became an apatrid .

After that the applicant did not submit any further request for a travel document. On 3 April 2000 he obtained Croatian citizenship and on 17 April 2000 he also obtained a regular Croatian passport.

2. Various civil proceedings:

i. Proceedings against S. C.

On 30 June 1990 the applicant filed an action for payment with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Dubrovniku ), against S. C.

The proceedings ended by the Dubrovnik County Court’s ( Županijski sud u Dubrovniku ) decision of 7 February 1997, rejecting the applicant’s appeal against the first instance decision.

ii. Proceedings against H. J.

On 19 March 1993 the applicant, together with another plaintiff, instituted eviction proceedings with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, against H. J., asking for his eviction from a flat in Dubrovnik.

By judgment of 19 May 1994 the first instance court granted the applicant’s claim. On 12 August 1994 the appellate court upheld that judgment upon H. J.’s appeal.

On 30 September 1994 H. J. filed a request for revision with the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ).

On 24 August 1998 the applicant filed a request to have issued a warrant of execution of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court judgment of 19 May 1994. On 6 October 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit a copy of the judgment with the stamped endorsement certifying final adjudication. The letter was sent by registered mail on 8 and 24 November 1998 but the applicant did not collect it. Finally, the letter was served on the applicant on 23 January 1999.

On 18 February 1999 the applicant informed the court that he was unable to submit the requested document and asked the court to find it in the case-file.

On 27 May 1999 the Supreme Court rejected H. J.’s request for revision.

On 11 June 1999 the Zagreb Municipal Court issued a warrant of execution.

On 1 September 1999 the applicant informed the court that H. J. had moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina several years ago. The court requested the Dubrovnik Police Department to verify H. J.’s address. On 22 October 1999 the Dubrovnik Police Department confirmed that H. J. had moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 19 May 2000 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court appointed a legal representative for H. J.

On 28 December 2000 the court decided to carry out the warrant of execution on 15 February 2001.

On 24 January 2001 a third person, V. B., filed a motion to stay the execution. He claimed that he was the owner of the flat in question. The court served this motion on the applicant on 31 January 2001.

On 25 February 2001 the court instructed V. B. to institute civil proceedings to have the execution warrant declared inadmissible ( tužba radi proglašenja ovrhe nedopuštenom ), with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, against the applicant and H. J. It appears that V. B. did so.

The hearing was scheduled for 3 May 2001 but the applicant did not receive a notice of the hearing date. The postal receipt indicated that he had changed his address. The court invited the police department to verify the applicant’s address in Zagreb . It informed the court that the applicant was still registered at the same address as before but that he did not live there any longer.

On 17 May 2001 the court appointed a legal representative to the applicant because his address was unknown.

The hearings were held on 12 June and 6 July 2001 when the court pronounced judgment granting V. B.’s claim and declaring the execution warrant inadmissible.

iii. Proceedings against R. R

On 27 January 1994 the applicant brought civil proceedings against R. R. alleging appropriation without legal entitlement ( tužba radi stjecanja bez pravne osnove ).

R. R. filed a request that the applicant be ordered to deposit with the court the amount of 36,500 Croatian Kunas (HRK) to insure her costs and expenses for the proceedings ( aktorska kaucija ), as she claimed that the applicant was not a Croatian citizen. The court invited the applicant’s counsel to inform it about the applicant’s citizenship. Since the representative did not reply, the court repeated the request on 5 November 1998.

On 18 November 1998 the applicant’s counsel informed the court that the applicant no longer wanted his representation and invited the court to send all further invitations to the applicant’s address in Zagreb .

On 23 November 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit information about his citizenship. Two letters were returned indicating that the applicant was absent.

On 22 December 1998 the court requested the Dubrovnik Police Department to verify the applicant’s address and also to check out the applicant’s citizenship status.

On 29 December 1998 the Dubrovnik Police Department informed the court that the applicant was still registered at the same address in Zagreb .

On 7 January 1999 the court requested the Zagreb Police Department to inform it whether the applicant had Croatian citizenship.

On 11 January 1999 the Zagreb Police Department informed the court that the applicant did not have Croatian citizenship.

On 2 February 1999 the court granted R. R.’s request and ordered the applicant to deposit, within a time-limit of 15 days, 36,500 HRK to insure R. R.’s costs and expenses for the proceedings.

The court then unsuccessfully attempted to serve the above decision, by registered mail, on the applicant at the address indicated in his claim. However, the postal receipt indicated that he was no longer at that address. The court ordered the Zagreb Police Department to verify the applicant’s address in Zagreb . On 3 March 1999 the Zagreb Police department informed the court that the applicant had left his previous address in 1995 and that ever since his address had been unknown.

The court then posted the letter to the applicant on its public notice-board for eight days.

On 19 April 1999 the court struck out the applicant’s claim because he had not deposited the insurance for R. R.’s costs and expenses.

iv. Proceedings against R. R. - seeking declaration of the applicant’s property rights

On 27 January 1994 the applicant filed an action seeking declaration of his property rights with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, against R. R.

The court held a preliminary hearing. After that several hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s counsel’s non appearance or because the notices of the hearing dates were not served on him as he had changed his address without informing the court of his new address.

The hearing scheduled for 4 February 1997 was adjourned on the applicant’s counsel’s request. He had informed the court that he had no contact with the applicant.

The next hearing scheduled for 24 February 1998 was also adjourned due to the applicant’s counsel’s non appearance. The postal receipt indicated that he had changed his address but had failed to inform the court.

The next hearing scheduled for 8 April 1998 was again adjourned on the request of the applicant’s counsel who again informed the court that he had had no contact with the applicant.

At the hearing of 19 May 1998 the applicant appeared in person and asked the court to adjourn the next hearing sine die. He had instituted several proceedings with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court and would prefer not to have to travel from Zagreb to Dubrovnik frequently.

The proceedings are pending before the court of first instance.

v. Proceedings against Lj . Å .

On 11 March 1994 the applicant filed an action against Lj . Å . for payment of 9,718 HRK, with the Zagreb Municipal Court.

By judgment by default of 17 May 1994 the first instance court granted the applicant’s claim. On 28 October 1998 the appellate court quashed that judgment .

On 9 and 29 April 1998 the applicant asked the court to schedule a hearing, but did not submit Lj . Š.’s address. Therefore, the court requested her address from the Zagreb Police Department which was unable to indicate the requested address.

On 12 May 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit Lj . Š.’s address. The applicant did so on 19 June 1998.

As neither party appeared at the hearing scheduled for 12 November 1998 the court stayed the proceedings ( mirovanje postupka ).

On 25 November 1998 the applicant filed a motion to resume the proceedings ( prijedlog za povrat u prijašnje stanje ).

At the next hearing on 25 September 2000 the court heard the applicant and after that annulled its previous decision to stay the proceedings.

The next hearing scheduled for 23 November 2000 was adjourned because Lj . Š. did not appear. The postal receipt indicated that she had changed her address. The applicant submitted her new address. Lj . Š.’s counsel submitted a receipt of payment relevant for the applicant’s claim. The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing because he wished to submit his reply.

Since the applicant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for 22 January 2001 the court stayed the proceedings. Lj . Š.’s counsel appealed against that decision.

The proceedings are presently pending before the appellate court.

vi. Proceedings against company “M. R.”

On 23 May 1997 the applicant filed an action against company “M. R.” for payment with the Rovinj Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Rovinju ) .

On 5 December 1997 the first instance court granted the applicant’s claim. On 6 May 1998 this judgment was reversed, upon the defendant’s appeal, by the Pula County Court ( Županijski sud u Puli ).

On 7 June 1998 the applicant filed a request for revision with the Supreme Court.

On 26 September 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request.

vii. Proceedings against P. D. and D. D.

On 1 March 1997 the applicant filed an action seeking declaration of his property rights, with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, against P. D. and D. D.

The court of first instance granted the applicant’s claim to be exempted form the payment of the court fees and rejected his request to be entirely exempted from the payment of the costs and expenses in the proceedings. Several hearings were adjourned.

At the hearing on 20 March 1998 the defendants’ counsel asked the court to order the applicant to deposit insurance for the defendants’ costs and expenses for the proceedings as the applicant was not a Croatian citizen.

At the next hearing on 19 May 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit a certificate on his residence in Croatia.

On 6 June 1998 the applicant informed the court that he was unable to submit the requested certificate.

On 22 January 2001 the applicant informed the court that he had obtained Croatian citizenship.

It appears that the proceedings are pending before the first instance court.

viii. Proceedings against K. M.

On 20 March 1997 the applicant filed an action for payment of 1,126.100 HRK, with the Samobor Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Samoboru ), against K. M.

On 17 November 1997 the applicant was invited to submit a declaration of means in connection to his application for the exemption from the payment of the court fees.

The applicant filed a motion challenging the presiding judge for bias. His motion was dismissed by the President of the court on 2 December 1997.

However, the case-file was assigned to another judge. At the hearing on 17 February 1998 K. M gave her reply to the applicant’s claim.

As the judge retired, the case-file was assigned to another judge.

At the hearing on 2 June 1998 the court invited the applicant to specify his claim.

The next hearing scheduled for 23 February 1999 was adjourned due to the applicant’s illness.

At the hearing of 4 May 1999 the court again invited the applicant to specify his claim.

On 7 May 1999 the applicant complied with the court’s request.

The judge went on maternity leave and the case-file was assigned to yet another judge.

The next hearing scheduled for 20 September 2000 was adjourned because K. M. did not appear.

At the hearing on 5 October 2000 the court concluded the proceedings.

On 13 October 2000 the court pronounced judgment partly granting and partly rejecting the applicant’s claim.

On 30 October and 11 December 2000, respectively, K. M. and the applicant filed their appeals against the judgment .

The proceedings are presently pending before the appellate court.

ix. Proceedings against A. J. J.

On 20 March 1997 the applicant filed an action for compensation of damages against A. J. J. with the Zagreb Municipal Court.

The court of first instance granted the applicant’s claim to be exempted from the payment of the court fees.

On 24 November 1997 A. J. J.’s counsel filed a request that the applicant be ordered to deposit insurance for A. J. J.’s costs and expenses of the proceedings because the applicant was not a Croatian citizen.

At the hearing on 3 December 1997 A. J. J.’s counsel repeated the previous request. The applicant opposed that request.

It seems that A. J. J. filed written submissions concerning the applicant’s claim.

At the next hearing on 29 September 1998 the court invited the applicant to reply to A. J. J.’s submissions.

On 7 June 2000 the court rejected A. J. J.’s request that the applicant deposit the insurance for her costs and expenses.

On 14 July 2000 A. J. J. appealed against the above decision.

In the meantime, on 12 July 2000, the applicant informed the court that he had obtained Croatian citizenship.

On 25 July 2000 A. J. J.’s appeal was sent to the applicant for reply.

At the hearing on 22 November 2000 the parties agreed that, since the applicant had obtained Croatian citizenship, there was no need for further examination of A. J. J.’s appeal.

At the next hearing on 13 March 2001 the court stayed the proceedings as the applicant did not appear.

On 23 March 2001 the applicant filed an application to resume the proceedings.

It appears that the proceedings are pending before the first instance court.

B. Relevant domestic law

Section 59 (4) of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (entered into force on 24 September 1999 - hereinafter “the Constitutional Court Act” - Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu ) reads as follows:

“The Constitutional Court may, exceptionally, examine a constitutional complaint prior to exhaustion of other available remedies, if it is satisfied that a contested act, or failure to act within a reasonable time, grossly violates a party’s constitutional rights and freedoms and that, if it does not act a party will risk serious and irreparable consequences.”

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 that during eight years he had been prevented from travelling since the Croatian authorities refused to issue him any travel document and that thus his right to freedom of movement was violated.

2. The applicant complains also, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of civil proceedings.

3. Finally, the applicant complains, under Article 13 of the Convention, that he has no effective remedy in respect of the length of the proceedings.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the Croatian authorities denied him any kind of a travel document and thus violated his right of freedom of movement. He relies on Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.”

The Government submit firstly that this part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis with the Convention since the events complained of took place prior to 5 November 1995, the date of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia.

In the alternative the Government invite the Court to conclude that the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. In this respect they contend that the applicant had not been lawfully within the territory of Croatia from 20 December 1996 when his permission for extended stay in Croatia was terminated until 3 April 2000 when he was granted Croatian citizenship.

Furthermore, in the period from 23 November 1993 until 21 May 1998 the applicant had an identification card for foreign citizens, and he also had a passport issued in Cetinje by the authorities of Montenegro.

The applicant disagrees with the Government and insists that his right to freedom of movement had been violated during the period of some eight years.

The Court observes that, although it is disputed between the parties whether the applicant filed any request for a travel document with the Dubrovnik Police Department in 1993, the parties do agree that the applicant filed two such requests with the Zagreb Police Department, on 27 February and 24 April 1995, respectively. The parties also agree that the only travel document that the applicant could have obtained was a travel document for a foreign citizen which would have allowed the applicant to leave Croatia. The parties also agree that the applicant refused such a document some time in the spring of 1995. The applicant had not repeated any request for a travel document until he obtained the Croatian citizenship and a regular Croatian passport in April 2000.

The Court recalls that the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia on 5 November 1997 while the events complained of by the applicant took place in 1995.

It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

2. The applicant complains that the length of several sets of the civil proceedings instituted by him have exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

a) The Government submit firstly that the part of the application relating to events which took place prior to 5 November 1997, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia, is outside the Court’s competence ratione temporis . The Government specifically point out that the proceedings against S. C. were terminated prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia, and that this part of the application should be declared inadmissible.

In this connection, the Court recalls that Croatia recognised the competence of the Court to receive applications “from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation by Croatia of the rights recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event occurring after 5 November 1997.” It follows that the period to be taken into consideration by the Court starts on 6 November 1997.

In respect of the proceedings against S. C. the Court observes that they ended by the Dubrovnik County Court decision of 7 February 1997.

It follows that the complaints concerning the proceedings against S. C. are incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

b) The Government invite the Court to reject the application on the ground that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In this respect they allege that the applicant has not lodged a constitutional complaint pursuant to Section 59 (4) of the newly revised Constitutional Court Act which exceptionally allows the Constitutional court to examine a constitutional complaint before exhaustion of other available remedies in cases where it is evident that there is a serious risk that the party’s constitutional rights and freedoms may be violated and that serious and irreparable consequences may arise from the failure of the relevant authorities to reach a decision.

The applicant disagrees with the Government.

The Court finds that the question of whether the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies has been satisfied in the present case raises issues which are so closely related to the question of the existence of an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention that, to avoid prejudging the latter, both issues should be examined together. Accordingly, the Court considers that the final determination of the issue concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies should be joined to the merits and reserved for later consideration.

c) In the alternative the Government invite the Court to conclude that the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.

As regards the complexity of the cases the Government argue that some of the cases disclose a certain degree of complexity as neither the plaintiffs nor the courts were able to identify the correct addresses of the defendants and moreover the applicant did not inform the courts about his new address. In addition, they submit that the subject matter of the applicant’s cases did not call for particular urgency. They refer to the Court’s case-law arguing that the cases that do call for special urgency are those that relate to family law matters or to payment of damages to victims of traffic accidents, those that involve interests of a great number of persons and cases concerning dismissal from work.

Concerning the applicant’s conduct, the Government submit that the applicant contributed to the length of the proceedings. For example, in the case against R. R. for the recognition of the applicant’s property rights the applicant’s counsel repeatedly asked the court to adjourn the hearings and finally when the applicant appeared before the court he asked the court to adjourn the hearing sine die since he did not want to travel from Zagreb to Dubrovnik too often. In the second set of proceedings where the applicant brought an action against R. R. alleging appropriation without legal entitlement, the applicant’s counsel did not submit the requested information about the applicant’s citizenship and his address. In the proceedings against P. D. and D. D. the hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s absence. In the proceedings against K. M. it took the applicant about a year to specify his claim.

As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Government point out that in civil proceedings the courts are limited in their activity as they may not take procedural steps on their own initiative but mostly according to the requests of the parties. In this respect they claim that domestic courts showed diligence in the conduct of the proceedings.

The applicant submits that the delays in the proceedings are entirely attributable to the domestic authorities. The courts held hearings rarely, showed passivity in their conduct of the proceedings and ignored his requests for speeding up the proceedings.

The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation (see as recent authorities, the Humen v. Poland judgment of 15 October 1999 [GC], no 26614/95, 15 October 1999, unpublished, § 60 and Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382/97, ECHR 2000-IV).

i. Proceedings against H. J.

The Court observes firstly that the proceedings commenced on 19 March 1993 when the applicant lodged his civil action with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court. However, the period which falls under the Court’s jurisdiction begins on 5 November 1997, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia (see the Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, §53).

As to the end of the proceedings the Court recalls that it has accepted in cases concerning length of proceedings the principle that execution of a judgment given by any court must be regarded as an integral part of the "trial" for the purposes of Article 6 (see the Di Pede v. Italy and Zappia v. Italy judgments of 26 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, pp. 1383-1384, §§ 20-24, and pp. 1410-1411, §§ 16-20 respectively).

Thus, the proceedings ended on 6 July 2001 when the Dubrovnik Municipal Court declared the execution warrant inadmissible. Therefore, they lasted for over seven years, out of which a period of two years and eight months falls to be examined by the Court.

The Court recalls that in order to determine the reasonableness of the length of time in question, regard must be had to the state of the case on 5 November 1997 (see, among other authorities, Styranowski v. Poland, no. 28616/95, § 46, ECHR 1998-VIII). In this respect the Court notes that at the moment of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia the proceedings had lasted for four years seven months and 16 days.

The Court notes that on 5 November 1997 the case was pending before the Supreme Court upon the applicant’s request for revision. The case was pending before the Supreme Court for a total period of about four years and five months out of which the period to be examined by the Court amounts to one year, six months and 22 days. The Court finds that the period which elapsed after the entry into force of the Convention is not substantial enough for the length of the proceedings to have exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.

The Court further finds that after the execution warrant was issued there were no significant delays in the proceedings.

The execution warrant was not carried out because V. B. filed a motion to stay the execution and subsequently he instituted civil proceedings where he asked that the execution warrant be declared inadmissible. The execution proceedings, together with the proceedings instituted by V. B. which were directly decisive for the execution proceedings, lasted for a total of one year, eleven months and nine days.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

ii. Proceedings against R. R. - claim that she had appropriated without lawful entitlement

The proceedings commenced on 27 January 1994 when the applicant filed a civil action with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court and ended by that court’s decision of 19 April 1999 striking out the applicant’s claim. Thus, the proceedings lasted for over five years, out of which a period of one year, five months and 14 days falls within the Court’s competence ratione temporis .

At the moment of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia the proceedings had been pending for about three years and nine months.

As to the behaviour of the applicant, the Court observes that he had changed his address but failed to notify the court about it.

As to the behaviour of domestic authorities the Court observes that the Dubrovnik Municipal Court made several attempts to verify the applicant’s address, both through the Dubrovnik and Zagreb Police Departments. Finally, that court decided to strike out the applicant’s claim and concluded the proceedings on 19 April 1999.

The Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case the delays in the proceedings are essentially attributable to the applicant and do not exceed the “reasonable time” requirement.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

iii. Proceedings against company “M. R.”

The proceedings commenced on 23 May 1997 when the applicant filed a civil action with the Rovinj Municipal Court and ended by the Supreme Court’s decision of 26 September 2000 rejecting the applicant’s request for revision. Thus, the proceedings lasted for over three years, out of which a period of two years, ten months and 21 days falls within the Court’s competence ratione temporis .

At the moment of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia the proceedings had been pending for five months and 12 days.

The Court notes that within the period to be taken into account the first instance court ruled in the applicant’s favour but that judgment was reversed by the appellate court. The case was also examined at third instance by the Supreme Court.

The Court considers that the period of about two years and eleven months in which the case had been examined before three instances does not appear excessive for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

iv. Proceedings against R. R. seeking declaration of the applicant’s property rights, against Lj . Š., P. D. and D. D., K. M. and A. J. J.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the above five sets of proceedings raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

3. The applicant also complains that he had no effective remedy in respect of the length of the above proceedings. He invokes Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Government argue that the applicant could have requested the presidents of the courts dealing with his cases and the Ministry of Justice to speed up the proceedings. He also could have lodged a constitutional complaint pursuant to Section 59 (4) of the Constitutional Court Act.

i. Proceedings against H. J., against R. R. - claim that she had appropriated without lawful entitlement, and against company “M. R.”

The Court does not find it necessary to answer the point raised by the Government in respect of the above three sets of proceedings since this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

The Court recalls that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision (see e.g. Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, pp. 23-24, §54-55). In the present case the applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the above three sets of civil proceedings. However, the Court notes also that, in the period which falls within the Court’s competence ratione temporis , this part of the application does not disclose a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and is manifestly ill-founded for the reasons explained above. The Court considers, therefore, that the applicant does not have, as regards the length of these proceedings, an arguable claim under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

ii. Proceedings against R. R. seeking declaration of the applicant’s property rights, against Lj . Š., P. D. and D. D., K. M. and A. J. J.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint under Article 13 in respect of the above five sets of proceedings raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of five sets of civil proceedings exceeded the reasonable time requirement and under Article 13 of the Convention that he has no effective remedy in respect of the length of those proceedings;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

Erik Fribergh Christos R OZAKIS Registrar President