BRIENZA v. ITALY
Doc ref: 62849/00 • ECHR ID: 001-22761
Document date: October 10, 2002
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FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 62849/00 by Silvano Carmelo BRIENZA against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section) , sitting on 10 October 2002 as a Chamber composed of
Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mr G. Bonello , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mrs N. Vajić , Mrs S. Botoucharova , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , Mrs E. Steiner , judges ,
and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 November 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1956 and living in San Cesareo (Rome). He is represented before the Court by Mr F. Scorsone and Mrs C. Zuardi Scorsone , lawyers practising in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
P.C. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to A.C.
In a writ served on the tenant on 3 March 1986, the owner informed her of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned her to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 12 June 1986, which was made enforceable on 6 November 1986, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.
On 30 April 1990, a notice was served on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 18 May 1990, a notice was served on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 July 1990.
Between 11 July 1990 and 5 October 1999, the bailiff made thirty attempts to recover possession, but they proved unsuccessful as the owner and then the applicant were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 21 June 1991, the applicant became the owner of the apartment and pursued the enforcement proceedings
On 13 October 1997, he made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself.
On 2 May 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that he failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President