SECOND SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 72059/01 by Drahomíra LAŠTUVKOVÁ and Jan MRÁZEK against the Czech Republic

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section) , sitting on 17 December 2002 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr C. Bîrsan , Mr K. Jungwiert , Mr V. Butkevych , Mrs W. Thomassen , Mrs A. Mularoni , judges , and Mr T.L. Early, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 20 November 2000,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants, Mrs Drahomíra Laštuvková and Mr Jan Mrázek, are Czech nationals who were born in 1928 and 1934 respectively and live in Prague. They are represented before the Court by Mr S. Balík, a lawyer practising in Prague.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows.

In 1939 the applicants’ parents acquired ownership rights to a house and a plot of land. The property was expropriated from them in 1953 for the purposes of the enlargement of Charles University. On 25 June 1991 the applicants requested Charles University to sign an agreement for the return of the property under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act ( zákon o mimosoudních rehabilitacích ). As Charles University refused to sign the agreement, the applicants brought an action against it in the Prague 1 District Court ( obvodní soud ), requesting that the court adjudicate on their restitution claim by ordering the defendant to sign the restitution agreement.

On 30 June 1994 the District Court, having assessed a substantial amount of documentary evidence, rejected the action on the grounds that the applicants lacked title to obtain restitution under section 6 (1)( i ) and (1)(j) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act and that the applicants’ parents had been awarded compensation for the expropriation of the property.

The applicants appealed, claiming, in particular, that the District Court had failed to take into account that their parents had been persecuted for their political views. Moreover the court had not ordered an expert report and had not examined whether their parents had received compensation and whether the property had served the purpose for which it had been expropriated, as required by the relevant law.

On 23 August 1995 the Prague Municipal Court upheld the District Court’s judgment . It found that the applicants’ parents had been awarded compensation and that the property had in fact served the purpose for which it had been expropriated as it had been part of the University campus, being used as a dining-room. The court held that it had not been proved that the decision on confiscation was invalid, and that there was no proof either that the applicants’ parents were victims of political persecution on account of the expropriation of the property at issue. The court refused the applicants leave to appeal.

The applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against the above judgments , claiming that the restitution proceedings had been both unfair and lengthy. The appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court on 5 June 2000 as being unsubstantiated.

The applicants also lodged an appeal on points of law, claiming inter alia that the composition of the appellate-court bench dealing with their case had differed at each hearing. They also challenged the impartiality of the bench on the ground that the judges were graduates from the defendant University.

On 22 April 1998 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The decision stated that the applicants and their representative had had ample opportunity to submit their arguments, adduce evidence and make their submissions in the lower courts. The court held that the applicants had been duly summoned to the hearings and that they had not objected to the transcripts of the hearings before the lower courts. The court concluded that the hearings in the lower courts had not been affected by any procedural shortcomings which would justify allowing their appeal. As to the applicants’ objection to the lower court judges, the Supreme Court held that the fact that they had attended the Law Faculty of Charles University did not in itself justify the conclusion that they were biased. Furthermore, it had not been shown that they had any link with the parties or the subject-matter of the dispute such as to cast doubt on their impartiality.

On 25 June 1998 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision, requesting that certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure be repealed. On 21 January 1999 the Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s decision and remitted the case to it. It stated that the Supreme Court had given insufficient consideration to the issue of the composition of the appellate-court bench. It rejected however the applicants’ request for repeal of certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On 16 February 2000 the Supreme Court again rejected the applicants’ appeal on points of law, stating that at the hearings on the applicants’ appeal the composition of the bench had corresponded to the work schedule of the court. It noted that at the first hearing, held on 9 December 1994, the appellate bench had been composed of judges LS (president), ZM and AS; at the second hearing on 14 April 1995 the bench had been composed of judges LS (president), ZM and ZV; and that at the third hearing, on 23 August 1995, the bench had been composed of judges HD (president), ZM and HC. Owing to a modification of the work schedule of the appellate court, judge AS had been transferred to the bench dealing with the applicants’ case for the period from 1 December 1994 to the end of 1994. According to a new work schedule for 1995, the bench had been composed of judges LS (president), ZM and JJ with LM, DD and ZV as substitute judges. On 12 May 1995 a modification of the work schedule was made as a result of which judge HC was temporarily assigned to the bench dealing with the applicants’ case. Judge JJ was on sick leave from 8 March 1995 to 2 July 1995 and judge LS was on leave on 23 August 1995. The Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the bench dealing with the applicants’ case had corresponded to the modified work schedule in force at the relevant time. There had been valid reasons for the judges’ absence and they had been replaced in accordance with the work schedule. The Supreme Court concluded that the bench dealing with the applicants’ case had not been arbitrarily composed.

On 25 May 2000 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against this decision, alleging a breach of their right to a fair hearing and claiming, inter alia , that a bench corresponding to a work schedule is not necessarily a bench established by law. On 30 November 2000 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The decision stated that the composition of benches in accordance with a duly established schedule of work was one of the aspects of the interpretation of the principle of a tribunal established by law, a matter which had been dealt with by the Supreme Court on 16 April 2000. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicants on 6 December 2000.

B. Relevant domestic law

Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act

Section 1(1) sets out the aim of the Act. It provides that it is designed to redress the consequences of certain violations of property and other rights caused by acts falling within the sphere of civil or labour law or by administrative acts incompatible with the principles of a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

According to section 2(1)(c) and (3), such redress consists in the surrender of property if the violation in question was caused by an act infringing generally recognised human rights and freedoms, that is, an act in contradiction with the principles referred to in section 1(1) of the Act. Where an eligible person was deprived of his or her property rights without appropriate compensation under nationalisation laws adopted between 1945 and 1949, he or she has a claim under this Act.

Section 3(1) provides that, in order to be entitled to restitution of his or her property, a claimant must be a natural person and a citizen of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic whose property was transferred to the State in the circumstances listed in section 6 of the Act. According to section 3(2)(c), if the person whose property was transferred to the State in a case specified in section 6 dies before the expiry of the time-limit specified in section 5(2), the eligible persons, provided they are citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, shall be his or her children and spouse or, in the case of the children’s death, their children.

According to section 6(1)( i ), property shall be restored to a claimant who received compensation for the expropriation of property if the property exists and has never served the purposes for which it was expropriated.

Section 6 (1)(j) provides that property shall be restored to a claimant if it was expropriated from him or her without compensation.

Courts and Judges Act No. 335/1991

According to section 12 (3), Regional Court benches are composed of

a) one judge and two lay judges if sitting as a first-instance criminal court;

b) a presiding judge and two judges in other cases.

Ministry of Justice Decree on Rules of District and Regional Courts

According to section 2 (1), distribution of the courts’ work load is fixed by a schedule of work made drawn up for each calendar year.

According to section 2 (2), in cases of long-term absence of a judge or substantial difference in work-load, the President of the Court shall determine the extent to which cases can be transferred to another division.

Instruction of the Ministry of Justice No. 1100/98-OOD on Internal Rules of District, Regional and High Courts

Section 1 (1) (“Schedule of work”) provides that the President of a court shall draw up a schedule of work for the next calendar year until 30 November of each year.

Section 1 (2) provides that the schedule of work shall contain the name and surname of the President of the court and his/her vice-presidents, the manner of distribution of cases within court divisions created for each bench and each judge sitting alone and the manner of distribution of cases between presiding judges if there is more than one presiding judge in one division. Judges and judicial officers shall be assigned by name to each division. Their substitutes shall be appointed for cases where a judge or judicial officer is absent on a long-term basis or is excluded or cannot sit for other reasons provided for in law, so as there is no doubt as to which bench, judge or judicial officer shall deal with a case.

According to section 1 (5), draft schedules of work of Regional and High Courts are approved by the Ministry of Justice.

According to section 1 (6), Regional and High Courts shall submit their draft schedules of work in two copies for ministerial approval no later than 30 November. If there are reasons provided for by law, the President of a court is entitled to modify the fixed schedule of work during the calendar year. Proposals for such modifications shall be announced to the Ministry of Justice without delay.

According to section 1 (7), the Ministry of Justice shall decide and announce its decision on approval to the respective court no later than 15 December. Ministerial decisions on modifications of schedules of work shall be delivered and served on the respective courts within 15 days.

According to section 2 (2), the work of the Regional and High Court benches is determined and co-ordinated by presiding judges appointed in accordance with schedules of work.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that there were excessive delays in the proceedings. They also complain that they were denied a fair hearing in the determination of their right to be recognised as persons entitled to restitution under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act. They submit in particular that they were placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent as the latter was the oldest University in central Europe. They maintain that the national courts did not examine the factual and legal aspects of their case sufficiently. They further complain that their appeal was not examined by a tribunal established by law as the composition of the appellate-court bench varied at each hearing, that the decisions of the first and second-instance courts lacked sufficient reasoning and that the Constitutional Court dismissed their constitutional appeal, endorsing the reasons of the Supreme Court’s decision of 16 February 2000.

2. The applicants also complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about being denied the use and enjoyment of their property on account of the national courts’ decisions rejecting their action.

THE LAW

1. The applicants submit that their right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated. They rely on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

a) As regards the applicants’ complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this complaint to the respondent Government.

b) The applicants also complain of unfairness of the proceedings and, in particular, that the domestic courts failed to establish the relevant facts of the case correctly, that their decisions were arbitrary and that the reasons were therefore insufficient.

The Court recalls that the principle of equality of arms, which forms a component of the broader concept of a fair trial, requires that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent (see, among other authorities, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium , judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 238, § 53).

The Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with a complaint alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain , no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I,). In particular, it is not for the Court to re-assess the factual or legal elements of the case before the domestic courts when the decisions taken had a basis in law and were supported by relevant and sufficient reasons (see Barbera , Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain , judgment of 6 December 1988, Series A no. 146, p. 31, § 68).

According to the established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Although Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle, simply endorse the reasons for the lower court’s decision (see García Ruiz v. Spain , cited above, § 26).

In the present case the first-instance court, after having assessed a substantial amount of documentary evidence, held that the applicants were not entitled to restitution of the property under section 6 (1)( i ) and (1)(j) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act as their parents had received compensation for its expropriation. The appellate court endorsed the reasons of the first-instance decision, adding that there was no indication that the applicants’ parents were the victims of political persecution in connection with the expropriation of the property and that the property had served the purpose for which it had been expropriated. The Supreme Court thereafter stated that the proceedings before the lower courts had not been impaired by any procedural shortcomings, that the applicants and their representative had had ample opportunity to submit their arguments, adduce evidence and make their submissions. The Constitutional Court, after having examined the constitutional aspects of the applicants’ case, dismissed their constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated, endorsing the reasons of the Supreme Court’s decision of 16 February 2000.

In the light of the information before it, the Court considers that the first-instance court gave sufficient factual and legal reasons for its decision, which were endorsed and extended by the appellate court. The higher courts thereafter addressed all the arguments submitted by the applicants in their decisions.

Furthermore, the applicants’ restitution action was considered by the national courts at a public hearing and the applicants had ample opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their case and to comment on the submissions of the defendant. The Court finds no indication that the decisions of the national courts were arbitrary or that the national courts gave insufficient consideration to the applicants’ case.

In these circumstances, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a breach of the principle of equality of arms in the proceedings before the national courts and, more generally, the applicants have not substantiated their complaints that the proceedings were tainted by procedural unfairness or arbitrariness.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

c) The applicants further complain that their appeal was not examined by a tribunal established by law as the composition of the appellate-court bench varied at each hearing.

The documents before the Court indicate that the assignment of judges to deal with individual cases at the Regional Court was organised in accordance with a schedule of work fixed for each calendar year. Such a schedule was issued pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Instruction of the Ministry of Justice on Internal Rules of District, Regional and High Courts, the Ministry of Justice Decree on Rules of District and Regional Courts and pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Courts and Judges Act.

The changes in the composition of the bench dealing with the case were due to modifications to the schedule of work which the President of the Regional Court had power to make under the relevant regulations and which were approved by the Ministry of Justice. In particular, the Court notes that the composition of the bench varied because one judge was on sick leave at the time of the second hearing, that the schedule of work was modified before the third hearing took place, and that one of the judges who was to sit in the case was on leave on the day of the third hearing. The Court further notes that the substitute judges on the bench sat at the second and third hearings in accordance with the schedule of work.

Both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court duly addressed the applicants’ complaint in this respect but found, for reasons set out in their decisions, that the changes in the appellate-court bench determining the case had been in accordance with the relevant regulations and that the applicants’ right to a hearing by a tribunal established by law had not been infringed. In the light of the information before it, the Court finds no reason for reaching a different conclusion.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

d) To the extent that the applicants may be understood as complaining that the judges dealing with their case lacked impartiality as they had graduated from the University which was the defendant in their case, the Court considers that this argument is not capable, as such, of calling into question their subjective impartiality or of casting a legitimate doubt on their impartiality viewed objectively (see, among other authorities, Findlay v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 281, § 73).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicants further complain of a violation of their property rights. They rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which provides as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The Court observes that the national courts rejected the applicants’ action for restitution as they lacked title to restitution under section 6 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act. The Court has found above that when deciding on the applicants’ claim the national courts proceeded pursuant to domestic law and that the assessment of the relevant facts of the case cannot be regarded as having been arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

In these circumstances, and considering that the applicants’ claim fell outside the scope of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation Act, the Court finds that the applicants had neither a right nor a claim amounting to a legitimate expectation to obtain the property and, therefore, no “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (see, mutatis mutandis , Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII).

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicants’ complaint concerning the length of the restitution proceedings;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

T.L. Early J.-P. Costa              Deputy Registrar President