SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 54457/00 by Ágnes KOVÁCS against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 13 May 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr L. Loucaides , Mr C. Bîrsan ,

Mr K. Jungwiert , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , Mrs A. Mularoni, judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 September 1999 and registered on 28 January 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Ágnes Kovács, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1937 and lives in Halásztelek, Hungary. The respondent Government are represented by Mr L. Höltzl, their Agent.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In February 1991 the applicant’s employment was terminated by mutual consent. She subsequently challenged the validity of this agreement and claimed damages before the Budapest Labour Court. Her action was filed with the court on 3 May 1991. The applicant alleged that her resignation was void on account of her temporary incapacity at the time of signing the agreement with her employer.

On 3 July and 30 September 1991, as well as on 25 March and 22 September 1992, hearings were held. On 10 June 1993 the Labour Court suspended the proceedings pending the preparation of a medical expert opinion on the applicant’s mental capacity. This opinion was submitted on 26 October 1993. In view of certain inconsistencies between this opinion and earlier opinions, the applicant was subsequently ordered to undergo an examination by the National Council of Health Sciences (“the Council”). This examination was carried out on 11 November 1994. The Council’s opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 1995.

The proceedings were resumed and a hearing was held on 10 October 1995. At the hearing the applicant was requested to elaborate on and quantify her claims.

On 16 April 1996 the Labour Court requested the Council to update its opinion. The Council’s revised opinion was submitted on 11 July 1996.

On 29 October 1996 the Labour Court reminded the applicant of its order of 10 October 1995 according to which she was required to quantify her claims. She did so on 26 November 1996.

On 4 December 1996, 29 January, 12 March and 28 May 1997 further hearings took place. On the latter date the Budapest Labour Court delivered its judgment, annulled the disputed agreement and dismissed the remainder of the action.

On 14 November 1997 the applicant appealed.

On 15 April 1998 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed her appeal.

On 31 March 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed her petition for review. This decision was served on 4 May 1999.

THE LAW

1. The applicant’s first complaint relates to the compatibility of the length of the proceedings with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in its relevant parts, as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal (...)”

The Court notes at the outset that the proceedings began on 3 May 1991. However, the period to be taken into consideration did not begin on that date, but on 5 November 1992, when the declaration whereby Hungary recognised the right of individual petition for the purposes of former Article 25 of the Convention took effect. The proceedings ended on 4 May 1999 with the service of the Supreme Court’s decision. They therefore lasted eight years, of which six and a half years fall within the Court’s competence ratione temporis .

The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to her under Hungarian law in that she did not bring an official liability action under section 349 of the Civil Code seeking compensation for the protracted proceedings.

The applicant contests this. She considers that such an action is not an effective remedy which she was required exhaust.

Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant part, provides:

“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law (...).”

The Court recalls that an official liability action under section 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code cannot be considered, for want of relevant domestic case-law, an effective remedy in respect of the excessive length of either pending or terminated civil proceedings (see Nyírő and Takács v. Hungary (dec.), nos. 52724/99 and 52726/99 (joined), 17 September 2002, unreported; Erdős v. Hungary (dec.), no. 38937/97, 3 May 2001, unreported). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The complaint cannot therefore be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government reject the allegation, arguing that substantial delays in the proceedings were imputable to the applicant.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.

2. The applicant’s second complaint relates to the alleged unfairness of the proceedings.

The Court notes that there is nothing in the case-file to suggest that the courts which heard the applicant’s claim lacked impartiality or that the proceedings disrespected the fairness requirements of Article 6 § 1.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint relating to the excessive length of the proceedings instituted on 3 May 1991 before Budapest Labour Court;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa Registrar President