SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 62730/00 by István LOVÁSZ against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 13 May 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr L. Loucaides , Mr K. Jungwiert ,

Mr V. Butkevych ,

Mrs W. Thomassen , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 May 2000 and registered on 9 November 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr István Lovász, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1951 and lives in Balassagyarmat, Hungary. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr L. Höltzl.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In 1974 the applicant married in the former Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, he and wife moved to Hungary. Their daughter was born in January 1980.

On 17 September 1996 the applicant’s wife, then a Slovak national, filed for divorce before the Balassagyarmat District Court. She also sought custody of their child and the division of the matrimonial property.

Shortly afterwards, the applicant challenged his paternity of their daughter before the District Court. On 24 January 1997 the District Court rejected this action as being incomplete.

Meanwhile, on 25 November 1996 and 11 February 1997 the District Court held hearings in the principal proceedings.

On 11 March 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action.

At the hearing on 13 June 1997 the District Court suspended the proceedings in the divorce case pending a decision on the paternity dispute.

On 27 August 1997 the District Court again rejected the applicant’s paternity action as being incomplete.

On 9 September 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. On 25 March 1998 the District Court dismissed his claims. On 10 September 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court dismissed his appeal.

Meanwhile, on 16 February 1998 the applicant’s wife requested that the principal proceedings be continued. She argued that their daughter had reached the age of 18 and for that reason it was no longer necessary to decide the question of custody; consequently, the outcome of the paternity proceedings was irrelevant to the determination of the divorce action. The proceedings were resumed soon afterwards.

Subsequently, the applicant brought a counter-action seeking the invalidation of the marriage. At the hearing on 23 April 1998 the District Court ordered, in this context, that the relevant provisions of the Czechoslovakian Civil Code be obtained via the Ministry of Justice.

On 4 November 1998 the applicant’s daughter filed a rebuttal of the presumption of the applicant’s paternity. On 19 January 1999 the District Court appointed a medical expert to carry out a blood group examination of the parties. On 14 April 1999 the expert verified the applicant’s paternity. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her claims and these proceedings were discontinued.

In the principal proceedings, the translation of the Czechoslovakian law reached the District Court on 19 October 1999.

On 26 October 1999 the District Court requested, via the Ministry of Justice, a copy of the parties’ marriage certificate from the archives of the Slovakian Nagykürtös District Registry.

On 9 December 1999 another hearing was held. On the same day, the District Court dismissed, in a partial decision, the applicant’s counter-claim for invalidation of the marriage. The District Court relied on documentary evidence received from Slovakia. On 16 May 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

On 28 August 2000 the District Court held a further hearing and ordered a bank to submit information about the parties’ property holdings.

On 2 October 2000 the District Court pronounced the parties’ divorce and disjoined the remainder of the claims. In this latter respect, it ordered that the Land Registry be notified of the dispute concerning the division of the matrimonial property.

On 14 November 2000 the applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and challenged the Regional Court for bias. On 8 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed his motion. On 10 May 2001 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal.

On 18 December 2000 the District Court appointed experts to assess the value of the parties’ real property.

On 21 January 2001 the applicant challenged all of the judges of Nógrád County for bias. On 22 January 2001 the Regional Court transferred the case file to the Supreme Court.

On 20 March 2001 an inspection of the parties’ real property assets was carried out.

On 28 March 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias and sent the case file back to the Regional Court.

On 22 May 2001 the Regional Court appointed the Salg ótarján District Court to hear the case.

The case – in so far as it concerns the division of the matrimonial property – is still pending before the Salg ótarján District Court.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the above proceedings have lasted unreasonably long and that the decisions taken so far by the Hungarian courts were wrong. He invokes Articles 2, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant’s first complaint relates to the length of the proceedings and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in its relevant parts, as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him under Hungarian law in that he did not bring an official liability action under section 349 of the Civil Code to seek compensation for the alleged protracted nature of the proceedings.

The applicant contests this argument. He maintains that the action relied on by the Government is not an effective remedy which he is required to exhaust.

Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant part, provides:

“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law ...”

The Court recalls that an official liability action under section 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code cannot be considered, for want of relevant domestic case-law, an effective remedy in respect of the excessive length of either pending or terminated civil proceedings (see Nyírő and Takács v. Hungary (dec.), nos. 52724/99 and 52726/99 (joined), 17 September 2002, unreported; Erdős v. Hungary (dec.), no. 38937/97, 3 May 2001, unreported). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The complaint cannot therefore be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

2. The Government submit that the subject matter of the case was relatively complicated and required the appointment of experts. Moreover, the proceedings involved the determination of multiple claims and had to be suspended pending the outcome of the paternity dispute. The applicant’s conduct contributed to the length of the proceedings, in particular his lack of due diligence. The Government observe in this connection that the applicant delayed the procedure by challenging his paternity, seeking the invalidation of the marriage and repeatedly filing motions for bias. However, no substantial periods of delay could be imputed to the authorities.

The applicant contests this and maintains that the proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time.

The Court observes that the proceedings were instituted on 17 September 1996 and that part of the claims are still pending at first instance.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.

3. The applicant also complains, without giving any further explanation, that the decisions taken so far by the domestic courts were wrong. He invokes Articles 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this respect.

The Court considers that there is nothing in the case-file which indicates that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings, in so far as they have been terminated, were otherwise unfair in breach of Article 6. As to the other Articles relied on, the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any appearance of their violation.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint that the proceedings concerning the division of the matrimonial property lasted an unreasonably long time;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

S. Doll é J.-P. Costa Registrar President