FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 71731/01 by Bogusława KNIAT against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 17 June 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mrs E. Palm , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr M. Fischbach , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr R. Maruste , Mr L. Garlicki , judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 November 2000,

Having regard to the partial decision of 11 December 2001,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mrs Bogusława Kniat, is a Polish national, who was born in 1956 and lives in Poznań. She is represented before the Court by Mrs M. Moś, a lawyer practising in Poznań (Poland).

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant’s husband lodged a petition for divorce with the Poznań Regional Court ( Sąd Okręgowy ) .

The applicant did not agree to a divorce and asked the court to dismiss the petition.

On 1 November 1997 the court made an interim periodical payments order requiring the applicant’s husband to pay 2,500 Polish zlotys (PLN) pending the proceedings.

On 21 September 1999 the Poznań Regional Court granted a decree of divorce. The court held that the marital breakdown was irretrievable and that both spouses had been at fault in respect of the breakdown of their marriage. It ordered that a final court fee (“ wpis ostateczny ”) of PLN 10,000 should be borne by the parties in equal shares (PLN 5,000 each).

On 20 October 1999 the applicant appealed against the divorce decree. She contested the findings made by the Regional Court in respect of the breakdown of the marriage and her being responsible for the marital breakdown. She also asked the court to rule that adultery on the part of her husband had been the main reason why their marriage had ended.

On 25 October 1999 the court ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of PLN 10,000 for lodging the appeal.

On 3 November 1999 the applicant made an application for an exemption from that fee. She argued, in particular, that a court fee for lodging an appeal constituted in fact an interim court fee (“ wpis tymczasowy ”) and that it should be estimated pursuant to section 11 of the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 17 December 1996 on Determining Court Fees in Civil Cases ( Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości w sprawie określenia wysokości wpisów w sprawach cywilnych ) . It could not, therefore, exceed the maximum interim court fee in divorce proceedings, which was PLN 600. The applicant further submitted that she was in a difficult financial situation and that she was not able to pay the fee in question. She also stressed that the sum required from her was unusually high and out of any proportion to her standard of living.

On 8 November 1999 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed the application, considering that the applicant had “not shown that her financial situation made it impossible for her to pay the fee”. It held that she had not supplied a detailed statement concerning her financial situation.

On 20 November 1999 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against that decision. She maintained that she had already submitted a declaration of means, pursuant to Article 113 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Poznań Court of Appeal ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) dismissed that appeal on 30 November 1999. That decision did not contain any reasons.

On 16 December 1999 the Poznań Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay, within seven days, a court fee of PLN 10,000 for lodging the appeal of 20 October 1999, on pain of it being rejected.

On 10 January 2000 the applicant lodged the second application for an exemption from court fees. She submitted that, given her financial means, she could pay only a sum not exceeding PLN 3,300. The applicant argued that she was not employed and that her only means were payments for her share in marital property received from her husband. She further maintained that she had not put money aside for the litigation since she had not expected the court fee to be so high. The applicant also stressed that the case was relatively simple but that important issues were at stake for her in the proceedings because they related to her civil status. Moreover, she pointed out that in other, more complex proceedings (concerning the marital property division) the Poznań Regional Court levied a moderate court fee of PLN 4,660 on each party.

On 13 January 2000 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed the application for a partial exemption from court fees and rejected the appeal against the divorce decree of 21 September 1999 for non-compliance with the court’s decision ordering the applicant to pay the court fee for lodging that appeal. The court held that the applicant had failed to indicate whether paying the full amount of court fees would entail a substantial reduction in her standard of living.

On 28 January 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against that decision.

On 22 February 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the applicant’s financial situation was good since she had already received PLN 300,000 from her husband on the basis of a lump sum order made in the proceedings concerning the division of their marital property, and that she would receive more payments.

On 20 March 2000 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against that decision. She repeated the arguments raised in her earlier applications.

On 29 March 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of PLN 10,000 for lodging the cassation appeal.

On 5 April 2000 the applicant made an application for a partial exemption from court fees in the cassation proceedings. She submitted that she was able to pay the court fees not exceeding PLN 3,300. She further maintained that her financial situation was difficult because she was not employed and her only asset was the lump sum received from her husband; that sum, however, had to be disbursed not only for her needs but also for maintenance of her two minor children who lived with her.

On 17 April 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed the application. The decision did not contain any reasons.

The applicant did not pay the fee of PLN 10,000. As a consequence, on 16 May 2000, the Poznań Court of Appeal rejected her cassation appeal on formal grounds.

On 26 May 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against that decision.

On 30 May 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of PLN 2,000 for lodging the interlocutory appeal.

On 6 June 2000 the applicant made another application for an exemption from court fees in the interlocutory appeal proceedings.

On 9 June 2000 the court again ordered her to pay a court fee of PLN 2,000.

On 9 June 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed her application for an exemption from court fees in the interlocutory appeal proceedings. That decision was upheld on appeal on 12 July 2000.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

The legal provisions applicable at the material time and questions of practice are set out in paragraphs 23-33 of the judgment delivered by the Court on 19 June 2001 in the case of Kreuz v. Poland appl . no. 28249/95, ECHR 2001-VI.

Polish law provides however, for special regulations with respect to divorce proceedings. A petitioner is obliged to pay an interim court fee at the time of lodging a divorce petition with a court. Subsequently, the court levies a final court fee in a divorce decree.

Section 31 of the Law of 13 June 1967 on Court Fees in Civil Cases ( Ustawa o kosztach sÄ…dowych w sprawach cywilnych ) (as amended) states, in so far as relevant:

“1. In cases concerning non-pecuniary rights and in cases where it is impossible to establish the value of a claim at the time of lodging a statement of claim with a court, the president of the court shall order the party concerned to pay an interim court fee ( wpis tymczasowy ) for lodging his pleading.

2. The court levies a final court fee ( wpis ostateczny ) at the end of the first -instance proceedings. In cases concerning non-pecuniary rights, the court shall take into consideration the financial situation of the party that has been ordered to pay the court fee in question, the circumstances of the case and its complexity ...”

Paragraph 11(6) of the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 17 December 1996, reads:

“An interim court fee for lodging a divorce petition shall range from PLN 30 to PLN 600.“

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she had been deprived of access to a court for the determination of her civil rights as the amount of court fees imposed on her by the Polish courts had prevented her from pursuing her appeal against the divorce decree

THE LAW

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that, on account of the excessive court fees required from her for proceeding with her appeal against the divorce decree, she had been deprived of access to a court for the determination of her civil rights.

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:

"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal established by law. ..."

The Government maintained that the applicant’s appeal had been directed exclusively against the court’s finding concerning the responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage. Before fixing the final fee, the Poznań Regional Court had diligently examined the parties financial situation and their ability to pay the required sum. The Regional Court’s assessment of facts and law had been subsequently confirmed by the Poznań Court of Appeal.

They stressed that the applicant’s monthly income had been of considerable value and it could not be said that the fees required from her would have been detrimental to her financial situation. In their view, the courts had not been arbitrary in assessing the applicant’s financial situation.

They further underlined that it had been for the applicant to prove that she had been unable to pay the fees in question. As it emerged from the Regional Court’s decisions of 8 November 1999 and 13 January 2000, she had failed to do so. Thus, the courts assessed her financial situation on the basis of evidence that had been gathered in the course of the divorce proceedings.

According to the Government, the amount of court fees imposed on the applicant had entirely been justified by the interests of justice and was based on an objective assessment of her financial situation.

In sum, the Government invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded or, should the case be examined on the merits, to find that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention

The applicant replied that her case required special diligence from the authorities as it concerned her civil status. Her appeal had been directed against the divorce itself and the court’s finding that the breakdown of the marriage had been irretrievable.

She further stressed that the courts assessed her financial situation solely on the basis of the lump sum of PLN 300,000 which she had received from her ex-husband in the proceedings for the division of marital property. She maintained that it had not been justified to demand that she spend part of it for court fees, rather than secure her and her minor children’s future.

The applicant pointed out that the sum required from her had been unusually high and disproportionate to a normal standard of living in Poland.

In conclusion she asked the Court to find that her right of access to a court had not been respected.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that this complaint raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes, therefore, that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

Michael O’Boyle Nicolas Bratza Registrar President