FIRST SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 47829/99 by Anton Stoyanov DIMITROV against Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 19 June 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mr P. Lorenzen , Mr G. Bonello , Mrs N. Vajić , Mrs S. Botoucharova , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , Mrs E. Steiner, judges , and Mr S. Nielsen , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 26 March 1999,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Anton Stoyanov Dimitrov, is a Bulgarian national born in 1934 and living in Sofia. He is represented before the Court by Mr Y. Grozev, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The respondent Government are represented by Mrs G. Samaras, co-agent, of the Ministry of Justice.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In March 1991 a statute providing for the restitution of agricultural lands collectivised during the communist regime, the Agricultural Lands Act, entered into force.

Between November 1991 and June 1992 the applicant filed four applications with the competent agricultural lands commission, requesting the restitution of certain plots of agricultural land allegedly owned by his wife’s grandfather. His daughter filed another four applications.

On 16 September 1992 the commission refused to restitute 492.3 decares claimed by the applicant. Apparently by mistake in the text of its decision the commission referred to a non-existing application by the applicant.

The applicant was informed of the decision by letter dated 16 February 1993.

On 11 March 1993 the applicant and his daughter appealed against the refusal to the Tervel District Court, arguing that they were entitled to the restitution of the 492.3 decares.

The court held its first hearing on 26 September 1994. Counsel for the applicant presented certain written evidence and requested an adjournment, so as to be able to adduce further written evidence and bring certain witnesses. The court granted the request and adjourned the case.

The second hearing, listed for 14 November 1994, was adjourned by request of the counsel for the applicant who stated that he was encountering difficulties with the gathering of certain written evidence.

The third hearing was held on 13 March 1995. Counsel for the applicant presented certain written evidence. The court heard two witnesses brought by the applicant and the parties’ closing argument.

By a judgment of 15 March 1995 the Tervel District Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the applicant’s ancestor had owned the land. The applicant was notified of the judgment in writing on 11 April 1995.

On 12 May 1995 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the district court had erred in assessing the evidence and that his ancestor had owned the land in issue.

At the end of 1996 the Supreme Court was divided into a Supreme Court of Cassation and a Supreme Administrative Court. The applicant’s case was taken up by the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing on 13 March 1997. At the hearing counsel for the applicant presented additional written observations in which he pointed out that the agricultural lands commission’s file had not been appended to the court case file and that the Tervel District Court had hence decided the case without acquainting itself with all relevant documents.

On 25 March 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Tervel District Court’s judgement and remanded the case, holding that the non-appending of the commission’s file to the court case file had entailed a serious breach of the rules of procedure.

On remand the Tervel District Court examined the case in three hearings.

The first hearing, listed for 22 May 1997, was adjourned because of the applicant’s request to adduce additional evidence and the failure of the agricultural lands commission to produce its file.

The second hearing, listed for 18 July 1997, was adjourned due to the failure of the land commission to produce its file.

On 14 August 1997 the applicant complained to the Supreme Administrative Court about the delay in the proceedings.

The third hearing was held on 2 October 1997. The court examined all evidence, heard the parties’ closing argument, and reserved judgment.

On 19 October 1998 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the delay in the delivery of judgement. The Ministry of Justice notified the chairperson of the Dobrich Regional Court (in whose region the District Court of Tervel was) about the complaint.

The chairperson of the Dobrich Regional Court eventually sent a letter to the applicant, stating that his complaint had been well founded and that following his intervention the district court judge had promptly completed the case.

Indeed, on 10 November 1998 judgement was delivered. The Tervel District Court dismissed the appeal, holding that 492.3 decares of the applicant’s ancestor’s land had been confiscated in 1923 by the Romanian State after the Romanian occupation of the northern part of Bulgaria (the so-called South Dobrudja). Thereafter, in 1942, pursuant to an international treaty concluded between Bulgaria and Romania („ Крайовска спогодба “), a statute providing for the restitution of those plots had been adopted. The court noted that the applicant had not produced evidence that in 1942 his ancestor had requested the restitution of the land under the procedure provided by that statute. The court therefore found that the applicant had not proved that his ancestor had been the owner of the land which had been collectivised after 1944.

On 30 November 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the district court’s judgment with the Dobrich Regional Court.

The Dobrich Regional Court held one hearing on 14 May 1999. At the hearing counsel for the applicant presented written observations in which she pointed out, inter alia , that the agricultural lands commission had issued a decision pursuant to a non-existent application by the applicant. The applicant had filed several applications for restitution, none of which had borne the number or had related to the quantity of land mentioned in the commission’s decision. The decision was thus invalid. Accordingly, counsel invited the court to quash the district court’s judgment and remit the case to the agricultural lands commission for a fresh examination of the applicant’s applications for restitution.

By a judgment of 3 July 1999 the Dobrich Regional Court quashed the district court’s judgment and remitted the case to the agricultural lands commission. It held that the commission’s decision had not been issued pursuant to the applicant’s applications and was thus void.

On unspecified dates in 1999 and 2000 the commission issued seven decisions, all of which were appealed by the applicant before the Tervel District Court.

As of the time of the latest information from the parties the proceedings were still pending.

B. Relevant domestic law

1. Agricultural Lands Act of 1991

The Agricultural Lands Act of 1991 ( „Закон за собствеността и ползването на земеделските земи“ ) provides that persons, or their heirs, whose land had been collectivised during the communist regime, may request restoration of their ownership rights under certain conditions (section 10).

As a rule, the procedure for obtaining restitution is to apply to the local agricultural lands commission (section 11(1) of the Act). The commissions are state bodies whose members are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture (section 33). Their task, after a person applies for restitution under section 11(1) of the Act, is to establish whether the relevant statutory conditions are met and, if so, to issue a decision restoring ownership.

The commissions’ decisions are subject to appeal before the competent district courts (section 14(3)). Until August 1997 the district courts’ judgments were reviewable by the Supreme (Administrative) Court. After August 1997 they are appealable on points of law before the competent regional courts.

2. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)

Article 190 of the CCP provides that judgment with reasons must be delivered within thirty days after the final hearing in the case.

The new Article 217A of the CCP, adopted in July 1999, provides:

“1. Each party may file a complaint about delays at every stage of the case, including after oral argument, when the examination of the case, the delivery of judgment, or the transmitting of an appeal against judgment is unduly delayed.

2. The complaint about delays shall be filed directly with the higher court, no copies shall be served on the other party, and no State fee shall be due. The filing of a complaint about delays shall not be limited by time.

3. The chairperson of the court with which the complaint has been filed shall request the case file and shall immediately examine the complaint in private. His instructions as to the acts to be performed by the court shall be mandatory. His order shall not be subject to appeal and shall be sent immediately together with the case file to the court against which the complaint has been filed.

4. In case he determines that there has been [undue delay], the chairperson of the higher court may make a proposal to the disciplinary panel of the Supreme Judicial Council for the taking of disciplinary action.”

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings concerning his claim for restitution had lasted unreasonably long.

2. The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy to challenge the excessive length of the proceedings.

THE LAW

1. In respect of his complaint about the length of the proceedings the applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides in its relevant part:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government submitted that the complexity of the case should be assessed in view of the intricacy of the restitution process in Bulgaria and the difficulties encountered by the authorities in dealing with the claims of a high number of persons applying for restitution.

As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Government contended that they had displayed the utmost diligence possible under the circumstances. The Government pointed out that the Agricultural Lands Act of 1991 had created a new and complex procedure for the restitution of vast amounts of land. The restitution process had involved novel issues and a huge number of individual applicants. During the first years after the adoption of the Act the number of cases before the district courts had surged, and a few years later these cases had created backlogs at the Supreme Court. For this reason the legislature had amended the Act, providing for review of the district courts’ judgments by the regional courts, which had greatly streamlined the procedures and reduced the delays. As regards the particular circumstances of the applicant, his case had been examined twice by the lands commission and by four levels of court, which had held a substantial number of hearings.

In contrast, according to the Government, the disorganised manner in which the applicant had conducted his case had contributed to a great extent to the delay. Specifically, during the first examination of the case by the Tervel District Court the applicant’s counsel had requested one adjournment and had failed to ask the court to append the lands commission’s file to its case file. He had raised this point only before the Supreme Administrative Court. Also, the applicant had raised the novel argument that the lands commission had ruled on a non-existent application and that its decision was hence invalid only in 1999, before the Dobrich Regional Court, while being able to do so six years before that, in 1993. Finally, the applicant had complained about the delay only once.

The applicant replied that the case had not been particularly complex in fact or in law. The sole subject-matter of the dispute had been whether his ancestor had owned certain plots of land before the collectivisation. This had not necessitated the gathering of vast amounts of evidence. Moreover, the applicant had presented most of the evidence at the very beginning of the proceedings. As to the legal issues raised by the case, it was true that they involved an international treaty and a piece of legislation from the 1940s, but it had to borne in mind that, since the applicant’s case was far from being unique, the courts in the region had quite often had occasion to deal with these texts.

The applicant considered that the courts and the agricultural lands commission had been responsible for most of the delays. In particular, he pointed out that the lands commission had taken more than a year to rule on his applications, that the Tervel District Court had listed his appeal against the commission’s decision for hearing approximately a year and a half after its filing, that there had been long intervals between the hearings before that court during both the first examination of the case and on remand, that the Supreme Court had listed the case for hearing a year and ten months after the filing of the petition for review, that on remand the Tervel District Court had delayed the delivery of judgment for more than a year, and that the Dobrich Regional Court had not proceeded with the appeal on points of law for more than four months.

The applicant protested against the allegation that he had been responsible for most delays. In particular, the fact that the lands commission’s file had not been appended to the court case file had not been his fault, but a responsibility of the authorities. The applicant conceded that he had raised arguments relating the nullity of the commission’s decision only in 1999, but stressed that by law it was the courts’ duty to verify the validity of this decision from the very beginning of the judicial proceedings. The applicant finally emphasised that although he lived 450 km away from the venue of the proceedings before the Tervel District and the Dobrich Regional Courts, he had attended all hearings.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established by its case-law on the question of “reasonable time”, and having regard to all the material in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.

2. In respect of his complaint about the lack of effective remedies the applicant relied on Article 13 of the Convention which provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Government limited their comments on this complaint to referring to the text of Article 217A of the CCP and stating that it provided an effective remedy against delays.

The applicant maintained that under Bulgarian law he had no effective remedy against the excessive length of the proceedings.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis              Deputy Registrar President