FIRST SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 69529/01 by Lidiya Andreyevna PRAVEDNAYA against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 25 September 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L. Rozakis , President , Mrs F. Tulkens , Mrs N. Vajić , Mr E. Levits , Mrs S. Botoucharova , Mr A. Kovler , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , judges , and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 21 April 2001,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Lidiya Andreyevna Pravednaya , is a Russian national, who was born in 1936 and lives in Novosibirsk. She is represented before the Court by Mr I. Novikov , a lawyer practising in Novosibirsk.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1 . The 1998 State pension scheme

Since 1991 the applicant has been receiving an old-age pension. From 1 February 1998 the amount of her pension was to be determined by the Law on Calculating and Upgrading State Pensions (the “Pensions Law”). The Pensions Law introduced a new method of upgrading retirement benefits – “Individual Pensioner Coefficient” (“IPC”). The IPC, established for the purpose of calculating individual pensions, was the ratio between the individual’s final wages at retirement and the national average wage, and was meant to maintain a link between a person’s pension and previous earnings.

2 . Litigation with the pension authority

The authority in charge of the applicant’s pension – the Pension Fund Agency of the Zayeltsovskiy District of Novosibirsk – decided that the IPC to be applied to her should be 0.525. The applicant considered this decision arbitrary as it conflicted, in her opinion, with the Pensions Law. On 12 April 1999 she brought an action against the pension authority.

On 21 October 1999, the Zayeltsovskiy District Court of Novosibirsk found in the applicant’s favour. The court held that since the defendant had misinterpreted the Pensions Law, the applicant’s pension should be recalculated with an IPC of 0.7.

On 15 February 2000 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal, and the judgment became final.

On 6 March 2000 enforcement proceedings were opened.

As the pension agency had complained about the bailiff in charge of the execution, on 10 April 2000 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court ordered a stay of the enforcement proceedings. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed on 6 February 2001.

3. Re-opening of the judgment

On 21 August 2000 the pension agency filed an application for re-opening of judgment of 21 October 1999. The agency submitted that on 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development had passed an instruction specifying how the Pensions Law should be interpreted and applied. Furthermore, argued the agency, the lawfulness of the instruction was later confirmed by the trial and appeal instances of the Supreme Court on 24 April and 25 May 2000 respectively. As the agency had not known about these circumstances at the moment when the judgment of 21 October 1999 was passed, it contended that the judgment should be re-considered.

On 16 January 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court granted the pension agency’s application having applied Article 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure according to which judgments could be re-considered in case of discovery of significant circumstances which were not and could not have been known to the party concerned. No appeal lay against this decision.

4. Fresh examination of the case

After a fresh examination on 12 February 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court dismissed the applicant’s case in full. On 27 March 2001 the Novosibirsk Regional Court disallowed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment.

B. Relevant domestic law

The Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 in force at the material time:

Article 333. Grounds for re-consideration

“Final [judgments] may be re-considered on the basis of newly-discovered circumstances. The grounds for re-consideration ... are:

1. significant circumstances which were not and could not have been known to the party who applies for re-consideration;...

4. cancellation of a court [judgment] or of another authority’s decision which served as legal basis for the [judgment] in question.”

Article 334. Making of application

“... [An application for re-consideration of a [judgment] due to discovery of new circumstances] is to be made within three months after the discovery of the circumstances.”

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complained with reference to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that the legal acts which occurred after the judgment of 21 October 1999 should not have been considered as newly discovered circumstances. Therefore, the re-opening of the final judgment in respect of which enforcement proceedings had begun was abusive.

2. Under the same Convention provisions the applicant further complained that the procedural time-limits had not been respected in the proceedings on the merits and the enforcement proceedings; that the enforcement had been unlawfully stayed; that the judgments were not sufficiently reasoned and were not based on law.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 about the re-opening of the final judgment in her favour. The Court will consider this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

Article 6 § 1, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The Government claimed that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They submitted, in particular, that the pension authority had only become aware of the substantial circumstances relevant for the case after the judgment of 21 October 1999 had become final. Therefore, the court had had a solid reason to re-open the proceedings.

The applicant disagreed. She averred that the instruction of 29 December 1999 and the Supreme Court’s judgments of 24 April and 25 May 2000 should not have been considered as newly-discovered evidence. The applicant argued that these instruments had only come into being after the litigation had ended, and could not therefore call the original findings in question. Furthermore, even though there was a three-month time-limit for re-opening of cases due to discovery of new evidence, the pension authority made such an application eight months after the instruction of 29 December 1999 had been passed.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

2. The applicant further alleged under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that the proceedings had been blemished by a number of irregularities and that the conclusions of the domestic laws were wrong.

However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint that a final judgment in her favour was re-considered;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President