FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 42317/98 by Ivan HOOPER against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 October 2003 as a Chamber composed of:

Mr M. Pellonpää , President , Sir Nicolas Bratza , Mr M. Fischbach , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr S. Pavlovschi , Mr J. Borrego Borrego , Mrs E. Fura-Sandström, judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 July 1998,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Ivan Hooper, is a United Kingdom [Note1] national, who lives in London. He is represented before the Court by Mr R. Price, a lawyer practising in Sheffield.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows.

1. The magistrates’ court proceedings

On 3 January 1997 the applicant appeared before the magistrates’ court, charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm and failing to answer bail. He was legally represented. The applicant elected to be tried in the Crown Court. The magistrate therefore adjourned the proceedings to enable a committal hearing to take place at a later date. The magistrate then proceeded to consider whether the applicant should be granted bail. During the course of that consideration, the applicant ‘reacted adversely’ in court, causing a disturbance which led the stipendiary magistrate to conclude that there existed a future risk of a breach of the peace by him. The magistrate therefore made an order binding the applicant over to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour under the Justices of the Peace Act 1361.

The applicant was ‘bound over’ in his own recognisance of 50 pounds sterling (GBP) together with a surety of GBP 250. The precise terms of the order were found by the High Court (in the later judicial review proceedings) to be unclear. However, the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the order of the magistrates’ court had fixed a period of 28 days’ imprisonment in default of the applicant’s own recognisance and/or a suitable surety. The magistrate did not give any opportunity for the applicant or his representative to make submissions about the terms of the order before it was imposed.

It appears that later on the day on which the binding over order was imposed, in the absence of both the applicant and his representative, the surety presented himself to the magistrate, who himself took the recognisance. The magistrate appears to have deemed the proposed surety unsuitable and to have done so on the ground that he did not have any readily available money. The applicant was committed to custody on the same day for 28 days. The High Court later noted that he had remained in custody until 16 January 1997 or a little later.

2. The judicial review proceedings

On 2 June 1997 the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review of the decision to impose the binding over order.

On 20 January 1998 the High Court granted the application for judicial review. The nature of the applicant’s case was stated by the High Court to be as follows:

“It is not suggested by Mr. Daniel, for the applicant, that the magistrate had no power under [the Justices of the Peace Act 1361] or common law to impose a binding over order without consent, to require a surety or to impose a sentence of imprisonment in lieu. What is suggested is that there was a breach of natural justice or procedural irregularity in the way in which the magistrate dealt with the matter, without investigating further, or giving specific opportunity to the applicant or his legal representative to make representations about the terms of any binding over order.”

The High Court agreed that the binding over order had been procedurally irregular and granted a declaration to that effect. During the course of its judgment, the High Court found that:

(a) previous domestic case-law had established that there were circumstances where failing to hear a defendant or his representative prior to imposing a binding over order containing a requirement of a recognisance could amount to a breach of the rules of natural justice. Mr Justice Mance quoted, inter alia , the headnote of the case of R. v. Central Criminal Court ex parte Boulding [1984] 1 QB 813 that:

“... although there was no general obligation upon a court to afford a defendant an opportunity to be heard prior to binding him over, it was a breach of the rules of natural justice, unless the recognisance was of a trivial sum, for a court to bind a person over without inquiring into his means and giving him an opportunity to make representations as to the size of the recognisance.”

(b) the position where there was a requirement for a surety was even clearer. A surety required the separate approval of the court as to his suitability. This was outside the control of the person to be bound over and yet could have drastic consequences for him where, as in the present case, it resulted in his serving a period of imprisonment imposed as an alternative;

(c) in such circumstances, a magistrates’ court needed to take particular care in case it did not appreciate that imposing the order effectively amounted to an automatic sentence of imprisonment;

(d) a defendant ought not to be put at peril of a prison sentence in default of finding a surety unless he had first been specifically invited to address the magistrates’ court upon that point;

(e) the magistrate did not expressly invite or give opportunity for any submissions, or indeed any discussion between the applicant and his representative, about the proposed terms of the binding over order before he imposed it. While the magistrate stated during the course of the judicial review proceedings that he would have been prepared to listen to anything that the applicant’s representative would have wished to say, the High Court accepted that the applicant’s representative was effectively presented with a “fait accompli” of a nature which she had not come across before. In responding to an argument put forward on behalf of the magistrate that an advocate was under a duty to bring any procedural irregularity to the attention of the court during the hearing and not reserve such matter to be raised on appeal, Mr Justice Mance said:

“That is of course right, but it assumes that the advocate appreciates that what happens does amount to a procedural irregularity and understands at the time the nature of the point. Here [the applicant’s representative] does not appear to have had the confidence of whatever belief she had that something was not quite right, she did not raise the matter, and I do not think that the applicant should suffer from any failure, if there was any on her part, to react as another advocate, perhaps more familiar with this area of the law and practice, might have done.”

(f) had the applicant or his representative been able to make submissions about the proposed order the magistrate might have been persuaded to impose different terms. Mr Justice Mance stated:

“This is all, of course, speculative, but speculation though it may be, the reason why it is speculation is that the magistrate failed, in my judgment, to give the applicant or, on his behalf, [the applicant’s representative] proper time or a proper opportunity to address the terms of the proposed bind over order, particularly so far as they involved a requirement that the applicant produce a surety in the sum of £250.”

(g) the order imposed was procedurally irregular. In considering the nature of the irregularity, and the relief that should be granted, Mr Justice Mance stated as follows:

“I am quite unable to accept that any irregularity was de minimis as Mr Burnett [counsel for the respondent] at one point suggested. It seems to me, that the procedural error which occurred means that the bind-over order imposed ... was irregular. The question remaining is what relief this Court can and should in the circumstances grant. The applicant has, of course, long since served the alternative period of imprisonment imposed. Mr Daniel, on behalf of the applicant, does not therefore pursue his application for certiorari [the quashing of the order of the magistrate]. What he seeks is a declaration that the binding over order was irregular and, in my judgment, to that extent, this application for judicial review succeeds.”

(h) Lord Justice Simon Brown added that, while it might have been possible to seek to vary or to appeal the binding over order after it had been imposed, neither option met the problem that, pending such further proceedings, a defendant may serve one half at least of a term of imprisonment “which could never properly have been imposed upon him, save only contingently for a failure to meet a reasonable requirement for a surety”.

In considering the question of costs, the High Court was reminded that costs should only be awarded against the magistrate if it was considered that his conduct should be stigmatised. In declining to make a costs order against the magistrate, Lord Justice Simon Brown said:

“This is not one of those exceptional cases where it could possibly be appropriate to make the order against the magistrate.”

B. Relevant domestic law

1. Binding over

Magistrates have powers to bind over at common law and under the Justices of the Peace Act 1361. These powers allow magistrates, at any stage in proceedings before them, to bind over any participant in the proceedings if they consider that the conduct of the person concerned is such that there might be a breach of the peace or that his or her behaviour has been contra bonos mores .

2. Void and voidable orders of magistrates’ courts

Orders of a magistrates’ court which are in excess of jurisdiction are void from the outset, whereas orders made within jurisdiction remain valid until set aside by a superior court.

The order of a magistrates’ court is considered to be in excess of its jurisdiction in three specific circumstances:

(a) where the court acted without having any jurisdiction over the cause;

(b) where, although the court had jurisdiction, it was guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure or a breach of the rules of natural justice; or

(c) where the court made an order that had no proper foundation in law because of a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent.

( McC. v. Mullan [1984] 3 All ER 908 (HL) and R. v. Manchester City Magistrates’ Court ex parte Davies [1989] 1 All ER 90 (CA)).

In relation to the second circumstance (head (b) above), Lord Bridge said the following in the above-cited McC. v. Mullan case:

“Justices would, of course, be acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of s[ection] 15 if, in the course of hearing a case within their jurisdiction, they were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure, as for example if one justice absented himself for part of the hearing and relied on another to tell him what had happened during his absence, or of the rules of natural justice, as for example if the justices refused to allow the defendant to give evidence. But I would leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases one might imagine in which it could successfully be contended in judicial review proceedings that a conviction was vitiated on some narrow technical ground involving a procedural irregularity or even a breach of the rules of natural justice. Such convictions, if followed by a potential trespass to person or goods, would not, in my opinion, necessarily expose the justices to liability in damages.”

3. Compensation claims against magistrates

The Justices of the Peace Act 1997 provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:

“51 . No action shall lie against any justice of the peace...in respect of any act or omission of his-

(a) in the execution of his duty-

(i) as such a justice;

...

(b) with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction.

52 . An action shall lie against any justice of the peace...in respect of any act or omission of his-

(a) in the purported execution of his duty-

(i) as such a justice;

...

(b) with respect to a matter which is not within his jurisdiction,

if, but only if, it is proved that he acted in bad faith.”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 that his detention was unlawful and that he was denied the right to compensation therefor by reason of the provisions of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997. The applicant further complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention about the decision of the magistrate to commit him to prison without giving him the opportunity to make representations.

THE LAW

A. Article 5

The applicant complained that his detention, and his inability to obtain compensation therefor, violated Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention, which reads, in relevant part:

Article 5 – Right to liberty and security

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law.

...

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The Government

The Government submitted that it was common ground that the magistrates’ court had the power to make the order and that the case did not involve a breach of a statutory condition precedent. As such, the Government averred that the sole issue in the case concerned whether the breach of procedural fairness, which led to the making of the order, took the matter outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate.

The Government submitted that a procedural error or a breach of natural justice did not, in itself, automatically render an order outside jurisdiction. They emphasised that the speech of Lord Bridge in McC v. Mullan (see above) had explained that whether a breach of procedural fairness or natural justice would amount to a justice acting without jurisdiction depended on the facts of each case.

The Government further referred to the principles underlying the judgments of this Court in Benham v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III) (“ Benham ”) and Perks and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 25777/94 and others, 12 October 1999 (“ Perks ”). They pointed out that, as in those cases, the Court did not have the benefit of any ruling from the domestic courts in respect of whether the magistrate acted within or outside jurisdiction. In those circumstances, the Court had to examine whether it could be said, with a degree of certainty, that the detention of the applicant was unlawful under domestic law.

The Government submitted that the magistrate had acted within jurisdiction when he made the order. They contended that it had been agreed in the High Court that the order had been soundly based in domestic law under the Justices of the Peace Act 1361. As such, they averred that the detention of the applicant fell within Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the sole basis of the decision of the High Court was that the magistrate had acted in a procedurally unfair manner.

By reference to the domestic cases of Sirros v. Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776 and McC v. Mullan (cited above), the Government submitted that the present case involved a mere procedural irregularity which did not deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction. They contended that, in any event, the procedural error was not “gross and obvious”. The Government pointed out that the error arose at the end of the hearing and concerned the issue of requiring a surety. The applicant’s representative had been present when the order was made, but the error of the magistrate was not to inform the representative of her right to make submissions at that stage. The Government submitted that that was clearly a procedural defect, but not one which deprived the magistrate of jurisdiction. The Government contended that, accordingly, the detention of the applicant was lawful under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

The Government further submitted that Article 5 § 5 guaranteed an enforceable right to compensation only to those who had been detained contrary to the provisions of Article 5. The Government argued that, since there had not been any violation of Article 5 § 1 in this case, Article 5 § 5 was not applicable.

(b) The applicant

By reference to paragraph 43 of the Court’s above-cited Benham judgment, the applicant accepted that to succeed in his claim that a breach of Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention had occurred in his case, he had to show that his committal to prison was made outside the jurisdiction of the justices. The applicant relied upon the above-cited part of the passage of Lord Bridge in McC. v. Mullan that:

“Justices would of course be acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ ... if, in the course of hearing a case within their jurisdiction, they were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure ... as for example if the justices refused to allow a defendant to give evidence. But I would leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases ...”

The applicant submitted that his case fell squarely within the example given by Lord Bridge in that the applicant was not given the opportunity to make representations to the magistrate. He contended that, on analysis, the error was not a “mere procedural irregularity”, but was one that was “gross and obvious” and was so serious as to take the decision outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate.

The applicant further submitted that, having established a breach of Article 5 § 1, his claim for compensation pursuant to Article 5 § 5 necessarily followed.

2. The Court’s assessment

The Court recalls the following general principles that were stated at paragraphs 40-44 of the above-cited Benham judgment, and reiterated, in large part, at paragraph 62 of the Perks judgment:

“40. The main issue to be determined in the present case is whether the disputed detention was ‘lawful’, including whether it complied with ‘a procedure prescribed by law’. The Convention here essentially refers back to national law and states the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be consistent with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect individuals from arbitrariness ... .

41. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. However, since under Article 5 § 1 failure to comply with domestic law entails a breach of the Convention, it follows that the Court can and should exercise a certain power to review whether this law has been complied with.

42. A period of detention will in principle be lawful if it is carried out pursuant to a court order. A subsequent finding that the court erred under domestic law in making the order will not necessarily retrospectively affect the validity of the intervening period of detention. For this reason, the Strasbourg organs have consistently refused to uphold applications from persons convicted of criminal offences who complain that their convictions or sentences were found by the appellate courts to have been based on errors of fact or law.

43. It was agreed by those appearing before the Court that the principles of English law which should be taken into account in this case distinguished between acts of a magistrates’ court which were within its jurisdiction and those which are in excess of jurisdiction. The former were valid and effective unless or until they were overturned by a superior court, whereas the latter were null and void from the outset.

It was further submitted that the appropriate test under English law for deciding whether or not magistrates acted within their jurisdiction was that laid down by the House of Lords in McC. v. Mullan ...

44. In each of the [domestic] cases referred to above it was necessary for the courts to decide the jurisdictional issue, because at the relevant time damages could be awarded against magistrates who acted in excess of jurisdiction. However, section 108 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 has since changed the law to provide that there is no right to damages unless magistrates acted in bad faith ... For this reason, when the Divisional Court reviewed the magistrates’ order for Mr Benham’s detention, there was no reason under English law for it to decide whether or not the order had been made in excess of jurisdiction.”

The Court further recalls that it must be possible for it to conclude, with a degree of certainty, that the magistrate acted in excess of jurisdiction within the meaning of domestic law for the Court to be able to determine that the detention of the applicant was unlawful under domestic law (see Benham § 46 and Perks § 63).

Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that it was not contended that the detention of the applicant could not, in principle, be compatible with the objectives of Article 5 §§ 1 (a) and/or (b) of the Convention; or that the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to impose the order or that there was no foundation in law for it to be made. The question to be addressed is whether it can be said, with a degree of certainty, that the procedural error of the magistrate was, under domestic law, “gross and obvious” or a breach of the rules of natural justice of a nature which rendered the decision of the magistrate in excess of jurisdiction (see “Relevant domestic law” above).

In addressing that question, the Court notes the examples given by Lord Bridge in McC v. Mullan of a gross and obvious irregularity of procedure (a justice absenting himself for part of the hearing) or a breach of the rules of natural justice (refusing to allow the defendant to give evidence) which would render the actions of a magistrate in excess of jurisdiction (see “Relevant domestic law” above). The Court regards as significant the passage of the speech of Lord Bridge which followed immediately thereafter:

“But I would leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases one might imagine in which it could successfully be contended in judicial review proceedings that a conviction was vitiated on some narrow technical ground involving a procedural irregularity or even a breach of the rules of natural justice.”

The Court therefore notes that, under domestic law, it is not every procedural irregularity or breach of the rules of natural justice that results in the domestic court acting without jurisdiction. Furthermore, as the domestic courts were not required to determine the jurisdictional issue in the present case, it falls upon this Court to address that domestic law issue without the benefit of any express ruling thereon from the domestic courts.

The Court recalls that the High Court found that there had been an irregularity of procedure in the present case. However, there is nothing in the judgment of the High Court which enables this Court to conclude, with a degree of certainty, that the nature of the error was “gross and obvious” or of a type to render the actions of the magistrate in excess of jurisdiction within the meaning of domestic law.

The Court notes, in particular, that, in describing the nature of the irregularity, Mr Justice Mance stated that he was quite unable to accept that it was “ de minimis ”. However, he did not proceed to state expressly, or even to use a form of words from which this Court could, with a degree of certainty, imply, that the irregularity fell into the significantly higher “gross and obvious” category. Furthermore, in responding to the argument that the applicant’s representative in the magistrates’ court should have brought the irregularity to the attention of the magistrate, Mr Justice Mance was not expressly critical of her failure to do so and, inter alia , questioned whether “there was any [failure] on her part”. Had the procedural error been so serious as to take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the magistrate within the meaning of domestic law, the Court would have expected the language used by Mr Justice Mance in that part of his judgment to have been different. Moreover, the Court notes that, having considered whether to award costs against the magistrate on the basis that his conduct should be stigmatised, Lord Justice Simon Brown concluded that this was “not one of those exceptional cases where it could possibly be appropriate to make the order against the magistrate”.

Furthermore, the Court is not, without more, persuaded by the applicant’s argument that the example given by Lord Bridge in McC v. Mullan of a magistrate refusing to allow a defendant to give evidence necessarily equates to the present situation; namely, where the representative of the defendant was not expressly invited or given the opportunity to make submissions about the terms of a binding over order – more particularly the availability of a suitable surety – imposed by the court at the end of a procedural hearing by way of a response to the applicant’s reaction in court to proposed terms of bail. The Court notes that the applicant has not brought any other domestic case-law to its attention on the specific point in issue in this case.

In the above circumstances, the Court cannot conclude, with a degree of certainty, that the procedural irregularity that arose in this case was of such a nature as to deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction and therefore render the applicant’s detention unlawful within the meaning of domestic law.

The Court further notes that it has not been suggested that the magistrate acted in bad faith. The Court does not find any other feature of this application which could enable it to find that the detention of the applicant was arbitrary within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention (see § 47 of Benham and § 70 of Perks ).

In those circumstances, it follows that the complaint of the applicant under Article 5 § 1 is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

The Court observes that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention guarantees an enforceable right to compensation only to those who have been the victims of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of Article 5. In the light of its conclusion that the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 is manifestly ill-founded, the Court concludes that Article 5 § 5 is not applicable to his case and that his complaint under that Article must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded (see § 50 of the Benham judgment and § 74 of the Perks judgment).

B. Article 6

The applicant complained that the circumstances surrounding his committal to prison violated Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which reads, in relevant part:

Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.”

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The Government

The Government submitted that the High Court found, applying common law principles of natural justice, that there had been unfairness in the circumstances which led to the making of the binding over order. In effect, the Government contended that the High Court, applying domestic law, had found in substance that the guarantees contained within Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention had been violated in that neither the applicant nor his representative had been given an opportunity to address the magistrate in relation to the issue of the availability and suitability of the surety. As such, the Government submitted that the High Court had addressed the complaints of the applicant and found in his favour.

The Government further submitted that sufficient redress had been provided to the applicant in the judgment of the High Court. They pointed out that it was not suggested by the applicant’s representative in the High Court that any further relief was required from that court beyond the ruling that the binding over order had been made in a procedurally unfair manner. The Government argued that this equated to the redress which the Court provided to the applicants in Perks at paragraph 82, where it held that a finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention was in itself just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. The Government contended that any claim for pecuniary damage arose under Article 5.

In the above circumstances, the Government concluded that the applicant was not a victim under Article 34 of the Convention in relation to his complaints under Article 6.

(b) The applicant

The applicant averred that the Government had conceded that there had been a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. The applicant disputed that the judgment of the High Court had provided him with sufficient redress. He emphasised that he was precluded from pursuing a claim for compensation in the domestic courts due to the operation of section 52 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997.

The applicant further disputed the contention of the Government that a finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) was sufficient just satisfaction. He argued that, had he had the opportunity to make representations, it was highly improbable that the magistrate would have made the order that was made. By reference to Perks , the applicant sought compensation for the alleged breach of Article 6.

2. The Court’s assessment

The Court has considered the submission of the Government that the applicant is no longer a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.

The Court recalls that, according to its established case-law, the word “victim” in the context of Article 34 denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of Article 41 (just satisfaction). Consequently, a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Amuur v. France (judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, p. 846, § 36)).

In the present case, even assuming that the judgment of the High Court amounted to an acknowledgment in substance of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention, the Court recalls that, by the time of the judicial review proceedings, the applicant had already served his prison sentence and had spent approximately two weeks in prison as a result of the order made by the magistrate. The Court further recalls that the applicant was not able to seek compensation therefor as a result of the operation of section 52 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997. That section provided that an action against a justice could only lie if that justice had acted both outside his jurisdiction and in bad faith. Having regard to that section, the Court notes that, while the Government argued that the applicant’s representative did not seek any further relief from the High Court beyond that court’s findings that the making of the order had been procedurally unfair, the Government did not suggest what further relief was available.

In the above circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant has not lost his status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.

Moreover, the Court considers that the complaints of the applicant raise serious issues under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention which require determination on the merits. It follows that they cannot be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention

and, by a majority

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

Michael O’Boyle Matti Pellonpää Registrar President

[Note1] To be checked.