FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 45309/99 by Eugeniusz MADEJ against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 March 2004 as a Chamber composed of:

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mr M. Pellonpää , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr R. Maruste , Mr L. Garlicki , Mrs E. Fura-Sandström, judges , and Mr M. O'Boyle , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 31 August 1998,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the Court's decision to apply the procedure under Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Eugeniusz Madej, is a Polish national who was born in 1949 and lives in Warsaw, Poland.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In January 1995 the applicant, who had been working as a driver and carried out other duties at the Polish Embassy in Brazil, was dismissed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On 4 May 1995 the applicant lodged with the Warszawa District Court ( SÄ…d Rejonowy ) an action for reinstatement against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

O n 9 August 1995 the court held the first hearing.

On 27 December 1995 the applicant extended his action. He sought amendment of his employment record ( o uzupełnienie opini ).

Subsequently, on 4 January 1996 a hearing was held.

The hearing scheduled for 11 April was adjourned because of the illness of the judge rapporteur and the next one, listed for 26 August 1996, was adjourned at the request of the applicant's lawyer.

The next hearing was held on 10 October 1996.

Subsequently, hearings were held on 30 January, 23 June and 17 October 1997 and on 19 January 1998.

On 23 February 1998 the applicant further extended his action.

On 20 April and 22 October 1998 the trial court held hearings.

On 15 March 1999 the Warszawa District Court gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant's claim.

The applicant lodged an appeal.

On 4 October 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court ( Sąd Wojewódzki ) dismissed his appeal.

The parties did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that the length of the proceedings was in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government contend that the facts of the present case do not disclose a violation of Article 6 § 1. They submit that the applicant's case was complex; they refer in particular to the fact that some of the witnesses heard by the court were high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seconded to consular and diplomatic missions. Furthermore, the trial court had to request relevant authorities to disclose some pieces of evidence which were classified as confidential. The Government further submit that the national authorities showed due diligence in examining the case and that there were no delays for which the trial court should be held responsible since the hearings were held at short intervals. As regards the applicant's conduct, the Government point out that he twice modified his claim which led to the re-examination of certain evidence and that some of his requests to adduce new evidence were manifestly ill-founded.

The applicant disagrees with the Government. He avers that the case was not as complex as the Government submitted and that the domestic courts were solely to blame for the delay.

The Court firstly notes that none of the parties to the proceedings made any submissions on the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to the impugned proceedings in the light of the Court's case-law on that subject (see Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999). However, in the particular circumstances of the instant case, the Court considers that it is not called on to decide that question since the application is anyway inadmissible for the following reasons (see, mutatis mutandis, Mochejski v. Poland , (dec), no. 43397/98, 23 October 2001).

The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII and Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 60, 15 October 1999).

The Court observes that the proceedings began on 4 May 1995 and ended on 4 October 1999 with the Warsaw Regional Court's judgment. They therefore lasted four years and five months and the case was examined on merits by two courts. As regards the complexity of the case, the Court considers that it was one of some complexity.

The Court considers that the applicant did not significantly contribute to the length of the proceedings. However, it notes that the applicant twice modified his claim. The Court reiterates, that while the applicant is entitled to make use of his procedural rights, he must bear the consequences when it leads to delays (see, Łobarzewski v. Poland, no. 77757/01, §42, 25 November 2003).

With respect to the conduct of the national authorities, the Court firstly observes that the employment disputes by their nature call for expedition. However, in the present case the Court notes that although the trial court had been examining the case for four years, it held during this period at least ten hearings. These hearings were held at regular intervals and the Court does not discern any delays attributable to the domestic authorities.

In conclusion, regard being had to all of the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the impugned proceedings do not disclose an unreasonable delay within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Discontinues the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention;

Declares the application inadmissible.

Michael O'Boyle Nicolas Bratza Registrar President