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WILKINSON and KNOTT v. the UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 57429/00;57882/00 • ECHR ID: 001-23955

Document date: May 25, 2004

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
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WILKINSON and KNOTT v. the UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 57429/00;57882/00 • ECHR ID: 001-23955

Document date: May 25, 2004

Cited paragraphs only

FOURTH SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 57429/00 Application No, 57882/00

James WILKINSON Gareth KNOTT

against the United Kingdom against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 25 May 2004 as a Chamber composed of:

Mr M. Pellonpää , President , Sir Nicolas Bratza , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr R. Maruste , Mr S. Pavlovschi , Mr L. Garlicki , Mr J. Borrego Borrego, judges , and Mr M. O'Boyle , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the applications lodged on 2 and 22 May 2000,

Having regard to the partial decision of 4 June 2002 when the cases were also joined,

Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention in order to examine together the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints in the cases,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants, James Wilkinson and Gareth Knott, are United Kingdom nationals. They were born in 1959 and 1962 and are from Manchester and Newcastle, respectively. They were represented before the Court by Mr G. Blades, a lawyer practising in Lincoln.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Both applicants were convicted and sentenced by courts-martial convened following the entry into force of the Armed Forces Act 1996.

In October 1999 Mr Wilkinson was convicted by an air-force district court-martial of conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline. He was fined of £1000 pounds sterling (“GBP”). The Reviewing Authority confirmed the verdict but reduced his fine to GBP 250. In December 1999 the Courts-Martial Appeal Court dismissed his application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence and his renewed application was rejected in April 2000.

In October 1999 Mr Knott was convicted by an army district court-martial of disobeying a lawful command. He was sentenced to a severe reprimand and to a fine of GBP 700. The Reviewing Authority confirmed the verdict and sentence. In January 2000 the Courts-Martial Appeal Court dismissed his application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence and his renewed application was rejected in April 2000.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

The provisions of the Army Act 1955 and of the Air Force Act 1955, which regulated army and air-force courts-martial prior to 1 April 1997, are set out in Findlay v. the United Kingdom (of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, §§ 32-51) and Coyne v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 24 September 1997, Reports 1997 ‑ V, §§ 20-44).

Following the adoption of the Commission's report in the Findlay case (no. 22107/93, Commission's report of 5 September 1995), the Armed Forces Act 1996 came into force on 1 April 1997 and significantly amended both 1955 Acts. The relevant domestic law and practice applicable to air-force courts-martial following the entry into force of the 1996 Act is set out in the case of Cooper v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 48843/99, §§ 15-77, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII). The relevant regulatory framework governing post-1996 Act army courts-martial is the same in all material respects (the Cooper judgment, at § 107).

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they did not have a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

THE LAW

The applicants maintain that their courts-martial did not amount to fair and public hearings by independent and impartial tribunals established by law. In particular, and relying on the above-cited Findlay judgment, the applicants argue that the post-1996 Act court-martial system has similar structural independence and impartiality and, consequently, fairness problems as were found to violate Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the Findlay case. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

The Court recalls that, in the case of Morris v. the United Kingdom , the Court found the army court-martial system, put in place by the 1996 Act, to violate, inter alia , the independence and impartiality requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (no. 38784/97, ECHR 2002-I). The present cases were then communicated to the respondent Government raising the applicability of Article 6 together with the complaint outlined above. Subsequently, the House of Lords opined that post-1996 Act air-force and army court-martial systems were compliant with the independence and impartiality requirements of Article 6 ( R. v. Boyd and Others , judgment of 18 July 2002), noting, inter alia , that all relevant information had not been put before this Court in the Morris case. The present cases were consequently adjourned. Subsequently, the Grand Chamber found, in concluding that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the above-cited Cooper case, that the applicant's misgivings about the independence and impartiality of his air-force court-martial convened under the 1996 Act were not objectively justified and that those court-martial proceedings could not consequently be said to have been unfair.

Following the adoption of the above-cited Cooper judgment, the parties' observations were requested in the present cases. The Government submit that it is not necessary to resolve the question of the applicability of Article 6 because, in any event, the present cases were inadmissible given the Court's findings in its Cooper judgment. The applicants did not wish to submit observations in response.

Even assuming that the present courts-martial determined criminal charges against the applicants, the Court finds no reason in the present cases to depart from its finding in the above-cited Cooper judgment, a finding which applies equally to air-force (Mr Wilkinson) and army (Mr Knott) courts-martial (the Cooper judgment, at § 107).

Accordingly, the Court concludes, for the reasons set out in detail in the above-cited Cooper judgment, that the applicants' complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention; and

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Michael O'Boyle Matti Pellonpää Registrar President

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