SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 10956/03 by Zlatko VIDAKOVI Ć against Hungary

and

Application no. 5336/05 (joined) by Dario MATIĆ against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on

20 March 2007 as a Chamber composed of:

Mrs F. Tulkens , President, Mr A.B. Baka , Mr R. Türmen , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , Ms D. Jočienė , Mr D. Popović , judges, and Mrs F . E lens-Passos , Deputy Section Regist rar ,

Having regard to the above application s lodged on 6 August 2002 and 17 November 2004, respectively ,

Having regard to the decision of 15 September 2005 to join the applications as well as to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant s ,

Having regard to the declaration of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro of 30 November 2005 informing the Court that they did not wish to exercise their right under Article 36 § 1 of the Convention to intervene in the proceedings,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first applicant, Mr Zlatko Vidaković, was born in 1968 . The second applicant, Mr Dario Matić, was born in 1972. Both being nationals of Serbia , they live in Novi Sad , Serbia . They were represented before the Court by Mr Z. Ristić , a lawyer practising in Novi Sad . The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl , Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In September 1996 the applicants took part in a motor-bikers ’ meeting in Mindszent , Hungary , organised in the park of an open-air swimming pool. They slept in a tent under a tree when, due to the heavy rain, a branch broke and fell on them causing them several injuries.

On 9 June 1998 the first applicant instituted proceedings in the Hódmezővásárhely District Court seeking the payment of damages from the owner of the swimming pool, the Mindszent Municipality . On 10 June 1998 the second applicant filed a similar action.

The second applicant ’ s case was stayed on 15 October 1998 and statutorily ceased to exist on 16 April 1998. He reintroduced his claim on 22 March 2002.

Meanwhile, after having held three hearings and suspending the proceedings at the parties ’ request between 8 April and 9 August 1999, on 21 October 1999 the District Court dismissed the first applicant ’ s action, holding that the respondent was not liable. The court relied largely on the opinions of two experts. On 4 January 2000 the Csongrád County Regional Court dismissed the first applicant ’ s appeal. On 27 September 2001 the Supreme Court ’ s review bench quashed the first and second instance decisions and remitted the first applicant ’ s case to the District Court, holding that it had failed to examine whether the Municipality had any contractual liability.

After several hearings held in the resumed proceedings and the joinder of the two cases on 23 May 2002, on 23 May 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicants ’ joint action, holding the respondent had neither contractual nor delictual liability.

On 7 October 2003 the Regional Court finally dismissed the applicants ’ appeal.

On 15 April 2004 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants ’ petition for review as inadmissible, without examining it on the merits, observing that they had failed to specify any appropriate legal grounds for their motion, as required by section 270 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This decision was served on the applicants ’ representative on 23 May 2004.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant s complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. Moreover, they complained about the outcome of the case, invoking Articles 5, 6, 13 and 17 .

THE LAW

1. The first applicant complained that the proceedings exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as relevant:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government contested this view.

The Court observes that the proceedings started on 9 June 1998 and ended on 23 May 2004 at the latest. Of this period of five years, eleven months and two weeks, four months between 8 April and 9 August 1999 corresponded to a suspension which the District Court granted at the parties ’ request. Moreover, the period of seven months and two weeks which elapsed between 7 October 2003 and 23 May 2004 related to the first applicant ’ s incompatible review motion, which was devoid of any prospect of success and thus entirely futile. Therefore, only the remaining period of five years can be attributed to the State, during which time three court instances dealt with the first applicant ’ s case. In the absence of any particular period of inactivity imputable to the authorities, the Court is satisfied that the overall length of the proceedings did not exceed a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

2. Moreover, relying on Articles 5, 6, 13 and 17 of the Convention, the first applicant complained of the outcome of the proceedings.

In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 ‑ I ).

In the present case, the Court observes that there is nothing in the case file indicating that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. The first applicant ’ s submissions do not disclose any appearance of a violation of his other Convention rights, either. It follows that this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

3. The second applicant complained that the proceedings in his case also lasted an unreasonably long time and that the domestic courts ’ decisions were wrong.

The Government submitted that his application had been introduced outside the six-month time-limit.

Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides as follows:

“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”

The Court notes that, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the final decision in the case was given by the Regional Court on 7 October 2003. However, the second applicant introduced his application only on 17 November 2004, i.e. more than six months later. His incompatible petition for review, which was rejected without an examination of the merits, was not an effective remedy in the circumstances and thus did not influence the running of the six-month time-limit. It follows that his complaints must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

In view of the above, the Court considers that Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should no longer apply to the case .

For these reasons, the Court unanimously ,

Declares the application s inadmissible.

F . E lens-Passos F. Tulkens Deputy Registrar President