FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 23788/06 by Anna BECOV Á against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 12 June 2007 and 18 September 2007 as a Chamber composed of:

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mr G. Bonello , Mr K. Traja , Mr L. Garlicki , Ms L. Mijović , Mr J. Šikuta , Mrs P. Hirvelä, judges , and Mr T.L. Early , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 June 2006,

Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together ,

Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application unde r Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, M r s Anna Becov á, is a Slovak national who was born in 1931 and lives in Michalovce. She was repr esented before the Court by Mrs I. Rajt áková , a lawyer practising in Ko š ice. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 29 October 1991 the applicant and another person filed an action under the Land Ownership Act of 1991.

On 2 July 1993 the District Court in Michalovce ordered the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiffs. It decided to deal in a separate set of proceedings with the claims concerning compensation for movable property and compulsory lease of the land in issue. Finally, the District Court rejected the remainder of the action.

The District Court in Michalovce and the Regional Court in Ko Å¡ice determined the claims for compensation on 26 July 1996 and 27 January 1998. The claims related to the lease of the property were to be determined separately.

In the meantime, on 16 May 1997, bankruptcy proceedings were brought against the first defendant. The proceedings in respect of that defendant were therefore stayed pending the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings. The applicant registered her claims against that person in the context of the bankruptcy proceedings on 6 April 1998.

On 23 January 2002 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court . She complained about delays in the proceedings before the District Court.

On 2 October 2002 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant ’ s right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court noted that the case fell within its competence ratione temporis as from 15 February 1993 only. It nevertheless had regard also to the period during which the proceedings had been pending prior to that date. After having analysed the proceedings in the light of the criteria which the Court applies under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court reached the conclusion that the overall period of 11 years was clearly excessive and that the way in which the District Court had acted was, as a whole, contrary to the applicant ’ s right to a hearing within a reasonable time.

The Constitutional Court ordered the District Court in Michalovce to proceed with the case without any further delay. It also ordered that the District Court should pay 150,000 Slovak korunas [1] (SKK) to the applicant within two months.

On 23 October 2002 the District Court asked the plaintiffs to complete their submission of 26 July 2001.

The parties made several submissions to the District Court between 25 October and 6 December 2002.

The District Court held a hearing on 9 December 2002. It decided to obtain an expert opinion with a view to determining the rent payable in respect of the land in issue.

Between 16 December 2002 and 17 February 2003 the file was put at the disposal of the Regional Court in Ko Å¡ice.

On 19 February 2003 the District Court asked the parties to pay an advance on an expert ’ s fees. On 23 April 2003 it appointed an expert who was requested to submit an opinion within 60 days. The decision was served on the expert on 3 May 2003.

On 2 June 2003 the expert asked for further documents.

Between June and September 2003 the District Court obtained documentary evidence from several co-operatives and an administrative authority. It submitted the evidence thus obtained to the expert on 9 October 2003. The expert was asked to obtain information in respect of co-operatives which had not replied to the court ’ s request.

On 5 November 2003 the District Court heard a witness. Two other witnesses representing the co-operatives concerned failed to appear.

At the expert ’ s requests the District Court obtained further documentary evidence on 18 December 2003, 8 January 2004 and 5 February 2004.

The expert submitted his opinion on 10 February 2004. The parties submitted their comments on it on 20 and 24 February 2004.

The District Court held a hearing on 27 February 2004. It delivered a judgment in which it partly granted the applicant ’ s claims related to compulsory lease of the property by the second defendant. It decided to deal in a separate set of proceedings with the relevant claim related to the first defendant in respect of whom bankruptcy proceedings were still pending.

On 5 and 7 May 2004 the second defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. After the court fee had been paid, the District Court submitted the case to the court of appeal on 4 June 2004.

On 29 March 2005 the Regional Court in Ko Å¡ice quashed a pa rt of the first-instance judgment on the ground that the District Court had proceeded and decided erroneously in several respects. The decision of the court of appeal was transmitted to the District Court on 13 May 2005.

On 23 May 2005 the applicant specified her claim. She submitted further documents i n July and August 2005.

On 26 August 2005 the District Court gave a new judgment on the point in issue.

On 12 October 2005 the second defendant appealed. The file was submitted to the court of appeal on 19 October 2005.

The Regional Court in Ko Å¡ice upheld the relevant part of the first-instance judgment on 20 May 2006. The decision on the point in issue became final on 29 June 2006.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complain ed under Article 6 § 1 of th e Convention about the length of the proceedings concerning her action .

THE LAW

The applicant complained about the length of the proceedings initiated by her in 1991. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which in its relevant part provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Court has jurisdiction to examine the length of the proceedings in issue as from 18 March 1992 when the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic , to which Slovakia is one of the successor States, ratified the Convention and recognised the right of individual application. The proceedings of which the applicant complained both before the Constitutional Court and in her complaint under Article 34 of the Convention ended on 20 May 2006. The period under consideration thus lasted 14 years, 2 months and 5 days for two levels of jurisdiction.

The Court has noted that the proceedings related to the applicant ’ s outstanding claim filed against the first defendant were stayed pending the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings against that legal person. The applicant, who had registered her claim in the context of the bankruptcy proceedings, has not complained of the length of those proceedings either before the Constitutional Court or before the Court.

The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of her right to a hearing within a reasonable time as the Constitutional Court had acknowledged a violation of that right in the proceedings before the District Court and had provided her with appropriate redress of both a compensatory and preventive nature. Furthermore, the applicant had not complained to the Constitutional Court about any delays in the proceedings before the court of appeal.

According to the applicant, the sum which the Constitutional Court had awarded to her as just satisfaction was not adequate given the overall length of the proceedings and the way in which the District Court in Michalovce had acted. Further delays had occurred after the delivery of the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment. In particular, it had taken 14 months to obtain the opinion of an expert.

The Court recalls that an applicant ’ s status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention depends , inter alia , on whether the redress afforded at domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she complains before the Court was adequate and sufficient having regard to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention. While there is no requirement under the existing case-law that the domestic authorities should award the same sum by way of compensation as the Court would be likely to award under Article 41 of the Convention , t he level of just satisfaction granted at national level must nevertheless not be manifestly inadequate in the particular circumstances of the case (see the principles recently established under the Court ’ s case-law in Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § § 65-107 , ECHR 2006 ‑ ... or Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC] , no. 36813/97, § § 178-213, ECHR 2006 - ...).

The Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to examine the length of the proceedings as from 15 February 1993. It nevertheless had regard also to the period preceding that date. A fter having applied principles similar to those used by the Court, it concluded that the length of the proceedings was clearly excessive and awarded the applicant the equivalent of approximately 3,600 euros . That sum corresponds to 30% of the award which the Court would make in respect of non-pecuniary damage, in accordance with its practice under Article 41 of the Convention, for the period starting on 18 March 1992 and ending on the date of delivery of the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment. However, apart from granting just satisfaction to the applicant, payable within two months from the date of service of its decision, the Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to proceed with the case without any further delay.

Subsequently, more than 9 months elapsed before the expert appointed by the District Court submitted his opinion. The Court notes, however, that the bulk of that period was spent on obtaining extensive documentary evidence from a number of legal persons several of whom had failed to co-operate. The District Court proceeded in an active manner with a view to obtaining the information needed. The expert opinion was submitted on 10 February 2004.

Between 27 February 2004 and 20 May 2006 the merits of the case were determined twice by courts at two levels of jurisdiction. During that period, the case was dealt with by the District Court for a period totalling approximately 8 months. There is no appearance that any particular delays had occurred for which the District Court should be held responsible.

In view of these facts and having regard to the principles established in its case-law (see, in particular, § 206 of the Scordino (1 ) judgment referred to above ) , the Court considers that the applicant obtained adequate redress in respect of h er complaint about the length of proceedings as submitted to the Constitutional Court. In this respect the applicant can therefore no longer claim to be a “victim” within the meaning o f Article 34 of the Convention.

The Court further considers that in certain situations applicants who have already sought redress before the competent domestic authority in respect of their complaint under Article 6 § 1 about excessive length of proceedings may be required to have recourse again to that remedy irrespective of whether or not they have filed an application under Article 34 of the Convention in the meantime. Such is the case, for example, when an applicant considers excessively long the period which lapsed after the first finding of the competent domestic authority (see, mutatis mutandis , Musci v. Italy [GC], no. 64699/01, § 141, ECHR 2006 ‑ ... (extracts) and, in particular, when the first decision of the domestic authority is consistent with the Convention principles (see Sukobljević v. Croatia , no. 5129/03, § 45, 2 November 2006).

The same is true of a situation where, following the use of the domestic remedy, the case was transferred to a different authority, e.g. a court of a higher level, and the applicant considers that the proceedings continue to be marked by unreasonable delay. In that situation, the applicant can be expected to avail himself or herself again of the domestic remedy.

On the other hand, repeated recourse to the domestic remedy is not required where the effects produced by the decision of the competent authority do not satisfy the criteria applied by the Court. Such is the case, for example, where the domestic authority, unlike the Court, concluded that the length of the proceedings in issue was not excessive; or where a low amount of just satisfaction was granted due consideration being given in this connection, if appropriate, to whether or not the proceedings were subsequently accelerated in accordance with the domestic authority ’ s order; or where the remedy in issue was incapable of providing redress in respect of the overall length of the proceedings complained of (see the Sukobljević v. Croatia judgment referred to above, § 52; Sika v. Slovakia , no. 2132/02, § 31, 13 June 2006; Tomláková v. Slovakia , no. 17709/04, §§ 34-35, 5 December 2006). This list is not exhaustive.

When assessing the position in each individual case, the Court has to take into account the particular features of the length of proceedings remedy in the Contracting State concerned. It must be established whether the applicant used the remedy in a manner which allowed the competent domestic authority to redress the alleged violation of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time (see, for example, Šidlová v. Slovakia , no. 50224/99, § 53, 26 September 2006, with further references) .

Turning to the facts of the present case in the light of the above, the Court considers that the applicant should have again sought redress before the Constitutional Court as regards her allegation that further delays had occurred in the proceedings before the District Court despite the Constitutional Court ’ s order of 2 October 2002. It is particularly relevant in this respect that the application was introduced on 1 June 2006, that is 3 years and 8 months after the Constitutional Court ’ s decision had been given. Furthermore, t he applicant has not complained to the Constitutional Court about any delays in the proceedings before the court of appeal. In respect of the relevant period she has not, therefore, exhausted domestic remedies.

It follows that th e applicant ’ s complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention as being manifestly ill-founded and for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

In view of the above, the Court considers that Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should no longer apply to the case.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza Registrar President

[1] SKK 150,000 was at that time the equivalent of approximately 3,600 euros.