FIRST SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 74124/01 by Sergey Anatolyevich MATVEYEV against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 23 October 2007 as a Chamber composed of:

Mr L. Loucaides , President , Mrs N. Vajić , Mr A. Kovler , Mrs E. Steiner , Mr D. Spielmann , Mr S.E. Jebens , Mr G. Malinverni, judges , and Mr S. Nielsen , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 January 2001,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Sergey Anatolyevich Matvey ev , is a Russian national who was born in 1955 and lives in Magnitogorsk . He was rep resented before the Court by Mr I. Smorodin, a lawyer practising in Magnitogorsk . The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev , Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights .

The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 5 February 1998 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court convicted the a p plicant of bribe-taking, abuse of office and unlawful possession of firearms and sentenced him to ten years ’ imprisonment . On 19 February 1998 the court sent the judgment to the remand prison where the appl i cant was detained. The judgment, which counted 27 pages, was handed to the a p plicant.

Having studied the judgment, the applicant drafted an appeal and on 26 February 1998 lodged it with the Supreme Court. In his appeal the applicant denied that he had committed the offences and claimed that there had been no proper evidence of his guilt.

On 14 October 1998 the Supreme Court examined the case. It held that the finding of the applicant ’ s guilt had been corroborated by statements of victims and witnesses, expert reports, the applicant ’ s own statements and other evidence. By a decision of 14 October 1998 the Supreme Court reclassified the applicant ’ s actions in respect of one of the episodes imputed to him as an attempted crime, reduced the amount of the bribe in respect of another episode, and upheld his conviction for the remainder.

On an unspecified date the applicant learned that, in fact, there had been two different versions of the judgment: the one in the case file was not the same as the one pronounced on 5 February 1998. The applicant asked the R e gional Court to send him the judgment from the case file.

When the applicant received the judgment in October 2000, he di s covered that it counted 31 pages, i.e. it was four pages longer than the judgment that he had r e ceived in the remand prison and had appealed against. He identified about 200 changes in total.

On 11 October 2000 the applicant complained to the Presi d ium of the Supreme Court about this discrepancy. He asked the court to exercise its power of supervisory r e view and quash the judgment.

On 16 November 2000 the Supreme Court replied that it saw no reason to reopen the case.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complain ed that his trial had been unfair and his imprisonment had been unlawful because the judgment he had appealed against was not the same as the judgment the Supreme Court had examined on appeal. He referred to Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Convention. He alleged that the judge had changed the judgment after the trial and had sent the modified version to the Supreme Court.

THE LAW

The applicant complained, invoking Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Convention, that the fact that the judgment he had appealed against was different from the judgment examined by the appeal court had deprived him of the possibility of preparing his appeal properly, and that he had therefore been unlawfully convicted and deprived of his liberty as a result of an unfair trial.

Bearing in mind that the requirements of paragraph 3 (b) of Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed under paragraph 1 of Article 6, the Court considers that the applicant ’ s complaint falls to be examined under these two provisions taken together (see, among other authorities, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece , judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 252, p. 16, § 31). These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

...”

The Government made the following submissions, referring to information obtained from the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General ’ s Office and the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences.

The applicant ’ s case file contained three copies of the judgment of the Chelyabinsk Regional Court of 5 February 1998. One copy was handwritten and the two others were typed, one on 27 pages and the other on 31 pages. The two typed copies were “identical as to content” and the different number of pages could be explained by larger interlinear spacing and different paragraph formatting. There were small discrepancies caused by “technical mistakes” because both copies had been typed manually. Those “insignificant formal discrepancies [were] of a purely technical nature and [did] not influence the essence of the sentence”.

The Government concluded that the applicant ’ s right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention had not been violated and that the application should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.

The applicant maintained his complaint. He noted that he had not been aware of the handwritten copy of the judgment.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties ’ submissions, that the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

Søren Nielsen Loukis Loucaides Registrar President