FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 51555/09 J. and OTHERS against Finland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 12 February 2013 as a Chamber composed of:

Ineta Ziemele , President, Päivi Hirvelä , George Nicolaou , Ledi Bianku , Zdravka Kalaydjieva , Krzysztof Wojtyczek , Faris Vehabović , judges, and Lawrence Early , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 September 2009,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicants, Mr J. and his six children, who are all minors, are Finnish nationals. The President of the Section decided ex proprio motu to grant the applicants anonymity (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court) and confidentiality of the case file documents (Rule 33 of the Rules of Court). The applicants , who had been granted legal aid , were represented before the Court by Mr Matti Kauppi , a lawyer practising in Helsinki .

2. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. The applicant father J. and L. married in 1999. L. had four children from her previous relationship, three of whom lived with J. and L. (A born in 1994, B born in 1996 and C born in 1998). J. and L. had six children of their own: D born in 2000, E born in 2002, F born in 2003, G born in 2004, H born in 2005 and I born in 2007. J. had regular work while L. stayed at home to take care of the children.

5. Since February 2004 the social welfare authorities had been concerned about the children ’ s well-being and situation, and about the ability of the applicant father and L. to cope with daily life. Their suspicions had been aroused when F, who was less than a year old at the time, was treated for a fractured collarbone. Concerns had been expressed, inter alia , about the children ’ s basic hygiene and about occasional insufficiency of food for them. The family had also moved many times and the children ’ s nannies had changed frequently. During a family visit the social welfare authorities discussed the possibility of starting family support work and applying for day-care places. Family support work started in April 2004.

6. In May 2005 another family visit was made by the social welfare authorities. The applicant father and L. opposed the proposal to apply for day-care places for D and E and wanted to end the client relationship with the social welfare authorities which in their view had been a negative experience.

7. In December 2005 the social welfare authorities had a meeting with the applicant father and L. It appeared that the applicant father had moved away from the family home in November 2005. In February 2006 the social welfare authorities met L. and found out that the parents had cancelled the day-care places and taken a private nanny to take care of the children at home. They also learned that the applicant father and L. had decided to divorce.

8. In May 2006 the social welfare authorities visited the family without prior notice. L. and the youngest children were at home. The children wore only nappies. The apartment was almost empty, the bunk beds in the children ’ s room had no mattresses or bed linen, and L. said that she slept with the children on a mattress on the living room floor.

9. In June 2006 the family was evicted from the apartment as the children had blocked the drain and caused water damage to the apartment below. The family had also failed to pay rent. They were given social rented accommodation. The grandmother told the social welfare authorities that L. was tired and could not control the children. She did not have the energy to clean the apartment either.

10. On 5 December 2006 the police called the local social crisis services at 1 a.m. after being called out to a disturbance. They had found seven of the nine children awake and making a lot of noise. The police reported that the apartment was very messy and untidy, there was no space on the floor to walk and there was leftover food lying around. Nearly all the family members were naked. The parents were sober but did not seem to have any intention of putting the children to bed.

11. On 20 December 2006 a senior social worker, two social workers and a family worker visited the family without prior notice. L. told them that the applicant father did not officially live with the family but spent a lot of time with them. The authorities found mould growing in the apartment in which the family had been living for about a month.

12. In April 2007 J. and L. separated and J. moved away from the family home. The authorities arranged for a helper to visit the family every week.

13. On 11 May 2007 the social welfare authorities visited the family again without prior notice as a child welfare report had been made about the family. According to the report G and H, 2 and 3 years old at the time, had been outdoors without supervision. L. contested the accuracy of the report.

14. The children continued to live with their mother L., and J. met them regularly at weekends either at their home or at his home. In May 2007 the parents agreed on joint custody of all their six children and that the children would live with their mother. This agreement was confirmed by the child welfare officer ( lastenvalvoja , barnatillsyningsman ).

15. On 7 July 2007 L. decided to move to a shelter with her nine children as she claimed to be afraid of the applicant father. As her fear and anxiety remained, she consented the next day to be admitted to the closed ward of a mental hospital. She was diagnosed as suffering from psychotic symptoms, including irrational fears. She was admitted to hospital until 30 August 2007.

16. On 8 July 2007 all nine children were taken into emergency public care with their mother ’ s consent. They were placed in a reception home to wait for their final placement elsewhere. J. expressed his wish that the children live with him.

17. In October 2007 J. decided to return to support his sick wife and they took an apartment together. However, in December 2007 they filed for divorce which was granted in July 2008.

Proceedings relating to the taking into public care and the placement of the children

18. On 8 November 2007 the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board ( sosiaali - ja terveyslautakunta , social- och hälsovårdsnämnden ) decided to take C, D, E, F, G, H and I into public care and to place them in a reception home to wait for final placement in a suitable foster home. These decisions were submitted for the approval ( alistus , underställning ) of the Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus , förvaltningsdomstolen ).

19. On 27 November 2007 both parents made a legal agreement that the child ren live with their father, J.

20. By letter dated 28 November 2007 both J. and L. appealed against the Board ’ s decisions to the Administrative Court , requesting that these decisions be quashed. However, if the taking into public care were not quashed, they wanted the children to be placed with their father, J.

21. On 11 December 2007 J. and L. agreed on a plan for reuniting the family. Their plan was for the two girls, G and H, and the youngest boy, I to be returned home immediately while the three older boys, D, E and F were to be returned by 1 February 2008 and L. ’ s three children A, B and C by 1 March 2008.

22. By decisions of 4 and 9 January 2008 the three oldest boys D, E and F were placed, together with their step-brother C, in a foster home 250 km from their home town. These decisions were motivated by the fact that the boys needed special attention and care due to their underdevelopment and behavioural problems. C was withdrawn and quiet. D was not familiar with tooth-brushing, washing, eating or dressing himself, and had difficulties expressing himself and his feelings. E ’ s speech was very poor, as was his motor coordination. F had problems with eating and taking advice or instructions from adults. By letter dated 10 March 2008 J. and L. appealed against these decisions to the Administrative Court , requesting that it be quashed and that C, D, E and F be placed with their father.

23. On 18 January 2008 the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board decided to place the youngest child, I, in a nearby foster home. I had poor interaction skills: inter alia , he avoided eye contact and had difficulties allowing his head to be touched. J and L. appealed against this decision to the Administrative Court , requesting that it be quashed and that I be placed with his father.

24. On 10 March 2008 J. applied for termination of the public care for all of the children, or in the alternative that they be placed with him. He claims that he never received any decision on this issue.

25. By letter dated 15 May 2008 J. requested that the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board terminate the public care order in respect of the youngest child, I, and place him with J.

26. On 16 May 2008 the Administrative Court, after having held an oral hearing on 27 March 2008, rejected J. ’ s and L. ’ s appeals and confirmed the taking into public care of C, D, E, F, G, H and I. It found that the care and upbringing of the children had been neglected. The parents had been offered help in the form of day-care and assistance at their home but they had declined any help from the child welfare authorities. As the circumstances at home might seriously endanger the children ’ s health and development and other assistance had not been possible or sufficient, the court found that the children could be taken into public care and placed in foster care. As to their placement, the court found that J. was not able to take care of all the children aged between 1 and 10 years but ordered that the two girls, G and H, be placed with him. The three oldest boys D, E and F, together with their step-brother C, continued their placement in the same foster home which was best for them taking into account their special needs. The youngest boy, I. , remained in placement in another foster home.

27. After the judgment L. demanded that all the children live with her and disagreed with J. about the care of the children.

28. By letter dated 11 June 2008 J. appealed against the decisions of 16 May 2008 to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), requesting that they be quashed as far as the public care order was concerned and that, in any event, the court order that C, D, E, F, G, H and I be placed with him.

29. On 18 June 2008 the child welfare authorities informed J. that they were not going to implement the Administrative Court ’ s decision in respect of the two girls G and H but were going to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court instead. By letter of the same date J. requested the Supreme Administrative Court to implement immediately the Administrative Court ’ s decision of 16 May 2008 in respect of G and H, and asked that they be placed with him immediately.

30. On 27 August 2008 the Administrative Court rejected the appeals against the decisions of 4, 9 and 18 January 2008 concerning the placement of C, D, E, F and I. It found that the foster homes where they had been placed were able to offer professional help which the boys needed and that they had clearly progressed as a result. Their placement in the foster homes was in their best interest.

31. By letter dated 25 September 2008 J. appealed against the decisions of 27 August 2008 to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting that they be quashed and that all five boys, C, D, E, F and I, be placed with him.

32. On 30 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court ’ s decisions of 16 May 2008 concerning the taking into public care of the children and the placement of G and H with their father. On the same date it also upheld the Administrative Court ’ s decisions of 27 August 2008 concerning the placement of C, D, E, F and I.

33. On 17 May 2009 the two girls, G and H, went to live with J.

34. On 12 November 2009 the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board decided to terminate the public care order with immediate effect in respect of the two girls, G and H.

Proceedings relating to the termination of the public care and the placement of the four boys D, E, F and I

35. On 6 June 2009 the parents agreed again on joint custody of all the children, who would live with their father. This agreement was confirmed by the child welfare officer on 11 June 2009 in respect of the two girls, G and H.

36. By letter dated 24 June 2009 J. applied again for the termination of the public care order in respect of the four boys D, E, F and I, or, in the alternative, that they be placed with him.

37. On 20 October 2009 the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board decided to maintain the public care order in respect of the three oldest boys, D, E and F. It found that termination of the public care order would not be in the boys ’ best interest. The decision was based on several medical and other statements about the boys and on the need to secure their continued positive development. They had clearly benefited from a regular daily routine, their skills and knowledge had increased, and they had become receptive to the outside world, friends and new interests.

38. By letter dated 12 November 2009 J. appealed to the Administrative Court against the decision of 20 October 2009 requesting that it be quashed. If the decision were not quashed, he wanted the three boys D, E and F to be placed with him.

39. On 7 January 2010 the municipal Board decided to continue the public care of the youngest boy, I, as it was in the child ’ s best interest. This decision was based on several medical and other statements about the boy as well as on the need to secure his continued positive development. The applicant father would not be able to care alone for three children of different ages as he had very long working days of 10 to 12 hours.

40. By letter dated 21 January 2010 J. appealed to the administrative court against the decision of 7 January 2010, requesting that it be quashed. If the decision were not quashed, he wanted the youngest boy, I, to be placed with him.

41. On 2 November 2010 the Administrative Court rejected the appeals, after having held an oral hearing on 30 August 2010. It found that, even though J. had managed to take care of the two girls G and H, he would not be able to take care of the four boys in addition. All the boys had special needs and they clearly benefited from placement in their respective foster homes. The youngest boy, I, in particular continued to need a peaceful environment in order to progress. The father did not have a realistic picture of the extent of the boys ’ problems and of the work their treatment required. It was not in the best interest of any of the boys to change their placement, nor could their development be secured by less drastic means.

42. By letter dated 4 November 2010 J. appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against the decisions of 2 November 2010, requesting that they be quashed and that all the boys be placed with him. He referred to Article 8 of the Convention and claimed that the national authorities had failed to examine properly the possibilities for reuniting the family. The boys had been taken into public care more than three years previously. The circumstances had changed since the first decision on taking the children into public care had been taken and J. had now remarried.

43. On 29 February 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court ’ s decisions of 2 November 2010. It found that there was no intention on the part of the authorities to prevent the reunion of the family permanently. The lower court ’ s decisions were not contrary to the Constitution or Article 8 of the Convention. Termination of public care would not have been in the best interest of the children.

Proceedings relating to the termination of public care as well as contact and visiting rights

44. On 14 and 20 December 2007 the child welfare authorities decided to restrict contact between the parents and the five oldest children with a view to securing their forthcoming placement. The children were allowed to visit their parents between 25 and 26 December 2007 at their father ’ s home. Concerning the youngest child I, the aut horities decided on 20 December 2007 that the parents had the right to meet him once a week. Apparently the applicants did not appeal against these decisions.

45. On 15 May 2008 the municipal authorities decided that J. had the right to meet the two girls, G and H, once a month at his home and that he could also visit them at the reception home every weekend from Friday to Sunday.

46. By letter dated 15 May 2008 J. requested the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board to terminate the public care in respect of the youngest child, I, or grant him contact with I every other weekend and during the school holidays.

47. On 26 May 2008 the municipal authorities decided that J. had the right to meet the youngest child, I, under supervision once a month for two hours at a time.

48. By letter dated 25 June 2008 J. appealed to the Administrative Court against the decisions of 15 and 26 May 2008, requesting that they be quashed.

49. On 8 June 2009 the Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 15 and 26 May 2008. It found that, as concerned the youngest child, I, there should have been two meetings per month. As concerned the two girls, G and H, the court found that there were no grounds to restrict their contact with their father as the court had already ordered their placement with the father.

50. By letter dated 24 June 2009 J. applied for termination of the public care of D, E, F and I. In any event, the boys were to meet their father every other weekend and during school holidays at his home.

51. On 20 October 2009 the social authorities refused the applicant father ’ s application for the termination of public care of D, E and F and their reunion with him. The applicants appealed against these decisions to the Administrative Court .

52. On 7 January 2010 the municipal Social Welfare and Health Care Board decided to restrict the contacts between J. and the youngest boy, I. J. was granted a right to meet him once a month for 3 to 4 hours. At the same time the applicant father ’ s application for the termination of public care was refused.

53. By letter dated 21 January 2010 J. appealed to the Administrative Court against the decision of 7 January 2010, requesting that the decision be quashed. He wanted to meet I every other weekend from Friday to Sunday and during the school holidays. He also requested that he and his other children be able to meet I every other weekend and during the school holidays. I had only been able to meet his siblings once or twice during his placement in the foster home.

54. On 12 May 2010 the municipal Social Welfare authorities decided to restrict contacts between J. and the three boys D, E and F. The boys could meet their father at his home one weekend per month. The applicant father could visit the boys in the foster home any time upon prior agreement.

55. By letter dated 25 October 2010 J. appealed to the Administrative Court against the decision of 12 May 2010, requesting that it be quashed and that the three boys be allowed to meet him and their siblings every other weekend and during the school holidays.

56. On 2 November 2010 the Administrative Court rejected the appeals concerning the decisions of 20 October 2009 and 7 January 2010 after having held an oral hearing. It found, in respect of D, E and F, that the public care could not be terminated solely on the ground that the applicant father worked regularly, led an impeccable life and had a suitable apartment for children: the special needs of the children also had to be taken into account. The court considered that the applicant father did not have a clear and realistic picture of D, E and F ’ s special needs and how much practical and psychological support they needed. The applicant father was of the opinion that D, E and F ’ s problems were either genetic or caused by the taking into public care and their separation from their family. The court did not agree and noted that this was corroborated by the fact that the applicant father had himself stated that he had been unable to take care of anything but the children ’ s meals when they all were on home leave. The applicant father ’ s ability to take care of the children had to be assessed both individually from the point of view of each child as well as globally, taking into account that he would have to take care of four more children in addition to the two girls who already lived with him. All the children had benefited from their stay in foster care. The termination of public care was thus not in the best interest of D, E or F. Moreover, it found that the visiting rights J. had demanded would have endangered the health and development of the youngest boy, I. Restrictions on visiting rights had been necessary in respect of I and had been in the best interest of the child. As to reunion, the court did not consider that terminating the public care would be in I ’ s best interest. He could not be placed with the applicant father as open care measures would not be sufficient to secure his needs.

57. By letter dated 4 November 2010 J. appealed against the decisions of 2 November 2010 to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting that these be quashed and the public care terminated in respect of D, E and F, or at least that they be placed with him. He also requested the court to grant him contact with the youngest child, I, every other weekend and during the school holidays.

58. On 6 April 2011 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant father ’ s appeal against the decision of 12 May 2010. It found that accepting the applicant father ’ s demands would have endangered the boys ’ health and development. The imposed restrictions had been necessary in order to guarantee the development and care of D, E and F and it was thus in their best interest. Moreover, for half of this period none of the meetings between the boys and the applicant father had taken place because the applicant father had been away travelling for about three months.

59. The applicant father appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against the decision of 6 April 2011 requesting that it be quashed and that the three boys have the right to meet him every other weekend and during the school holidays. He claimed that the contact restrictions prevented any reunion of the family in the near future.

60. On 4 January 2012 the municipal Social Welfare authorities decided to restrict the contact between J. and I until 9 March 2012. They could meet once a month for 2 to 3 hours mainly in the foster home but also at J. ’ s home, if necessary together with a foster parent. It is not known whether the applicants appealed against this decision.

61. On 29 February 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant father ’ s appeals and upheld the Administrative Court ’ s decisions of 2 November 2010 and 6 April 2011. It found that I. was already meeting his mother and siblings regularly. If I was to have time for his own life in the foster family, it was not possible to allow the applicant father such extensive meeting rights. The restriction on contact rights was necessary in order to secure I ’ s proper care, upbringing and development. As concerned the contact restrictions with D, E and F, the court found that only the meetings at J. ’ s home had been restricted. J. could meet the boys in the foster home as often as he liked.

B. Relevant domestic law

62. Section 47 of the Child Welfare Act ( lastensuojelulaki , barnskyddslagen , Act no. 417/2007) stipulates, as regards the duration and termination of care, as follows:

“Taking into care is valid indefinitely. When the need for care and substitute care under section 40 no longer exists, the municipal officeholder determined under section 13(1) must make a decision on terminating the care when the social worker responsible for the child ’ s affairs has prepared the case. Care must not be terminated even if the conditions for taking a child into care no longer exist if termination is manifestly not in the interests of the child in the manner referred to in subsection 3.

The social worker responsible for the child ’ s affairs must assess the conditions for continuing care when the client plan is reviewed, when a child or custodian applies for termination of care or when it otherwise proves necessary.

When a child ’ s interests are being considered in a case concerning termination of care, in addition to what is said in section 4(2), the following must be taken into account: the duration of substitute care, the quality of the affection between the child and the party providing substitute care, interaction between the child and the parents and the child ’ s views.

Care is terminated when the child concerned reaches 18 years of age.”

63. According to section 62 of the Act, t he rights of children in substitute care to keep in contact with their parents or other persons close to them may be restricted by a decision if it has not been possible to reach agreement on contact and if:

“1) the contact endangers the purpose of a child ’ s substitute care and the restriction is necessary for the child ’ s care and upbringing; or

2) the contact endangers a child ’ s life, health, development or safety; or

3) the restriction is necessary because of the safety of the parents or other children in the family or the family care home or other children or personnel in an institution; or

4) a child of 12 years of age or more opposes contact; the same applies to children under 12 years of age if they are sufficiently developed for their views to be taken into account.”

It is possible 1) to restrict children ’ s rights to meet their parents or other people close to them; 2) to restrict children ’ s rights to keep in contact with persons close to them by telephone or using other devices or means of contact; 3) to read and withhold private letters sent by children or addressed to them or other similar confidential messages or inspect and withhold some other delivery; and 4) for the place of substitute care to confiscate for the duration of the restriction all communication means or equipment held by the children concerned or restrict their use. Restriction of contact can only be applied to the extent necessary in each individual case to achieve the purpose laid down in law.

64. According to section 63 of the Act,

“A decision must be made concerning restrictions on contact referred to above in section 62 which must be issued for a fixed term and last for a maximum of one year at a time. The decision must include the reason for the restriction, the persons restricted, the kind of contact the restriction concerns and to what extent the restriction is enforced.

Decisions on restricting contact are made by the officeholder ... Restrictions on contact must be lifted as soon as they are no longer necessary in the manner referred to in section 62.”

COMPLAINTS

65. The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that that Article had been violated as the children had been taken into public care even though J. would have been capable of taking care of them. As the three boys, D, E and F, had been placed in a distant city, they had not been able to maintain contact with their parents or their other siblings. J. had not been able to maintain contact with his children. All six children had been unable to maintain contact with their three older siblings, A, B and C, with whom they used to live. The applicants ’ family life had been disrupted. The national authorities had not taken any active measures in order to reunite the family even though two years had already elapsed. They had not reassessed J. ’ s ability to have all the children living with him but had preferred to attach the children to their foster families.

THE LAW

A. Standing of the applicant father

66. The Court notes that the present application was introduced by the applicant father in his own name as well as on behalf of his minor children. The Government have not disputed the applicant father ’ s standing. The Court finds that the applicant father must be regarded, as a natural parent, as having standing to represent his minor children (see M.I. and Others v. Finland ( dec .), no. 65092/09, 13 November 2012) .

B. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the four boys D, E, F and I

67. The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the taking into emergency care and the placement of the four boys, D, E, F and I, who were minors, about the restrictions on visiting rights and about the failure to reunite them with the family.

68. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

69. The Government agreed with the applicants that the impugned measures constituted an interference with the applicants ’ right to respect for their family life. However, this interference had a basis in the Child Welfare Act and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting “the health or morals” and “the rights and freedoms” of the children. The impugned measures were also necessary in a democratic society.

70. As to the taking into public care and placement of the children, the Government noted that the boys D, E and F liked living in the foster home and they had a strong relationship as brothers. They had all made a promising start but regressed after every stay at the applicant father ’ s home. All the boys did well or moderately well at school, they had friends and their self-esteem had improved. However, they were susceptible to exclusion without continuous support. They could not think independently and needed clear instructions, even about going to the toilet. The applicant father had openly cooperated with the foster home and had never opposed the boys ’ placement there. The major objective for D, who showed symptoms typical of Asperger syndrome, was to build his self-esteem. He was receiving therapy which he would need for a long time. The boys continued to need foster care as the conditions at their home and the parenting had not improved to the extent that terminating public care and foster care could be considered to serve the children ’ s best interest.

71. The Government noted that I and his foster parents had developed mutual affection. I had many special needs which required a secure family environment and the resources of two parents. For example, he was behind in speech development for his age and he was still being toilet trained. He received speech therapy but still needed to sign the key words. In summer 2012 I was to undergo a neurological examination. He was attending a children ’ s group, which was very important for his interaction skills. Although I ’ s relationship with the applicant father had progressed positively, his home did not currently provide a stable and safe environment for I and therefore the taking into public care was maintained.

72. As to the contact restrictions, the Government emphasised that, at the beginning, the contact restrictions were necessary as the applicant father and L. could not agree on contact, their demands endangered the fulfilment of the purpose of the foster care and the applicant father had difficulties in meeting the children ’ s individual needs. In 2010 the applicant father had been focusing on arranging his own life with the intention of moving to the Philippines . He had moved to a small one-room flat in order to save money. The practice of regular home leave was stopped as it was not possible to have six or seven children in such a small flat. During this time D, E and F visited the applicant father only twice.

73. The Government stressed that over recent years the authorities had ceased to restrict contact between the applicant father and D, E and F and noted that the applicant father himself had stopped calling and visiting the children. Before a five-month trip to the Philippines in 2010, the applicant father had called his sons D, E and F every week and had spoken with each of them separately. After moving to the Philippines , he had not had any contact with the three boys or the foster home, although he had agreed to keep in contact through Skype and e-mail. The boys had not requested any contact with the applicant father. On his return to Finland the applicant father had stopped calling the boys and apparently spent all his time on the computer when his sons visited him at home. Following the applicant father ’ s return to Finland in July 2011 after his second trip to the Philippines , the home leave began again from December 2011 onwards. Contrary to the applicants ’ allegations, the siblings had been able to meet each other. The authorities had made it possible for the applicant father to contact his children throughout the foster care period and any interruptions had been due to reasons attributable to the applicant father.

74. As concerned I, the Government noted that the applicant father had met him only a couple of times while he was in the reception home although he had the opportunity to meet him daily. He did not call I either, even though it had been agreed that he would call once a week. The relationship between them had been interrupted for almost half a year when the applicant father was in the Philippines and married there. After J. ’ s unexpected return to Finland in July 2011 from his second trip to the Philippines , he had met I about once a month. In December 2011 a meeting was held to plan contact between I, the applicant father and his new wife. The meetings would first take place in the foster home and then gradually move to the applicant father ’ s home, first in the presence of the foster parents. The length of the meetings would be extended gradually and I ’ s reaction to the change of circumstances would be closely monitored.

75. Finally, as to reuniting the children, the Government noted that the applicant father ’ s parenting had been assessed throughout the foster care period. His moving to the Philippines showed that catering for the children ’ s needs was not his primary concern. Thus, his own decisions had delayed the plans to reunite the family. However, the assessment of the applicant father ’ s situation continued after his return to Finland in July 2011. The child welfare authorities visited his home in summer 2011 and they had a negotiation meeting with him and his new wife in October 2011. However, the boys ’ visits to the applicant father and his new wife had been emotionally difficult for the boys and they did not have any common language with the wife. The welfare authorities were trying to help to reunite the family as much as possible. However, considering the best interest of the children, no grounds had been found for reuniting the family in the manner requested by the applicant father.

76. The applicants stressed that there had been an interference with their right to respect for their family life. However, there had been no legitimate aim for this interference, nor had it been necessary in a democratic society. There was no longer any justification to restrict contact between the applicant father and his sons.

77. The applicants noted that the applicant father had developed his parenting skills enormously and that he had remarried in May 2010. These facts had not been seriously taken into account by the social authorities as family reunion had not been considered an option for the children. The applicant father had been told that I ’ s placement in foster care was intended to be permanent. In the applicants ’ view, the State was continuously neglecting its positive obligation to reunite the family. Public care should only be a temporary measure and the authorities should at each stage work actively with the family with a view to family reunion. According to the domestic law a client plan should include a reunion plan. The possibility of reunion should be evaluated regularly and such evaluation should also focus on increasing visiting rights.

B. The Court ’ s assessment

78. The Court reiterates that mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other ’ s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life , and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention (see , inter alia , Johansen v. Norway , 7 August 1996 , § 52 , Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ III ). Any such interference constitutes a violation of this Article unless it is “in accordance with the law” , pursues an aim or aims that are legitimate under paragraph 2 and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”.

79. In determining whether the impugned measures were “necessary in a democratic society”, two aspects of the proceedings require consideration. First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were ‘ relevant and sufficient ’ ; second it must be examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant ’ s rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see K and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001-VII; A.D. and O.D. v. the United Kingdom , no. 28680/06 , § 82, 16 March 2010; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 134, 6 July 2010; and R. and H. v. the United Kingdom , no. 35348/06 , §§ 75 and 81 , 31 May 2011).

80. The Court reiterates that in child cases the best interests of the child are paramount (see Johansen v. Norway , cited above, § 78; Kearns v. France , no. 35991/04, § 79, 10 January 2008; and R. and H. , cited above , §§ 73 and 81 ) . In identifying the child ’ s best interests in a particular case, two considerations must be borne in mind: first, it is in the child ’ s best interests that her ties with her family be maintained except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child ’ s best interests to ensure her development in a safe and secure environment (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 136; and R. and H. , cited above, §§ 73-74) . It is clear from the foregoing that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘ rebuild ’ the family (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 136; and R. and H. , cited above , § 73 ) . It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for her upbringing (see K and T. , cited above, § 173). However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child ’ s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 136; and R. and H. , cited above , § 73).

81. The identification of the child ’ s best interests and the assessment of the overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a number of factors in the balance. In particular, the Court considers that in seeking to identify the best interests of a child and in assessing the necessity of any proposed measure in the context of proceedings concerning taking into public care, placement, contact restrictions and reunion, the domestic court must demonstrate that it has had regard to, inter alia , the age, maturity and ascertained wishes of the child (see Y.C. v. the United Kingdom , no. 4547/10 , § 135, 13 March 2012; and K.S. v. the United Kingdom ( dec .), no. 62110/10, § 39, 10 July 2012).

82. The Court recognises that, in reaching decisions in so sensitive an area, local authorities and courts are faced with a task that is extremely difficult. The national authorities have had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. There is therefore a need to allow them a certain margin of appreciation in deciding how best to deal with the cases before them. Accordingly, it is not the Court ’ s task to substitute itself for the domestic authorities but to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken and assessments made by those authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation (see K and T. , cited above, § 154 ; A.D. and O.D. , cited above , § 83 ; Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 138; and R. and H. , cited above, § 81).

83. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening to his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim of reuniting the family as soon as circumstances permit (see K and T. , cited above, § 155). The Court has indicated that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life, as such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K and T. , cited above, § 155; A.D. and O.D. , cited above , § 83; and R. and H. , cited above, § 81 ).

84. As to the decision-making process, what has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 139; and R. and H. , cited above, § 75). Thus it is incumbent upon the Court to ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what would be the best solution for the child (see, mutatis mutandis , Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 139). In practice, there is likely to be a degree of overlap in this respect with the need for relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a measure in respect of the care of a child.

85. The taking into care of a child should normally be regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit , and any measures of implementation of temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent and child (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1) , 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130 ; Johansen v. Norway , cited above , § 78; and E.P. v. Italy , no. 31127/96 , § 69 , 16 November 1999). In this regard a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child remaining in care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2) , 27 November 1992, § 90, Series A no. 250 ; and Hokkanen v. Finland , 23 September 1994, § 55, Series A no. 299 ‑ A ). In carrying out this balancing exercise , the Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child which , depending on their nature and seriousness , may override those of the parent (see Johansen v. Norway , cited above , § 78).

86. Turning to the present case, it is common ground that the placement of the applicant father ’ s four sons, all minors, in public care interfered with their right to respect for their family life. The Court finds no indication that the taking into public care of D, E, F and I on 8 November 2007 and their placement in two different foster homes was not based on the Child Welfare Act. The measures were also clearly aimed at protecting the health and best interests of the boys.

87. As to whether the taking into public care was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court finds that the competent authorities were entitled to conclude that the measure was necessary in the circumstances of the case. The main reason for taking the four boys into public care was that their care and upbringing were being neglected. As the domestic courts pointed out, the parents had been offered help in the form of day-care and assistance at their home but they had declined any help from the child welfare authorities. As the circumstances at home seriously endangered the boys ’ health and development and other assistance was not possible or sufficient, the reasons given by the domestic authorities to take the boys into public care were both “relevant and sufficient”. The Court does not have any reason to believe either that the placement of the boys in two different foster homes was not in their best interest, especially as the three older boys were placed together in one foster home in order to reinforce their relationship as brothers. The youngest boy I was placed in a near-by foster home to accommodate his special needs.

88. As far as the contact restrictions are concerned, the Court notes first of all that it is not able to examine any of the contact restrictions which took place or became final before 24 March 2009. As the applicants ’ application was lodged with the Court on 24 September 2009, the restrictions taking place or becoming final before 24 March 2009 fall outside the six-month time-limit. Moreover, it appears that no appeal was made against some of the decisions by the child welfare authorities to restrict contact. The applicants have thus in this respect failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to them.

89. The Court notes that the applicants only appealed against the decisions of 20 October 2009, 7 January and 12 May 2010 by the child welfare authorities. These decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court on 2 November 2010 and 6 April 2011, and by the Supreme Administrative Court on 29 February 2012. According to these decisions, only the meetings of D, E and F at the applicant father ’ s home were restricted. Otherwise he could meet the boys in the foster home as often as he liked. As concerns I, the applicant father J. was granted a right to meet him once a month for 3 to 4 hours. The Court finds these contact restrictions imposed on the applicant father justified due to the need to secure the well ‑ being of the boys and the progress made during foster care. In particular, a careful approach by the domestic authorities in respect of the youngest boy, I, in the changing circumstances can reasonably be regarded as having been in the best interest of the child.

90. As concerns the possible reunion of the family , the Court notes that the applicant father has repeatedly requested the termination of public care in respect of all the boys. These requests have been refused as the termination of public care, according to the domestic authorities, has not, in their assessment, so far been in the best interest of the boys. The Court considers that when examining these requests the domestic authorities gave relevant consideration to the applicants ’ circumstances as well as to the ultimate aim of family reunion. As the Supreme Administrative Court found in its most recent decision, there is no indication of an intention on the part of the authorities permanently to prevent reunion of the family. On the contrary, it can be clearly seen in the case documents that the possibility of family reunion has been regularly assessed by the child welfare authorities.

91. In conclusion , the Court finds that the social welfare authorities and the administrative courts acted in the best interest of the boys, struck a proper balance between the competing interests and did not overstep their margin of appreciation in ordering and implementing the necessary measures. The Court finds therefore that the taking of D, E, F and I into public care , their placement in foster homes, the contact restrictions and refusal so far of family reunion were based on reasons which were not only relevant but also sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Moreover, the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicants ’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly , this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill ‑ founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

C. Remainder of the application

92. The applicants also complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the taking into public care and the placement of the two girls, G and H, both minors, about the restrictions on visiting rights and about the failure to reunite them with the family.

93. The Court notes that G and H have been living with their father since 17 May 2009, and that their taking into public care was terminated on 12 November 2009. The two girls are thus no longer subject to any restrictions on contact with their father or their other siblings, including the three older ones who used to live with them. As the two girls were already reunited with their father before the date of lodging the present application, neither of them can any longer be regarded as a victim. Accordingly , this part of the application must be rejected as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Declares the application inadmissible.

Lawrence Early Ineta Ziemele Registrar President