SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 42947/12 Ferenc BÁBIK and others against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 21 May 2013 as a Chamber composed of:

Guido Raimondi, President, Peer Lorenzen, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Helen Keller, judges , and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 May 2012,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. They were represented before the Court by Mr A. Cech, a lawyer practising in Budapest.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

The applicants are all active members of various law-enforcement agencies. Under the rules which were in force when the applicants took up duties, they were entitled to retire after 25 years of service, irrespective of their age, or at the latest five year earlier than the generally valid age-limit for old-age pension. These advantages were available in the form of a ‘ service pension ’ ( szolgálati nyugdíj ).

As of 1 January 2012, the service pension as such was abolished by a legislative amendment (Act no. CLXVII of 2011). In its stead, a so-called service allowance ( szolgálati járandóság ) was instituted, with different amounts and conditions. In particular, the five-year age benefit is no longer applicable in cases like that of the applicants, and moreover, no special pension or allowance is available merely as a consequence of a 25-year long service. Furthermore, a one-time benefit of two months ’ salary due on retirement was also removed. In other words, under the new scheme the applicants ’ pension entitlement has become largely identical to that of the general population, despite the expectations they had when entering the service.

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the abolition of the service pension constituted an unjustified interference with their legitimate expectation of a more advantageous pension. They also complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that there was no access to a court or an effective remedy in order to challenge this measure, originating in a legislative act.

THE LAW

1. The applicants complained that the rules of service allowance, as opposed to those of service pension, amount to an unjustified interference with their property rights, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which provides as follows

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

They submitted in particular that the expectation that they would be able to retire under the special conditions attached to the service pension constituted a legitimate expectation for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, now frustrated by the new rules.

The Court observes that the applicants are still in active service, and their complaints concern the nature and the amount of their future State-sponsored pensions and the age-limit by which those entitlements will become available to them. Therefore the impugned legislative amendments concern no more than the situation of the applicants if and when they will retire.

It follows that this part of the application is premature and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicant also submitted that there was no access to a court or an effective remedy to challenge this measure. They rely on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention.

As to Article 6 § 1, the Court observes that there was no “dispute” in this case to attract the application of the civil limb of Article 6 § 1.

This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

Furthermore, the Court recalls that the Convention organs have consistently held that it cannot be deduced from Article 13 that there must be a remedy against legislation as such which is considered not to be in conformity with the Convention. Such a remedy would in effect amount to some sort of judicial review of legislation because any other review – generally sufficient for Article 13 which requires only a “remedy before a national authority” – could hardly be effective concerning legislation (see Xenodochiaki S.A. v. Greece (dec.), no. 49213/99, 15 November 2001; Greek Federation of Customs Officers, Nicolaos Gialouris, Georgios Christopoulos and 3,333 other Customs Officers v. Greece (dec.), no. 24581/94, Commission decision of 6 April 1995, Decisions and Reports 81, p. 123).

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Stanley Naismith Guido Raimondi Registrar President

Appendix

LIST OF APPLICANTS