THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 12042/05 Blenis SHYTI against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 19 November 2013 as a Chamber composed of:

Josep Casadevall, President, Alvina Gyulumyan, Corneliu Bîrsan, Ján Šikuta, Nona Tsotsoria, Kristina Pardalos, Johannes Silvis, judges, and Santiago Quesada , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 March 2005,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the absence of comments submitted by the Albanian Government,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Blenis Shyti, is an Albanian national, who was born in 1983 and lives in Constanța. He was represented before the Court by Ms A. Grigorescu, a lawyer practicing in Constanța.

2. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their co-Agent, Ms I. Cambrea and their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. The applicant ’ s pre-trial detention in respect of proceedings concerning human trafficking and unlawful possession of firearms

4. On 11 December 2004 the Constanţa Police Unit for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime (“Constanţa Police Unit”) initiated proceedings with the Constanţa County Court, seeking the applicant ’ s detention pending trial on suspicion of human trafficking and unlawful possession of firearms. By an interlocutory judgment delivered the same day the Constanţa County Court allowed the Constanţa Police Unit ’ s action and, on the basis of testimonial evidence and documents, ordered the applicant ’ s detention pending trial. It held that the evidence supported the suspicion that he had committed the offences, the offences were serious and he represented a danger to public order given the nature of the offences and the feeling of insecurity that could have been induced in the general public if he had been released. In addition, the proper administration of justice justified his pre-trial detention considering that the applicant might have attempted to intimidate the victim and to influence the witnesses. The applicant appealed against the interlocutory judgment.

5. By an interlocutory judgment not subject to appeal of 14 December 2004 the Constanţa Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal as ill-founded, relying on the same reasoning as the first-instance court.

6. By interlocutory judgments not subject to appeal of 8 February, 10 March and 9 April 2005 the Constanţa Court of Appeal extended the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention, on the grounds that new evidence discovered in the case file reinforced the suspicion that he had committed the offences and that the reasons which had justified his initial detention remained valid.

7. On 5 April 2005 the Constanţa Prosecutor ’ s Office indicted the applicant and sent his case for trial.

8. By an interlocutory judgment not subject to appeal of 6 June 2005, the Constanţa Court of Appeal allowed the applicant ’ s action seeking the discontinuation of his pre-trial detention and ordered his release on the grounds that the reasons justifying his initial detention were no longer valid.

2. The applicant ’ s pre-trial detention in respect of proceedings concerning aggravated murder and robbery

9. On 15 December 2004 the Constanţa Prosecutor ’ s Office ordered the applicant ’ s and S.N. ’ s detention for twenty-four hours pending trial on suspicion of having committed aggravated murder and robbery. It held, on the basis of testimonial, expert, forensic and documentary evidence, that the applicant and S.N. were suspected of having murdered an entire family in the town of Mangalia, including an eight-year-old girl whom they tried to strangle and afterwards buried alive in the woods with her arms and legs tied.

10. On 16 December 2004 the Constanţa Prosecutor ’ s Office initiated proceedings before the Constanţa County Court, seeking an extension of the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention. By an interlocutory judgment subject to appeal delivered on the same day, the Constanţa County Court allowed the Prosecutor ’ s Office ’ s action on the grounds that the conditions set out in Article 148 (d) and (h) of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure had been met. The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences, and that he and his co-accused had attempted to obstruct the course of justice by intimidating a witness and by hiding not only evidence but also the corpses of the victims. In addition they represented a danger to public order on account of the violent and heinous nature of their unlawful acts - the modus operandi of which had shocked the general public - the seriousness of the offence, and the severity of the anticipated penalty. The applicant withdrew the appeal he had brought against the interlocutory judgment.

11. By twenty-seven interlocutory judgments not subject to appeal delivered between 9 February 2005 and 26 May 2008, whilst taking into consideration the applicant ’ s personal circumstances, the Constanţa Court of Appeal extended his pre-trial detention. It held that the reasons which had justified his initial detention remained valid, that it was supported by new evidence, and that the length of his detention was not excessive given the complexity of the case, the numerous procedural acts required to observe the applicant ’ s right to a fair trial - which had been carried out without undue delay - and the need to hear evidence from several witnesses living abroad by using international procedures. In addition, it held that the detention was also justified by the need to gather additional evidence required for the examination of the applicant ’ s case, by the applicant ’ s attitude during the trial, and in order to prevent his interference with the process of gathering evidence and its preservation, as well as to avoid potential collusion by the accused. The court also rejected the applicant ’ s argument – namely that his detention pending trial in two separate sets of proceedings at the same time had breached the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of the overall length of his pre-trial detention - on the grounds that he had been investigated in respect of two separate unlawful acts and had not been detained longer than the maximum amount of time allowed by domestic law for pre-trial detention at the criminal investigation stage of proceedings. Moreover, it dismissed his request for alternative measures on the grounds that - according to the available evidence - the applicant might attempt to abscond.

12. On 6 June 2005 the Constanţa Prosecutor ’ s Office indicted the applicant and sent his case for trial.

13. By an interlocutory judgment of 3 August 2005 the Constanţa County Court ordered the joinder of the two sets of proceedings concerning firstly human trafficking and unlawful possession of firearms and secondly murder, and adjourned the hearing concerning the discontinuation of the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention to 10 August 2005.

14. By an interlocutory judgment of 10 August 2005 the Constanţa County Cour t allowed the applicant ’ s action seeking the discontinuation of his pre-trial detention on procedural grounds. It also held that the applicant ’ s detention in two separate sets of proceedings could have delayed the criminal proceedings brought against him. Consequently, it ordered the applicant ’ s immediate release. The Constanţa Prosecutor ’ s Office appealed against the interlocutory judgment.

15. The applicant was released on 10 August 2005.

16. By an interlocutory judgment not subject to appeal of 2 September 2005 the Constanţa Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the Prosecutor ’ s Office against the interlocutory judgment of 10 August 2005. It severed the two separate sets of proceedings on the grounds that there was no link between the two sets of offences for which the applicant was on trial for and that their joint examination would delay the proceedings and the examination of evidence. In addition, it ordered the applicant ’ s immediate incarceration on the grounds that the reasons which had justified the applicant ’ s initial detention remained valid. The applicant was detained pending trial on the same date.

3. The applicant ’ s pre-trial detention in respect of proceedings concerning theft

17. By an order of the Constanţa Police of 17 August 2005, the applicant was detained for twenty-four hours on suspicion of theft on the grounds that he represented a danger to public order.

18. By an interlocutory judgment of 20 August 2005, the Constanţa County Court ordered that the applicant ’ s detention be extended from 20 August 2005 to 17 September 2005 on similar grounds. The applicant appealed against the interlocutory judgment.

19. By an interlocutory judgment not subject to appeal of 22 August 2005 the Constanţa Court of Appeal allowed the applicant ’ s appeal on procedural grounds and referred the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. In addition, it noted that during the brief period he had been released from pre-trial detention the applicant had been stopped at Bucharest International Airport while trying to leave the country.

20. In a letter of 3 April 2006 the applicant submitted to the Court that his detention between 17 and 20 August 2005 had been unlawful.

4. The applicant ’ s pre-trial detention in respect of proceedings concerning drug trafficking and attempted human trafficking

21. On 19 August 2005 the Constanța Prosecutor ’ s Office ordered the applicant ’ s detention for twenty-four hours pending trial on suspicion of drug trafficking and attempted human trafficking.

5. Other sets of proceedings in which the applicant has been involved             

22. By a final judgment of 25 June 2007 the Constanţa County Court convicted the applicant of theft and, on the basis of testimonial evidence and documents, ordered him to pay an administrative fine.

23. By final judgments of 4 October and 3 December 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed the criminal proceedings for malfeasance brought by the applicant against two of the prosecutors who had launched the investigation against him for aggravated murder on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed.

6. The trial stage of the proceedings concerning aggravated murder and robbery             

24. By a judgment of 12 June 2008 the Constanţa County Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and robbery and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the basis of testimonial, documentary, expert and forensic evidence, as well as transcripts of his telephone conversation with his co-accused. The applicant appealed against that judgment.

25. By a judgment of 24 March 2009 the Constanţa Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal as ill-founded. The applicant appealed on points of law ( recurat ) against the judgments.

26. By a final judgment of 24 November 2009 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law as ill-founded.

7. The media campaign initiated against the applicant and the statement by the Romanian Prime Minister

27. Between December 2004 and April 2006 approximately forty articles were published in local and national newspapers, including România Liberă , Evenimentul Zilei , Gardianul , Ziua , and Cuget Liber , in respect of the criminal proceedings brought against the applicant for the aggravated murder he had allegedly committed in the town of Mangalia. The majority of the articles submitted by the applicant are a chronological narration of the criminal proceedings initiated against him.

28. On 10 January 2006 the national newspaper România Liberă published a press article under the headline “The Prosecutor ’ s Office and the High Council of Magistrates Live in a World of their Own” reporting on a public debate organised by the Romanian government on issues concerning the fight against corruption and their impact on the country ’ s intention to become a European Union Member State. According to the article, while expressing his opinion on the domestic justice system, the Romanian Prime Minister expressly stated:

“We have a serious problem with the police and the Prosecutor ’ s Office. The fact that a proven criminal has been released on the grounds that he is no danger to public order, in Mangalia, proves that the justice system is not working.”

B. Relevant domestic law

29. Article 148 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) provides that a person may be arrested when there is reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed a crime, and provided that one of the situations listed is applicable. These situations include ones in which an accused has attempted to obstruct justice by intimidating witnesses or by hiding evidence, or has committed a serious offence punishable by more than two years ’ imprisonment, or is a danger to public order.

30. The relevant domestic practice concerning the notion of “danger to public order” provided for by the provisions of Article 148 (h) of the CCP is set forth in the case of Calmanovici v. Romania (no. 42250/02, §§ 40-42, 1 July 2008). Following the amendment of the CCP by Act no. 281/2002, published in the Official Gazette on 1 July 2003, Article 148 (h) of the CCP requires the existence of evidence that the release of an accused would pose a real danger to public order.

COMPLAINTS

31. Relying on Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his pre-trial detention between 17 and 20 August 2005 had been unlawful, and that the same reasons had repeatedly been used to place and retain him in pre-trial detention for an excessively long time.

32. Invoking Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the allegedly excessive length of the proceedings, which had ended with the final judgment of 24 November 2009; about the alleged unfairness of the said proceedings in so far as the courts had wrongfully assessed the evidence; about the outcome of the proceedings, which had ended with the final judgments of 25 June, 4 October and 3 December 2007; and about the alleged breach of his right to the presumption of innocence on account of the media campaign initiated against him and the statement made by the Romanian Prime Minister of 10 January 2006 concerning his trial for aggravated murder.

33. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the alleged interference by the prison authorities with his correspondence during the first stage of his pre-trial detention.

34. Invoking Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been discriminated against and alleged that the opening of the criminal investigation against him for aggravated murder had been due to his nationality.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of Article 5 of the Convention

35. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had extended his pre-trial detention for an unreasonably long period of time by relying on the same grounds repeatedly. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial ...”

1. Submissions of the parties

36. The Government emphasised from the outset the numerous offences allegedly committed by the applicant which had given rise to an investigation. They dwelled, in particular, on the seriousness of the charge of aggravated murder for which the applicant had been sentenced to life imprisonment following a complex set of proceedings.

37. The Government argued that the dome stic legislation regulating pre ‑ trial detention was clear and foreseeable. They further contended that the domestic courts had observed the domestic legal provisions regulating pre-trial detention and had provided ample and concrete reasons for their decisions. The domestic courts had emphasised the need to avoid any interference by the applicant in the process of gathering evidence, the substantial criminal activity undertaken by him and the particularly violent nature of the offences. The applicant had been assisted by legal representatives of his choosing during the proceedings and his requests had always been examined by the domestic courts. In addition, the said courts had relied in their reasoning on new evidence and reasons to justify his continued pre-trial detention. Moreover, the reasons provided by the domestic courts when dismissing his requests for alternative measures had been extensive, clear and convincing. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had examined the particular circumstances of the applicant ’ s case even though he was charged with offences similar to those of his co-accused.

38. The Government also emphasised that the heinousness of the applicant ’ s offences, in particular the triple murder he was charged with, had presented a real danger for public order. Consequently, the reasons provided by the domestic courts for extending his pre-trial detention had been relevant and sufficient.

39. They also contended that no period of inactivity was imputable to the authorities, which had carried out their tasks diligently despite the great complexity of the case. They had gathered substantial amounts of evidence, allowed the applicant to freely submit all his procedural requests - which they had duly examined - and had undertaken measures to sever the proceedings in order to avoid undue delays.

40. The applicant contended that the domestic courts had extended his pre-trial detention for an excessively long time, relying on the same grounds repeatedly and without examining the evidence available on file. Moreover, the authorities had failed to carry out their tasks diligently and had therefore unduly delayed the proceedings.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) General principles

41. The general principles regarding the right “to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, have been stated in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, KudÅ‚a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110 et seq, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI, and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-X, with further references).

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

42. The Court notes that the applicant was remanded in custody in four parallel sets of criminal proceedings opened against him. The applicant ’ s detention continued with a very brief interruption under four subsequent detention orders (see paragraphs 4-21 above). It started in the first set of proceedings on 11 December 2004, when he was detained on suspicion of human trafficking and unlawful possession of firearms (see paragraph 4 above). On 15 December 2004 the Constanța Prosecutor ’ s Office detained the applicant on suspicion of aggravated murder and robbery (see paragraph 9 above). On 17 August 2005 the Constanța Police detained him in a third set of proceedings on suspicion of theft (see paragraph 17 above). Lastly, on 19 August 2005 the Constanța Prosecutor ’ s Office detained the applicant on suspicion of drug trafficking and attempted human trafficking (see paragraph 21 above).

43. In the first set of proceedings the applicant ’ s detention was lifted on 6 June 2005, while in the fourth and third set of proceedings it appears from the available evidence that his detention ended on 20 and 22 August 2005, respectively. However, in so far as the second set of proceedings is concerned, the applicant remained in pre-trial detention until 12 June 2008, when he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the first ‑ instance court (see paragraph 24 above).

44. Accordingly - given that where an accused person is detained for two or more separate periods pending trial, the reasonable time guarantee of Article 5 § 3 requires a global assessment of the cumulative period (see, among other authorities, Piechowicz v. Poland, no. 20071/07, § 188, 17 April 2012) - the term to be taken into consideration amounts to three years, five months and twenty-three days.

45. The Court observes that in their decision to remand the applicant in custody the judicial authorities relied on the following principal grounds: the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the serious nature of the offences with which he had been charged, the severity of the anticipated penalty, the risk of his influencing the testimonies of witnesses or of the co ‑ accused or obstructing the proceedings by other means, and the need to obtain extensive evidence and to prevent absconding. Furthermore, the Romanian authorities contended that the particular seriousness and complexity of the case - since it concerned aggravated murder - further justified the applicant ’ s detention.

46. The suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences was confirmed by testimonial, expert, forensic and documentary evidence and initially warranted his detention. Therefore, the only question which remains is whether and when the continuation of his detention ceased to be warranted by “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons.

47. The Court considers that the authorities were faced with the difficult task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged responsibility of both the applicant and his co-accused, who had been accused of acting together in committing the most serious offences with which they were charged. In these circumstances, the Court also accepts that the need to obtain copious and detailed evidence from many sources, coupled with the existence of a general risk flowing from the organised, violent and heinous nature of the applicant ’ s alleged criminal activities, constituted relevant and sufficient grounds for extending his detention for the time needed to complete the investigation, draw up the bill of indictment and hear evidence from the accused.

48. The Court notes that the judicial authorities also relied on the likelihood that severe sentences would be imposed on the applicant, given the serious nature of the offences at issue. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the severity of the anticipated sentence is a relevant element in assessing the risk of absconding or reoffending. It acknowledges that in view of the seriousness of the accusations against the applicant, the authorities could justifiably have considered that such an initial risk was established. However, the Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria , no. 33977/96, §§ 80-81, 26 July 2001). In the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the severity of the anticipated penalty in conjunction with the other grounds relied on by the authorities, could constitute “relevant and sufficient grounds” for holding the applicant in detention.

49. As regards the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of the obstruction of the proceedings by other unlawful means, the Court notes that the judicial authorities ’ presumption that such risks existed was well-founded, since the applicant had intimidated witnesses, and had hidden not only evidence but also the corpses of his victims (see paragraph 10 above). The Court also observes that the risk of absconding in the applicant ’ s case was particularly high, since during the brief period he was released from prison he had attempted to leave the country even though the criminal sets of proceedings opened against him were pending (see paragraph 19 above). Accordingly, the Court accepts that, in the special circumstances of the case, the risk flowing from the nature of the applicant ’ s criminal activities actually existed and justified holding him in custody for the relevant period.

50. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the grounds given for the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention were “relevant” and “sufficient” justification for holding him in custody for the entire period in question.

51. The Court lastly observes that the proceedings were of considerable complexity, regard being had to the need to determine the actual perpetrator of some of the offences, the extensive evidentiary proceedings and the implementation of special procedural measures required in cases concerning foreign nationals. Nevertheless, it appears from the available evidence that the hearings in the applicant ’ s case were held regularly and at short intervals. The Court therefore concludes that the national authorities displayed special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings. The length of the investigation and of the trial was justified by the complexity of the case as well as its exceptional circumstances and the extremely serious impact a potential decision of guilt could have had on the applicant ’ s life. In addition, the applicant has not substantiated any notable periods of inactivity which could lead the Court to conclude otherwise.

52. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that this part of the application must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention

53. The applicant complained that the statement made by the Romanian Prime Minister, as published in a national newspaper on 10 January 2006, breached his right to the presumption of innocence in respect of the criminal proceedings for aggravated murder initiated against him. He relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

1. Submissions of the parties

54. The Government argued that the present case concerned events of great interest for the general public. They also submitted that the Prime Minister had made his statement in a public debate concerning the fight against corruption in Romania. The statement concerned had been a private political opinion and had not singled out the applicant by name. Moreover, it had not discussed the offences the applicant was charged with or the domestic courts examining the case or the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention. The Prime Minister had mentioned only the name of the town of Mangalia which could not suffice to identify the applicant in the absence of any other material element relied on by him. Furthermore, at the time of the statement on 10 January 2006, the applicant h ad been re-incarcerated since 2 September 2005 and his situation could therefore not have been the one to which the Prime Minister was referring, particularly since the reasoning leading to the applicant ’ s release had not been the fact that he was not a danger to public order. Consequently, the Prime Minister ’ s statement could not be considered as an official position on the applicant ’ s guilt or capable of influencing the judges ’ opinions in that respect. His statement represented a subjective opinion on the way the domestic authorities had chosen to apply the law.

55. The Government also contended that the judges examining the applicant ’ s case were professionals and there was no evidence on file to suggest that during the course of the proceedings they had allowed themselves to be influenced by any outside opinion.

56. The applicant argued that the statement made by the Prime Minister had not been political but instead amounted to interference with judicial affairs, breaching the applicant ’ s right to be presumed innocent.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) General principles

57. The Court reiterates that while the presumption of innocence enshrined in paragraph 2 of Article 6 is one of the elements of the fair criminal trial that is required by Article 6 § 1, it is not limited to being a procedural safeguard in criminal matters: its scope is broader and requires that no representative of the State should claim that a person is guilty of an offence before his guilt has been established by a court. The Court also points out that the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or a court but also by other public authorities (see Daktaras v. Lithuania , no. 42095/98, §§ 41-42, ECHR 2000-X). This is because the presumption of innocence, as a procedural right, serves mainly to guarantee the rights of the defence and at the same time helps to preserve the honour and dignity of the accused.

58. In this regard, the Court stresses the importance of the wording used by representatives of the State in remarks made before a person has been tried and found guilty of an offence. It considers that what is relevant when it comes to the application of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention is the real meaning of the remarks made, not their literal form (see Lavents v. Latvia , no. 58442/00, § 126, 28 November 2002). However, the question of whether or not a public official ’ s remarks breach the principle of the presumption of innocence must be examined in the context of the particular circumstances in which the offending remarks were made (see, among other authorities, Adolf v. Austria , 26 March 1982, §§ 36-41, Series A no. 49).

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

59. In the instant case the Court notes that the statement in question was made by the Prime Minister, that is to say by one of the highest representatives of the State. The Court considers that this high-ranking official was duty-bound to respect the principle of the presumption of innocence (see Y.B. and Others v. Turkey , nos. 48173/99 and 48319/99, § 43, 28 October 2004). What is more, the statement was made when the proceedings initiated against the applicant were still pending before the first-instance court.

60. However, the Court notes that the Prime Minister ’ s statement of 10 January 2006 did not refer directly to the applicant. While his statement specifically mentioned the town where the applicant allegedly committed the offences, his comment did not mention the applicant by name. Moreover, his statement did not refer explicitly to the criminal case in which the applicant was involved or to any other element that could have led to the conclusion that he was referring to the applicant ’ s case.

61. The Court notes in this context that at the time of the impugned statement the applicant had already been re-incarcerated for five months following the interlocutory judgment of 2 September 2005 and that the initial reasons for his release were of a procedural nature and not because he represented no danger to public order.

62. While it is undisputed that the applicant ’ s case was given wide media coverage in Romania, this factor on its own does not suffice for the Court to conclude that the remark made by the Prime Minister related to him to a degree that was sufficient to render him identifiable.

63. Lastly, the Court considers that even if it is true that the Prime Minister could have avoided using the words “proven criminal”, his remark could not be regarded as an attempt to prejudge the domestic courts ’ verdict in the applicant ’ s case.

64. It follows that this part of the application must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

C. Other alleged violations of the Convention

65. The applicant raised several other complaints before the Court by relying on Articles 5, 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention (see paragraphs 31-34 above).

66. The Court has examined these complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as they fall within its jurisdiction, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall Registrar President