FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 72254/11 Savo BOGDANOVIĆ and O thers against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18 March 2014 as a Chamber composed of:

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Julia Laffranque, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Erik Møse, Ksenija Turković, judges, and Søren Nielsen , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 November 2011,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicants, Mr Savo Bogdanović, Ms Rosa Bogdanović and Mr Milan Bogdanović are Croatian citizens of Serbian ethnic origin. They were born in 1954, 1952 and 1950 respectively and live in Bosanski Brod, Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were represented before the Court by Mr L. Šušak, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.

2 . The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

A. The circumstances of the case

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Criminal investigation

4 . On 11 May 1992 the applicants ’ father B.B. was killed in his house in Slavonski Brod in Croatia.

5 . On 14 May 1992 the police carried out an on-site inspection of the crime scene and interviewed several persons. An autopsy was carried out on 15 May 1992.

6 . Firearms were confiscated from three persons, J.G., J.M. and V.P. A ballistics report was drawn up on 22 May 1992, showing that the cartridges found at the crime scene had not been shot from the confiscated firearms .

7 . The police lodged a criminal complaint against an unknown perpetrator on 22 May 1992 with the Požega County State Attorney ’ s Office on charges of murder.

8 . On 26 August 2004 the third applicant asked the Slavonski Brod police for a certificate confirming that his father had died on 11 May 1992, which was issued the following day.

9 . On 3 May 2012 the applicants ’ lawyer asked the Slavonski Brod County State Attorney ’ s Office for a copy of the case file concerning the investigation into B.B. ’ s death , for the purposes of having brought their application with the Court . He was informed that the criminal prosecution for the criminal offence of murder had become statutory barred on 11 April 2007.

2. Civil proceedings

10 . On 30 December 2004 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their father. They based their claim on the 2003 Liability Act.

11 . The claim was dismissed on 24 March 2006. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court and the Supreme Court on 13 May 2008 and 9 June 2010 respectively. The national courts found that the claim for compensation had been submitted after the statutory limitation period prescribed by the laws related to the compensation of damages in civil proceedings had expired.

12 . A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants was dismissed on 4 May 2011.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Relevant domestic law

13 . The relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima , Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 73/1991, 3/1994, 7/1996, 112/1999), as then in force, read as follows:

Section 360

“(1) The right to claim fulfilment of an obligation shall cease when the statutory limitation period has expired.

(2) The statute of limitations [bars a right to claim] when the statutory prescribed period in which a creditor could have claimed fulfilment of an obligation has expired.

...”

Section 376

“(1) A claim for damages shall become statute-barred three years after the injured party learned about the damage and the identity of the person who caused it.

(2) In any event that claim shall become statute-barred five years after the damage occurred.

...”

14 . Article 34 of the Criminal Code ( Krivični zakon , Official Gazette nos. 25/1977, 50/1978, 25/1984, 52/1987, 43/1989, 8/1990, 8/1991, and 53/1991) prescribes imprisonment of at least five years for murder. Qualified murder was punishable by up to twenty years ’ imprisonment.

15 . The relevant part of the Criminal Code ( Kazneni zakon , Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 50/2000, 129/00, 51/2001, 111/2003, 190/2003, 105/2004, 84/2005, 71/2006, 110/2007, 152/2008, 57/2011 and 143/2012) reads:

Article 18

“(1) On account of the statute of limitations, the criminal legislation of the Republic of Croatia may not be applied after the period determined by this Code has elapsed. The period is calculated from the time the offence was committed, sentence was pronounced or another criminal sanction was ordered.

(2) The previous rule does not apply in respect of the criminal offences of genocide ... , aggressive war ... , crimes against humanity ... , war crimes ... and other criminal offences which are not subject to statutory limitation according to the Constitution or international law”

Article 1 9

“(1) C riminal prosecutions may not be instituted , save for the criminal offences referred to in Article 18 of this Code, after expiry of the following periods from the time the offence was committed :

- twenty-five years for the offence punishable by long-term imprisonment;

- fifteen years for the offence punishable by more than ten years ’ imprisonment;

- ten years for the offence punishable by more than five years ’ imprisonment

...”

Article 20

“ (1) The limitation period shall start to run f rom the date on which the offence was committed.

...

(3) The statutory limitation period shall be interrupted each time a procedural step is taken concerning the prosecution of the offence.

...

(5) The statutory limitation period shall start to run again after each interruption.

(6) Criminal prosecutions shall in all cases become time-barred after expiry of the double statutory limitation period .”

16 . The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku , Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002) provide:

Article 127

“(1) A claim for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence shall be examined in the criminal proceedings where so requested by authorised persons, provided that this does not cause significant delays in the proceedings.

...”

Article 128

“A claim for compensation in criminal proceedings may be lodged by persons entitled to lodge such a claim in civil proceedings.”

Article 130

“Persons entitled to lodge a claim for compensation (Article 128) may, until the end of the trial, withdraw their claim in the criminal proceedings and pursue i t in the civil proceedings. ... “

17 . The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005) read as follows:

Section 12

“If it is necessary for a court, in order to make its decision, to first settle an issue of the existence of a right or legal relationship, and no decision on this issue has yet been adopted by a court or other competent body (preliminary issue), the court may settle the issue itself, unless otherwise provided for under special rules.

The court ’ s decision on a preliminary issue shall have legal effect only in the proceedings in which the issue in question was settled.

In civil proceedings, where an issue arises in relation to a criminal offence and the perpetrator ’ s criminal liability, the court shall be bound by the final judgment of the criminal court by which the accused was found guilty.”

18 . The relevant provisions of the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations ( Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija , Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 117/2003 of 23 July 2003 – “the 2003 Liability Act”), which entered into force on 31 July 2003, provides as follows:

Section 1

“(1) This Act regulates the liability for damage caused by acts of terrorism or other acts of violence committed with an aim of seriously disturbing public order by provoking fear or stirring up feelings of insecurity in citizens ...

(2) A terrorist act within the meaning of this Act is especially an act of violence committed for political reasons [motives] with a view to stirring up fear, terror or feelings of personal insecurity in citizens.”

Section 2

“The Republic of Croatia shall be liable for the damage referred to in section 1 of this Act ....”

Section 3

“The obligation to compensate damage under this Act exists irrespective of the fact whether the perpetrator has been identified, criminally prosecuted or found guilty.”

Section 7(1)

“The victim shall have the right to compensation [in the form of damages] of damage resulting from death, bodily injury or impairment of health.”

Section 11

“(1) Where the statutory limitation period began before 3 February 1996, it shall continue after the entry into force of this Act, and the period which had expired before the statutory limitation period was interrupted shall be counted into the overall stat utory limitation period.

(2) Where the damage occurred after 3 February 1996 the statutory limitation period begins from the entry into force of this Act.”

2. The practice of the domestic courts

19 . The domestic courts of appeal, on the subject of the possibility for a civil court to apply a longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act, held that this could be applied only if it had been established by a final judgment of the criminal court that the damage had been caused as the result of a criminal offence.

20 . This view was confirmed by the practice of the Supreme Court. For example, in its decision no. Rev- 217/05-2 of 20 October 2005 it held as follows:

“The lower court correctly established that section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act was not applicable in this case. ... The longer statutory limitation period [under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act] applies only when it has been established by a judgment in the criminal proceedings that the damage was caused by a criminal offence ... ”

21 . The Supreme Court, in its decision no. Rev-2563/1992-2 of 6 April 1993, examined the possibility for a court in civil proceedings to assess the statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act if criminal liability had not been established by a final criminal court judgment. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:

“The conclusion of the lower courts that section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act is applicable only if the criminal offence has been established by a final judgment of the criminal court is incorrect. This is because, according to the well-established case-law, if damage has been caused by a criminal offence but no criminal proceedings have been instituted or concluded against the perpetrator because of his death or mental illness, or the offence at issue has been exempted from prosecution by a pardon or amnesty, or if there exist some other circumstances preventing criminal responsibility from being established or barring the criminal prosecution, the fact that the damage was caused by a criminal offence may, if the defendant has invoked the statute of limitations, be established (as a preliminary issue) in the civil proceedings.

It is also to be noted that the longer statutory limitation period under section 377 of the Civil Obligations Act is applicable not only in respect of the perpetrator of the criminal offence but also in respect of the person responsible for the damage.”

COMPLAINTS

22 . The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the criminal law mechanisms applied in their case had not met the standards of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention.

23 . They complained further that their father had been killed solely because of his Serbian origin and that, contrary to their procedural obligations under Article 14 of the Convention, the relevant authorities had failed to investigate the possibility of that having been the motive for his death.

24 . Lastly, they complained under Article 6 of the Convention that their claim for damages had not been examined on the merits because of the national courts findings that their claim had become statutory barred.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violations of Article 2 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention

25 . The applicants complained that the domestic authorities had not taken all relevant and adequate steps to investigate the death of their father, identify the perpetrator s, allegedly Croatian Soldiers, and bring th ose person s to justice. They also contended that the national authorities had failed to investigate possible ethnic motives for his killing. They relied on Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

Article 2

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

...”

Article 14

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

26 . The applicants argued that the investigation into the death of their father B.B. had not been thorough and effective which had resulted in no perpetrator being identified.

27 . The Government argued that at the time the application had been lodged with the Court the applicants ’ representative had not had the authority to represent them because their power of attorney had been dated 8 November 2011, whereas the application had been dated 26 September 2011.

28 . They further submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, as they had not lodged a complaint against the police officers or against the State Attorney ’ s Office, in charge of the investigation, with their respective superiors. Had it been established that those authorities had acted unlawfully, the applicants could have claimed damages from the State.

29 . The Government also contended that the applicants lodged their application outside the six-month time-limit and that it was incompatible ratione temporis with the Convention. The applicants ’ constitutional complaint had been lodged exclusively in connection with the civil proceedings for compensation and not in connection with the State ’ s procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. Therefore, the decision of the Constitutional Court of 4 May 2011 could not be regarded as a final decision in the present case in respect of the applicants ’ complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. Since B.B. ’ s death in 1992 the applicants had not made any enquiries regarding the investigation into his killing. No steps had been taken in the investigation since 1992, while the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia on 5 November 1997. Therefore, the obligation to conduct an investigation concerned the period before the ratification of the Convention by Croatia.

30 . Lastly, they argued that the national authorities had taken all relevant steps aimed at identifying the perpetrator, but that those steps had nevertheless been to no avail.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

32 . The Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote security of law and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. Furthermore, it ought also to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see Bayram and Yıldırım v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38587/97, ECHR 2002 ‑ III, and Bulut and Yavuz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 73065/01, 28 May 2002).

33 . Where no remedies are available or are judged to be ineffective, the six-month time-limit in principle runs from the date of the act complained of (see Hazar and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 62566/00, 10 January 2002). However, special considerations may apply in exceptional cases where an applicant avails himself or relies on an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it is appropriate to take as the start of the six-month period the date when he first became aware or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001).

34 . In a number of cases concerning ongoing investigations into the deaths of applicants ’ relatives the Court has examined the period of time from which the applicant could or should start doubting the effectiveness of a remedy (see Şükran Aydın and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 46231/99, 26 May 2005; Bulut and Yavuz , cited above; Bayram and Yıldırım , cited above; Kıniş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 13635/04, 28 June 2005; Elsanova v. Russia (dec.) no. 57952/00, 15 November 2005; Frandeş v. Romania (dec.), no. 35802/05, 17 May 2011; Finozhenok v. Russia (dec.), no. 3025/06, 31 May 2011; Attalah v. France (dec.), no. 51987/07, 30 August 2011; Deari and Others v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 54415/09, 6 March 2012; and Gusar v. Moldova and Rumania (dec.), no. 37204/02, 30 April 2013).

35 . Consequently, where a death has occurred, applicant relatives are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation ’ s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 158, 18 September 2009). On the same basis, where time is of the essence in resolving the issues in a case, there is a burden on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised before the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly, and fairly, resolved ( Varnava and Others , cited above, § 160).

36 . Although the Court has refrained from indicating a specific period for establishing when an investigation has become ineffective for the purposes of assessing when the six-month period runs from, the determination of such a period by the Court depended on the circumstances of each case and other factors such as the diligence and interest displayed by the applicants as well as the adequacy of the investigation in question. In this connection, in the above-mentioned Varnava and Others judgment, the Court noted that where the lack of progress or ineffectiveness of an investigation is readily apparent, the requirements of expedition may require an applicant to bring such a case before the Court within a matter of months, or at most, depending on the circumstances, a very few years after events. This is in particular pertinent in cases of unlawful death where there is generally a precise point in time at which death is known to have occurred and some basic facts are in the public domain and thus the lack of progress or ineffectiveness of an investigation will generally be more readily apparent (see Varnava and Others , cited above, § 162) .

Application of the above principles to the circumstances of the present case

37 . T he Court reiterates that the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention in circumstances such as those in the present case in principle requires an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom , no. 46477/99, § 69, ECHR 2002 ‑ II).

38 . As regards the applicants ’ civil action for damages, the Court notes that they asked for compensation in connection with the death of their father. However, these proceedings are not, in the circumstances of the present case, relevant to the State ’ s procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention and therefore do not affect the running of the six-month period (compare to Narin v. Turkey , no. 18907/02 , § 48, 15 December 2009 ).

39 . It follows, therefore, that the relevant domestic remedy for the applicants ’ complaint, which would have had the potential to offer adequate redress, was the criminal investigation (compare to Narin , cited above, § 49).

40 . In the instant case, the Court notes that immediately after the impugned event in question on 11 May 1992, the police took some initial steps to investigate the circumstances of the applicants ’ father ’ s death. They inspected and photographed the crime scene, two persons were interviewed, an autopsy was carried out, firearms were confiscated from three persons and a ballistic report was drawn (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). On the basis of the evidence they had collected, the police lodged a criminal complaint against an unknown perpetrator on 22 May 1992 with the Požega County State Attorney ’ s Office on charges of murder (see paragr aph 7 above). No further steps have been taken thereafter. According to the letter of the Slavonski Brod County State Attorney ’ s Office the prosecution of the crime of murder, as this offence had been classified by the Požega County State Attorney ’ s Office, became statutory barred in April 2007.

41 . At this juncture the Court notes that the murder of the applicants ’ father was committed during the war in Croatia and that in their application to the Court the applicants alleged that their father was murdered by Croatian soldiers. They also argued that he had been killed because of his Serbian ethnic origin. All these elements might be relevant for the classification of the offence as a war crime in respect of which the rules on statutory limitation of prosecution do not apply (see Article 18 of the Criminal Code, paragraph 14 above). However, the applicant ’ s above allegations have not been proven and the Court does not have sufficient elements to dispute the classification of the offence by the national authorities. However, independently from whether or not the offence could be classified as a war crime, the complaints under Articles 2 and 14 of the Convention would in any event be inadmissible for the following reasons.

42 . The Court reiterates that applicants whose close relative s have been killed may be expected to display a certain amount of diligence and initiative in informing themselves about the progress made in the investigation ( Bulut and Yavuz , cited above). In the Court ’ s opinion, since the applicants are the children of the victim, they should be expected to display due diligence and take the requisite initiative in informing themself about the progress made in the investigation (see Varnava and Others , cited above, § 158, and Narin , cited above, § 45). This applies irrespective of the legal qualification of the offence as a murder or as a war crime.

44 . In the present case t he applicants did not show a ny interest in following up the conduct of, or the progress made in, the criminal investigation at any time before 3 May 2012 (compare to Narin , cited above, §§ 31 and 46; and Deari and Others , cited above, §§ 47-50). Given the circumstances of this case, the Court con sider s that the applicants should have known long before November 2011 , when they lodged their application with the Court , that there had been no progress in the investigation into the death of their father since 1992. Furthermore, the applicants have not put forward any justification for lodging the ir application with the Court with a delay of more than nineteen years after the last steps were taken in the investigation.

B. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

46 . The applicants also complained that the national courts dismissed their claim for damages on the ground that it had become statutory barred without examining the claim on the merits. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

48 . The right of access to court is not, however, absolute. It may be subject to legitimate restrictions such as statutory limitation periods, security for costs orders, etc. (see Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom , 22 October 1996, §§ 51 ‑ 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ IV; Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom , 13 July 1995, §§ 62 ‑ 67, Series A no. 316-B; and Golder , cited above, § 39). Where the individual ’ s access is limited either by operation of law or in fact, the Court will examine whether the limitation imposed impaired the essence of the right and, in particular, whether it pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom , 28 May 1985, § 57, Series A no. 93; ZwiÄ…zek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego v. Poland , no. 42049/98, § 29, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX; and Szwagrun-Baurycza v. Poland , no. 41187/02, § 49, 24 October 2006). If the restriction is compatible with these principles, no violation of Article 6 will arise (see Z and Others , cited above, §§ 92 ‑ 93).

49 . The Court notes that, after the applicants lodged an action for damages in the civil courts against the State , their claim was dismissed on the ground that it had become statute-barred. As to this conclusion, the Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law . This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature. The Court ’ s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see, for example, Tejedor García v. Spain , 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports 1997 ‑ VIII, and Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain , 28 October 1998, § 43, Reports 1998 ‑ VIII ).

50 . The Court has already held that statutory limitation periods serve several important purposes, namely to ensure legal certainty and finality, protect potential respondents from stale claims which might be difficult to counter and prevent the injustice which might arise if courts were required to decide upon events which took place in the distant past on the basis of evidence which might have become unreliable and incomplete because of the passage of time (see Stubbings and Others , cited above, § 51; see also, mutatis mutandis , Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 92, ECHR 2004 ‑ VIII, and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44302/02, §§ 68-69, ECHR 2007 ‑ X). Therefore, litigants should expect those rules to be applied (see, mutatis mutandis , Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain , nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98, § 33, ECHR 2000 ‑ I).

51 . As the above considerations show, the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the Convention. What the Court needs to ascertain in a given case is whether the nature of the time-limit in question and/or the manner in which it was applied are compatible with the Convention (see Vrbica v. Croatia , no. 32540/05 , § 66, 1 April 2010 ). This means, in particular, that the Court must satisfy itself that the application of the statutory limitation periods could be regarded as foreseeable for the applicants, having regard to the relevant legislation and case-law and the particular circumstances of the case (see Osu v. Italy , no. 36534/97, § 35, 11 July 2002; Vrbica , cited above, § 72; and Majski v. Croatia (no. 2) , no. 16924/08 , § 69, 19 July 2011).

52 . The Court notes that the statutory limitation period under section 376 of the Civil Obligation Act which is applicable to the applicant ’ s civil action for damages is set in clear terms and that the subjective period of three years and objective period of five years of statutory limitation were both foreseeable. However, the applicants lodged their civil action for damages outside these periods.

53 . The Court stresses in particular that the applicants did not put forward any arguments, either before the national courts or before the Court, claim ing that they had been prevented from lodging their civil action for damages within the general statutory limitation period under section 376 of the Civil Obligations Act or within the statutory limitation period under the Liability Act.

54 . Had the applicants complied with the statutory limitation period for lodging their civil action for damages, they would have allowed the civil courts to examine the applicants ’ claim on the merits. Instead, the applicants waited for twelve years before lodging their claim for damages and thus created a situation where their claim had become statutory barred.

55 . Therefore, it cannot be said that the statutory limitation periods themselves, or the manner in which they were applied in this case, impaired the very essence of the applicants ’ right of access to a court.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Søren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre Registrar President