FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 22674/11 Mladen KRIZMANIĆ against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights ( First Section ), sitting on 18 November 2014 as a Chamber composed of:

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre , President, Elisabeth Steiner , Khanlar Hajiyev , Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska , Julia Laffranque , Ksenija Turković , Dmitry Dedov , judges, and Søren Nielsen , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 March 2011 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Mladen Krizmanić , is a Croatian national, who was born in 1963 and lives in Tinjan . He was represented before the Court by Mr B. Zustović , a lawyer practising in Pazin .

2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, M s Š. Stažnik .

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . The applicant was employed with the publicly owned Labour Organisation for Road Maintenance and Construction in Pula ( Radna organizacija za održavanje cesta Pula ; hereinafter “Pula Road Maintenance”). At a meeting of the Central Housing Commission of Pula Road Maintenance held on 7 February 1989 it was decided that one of the two flat s which constituted the Tinjan “road - workers ’ house” ( cestarska ku ć a u Tinjanu ) would be given to the applicant , “since the flat was empty and Mladen Krizmani ć did not have a flat”. By an agreement of the same day , the applicant ’ s employer granted him a specially protected tenancy ( stanarsko pravo ) for an indefinite duration for the flat at issue , which was publicly owned, and the applicant moved into the flat with his family. The relevant part of that agreement reads:

“Agreement on the use of a flat

Drawn up between the Labour Organisation for Road Maintenance and Construction in Pula ... represented by its director B. Č. and Mladen Krizmanić from the Tinjan r oadworkers ’ h ouse as the holder of a specially protected tenancy ( hereinafter “the tenant”).

The Labour Organisation for Road Maintenance and Construction in Pula ... on the basis of a decision of the Central Housing Commission ... of 7 February 1989 allocates to Mladen Krizmanić from Tinjan a flat for official purposes in ... the Tinjan road-workers ’ house on the ground floor.

The flat consists of three rooms, a kitchen and a toilet and measures ninety-three square metres.

On the basis of the above-mentioned decision of the Central Housing Commission, this agreement fixes the rent at 271dinars ...

...

This agreement is concluded for an indefinite period ... ”

5 . On 3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act ( Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo ), which regulated the sale of publicly owned flats previously let under specially protected tenancies .

6 . Pula Road Maintenance was privatised and part of it became the Pula Road Company while the other part became “Croatian Roads ” ( Hrvatske ceste ).

7 . On an unspecified date the applicant asked Croatian Roads, one of the successor s of his former employer and the owner of the flat occupied by the applicant , to conclude a contract for the sale of the flat between the owner as the seller and himself as the buyer. On 31 January 1994 the owner declined his request on the ground s that the applicant had not acquired a specially protected tenancy on the flat at issue because it had been designated as a “ flat for official purposes” .

8 . On 27 May 1994 the applicant brought a civil action in the Pazin Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Pazinu ) seeking a judgment in lieu of the contract of sale. He argued that there was another flat in the same house, occupied by the M. family, and that neither flat had been allocated to employees performing road-maintenance functions. Moreover, those flats had never served any “official purpose” ; they were simply residential accommodation .

9 . On 20 March 1995 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant ’ s claim and established that he had the right to a specially protected tenancy on the flat at issue .

10 . However, that judgment was quashed on 11 September 1995 by the Pula County Court ( Županijski sud u Puli ) and the case was remitted to the Municipal Court.

11 . On August 1996 the Pazin Municipal Court established that the applicant had not acquired a specially protected tenancy on the flat in question. The court found that, even though some of the flats in so - called “road-workers ’ houses” had indeed been sold under the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act, the majority had not been sold. The court also established that the flat at issue had not been allocated to the applicant for any “official purpose”. However, it found that the flat had been given to him for temporary occupation only , until he could be allocated another flat.

12 . That judgment was upheld on 28 April 1997 by the Pula County Court , which also established that the flat at issue had been designated for “official purposes”.

13 . On 23 December 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law ( revizija ), to be decided by the Supreme Court. He lodged it with the Pazin Municipal Court, as required under the Civil Procedure Act. It appears that it was not forwarded to the Supreme Court.

14 . On 23 February 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint about the length of the civil proceedings with the Con stitutional Court. On 17 February 2006 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on the ground s that the proceedings had ended on 28 April 1997.

15 . However, on 8 May 2007 the Pazin Municipal Court instituted proceedings with a view to reinstating the applicant ’ s submission of 23 December 1997. T he applicant ’ s appeal on points of law was subsequently forwarded to the Supreme Court , which dismissed it on 4 December 2007, fully endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts.

16 . A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant about the merits of the case was dismissed on 9 September 2010. It was served on the applicant ’ s lawyer on 30 September 2010.

B. Relevant domestic law

The Civil Procedure Act

17. The Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette nos. 53/1991 and 91/1992), as in force at the material time, provided that in cases where a first-instance judgment had been upheld by that of the second-instance, it became res judicata when the second-instance court delivered its judgment . An appeal on points of law was regarded as an extraordinary remedy, that is, a remedy which could be lodged only against a res judicata judgment, and which did not, unless succes sful, affect the validity of that judgment.

COMPLAINTS

18 . The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his right to property had been violated as he could not formalise the ownership of the flat in question.

19. The applicant complained that he had been treated differently from those tenants in “road-workers ’ houses” who had been able to purchase the flats they occupied.

20. The applicant further complain ed under Article 6 of the Convention about the lack of fairness as well as about the length of the civil proceedings whereby he had sought a judgment in lieu of a sale contract as regards the flat he occupied.

THE LAW

A . Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention

21 . The applicant complained that that his right to property had been violated and that he was discriminated against, contrary to the guarantees under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:

Article 14

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

22. The Government argued that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was incompatible ratione temporis with the Convention, since the appeal judgment by which the case was finally resolved had been adopted on 28 April 1997, whereas the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia on 5 November 1997. The Government also submitted that the applicant had not mentioned any ground on which he had been discriminated against. Unlike the applicant, his neighbours, the M. family, had not been granted “a flat for official purposes”.

23. The applicant replied that his application was compatible ratione temporis , since the proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court had continued after the ratification of the Convention by Croatia. He also argued that, contrary to his situation, some other tenants of flats in “road-workers ’ houses” had been able to purchase the flats they occupied.

24. The Court reiterates that , in accordance with the general rules of international law, the provisions of the Convention do not bind a Contracting Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to that Party (see, for example, KadiÄ·is v. Latvia ( dec. ), no. 47634/99, 29 June 2000; and Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 70 , ECHR 2006 ‑ III ). Accordingly, the Court is not competent to examine applications against Croatia in so far as the alleged violations are based on facts having occurred before 5 November 1997, the date when Croatia ratified the Convention.

25. While it is true that from the ratification date onwards all of the State ’ s acts and omissions must conform to the Convention (see YaÄŸcı and Sargın v. Turkey , 8 June 1995, § 40, Series A no. 319 ‑ A), the Convention imposes no specific obligation on the Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX). Any other approach would undermine both the principle of non-retroactivity in the law of treaties and the fundamental distinction between violation and reparation that underlies the law of State responsibility (see Blečić , cited above , § 81) . In order to establish the Court ’ s temporal jurisdiction it is therefore essential to identify, in each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference. The subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference cannot bring it within the Court ’ s temporal jurisdiction (see Blečić , cited above, § 77).

26. As to the present case, the Court notes that the alleged interference with the applicant ’ s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions was the decision of the domestic courts denying the applicant the right to purchase th e flat he occupied. The final decision to that effect was adopted by the Pula County Court on 28 April 1997 by which it upheld the first instance judgment, which thus became a res judicata . The Court ’ s possible jurisdiction in respect of the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 therefore ceases at that time (compare to Mrkić v. Croatia ( dec. ), no. 7118/03, 8 June 2006, and Trifunovi ć v. Croatia ( dec. ), no. 34162/06, 6 November 2008). However, Croatia ratified the Convention only on 5 November 1997, after the Pula County Court ’ s judgment in the applicant ’ s case had been adopted.

27. The proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, subsequent to the Pula County Court ’ s judgment, are to be seen as the exercise of available domestic remedies aimed at redressing the interference (see, Blečić , cited above , §§ 77-78). Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court only resulted in allowing the interference allegedly caused by that judgment to subsist. Having regard to the date of the County Court ’ s judgment, the interference falls outside the Court ’ s temporal jurisdiction (see, Blečić , cited above, § 85).

28. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

B . Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

29. The applicant complained about the length of the civil proceedings whereby he sought a favourable judgment concerning the purchase of the flat he was occupying. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

30. The Government argued that the complaint about the length of the civil proceedings at issue was also incompatible ratione temporis , because a final decision in those proceedings had been adopted in April 1997. They further argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, as he had not lodged a fresh complaint about the length of the proceedings after his appeal on points of law had been restored. Lastly, they argued that the complaint had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit, since the last decision concerning the applicant ’ s complaint about the length of the proceedings before the national authorities had been adopted by the Constitutional Court on 17 February 2006.

31 . The applicant argued that his application was compatible ratione temporis , since the proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court had continued after the ratification of the Convention by Croatia. He also maintained that he had exhausted all domestic remedies and complied with the six-month rule.

32 . The Court does not have to address the issue of compatibility of this complaint with the Convention because it is in any event inadmissible on the following grounds.

33. The Court may deal with an application only if it is lodged with the Court within the six-month time-limit. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time , as well as to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for an extended period of time. Lastly , it should provide the possibility of ascertaining the facts of the case before the chance to do so fades away, making the fair examination of the question at issue virtually impossible (see Kelly v. the United Kingdom , no. 10626/83, Commission decision of 7 May 1985, De cisions and Reports (DR) 42, p. 205, and Baybora and Others v. Cyprus ( dec. ), no. 77116/01, 22 October 2002).

34. As to the applicant ’ s complaint about the length of the civil proceedings at issue, the Court notes that his complaint to that effect was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 17 February 2006. The present application was lodged with the Court on 30 March 2011.

35. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

C . Other alleged violations of the Convention

36. Lastly, the applicant complained , under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the outcome of the civil proceedings at issue.

37. I n the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

38. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Søren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre Registrar President