FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 21588/12 Petr KUDLIÄŒKA against the Czech Republic

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fifth Section ), sitting on 3 March 2015 as a Chamber composed of:

Mark Villiger , President, Angelika Nußberger , Boštjan M. Zupančič , Vincent A. D e Gaetano , André Potocki , Helena Jäderblom , Aleš Pejchal , judges , and Milan Blaško , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 28 March 2012 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Petr Kudlička , is a Czech national, who was born in 1940 and lives in Boskovice . He was repres ented before the Court by Mr Z. Pokorný , a lawyer practising in Brno.

The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Vít A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. C ivil action

On 11 April 2000, the applicant brought an action before the Brno Municipal Court against his former employer, the Czech Post, claiming compensation for wages and travel and subsistence allowances amounting to CZK 8,019 ( which at that time corresponded to approximately EUR 220). The substance of the dispute was whether the applicant ’ s case concerned a business trip or only the employer ’ s instruction designating a new place of reporting to work.

Upon the court ’ s request, on 27 March and 3 July 2002 the applicant supplemented his action. In his submission of 27 March 2002 he reduced his claim to CZK 6,173 ( which by this time, owing to currency fluctuations, was worth about EUR 200).

On 10 April 2003, the Municipal Court delivered a judgment in which it granted the action to a large extent.

Upon the applicant ’ s and defendant ’ s appeals, on 23 November 2004 the Brno Regional Court quashed the judgment and sent the case back to the court of first instance for further proceedings.

On 27 April 2006, the Municipal Court delivered a judgment granting the action.

Upon the defendant ’ s appeal, on 20 November 2007 the Regional Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the action.

On 28 January 2008, the applicant filed a constitutional appeal, which was dismissed on 11 June 2008.

2. Proceedings for damages

On 21 December 2007, the applicant applied to the Ministry of Justice, claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by an unreasonable length of the above court proceedings.

On 19 November 2008, the Ministry of Justice noted that there had been delays in the court proceedings but did not award compensation to the applicant, considering that the finding of a violation was sufficient in this case.

In the meantime, on 27 June 2008 the applicant brought an action for compensation before the Brno Munic ipal Court, claiming nearly CZK 800,000 (approximately EUR 3 3 ,000 at that time ).

On 28 April 2010, the Municipal Court delivered a judgment awarding the applicant an amount of CZK 10,000 (approximately EUR 390 at that time) for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unreasonable length of the proceedings.

Upon the applicant ’ s appeal, on 21 December 2011 the Brno Regional Court delivered a judgment upholding the judgment of the court of first instance.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the allegedly excessive length of judicial proceedings are set out in the Court ’ s decision in the case of Vokurka v. the Czech Republic (no. 40552/02 ( dec. ), §§ 11-24, 16 October 2007).

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings on his civil action was unreasonable. In this context, he asserted, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the damages he received are insufficient and that the compensation proceedings themselves lasted too long.

THE LAW

A. Length of the civil proceedings

According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings on his civil action was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention , which provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

The Government rejected the allegation and disputed that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage withi n the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. They argued that the impugned proceedings had concerned a property-related dispute over a modest sum and that the applicant had been awarded compensation for the length of the proceedings exceeding the sum in dispute. In their opinion, the importance of the proceedings for the applicant was low, in particular with regard to the amount in dispute, and also because he had not tried to expedite the proceedings. Subsidiarily , the Government claimed that the applicant had received sufficient redress at the domestic level.

The applicant disagreed with the alleged low importance of the proceedings and of the amount in dispute. Furthermore, he asserted that he had made an effort to speed up the proceedings. In any case, not making use of procedural tools in this regard cannot be held to his disadvantage.

The Court finds it appropriate to examine at the outset whether the complaint is admissible under Article 35 of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 14 which entered into force on 1 June 2010. The Protocol added a new admissibility requirement to Article 35, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:

“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:

(...)

(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as de-fined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”

Accordingly, in the present case the Court will examine in turn (a) whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage; (b) whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits; and (c) whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal.

1. Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage

The Court has previously held that this criterion applies where, notwithstanding a potential violation of a right from a purely legal point of view, the level of severity attained does not warrant consideration by an international court (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania ( dec. ), no. 36659/04 , 1 June 2010; Korolev v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 25551/05 , 1 July 2010; and Gaftoniuc v. Romania ( dec. ), no. 30934/05 , 22 February 2011).

Further, the level of severity must be assessed in the light of the financial impact of the matter in dispute and the importance of the case for the applicant.

As regards the first element of this analysis, the Court looks in the first place at the amount in dispute in the proceedings which length the applicant complains about (see Komanický v. Slovakia ( dec. ), no. 53364/07 , § 28, 18 June 2013; Cecchetti v. San Marino ( dec. ), no. 40174/08 , § 30, 9 April 2013 ; Kiousi v. Greece ( dec. ), no. 52036/09 , 20 September 2011; and Havelka v. the Czech Republic ( dec. ), no. 7332/10 , 20 September 2011). In the latter case the Court additionally took into account that the compensation the applicant had received at the domestic level did not considerably differ from the appropriate just satisfaction.

Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the financial value of the applicant ’ s claim in the proceedings against Czech Post as specified by him amounted to some EUR 2 2 0, later reduced to some EUR 2 0 0, which as such is not indicative of a significant disadvantage in terms of the Court ’ s case-law (see, for example, Kiousi v. Greece , cited above; Burov v. Moldova ( dec. ), no. 38875/08 , 14 June 2011; Šumbera v. the Czech Republic ( dec. ), no. 48228/08 , 21 February 2012; and Bazelyuk v. Ukraine ( dec. ), no. 49275/08 , 27 March 2012).

As to the importance of the case for the applicant, the Court has found no evidence to suggest that the proceedings have had any significant consequences for the applicant.

Furthermore, the applicant received just satisfaction of some EUR 390. While the award cannot be considered as providing sufficient redress under the Court ’ s relevant case-law, the Court has to take it into account when examining whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage .

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant cannot be said to have suffered any significant disadvantage.

2. Whether r espect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits

Under this safeguard clause, the Court is required to continue examining an application if it raises questions of a general character affecting the observance of the Convention.

The Court reiterates that the issues of lengthy proceedings in the Czech Republic and of an effective remedy in this regard have been addressed on numerous occasions (see, for example , Vokurka v. the Czech Republic , cited above ; and Golha v. the Czech Republic , no. 7051/06 , 26 May 2011).

It follows that the examination of the application would not bring any new element in this regard. The Court therefore concludes that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols does not require an examination of the present application on the merits.

3. Whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal

This second safeguard clause was designed to ensure that every case receives a judicial examination either at national level or at European level in order to avoid a denial of justice ( see Korolev v. Russia , cited above).

The Court notes that the applicant ’ s length complaint was examined both by the Ministry of Justice and by the Brno Municipal Court and the Brno Regional Court. The domestic authorities acknowledged the delays and awarded the applicant approximately EUR 390 in just satisfaction.

The Court concludes that the applicant ’ s case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b).

4. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that this complaint must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.

B. Other complaints

Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Conventio n and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 , t he applicant further allege d that the compensatory proceedings themselves were unreasonably long and did not provide him with the appropriate compensation.

Given that the applicant essentially complains about ineffectiveness of the domestic remedy in respect of the length of the proceedings, the Court finds it appropriate to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention . However, a ccording to the Court ’ s case-law, Article 13 applies only where an individual has an “arguab le claim” to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom , 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131).

The Court notes that Article 13 is not applicable in absence of an arguable claim under the substantive provision (see Vasilchenko v. Russia , no. 34784/02, § 54, 23 September 2010 ; and a contrario , Golha v. the Czech Republic , cited above, § 69).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 26 March 2015 .

Milan BlaÅ¡ko Mark Villiger              Deputy Registrar President