FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 445/10 J.S . against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ), sitting on 3 March 2015 as a Chamber composed of:

Guido Raimondi , President, Päivi Hirvelä , George Nicolaou , Ledi Bianku , Nona Tsotsoria , Paul Mahoney , Krzysztof Wojtyczek , judges, and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 December 2009 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the comments submitted by the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People as a third party intervener,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . T he applicant, J.S. , is a British national, who was born in 1993 and lives in Belfast . The President granted the applicant ’ s request for his identity not to be disclosed t o the public (Rule 47 § 4). He wa s represented before the Court by Mr F. Shiels of Madden & Finucane Solicitors , a firm of solicitors based in Belfast .

2. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) we re represented by their Agent, Ms J. Neenan of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office .

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. The alleged assault

4. In 2008 the applicant was a pupil at a high school in County Down (“the school”). On 28 August 2008 the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (“the PPS”) received a police investigation file which alleged that the applicant had assaulted a teacher at the school.

5. In September and October 2008 teachers at the school refused to teach the applicant because of the alleged assault. On 13 October 2008 the teachers went on strike. In order for the strike to be resolved, the applicant voluntarily excluded himself from school and was provided with alternative educational assistance.

6. The strike nonetheless generated a great deal of publicity. Two articles appeared in the News Letter ( one of Northern Ireland ’ s main daily newspapers ) on 21 October 2008.

7. The first article carried the headline “Details of school ‘ assault ’ revealed” and continued:

“Details of the alleged attack which sparked the teachers ’ strike at [the school] have been released exclusively to the News Letter ... An incident report filed with [the school ’ s] management by the teacher who was allegedly attacked has been obtained by the News Letter. The staff member, who wishes to remain anonymous while negotiations continue, claimed he was shoved through the doorway of his class after being screamed and cursed at by the boy ... The pupil is understood to have suffered two family bereavements, including the death of his brother, before the alleged attack. Internal documents show school bosses had branded the boy ‘ high risk ’ , with emotional and anger management issues. Reports also reveal management had warned staff to move at least 3 ft away from the pupil when he was in a confrontational mood. The boy was involved in a serious fight with another [school] pupil earlier this year after he was taunted about family members. He was being taught in the school ’ s special needs Pupil Support Centre just before the strike. The teachers have asked for the pupil to be removed from school or taught in isolation – but education authorities have refused.”

8. The second article, published under the headline “Pupil involved in 10 detentions” stated:

“The pupil at the centre of the strike row was involved in up to 10 detentions in the past year, behaviour records obtained by the News Letter show.

The punishments were given between September 2007 and February this year for incidents from aggression directed towards teachers and other pupils to disruptive behaviour and leaving school without permission.

He was also involved in a serious fight with another pupil after he was teased about his family, confidential files say.

Union officials have insisted the pupil has problems that make him a candidate for special needs teaching.

...

The pupil ’ s monitoring diary from his time in the segregated pupil support centre shows he was making improvements.”

9. A similar article had appeared in the Belfast Telegraph (another daily newspaper published in Belfast ) on 20 October 2008 under the headline “Details of strike school incident revealed”. This article also contained details from the monitoring diary, including the applicant ’ s marks for behaviour and comments made by teachers.

10. During the strike, the media made enquiries of the police, the PPS and the Northern Ireland Office (“the NIO”) as to what action had been taken in respect of the alleged assault at the school. The PPS, through a NIO press release, informed the media that a youth had been reported to the PPS by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“ the PSNI”), that a decision had been issued and that there would be a first appearance on summons in November on a charge of assault. In response to further queries, the PPS informed the media that the youth ’ s court appearance would take place on 4 November 2008.

11. The press release did not disclose the applicant ’ s name, age or school. However, subsequent media reports connected the youth in the press release to the previous stories about the strike at the school. Although the applicant ’ s name was not published, his age, the name of his school and the date of his hearing before the Youth Court were disclosed in these reports.

12. The applicant ’ s solicitors wrote to the PPS asking it to explain its decision to issue the press release. They also invited the PPS to withdraw the summons and reissue it without informing the media that a new court date had been set.

13 . In the absence of a reply from the PPS, the applicant issued judicial review proceedings in which he contended that the information it had disclosed to the NIO and the press constituted an unjustified interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see section 3 below).

2. The Youth Court proceedings

14. On 4 November 2008, in order to have the media excluded from the trial, the applicant applied to the Youth Court for the case to be adjourned to a date not to be announced in open court. The application was refused by the District Judge, who instead adjourned the hearing to 2 December 2008 and ordered that only three reporters could attend it. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (“the 1998 Order”) the District Judge also ordered that “no details pertaining to the identification of the applicant be published or released to the media”.

15. The applicant renewed his application in writing. On 2 December 2008 the District Judge decided that the case should not be adjourned to an undisclosed date but indicated that the court would hear argument as to the exclusion of the press. Those arguments were heard on 20 January 2009. The Belfast Telegraph was represented and opposed the applicant ’ s application for exclusion; the PPS made no representations.

16. After hearing the parties ’ arguments, the District Judge refused the application on the ground that, due to the extent of the publicity in the case, much of it from the perspective of the teacher alleged to have been assaulted, the applicant would be disadvantaged by a media ban because it would mean his version of events would not be aired.

17 . The applicant sought judicial review of the District Judge ’ s decision, relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 40(2 )( b)(vii) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see Relevant law and practice below).

3. The judicial review proceedings

18. The applications for permission to apply for judicial review against the PPS (see paragraph 13 above) and against the District Judge ’ s decision (see paragraph 17 above) were heard together by the High Court, sitting as a Divisional Court. However, on 26 June 2009 the applications were dismissed.

19. The Divisional Court accepted that Article 8 was engaged as the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy due first, to the statutory scheme in place under the 1998 Order; and secondly, to the personal intrusion which had arisen from the extensive nature of the media reporting of the case. In reaching this conclusion, the Divisional Court did not consider the applicant ’ s complaints individually but instead had general regard to the intrusive nature of the media reports taken as a whole.

20. Having found that Article 8 was engaged, the Divisional Court went on to consider whether the PPS had been justified in the disclosures it made and whether the Youth Court had been justified in allowing three members of the press into the hearing. In respect of the PPS disclosures, the Divisional Court found that it was the responsibility of the media not to publish anything that disclosed the name, address or school of a child covered by the 1998 Order and the PPS had not been under any obligation to warn the media of its responsibilities.

21. With regard to the attendance of the press at the hearing, the Divisional Court found that the public interest in securing open justice had outweighed the interest of the applicant in preventing reporting of the case. It added that, in the course of the Youth Court hearing, personal material relating to the applicant might be disclosed in which there was little or no public interest. However, the Divisional Court considered that the Youth Court would make appropriate orders preventing publication of such information.

22. On 1 July 2009 the Divisional Court refused to certify a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords.

4. The applicant ’ s Youth Court trial

23. The applicant ’ s trial began on 26 July 2009. The applicant gave evidence in his defence and was acquitted. The Youth Court found that he had been unlawfully detained by the teacher concerned and that the force used by the applicant on the teacher had been reasonable and proportionate.

5. The data protection complaint

24. Before the trial, the applicant ’ s solicitors had complained to the police about the conduct of the media and alleged that the school had breached its obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998 in releasing personal information about him to the media. The police advised the applicant ’ s solicitor that the complaint about the release of personal information to the media would be forwarded to Information Commissioner as that aspect of the complaint was not a matter which they could investigate. The police took a statement from the applicant on 25 February 2010.

25 . On 7 October 2010 the PSNI wrote to the applicant ’ s solicitor t o confirm that a report has been submitted to the PPS and its advice and direction were awaited. On 12 November 2010 the PSNI notified the applicant ’ s solicitor that the PPS had advised that the o ffence in question was a summary only offence and, as such, had become statute barred six months after the date it was committed . No prosecution could therefore be brought.

26. The PSNI did not forward the applicant ’ s complaint to the Information Commissioner and the applicant therefore complained directly to the Commissioner on 16 November 2010. The outcome of this complaint is unknown.

27. In addition, by letter dated 22 February 2011 the applicant complained to the school about the release of confidential information to the media. The school replied on 14 March 2011, indicating that it had not released any personal or confidential information to the media, except where authorised by the applicant to do so.

B. Relevant domestic law

1. The Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998

28. Article 22 of the above Order provides as follows:

“ Restrictions on reporting proceedings

(1) Where a child is concerned in any criminal proceedings (other than proceedings to which paragraph (2) applies) the court may direct that -

(a) no report shall be published which reveals the name, address or school of the child or includes any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the child; and

(b) no picture shall be published as being or including a picture of the child,

except in so far (if at all) as may be permitted by the direction of the court.

(2) Where a child is concerned in any proceedings in a youth court or on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated) -

(a) no report shall be published which reveals the name, address or school of the child or includes any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the child; and

(b) no picture shall be published as being or including a picture of any child so concerned,

except where the court or the Secretary of State, if satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so, makes an order dispensing with these prohibitions to such extent as may be specified in the order.

...

(4) A court shall not exercise its power under paragraph (3) without -

(a) affording the parties to the proceedings an opportunity to make representations; and

(b) taking into account any representations which are duly made.

(5) If a report or picture is published in contravention of a direction under paragraph (1) or of paragraph (2), the following persons -

(a) in the case of publication of a written report or a picture as part of a newspaper, any proprietor, editor or publisher of the newspaper;

(b) in the case of the inclusion of a report or picture in a programme service, any body corporate which provides the service and any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper,

shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale ...

(6) For the purposes of this Article a child is ‘ concerned ’ in any proceedings whether as being the person by or against or in respect of whom the proceedings are taken or as being a witness in the proceedings.

(7) In this Article -

...

‘ publish ’ includes -

... (b) cause to be published ... ”

2. The Data Protection Act 1998

29. The relevant Data Protection principles are set out in section 4 of the Act:

“ 4 T he data protection principles

(4) Subject to section 27(1), it shall be the duty of a data controller to comply with the data protection principles in relation to all personal data with respect to which he is the data controller. ”

and in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 of the Act:

“ 1 . Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless —

(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and

(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the condit ions in Schedule 3 is also met.

2 . Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. ”

30. Schedule 3 provides that in the case of sensitive personal data, the processing must be necessary for the purposes of exercising or performing any right or obligation which is conferred or imposed by law on the data controller in connection with employment . Pursuant to section 2, “sensitive personal data” includes information as to “ any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by [the data subject] , the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings ”.

31. Section 13 of the Act provides for the award of compensation for damage caused by a contravention of the Act:

“ 13 Compensation for failure to comply with certain requirements

(1) An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage.

(2) An individual who suffers distress by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that distress if—

(a) the individual also suffers damage by reason of the contravention, or

(b) the contravention relates to the processing of personal data for the special purposes.

(3) In proceedings brought against a person by virtue of this section it is a defence to prove that he had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the requirement concerned.”

32. Moreover, one of the roles of t he Information Commissioner ’ s office is to uphold information rights in the public interest. The Commissioner can rule on eligible complaints and take appropriate action when the law is broken. In particular, section 40 of the Act permits the Information Commissioner to issue an enforcement notice where a data controller has contravened the Act:

“ 40 Enforcement notices

(1) If the Commissioner is satisfied that a data controller has contravened or is contravening any of the data protection principles, the Commissioner may serve him with a notice (in this Act referred to as “an enforcement notice”) requiring him, for complying with the principle or principles in question, to do either or both of the following —

(a) to take within such time as may be specified in the notice, or to refrain from taking after such time as may be so specified, such steps as are so specified, or

(b) to refrain from processing any personal data, or any personal data of a description specified in the notice, or to refrain from processing them for a purpose so specified or in a manner so specified, after such time as may be so specified.”

3. The Human Rights Act 1998

33. Section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that

“A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposed to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may 

(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or

(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,

but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.”

C . Relevant International Law

34. Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:

“1. States Parties recognise the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child ’ s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child ’ s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child ’ s age and the desirability of promoting the reintegration and the child ’ s assuming a constructive role in society.

2. To this end ... the States Parties shall, in particular, ensure that:

...

(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following guarantees:

...

(vii.) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.”

COMPLAINTS

35. The applicant complained that there had been a breach of his right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the Convention . In particular, he complained about the disclosure of confidential information to the media and the issuing of the press release by the PPS. He further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy in respect of his Article 8 complaint .

THE LAW

A. Article 8 of the Convention

1. T he release of apparently confidential information to the media

(a) The Government ’ s submissions

36 . Insofar as the applicant ’ s complaint concerned the release of apparently confidential information to the media, the Government submitted that he had not exhausted domestic remedies.

37. At the outset, the Government noted that the media was not a public authority and consequently the applicant could not – and did not – directly complain about the publication of the articles. Furthermore, although the applicant had speculated that confidential information had been provided to the media by the school, the Government submitted that there was no evidence to support this.

38. In any case, the applicant had complained to the police about the conduct of the media and alleged that the school had breached its obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998 in releasing personal information about him to the media. A statement was taken from the applicant on 25 February 2010 and the matter was referred to the PPS. However, no prosecution was possible as the complaint was made after any prosecution had become statute-barred.

39. Moreover, the applicant had complained directly to the Information Commissioner about the disclosure of the confidential information to the media. The outcome of this complaint is unknown but the Government submitted that it constituted an effective domestic remedy because the Information Commissioner had power under section 40 of the Data Protection Act 1998 to issue an enforcement notice requiring a data controller to take, or refrain from taking, certain specified steps, and/or to refrain from processing personal data for a specified period.

40. The Government also argued that pursuant to section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998 the applicant could have applied to a court for compensation for damage caused by a contravention by a data controller of the requirements of that Act. Likewise, pursuant to section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 he could have sought compensation for the alleged breach of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Had he done so his assertion that the school had been the source of the information could have been tested and findings made. Indeed, his failure to do so meant that the Court did not have before it the factual information necessary to form a judgment on this aspect of his complaint.

41. Insofar as the applicant was seeking to argue that the State was under a positive obligation to protect his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, the Government submitted that there was an appropriate framework of laws in the United Kingdom to ensure respect for private life. These included Article 22(2) of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which prohibited the reporting of information likely to lead to the identification of a child involved in proceedings in a Youth Court; the Data Protection Act 1998, which prohibited the disclosure of personal data except in controlled circumstances; and the Human Right Act 1998, which required public authorities to act in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention.

( b ) The applicant ’ s submissions

42. The applicant, on the other hand, contended that there was ample evidence to conclude that the information provided to the media came from within the school and that the domestic remedies available to him were ineffective. The complaint to the police concerned the publication of private information by the media; it could not, therefore, provide a remedy for the complaint about the preceding disclosure of the information to the media.

43. Likewise, the applicant argued that a complaint to the Information Commissioner under the Data Protection Act 1998 would not have amounted to an effective remedy as the Commissioner had neither the power to sanction a public authority which had broken the law nor the power to award compensation.

44. Finally, the applicant further complained that neither the school nor the respondent State had in place adequate and effective safeguards to prevent disclosure of private and confidential information, and, following the publication of private information pertaining to him, the respondent State had failed to take measures to investigate how the disclosure occurred with a view to preventing reoccurrence.

( c ) The Court ’ s assessment

45. The Court considers it appropriate to treat the applicant ’ s complaint about the release of confidential information to the media under three heads: first, the alleged disclosure of confidential material by the school; secondly, the publication of confidential information by the media; and finally, the alleged violation of the State ’ s investigatory obligation under Article 8.

( i ) The alleged disclosure of confidential information by the school

46. The Court accepts at the outset that the disclosure of confidential material about the applicant and the content of some of the newspaper stories concerning the strike amounted to a considerable intrusion into his privacy. However, not only has the applicant ’ s submission that the school was the source of the disclosure of confidential information not at all been substantiated in the evidence submitted to the Court, but it would have been open to him to test this assertion at the domestic level. In this regard, it is noted that he did not bring an action against the school (or indeed the newspapers) for compensation under either section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998 or section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Had he brought such a claim, the domestic courts could have considered the evidence in the round and made findings of fact about the source of the disclosure of the confidential information. In the context of such a claim he could have argued, as he has argued before this Court, that the school had failed in a duty of care owed to him to have in place adequate safeguards to prevent disclosure of confidential information in this regard.

47. Moreover, contrary to his assertion before this Court, t he applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the police on 7 July 2009 which alleged that the actions of the school as well as those of the media had amounted to criminal offences requiring further investigation. However, no prosecution could ensue because the alleged offences were summary offences which had become statute-barred by the time the complaint was made.

48. It would appear that the applicant also brought a complaint to the Information Commissioner. However, no information has been provided to the Court about the progress of this complaint and it can therefore only assume that the matter is still under investigation.

49. In light of the above, the Court finds that insofar as the applicant is complaining about the disclosure of confidential information to the media, he has not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Artic le 35 § 1 of the Convention .

(ii) The alleged violation of the State ’ s positive obligations under Article 8 as regards the publication of confidential information by the media

50. Given that the newspapers were not State-owned, their actions in publishing confidential information about the applicant were not attributable to the respondent State. This does not mean, however, that such actions by private entities are incapable of having implications for a Contracting State ’ s responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention.

51. I t is now well-established that p ositive obligations on the State are inherent in the right to effective respect for private life under Article 8 , and that these obligations may involve the adoption of regulatory and other measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals i s in principle within the State ’ s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (see Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08 , §§ 81 – 82 ECHR 2013; X and Y v. the Netherlands , judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, pp. 11-13, §§ 23-24 and 27 ; August v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no. 36505/02 , 21 January 2003; and M.C. v. Bulgaria , no. 39272/98, § 150 , ECHR 2003- XII ) .

52. In the context of the present case, while the media reports must have been distressing for the applicant, especially in view of his young age, the Court does not consider that the disclosure or publication of confidential personal information would ordinarily constitute “a grave act” on a par with rape or other serious offences against the physical integrity of a person. As such, it does not accept that the positive obligation under Article 8 required the enactment of criminal law provisions to prevent the disclosure or publication of such information. However, it would appear that such protection did exist in the United Kingdom as the applicant was entitled to – and if fact did – make a criminal complaint to the police about both the disclosure of the information to the media and its subsequent appearance in print. The matter was referred to the PPS and had the complaint been made timeously there is no reason to believe it would not have been fully investigated and, if necessary, a prosecution brought.

53. Moreover, pursuant to the Data Protection Act 1998, “data controllers” were required to follow the data protection principles, which provide, inter alia , that p ersonal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes . Information relating to actual or alleged criminal offences and criminal proceedings and/or sentences is considered to be “sensitive personal information” and , as such, its processing must be necessary for the purposes of exercising or performing any right or obligation which is conferred or imposed by law on the data controller in connection with employment .

54. Furthermore, one of the roles of t he Information Commissioner ’ s office is to uphold information rights in the public interest. In particular, the Commissioner can rule on eligible complaints and take appropriate action when the law is broken. Indeed, contrary to the applicant ’ s assertions, the Commissioner has the power under section 40 of the 1998 Act to issue enforcement notices requiring data controllers to take or refrain from taking certain specified steps or to refrain from processing personal data. Furthermore, pursuant to section 13 of the 1998 Act any person who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of th e Act is entitled to apply to the domestic courts for compensation for th e damage from the data controller .

55. In addition, Article 22(2) of the 1998 Order provided that where a child was concerned in any proceedings in a youth court, no report should be published which revealed the name, address or school of the child or included any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the child. If such information was published a complaint could be made to either the police or the Information Commissioner, both of which happened in the present case. Furthermore, an action for damages could be brought under section 13 of the 1998 Act or under section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

56. Consequently, the Court considers that the statutory framework in the United Kingdom provided adequate protection against the disclosure or publication of personal information. While it was unfortunate that in the present case such information was disclosed and later published, no legislative framework can provide complete protection against any breach of its provisions. However, for the reasons set out above the Court is satisfied that the system in place in the United Kingdom provided adequate remedies for the victims of unlawful disclosure. The fact that the applicant either did not use these remedies, or had recourse to them too late, is not a ground for challenging their efficacy or adequacy.

57. Therefore, insofar as the applicant complains that the State was in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 , the Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention .

(iii) The alleged violation of the State ’ s investigatory obligation under Article 8

58. The Court has not excluded the possibility that in certain cases the State ’ s positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual ’ s physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation (see, for example, M.C. v. Bulgaria , no. 39272/98, § 153 , ECHR 2003- XII ) . However, the Court has already held that in a case such as the present Article 8 did not require the enactment of criminal law provisions to prevent the disclosure or publication of confidential information and, as such, there can be no question of any o bligation arising to conduct an effective criminal investigation into his complaints (see paragraph 52 above).

59. In any case, the Court once again notes that a criminal complaint was lodged by the applicant and there is no reason to believe that such an investigation would not have taken place had the applicant complained to the police timeously.

60. Consequently, insofar as the applicant complains that the State was in breach of an investigatory obligation under Article 8 , the Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention .

(iv) Conclusion on complaint regarding release of information to the media

61. In sum, the Court finds the applicant ’ s complaints regarding the release of confidential information to the media to be inadmissible either as manifestly ill-founded or for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

2. The PPS press release

62 . Insofar as the applicant complained about the press release by the PPS, the Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded as the PPS had not provided any information which could have identified the applicant. As such, the Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his private life.

63. In this regard, the Government pointed out that the PPS had only provided administrative details concerning the court proceedings; namely, that a youth had been reported to the PPS by the PSNI, that a decision had been issued, and that there would be a first appearance on summons on 4 November on a charge of assault. Thus, the information provided did not by itself identify the applicant, nor was it confidential. On the contrary, it was the type of information routinely provided in response to media requests.

64. Moreover, in the Government ’ s submissions the provision of the information did not permit the media to publish anything that they were otherwise prohibited from publishing by law (and in particular by Article 22(2) of the 1998 Act). Rather, it simply facilitated the orderly debate within the domestic courts as to whether the media should be permitted to attend the trial and gave the applicant the opportunity to seek orders from the Youth Court preventing the media from attending the trial or restricting the ambit of permissible reporting.

65. The applicant, however, maintained that the disclosure of the material to the media, where the consequences resulted in exposure surpassing that which the applicant could have foreseen, amounted to an interference with his Article 8 rights ( Peck v. the United Kingdom , no. 44647/98, § 62 , EC HR 2003- I ).

66. Furthermore, he argued that the information provided to the media by the PPS was not “administrative”; on the contrary, it identified the applicant, a juvenile, as a defendant in criminal proceedings in circumstances where the media, having published extensively about the strike and the applicant ’ s school history, were trying to establish whether or not he was being prosecuted for assault.

67. The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People (“the Commissioner”), in his third-party intervention, submitted that the Court had typically only found there to be no interference with an applicant ’ s rights under Article 8 of the Convention where the events in question involved public acts where the protagonists could have no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, a young person who was a defendant in the juvenile justice system had an expectation of privacy underpinned by the provisions of Article 22(2) of the 1998 Act.

68. The Court recalls that p rivate life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It has already held that elements such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8. That Article also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and it may include activities of a p rofessional or business nature (see , for example, Peck v. the United Kingdom , cited above , § 57 ).

69. In P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom , no. 44787/98, § 5 7 , ECHR the Court noted as follows:

“There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a person ’ s private life is concerned in measures effected outside a person ’ s home or private premises. Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person ’ s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor.”

71. Bearing that in mind, the Court notes that the information disclosed by the PPS did not reveal the applicant ’ s name, age or school, or any other personal information. On the contrary, it did not go beyond that routinely provided to the media in response to queries about court proceedings. Consequently, the present case can be distinguished from that of Peck v. the United Kingdom , which concerned the unforeseen disclosure and publication of information of an exceptionally personal nature (the applicant ’ s suicide attempt). Moreover, in the present case the information was disclosed to the media by the PPS in the knowledge that the media were bound by their obligation under Article 22(2) of the 1998 Order not to reveal the name, address or school of a child involved in proceedings before a youth court.

73 . The Court therefore finds that this complaint is manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

B. Article 13 of the Convention

74. The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no domestic remedy in respect of his complaints under Article 8 .

75. For the reasons set out above, t he Government argued that domestic law provided the applicant with effective domestic remedies in respect of his Convention complaints .

76. As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the Contracting States ’ obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant ’ s complaint; however, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law (see, for example, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 288 ECHR 2011 ).

77. The applicant ’ s first complaint under Article 8 – regarding the release of apparently confidential information to the media – has been considered by the Court under three heads. The complaints under the second and third heads were rejected as manifestly ill-founded. Consequently, in respect of these heads, it cannot be said that the applicant had an arguable grievance under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 13 was not, therefore, engaged. With regard to the first head of complaint, which concerned the alleged disclosure of confidential information to the media by the school, the Court held that adequate domestic remedies existed and the applicant had failed to exhaust them.

78. The applicant ’ s second complaint, namely that the press release by the PPS violated his right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the Convention, has been held to be manifestly ill-founded on the ground that there had been no interference with his Article 8 rights. The Court must therefore conclude that he did not have an arguable grievance under this head and that Article 13 is not engaged.

79. Consequently, the Court finds that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention read together with Article 8 is manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention .

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 26 March 2015 .

Fatoş Aracı Guido Raimondi Deputy Registrar President