FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 26562/07 Emma TAGAYEVA and o thers against Russia and six other applications (see list appended)

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 June 2015 as a Chamber composed of:

Isabelle Berro, President, Elisabeth Steiner, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Julia Laffranque, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Erik Møse, Dmitry Dedov, judges,

and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above applications set out in the Appendix, lodged b etween 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having regard to the parties ’ oral submissions made at the hearing on 14 October 2014,

Having deliberated on 14 October 2014 and on 9 June 2015, decides as follows:

PROCEDURE

A. The applicants

1. Between 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011, 447 Russian nationals lodged seven applications. A complete and updated list of applicants and their representatives is set out in the Appendix.

2. The applicants raised various issues related to the terrorist attack, siege and storming of school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, on 1 ‑ 3 September 2004. Some applicants were held hostage and/or injured; others had family members among those taken hostage, killed or injured. Several applicants lodged complaints also in respect of their family members. Information in respect of each applicant is summarised in the Appendix. They invoked Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention.

B. Representatives and application forms

3 . The applicants in the seven cases grouped in the present report have submitted powers of attorneys to several representatives. The details are summarised in the Appendix.

4. The applicants in the four cases listed below submitted two application forms.

5. The applicants in case no. 26562/07 Tagayeva and Others : the first application form was submitted on 21 January 2008 (date of postmark), although the applicants ’ signatures were submitted separately and are dated between December 2007 and June 2008 (complaint lodged on 25 June 2007).

6. The applicants in case no. 49380/08 Savkuyev and Others submitted their first application form on 10 February 2009 (complaint lodged on 4 September 2008).

7. The applicants in case no 21294/11 Kokova and Others submitted the first application form and lodged their complaint on 12 March 2011.

8. The applicants in case no 37096/11 Nogayeva and Others submitted their first application form and lodged their complaint on 28 May 2011.

9 . The second application form common to cases nos. 26562/07 Tagayeva and Others , 49380/08 Savkuyev and Others , 21294/11 Kokova and Others and 37096/11 Nogayeva and Others was submitted on 18 October 2011 through Mr S. Kay.

10. The applicants in case no. 14755/08 Dudiyeva and Others submitted their application form on 28 August 2008 (complaint lodged on 14 February 2008).

11. The applicants in case no. 49339/08 Albegova and Others submitted their application form on 30 March 2009 (complaint lodged on 4 September 2008).

12 . The applicants in case no. 51313/08 Aliyeva and Others submitted their application form on 2 April 2009 (complaint lodged on 22 September 2008).

C. The Government

13. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights .

D. Proceedings at the Court

14. On 10 April 2012 the Court decided to communicate the applications to the respondent Government, inviting them to submit written observations. The parties exchanged written observations. The Government requested to hold an oral hearing and to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber.

15. On 25 June 2013 the Court decided to hold a hearing on the admissibility and merits (Rule 54 § 5 of the Rules of Court). It also decided to invite the parties to respond in writing to a list of questions prior to the date of the hearing. The parties ’ answers were received in September and October 2013.

16. A hearing was held in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 14 October 2014. At the hearing, one group of applicants (“the first group of applicants”, applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11) were represented by Mr Kirill Koroteev, a lawyer of EHRAC/Memorial Human Rights Centre, an NGO with offices in Moscow and London, assisted by Ms Jessica Gavron, advisor; and the remaining applicants (“the second group of applicants”, applications nos. 14755/08, 49339/08 and 51313/08) by Mr Sergey Knyazkin, a lawyer practicing in Moscow. T he Court heard addresses by Mr Matyushkin and Ms Gavron, Mr Koroteyev and Mr Knyazkin.

17. The Court decided, after examining the request of the Government, that there was no need to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

A. The circumstances of the case

18. While most events are relevant for all applicants, their situation in the domestic proceedings has somewhat differed. However, given the number of applicants, the extent of the domestic procedures and difficulties associated with the establishment of each applicant ’ s procedural role, the present decision refers to them collectively as the “applicants”. This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings has been relatively similar, whether or not each of them participated in the given procedural step, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others v. Russia , no. 27065/05 , § 181, 2 December 2010 ).

19. The voluminous materials of the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from four criminal investigation proceedings, three criminal trials, two sets of civil proceedings for compensation, two reports by the parliamentary groups and one dissenting opinion, books and articles written in the aftermath, copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and/or their relatives, and the applicants ’ own statements to the Court. The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above as well as other publicly available information.

1. Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004

(a) Terrorist attacks in 2004

20. The year 2004 saw a surge of terrorist acts in Russia entailing numerous civilian victims. Mr Shamil Basayev, the underground leader of the Chechen separatist movement, either claimed or was attributed responsibility for these acts.

21. On 6 February 2004 a suicide bomber killed over forty persons and wounded over 250 in a crowded underground train in Moscow.

22. In February and March 2004 several explosions in the Moscow Region damaged gas pipelines, a water - heating station and electricity pylons.

23. On 9 May the President of Chechnya, Mr Akhmat Kadyrov, and several senior officials were killed by a bomb placed under their tribune in a stadium in Grozny.

24. On 21-22 June a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked Nazran, Ingushetia ’ s largest town. They primarily targeted police stations and security offices; over ninety persons were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted.

25. On 24 August two civilian planes which had departed from the Moscow Domodedovo airport simultaneously exploded in mid-air; ninety persons lost their lives.

26. On 31 August a suicide bomber exploded at the entrance to an underground station in Moscow, killing ten and wounding about fifty persons.

(b) Evaluation of the terrorist threat in North Ossetia

27 . On 18 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued the following telex no. 1751 to all local departments of the interior:

“[The North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] has received information indicating movements of participants of [illegal armed groups] from the plains of [Ingushetia] and [Chechnya] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [Ingushetia] and [North Ossetia]. The fighters ’ meeting is presumably planned for mid-August of the current year, following which they are intending to commit in [North Ossetia] a terrorist act similar to that in Budennovsk. According to the available data, the fighters envisage capturing a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [North Ossetia], and then submitting demands to the country ’ s leadership for withdrawal of troops from [Chechnya]. A large sum of money in [foreign] currency has apparently been transferred from Turkey. [This information is] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken.”

28. On 27 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued decree no. 500 “About the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of North Ossetia”, which was sent to all district police stations. The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings, as well as ordering a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage-taking during public gatherings on the Day of Knowledge in the settlements situated along the administrative border with Ingushetia. The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the Interior should inform accordingly the administrations of educational facilities, put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally instruct the police staff about their functions, to carry out hourly updates of the situation at public gatherings, to ensure immediate feedback to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior and to provide for contingency staff in each police department.

29 . On 25, 27 and 28 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued three other telexes to the local departments, concerning security measures to be taken during the Day of Knowledge, heightened terrorist risks in the region and the prevention of possible attacks. The personnel of the Ministry of the Interior had been put on high alert (“ усиленный режим несения службы” ).

(c) Preparations for the hostage-taking in Beslan

30. As revealed by subsequent investigations, in the last days of August 2004 a sizeable group of terrorists (no less than thirty persons) camped and trained between the villages of Psedakh and Sagopshi in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia. Early in the morning on 1 September 2004 this group crossed the administrative border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, driving a GAZ-66 utility truck.

31. On 1 September 2004 at 7.30 a.m. Major S.G. from the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior stopped the vehicle for inspection at the administrative border in Khurikau. The terrorists unarmed him, placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-2107 and thus drove to Beslan. Major S.G. escaped there and later testified about these events.

2. Hostage-taking

32. At 9 a.m. on 1 September 2004 school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, held a traditional Day of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of the academic year. Over 1,200 persons gathered in the courtyard of the E ‑ shaped two-storey building located in Kominterna Street in the centre of the town, having a population of 35,000. The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny (the “Pravoberezhny ROVD”). The gathering included schoolchildren (859), teachers and staff of the school (about 60 persons) and members of their families. Dozens of children aged below six were present in the crowd with their parents, since several kindergartens in Beslan were closed on that day for various reasons. One unarmed police officer Ms Fatima D. was present at the ceremony.

33. According to some sources, in the morning of 1 September 2004 Beslan ’ s traffic police were called to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, through the town. The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD to the effect that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of Mr Dzasokhov ’ s convoy, and thus leave the school unprotected.

34. In the first minutes of the ceremony, at about 9.05 a.m., a group of at least thirty-two persons (the number of terrorists is disputed – see below), armed with various weapons, including machine guns, explosives and handguns, encircled the persons in the school courtyard and, shooting in the air, ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through the smashed windows on the ground floor. A GAZ-66 vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out of it; according to some witnesses other terrorists came from behind the school and yet another group was already in the building.

35. The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with the local residents or police. At least two local residents were killed (Mr R. Gappoyev and Mr F. Frayev) and some were wounded during the skirmish. It also appears that two terrorists were wounded. About one hundred persons, mostly adults and senior students, managed to escape at this point. Another fifteen persons hid in the boiler building, from where they were rescued later in the day.

36. Despite the initial chaos, the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those present in the courtyard – 1,128 persons (the exact figure is disputed by some sources), including about 800 children aged between several months and eighteen years. Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or to escape through the fire exits, but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium.

37. The hostages were assembled in the gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring about 250 square metres. The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey. The hostages ’ personal belongings, mobile phones and cameras were confiscated, and they were ordered to sit on the floor.

38. Then the attackers proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the gymnasium, using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support. Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task, which was completed within about two hours. A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the hostages ’ heads, two large IEDs attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor. Some IEDs were filled with parts such as metal pellets, screws and bolts. They were connected by wire to pedal detonators (“dead man ’ s switch”) constantly held by two terrorists in turns. Two women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath – suicide bombers – remained in the gymnasium among the hostages.

39. The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium, to allow air and probably to avoid the use of gas as a means of attack. Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points, with windows smashed and stocks of food, water and ammunition arranged. During the day on 1 September 2004 the terrorists kept shooting out of school windows in the direction of military personnel and civilians gathered outside.

40. At 9.25 a.m. the Ministry of the Interior in Vladikavkaz received information about the seizure of the school; it was immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian President Mr A. Dzasokhov and the Federal Security Service (the “FSB”).

3. Events of 1-2 September 2004

(a) The hostages ’ situation

41. The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium. During the first hours of captivity some families remained separated, but they were allowed to reunite later during the day of 1 September.

42. The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than Russian. Mr Ruslan Betrozov, father of two sons present in the gymnasium, repeated the captors ’ orders in Ossetian. One of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of the persons present in the gymnasium by shooting him in the head; his body was removed only several hours later. Mr Betrozov ’ s sons, Alan (born in 1988) and Aslan (born in 1990) witnessed the execution; both boys died on 3 September 2004 during the storming. Another father of three, Mr Vadim Bolloyev, was shot in the shoulder in the first hours of the crisis apparently because he refused to obey the terrorists ’ orders. He died in the gymnasium by the end of 1 September. His younger son Sarmat (born in 1998) survived the attack; his two daughters Zarina (born in 1993) and Madina (born in 1995) died during the storming.

43. During the day on 1 September 2004 the attackers allowed groups of children, under their escort and accompanied by adults, to access the toilets outside the sports hall, to drink tap water. They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and to distribute it among the hostages by small portions. Also on 1 September the terrorists brought into the gymnasium a large TV screen and on several occasions turned on the radio, so that some hostages could hear the news about the events.

44. On 1 September the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages, as well as some mothers with nursing babies, to stay in the smaller adjacent weights room, where they could stretch on the floor. Later these persons were brought into the sports hall.

45. Starting from 2 September the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine. They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they had declared a “dry hunger strike” in support of their captors ’ demands. Some of the hostages chewed leaves of the interior plants in order to relieve their thirst. The survivors later complained of exasperating thirst and heat prevailing on the 2nd and especially on the 3rd of September 2004.

(b) Execution of male hostages

46. From the outset the terrorists separated most men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building or to place IEDs. They were told that their disobedience would lead to execution of women and children in the hall.

47. Thus, in the morning of 1 September, two male hostages were ordered to lift floorboards in the library. Floorboards were also lifted in the corners of the gymnasium. Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors.

48. In the afternoon of 1 September several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor. An explosion occurred there at 4.05 p.m., as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured. One (or two) women suicide bombers and one terrorist of Arab descent were killed by this blast. Several explanations of that explosion were put forward; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation, “ Polkovnik ” (Colonel), had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists no longer needed and at the same time activated the suicide bomber ’ s explosive belt because the women had objected to the treatment of children. Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside, as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated and killed the woman bomber, the Arab terrorist and several hostages.

49. Male hostages who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off by automatic rifles. Karen Mdinaradze survived the explosion as well as the ensuing execution. When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive, he was allowed to return to the gymnasium, where he fainted. He later testified about these events. At about 4.30 p.m. on 1 September the terrorists forced two men to throw the bodies out of a window on the first floor. One of them, Aslan Kudzayev, jumped out the window; he was wounded but survived. His wife is an applicant, she and her infant daughter were released on 2 September; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming.

50. According to the investigation, sixteen men were killed by the terrorists on 1 September. Another sixteen persons were wounded on 1 September as a result of shots fired by the terrorists.

51. On 2 September at about 3 p.m. the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school, although it appears that no one was hurt and that no return fire followed.

(c) Negotiation attempts

52. At around 11 a.m. on 1 September the terrorists transferred a note to the authorities via one of the hostages, ambulance doctor Mrs Larisa Mamitova. She walked to the school gates, handed the note to a man who approached her and returned; in the meantime her minor son was held at gunpoint inside the building. This note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of persons with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and paediatrician Mr Roshal. The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in case of an attempt to storm it and that the terrorists would shoot fifty hostages for any one of them killed. However, it appears that the mobile telephone number was either wrongly noted or had been switched off, and no telephone contact could be established at that time.

53. At 1 p.m. on 1 September the Russian State TV programme “ Vesti ” announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities, containing their demands and images filmed inside the school. One hour later it was announced that the videotape was empty. Later on, the very existence of this videotape remained disputed.

54. Around 4 p.m. on 1 September Mrs Mamitova brought out a second note, containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator, aide to Russia ’ s President, Mr Aslakhanov. She also told the person who collected the note that there were over 1,000 hostages inside the building.

55. The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator, FSB officer Mr Z. His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the hostages ’ conditions, the possibilities of exit or surrender or the removal of the bodies from the school courtyard remained futile.

56. Mr Roshal arrived in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September 2004. When he called the hostage-takers, on 1 and 2 September, they were hostile and told him that they would enter into negotiations only if all four persons demanded by them arrived at the school. They told him that if he attempted to enter alone, he would be killed. They also refused to accept food, water or medicines, as well as to permit him to enter the building and examine the sick and wounded.

57. On 2 September the former President of Ingushetia, Mr Ruslan Aushev, arrived in Beslan on the invitation of the operative headquarters (OH). It appears that at about 3 p.m. he, for the first time, contacted by telephone Mr Akhmed Zakayev, the head of the self-proclaimed Chechen separatist government, living in London. He told Mr Zakayev about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded 1,000 persons.

58. Following a telephone contact with the terrorists, at 3.30 p.m. on 2 September Mr Aushev was allowed to enter the school. He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege. Mr Aushev was led to the gymnasium and then had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists, Mr Khuchbarov (“ Polkovnik ”).

59. Following negotiations, Mr Aushev was permitted to leave with twenty ‑ six (other sources indicate twenty-four) persons – nursing mothers and their babies; all women had elder children in the school and were forced to leave them behind.

60. Mr Aushev brought out a message addressed to the Russian President Mr V. Putin from Mr Shamil Basayev. It demanded the pulling of troops out of Chechnya and the official recognition of Chechnya as an independent state. In return, it promised cessation of terrorist activities in Russia “for the ensuing ten or fifteen years”. It bore no mention of the school siege. It appears that the terrorists also gave Mr Aushev a videotape depicting part of his visit, the gymnasium with the hostages, explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on the “dead man ’ s switch”. It also contained Mr Khuchbarov ’ s statement that the negotiations should involve Mr Aslan Maskhadov, the President of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen State, who had been in hiding at the time.

61. On 2 September and in the morning of 3 September the attackers tried to contact the authorities of North Ossetia with the assistance of the school director, Mrs Tsaliyeva. Two hostages – children of the North Ossetian Parliament ’ s speaker, Mr Mamsurov, – were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and to tell him that they were suffering without water and food. It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures (district prosecutor, a well-known sportsman) were singled out by the terrorists but that no contact was established.

62. In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr Z., on 2 September direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr Gutseriyev, an influential businessman of Ingush origin. The latter supplied Mr Aushev with the requisite telephone numbers, participated in the conversations with Mr Akhmed Zakayev and eventually tried to liaise with Mr Maskhadov.

63. Thus, as can be judged from various information sources, at around 5 p.m. on 2 September Mr Aushev, Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zakayev held a telephone conversation during which Mr Zakayev promised to involve Mr Maskhadov in the negotiations (see paragraphs 139, 321, 331, 339 below). Some sources indicated that these talks had apparently resulted in Mr Maskhadov ’ s agreement to come to Beslan.

(d) Coordination of the authorities ’ actions and involvement of army and security detachments

64. At about 10.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 the crisis OH was set up on the premises of the Beslan town administration. The exact composition, leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed. According to most sources, initially it was headed by Mr A. Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, and as of 2 September by General V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Mr Tsyban, the head of the North Ossetian Ministry of Emergency Situations (“Emercom”) Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, deputy head of the Information programme departments of the State Telecommunication corporation Rossiya Mr Vasilyev and the commander-in-chief of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence General Sobolev (see paragraphs 140, 168, 193, 312 - 333 below).

65. The detachments of the 58th Army started to arrive in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September. On 2 September 2004 eight armoured personnel vehicles (APCs) and several tanks of the 58th Army arrived in Beslan. They were placed under the command of the FSB special purpose units and positioned around the school but out of the terrorists ’ sight.

66. Early in the morning of 3 September the FSB special purpose units went to Vladikavkaz for joint training with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to prepare for a possible storming.

(e) Situation with the hostages ’ relatives outside the school

67. Thousands of people in Beslan were directly concerned with the crisis.

68. Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area, local residents, as well as ethnic Ossetians from outside Beslan, some of them armed, remained around the school building throughout the siege.

69. In the afternoon of 1 September the hostages ’ relatives were invited to the building of the town Cultural Centre. Until the end of the siege the Cultural Centre remained a hub for communicating with the relatives and for the provision of medical and psychological assistance to them.

70. At 7 p.m. on 1 September the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the deputy speaker of the North Ossetian parliament Mr Kesayev and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr Sikoyev met with the relatives in the Cultural Centre. During this meeting Mr Sikoyev informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and that they had refused to accept food, water or medicine for the hostages.

71. At about 9.30 p.m. on 1 September Mr Roshal participated in the meeting at the Cultural Centre. He assured the gathering that the conditions in the school were “acceptable” and that the hostages could survive several days without food or water. He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities.

72. On 2 September a psychological aid unit was set up at the Cultural Centre.

73. Late in the evening on 2 September Mr Dzasokhov held another meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre.

74. At 11.15 a.m. on 3 September Mr Dzasokhov announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that “new personalities” had appeared in the negotiation process.

75. Some of the applicants were among the relatives who gathered outside the school building or stayed at the Cultural Centre and have submitted written statements describing these events.

(f) Information about the crisis

76. From the outset the information about the hostage-taking was strictly controlled by the authorities. Mr Vasilyev, a member of the OH and senior employee of the State TV company Rossiya was put in charge of contacting the journalists.

77. In the afternoon of 1 September the media announced referring to the official sources that about 250 persons had been taken hostage. Later on the same day the media reported a “corrected” number of hostages: 354 persons. According to some hostages, this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute or at least throw out of the window the bodies of the executed men. It also transpires from the hostages ’ statements that after these announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet, saying that “there should anyway be no more than 350 of you left” (see paragraph 285 below).

78. In the evening of 2 September Mr Roshal held a press-conference. He announced that he had talked on the telephone with a terrorist nicknamed “ Gorets ” (highlander) who had put forward no demands.

79. At 1 p.m. on 3 September the State TV showed terrorists ’ relatives of Ingush origin who asked them to release the hostages. One woman, the wife of a presumed hostage-taker, said that she and her children were being held somewhere “against their will” and asked her husband to do everything “to avoid harming the children”.

4. Storming and rescue operation

(a) Morning of 3 September 2004

80. The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger. They had spent two days without sleep, in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened: people started to lose consciousness; some children were hallucinating, having seizures and vomiting.

81. Early in the morning the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor, hanging them along the walls.

82. At 11.10 a.m. the terrorists agreed with Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev to allow “Emercom” to collect the bodies from the school courtyard.

83. At about noon Mr Dzasokhov informed the OH that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr Zakayev (see paragraph 331 below). According to some sources, that agreement could have extended to a possibility of Mr Maskhadov ’ s arrival in Beslan.

84. At 12.55 p.m. an “Emercom” truck and four officers entered the school courtyard. The men had Mr Gutseriyev ’ s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists. One of the terrorists came out and supervised their work. The explosions inside the gymnasium at 1.03 p.m. came unexpectedly to this group. The ensuing exchange of gun fire resulted in two officers ’ deaths.

(b) The first three explosions in the gymnasium

85. At 1.03 p.m. a powerful explosion occurred in the upper eastern part of the gymnasium. Part of the roofing was destroyed, the insulation caught fire, and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium, killing and injuring people seated underneath. Many of the surviving hostages described the first explosion as a “fire ball”, or a “column of fire”, followed by white/silver powder falling from the ceiling. It appears that this explosion caused fire in the roof-space of the gymnasium (see paragraph 288 below). Twenty-two seconds later another explosion ripped through the lower part of the wall under the first window on the north-eastern side. The nature and origins of these explosions are disputed (see documents referred to below).

86. These two explosions killed both terrorists holding the detonators; however most of the IEDs remained intact (see paragraph 307 below). Dozens of people were killed, others were wounded or received burns of varying degrees, and almost everyone was shell-shocked. Many applicants submitted witness statements about these events.

87. Those hostages who could move and were able to reach the opening in the wall on the northern side started to climb through it and run outside. The terrorists fired at them from the upper floor, this prompted an exchange of gunfire between the terrorists and the security forces.

88. At this point General Andreyev issued an order to storm the building and to proceed with the rescue operation and neutralisation of the terrorists.

89. Several terrorists were killed or wounded during the first two explosions, however the majority of them survived, including “ Polkovnik ”. They rounded up the survivors in the gymnasium (about 300 persons) and forced them to walk to other premises of the main building, mostly in the southern wing: canteen, kitchen, meeting room and handicraft classrooms. Some hostages remained in the premises adjacent to the gymnasium (weights room, shower room).

90. The dead, injured and shell-shocked remained in the gymnasium, where the fire continued to spread in the roof-space.

91. At about 1.30 p.m. a third powerful explosion occurred in the southern part of the gymnasium. It appears that it was caused by one of the large IEDs which had caught fire. Soon afterwards flames spread around the gymnasium, taking to the floor and walls of the premises. Some hostages continued to escape through the openings in the walls.

92. Between 1.30 p.m. and 2.50 p.m. servicemen of the security services and local residents broke the western wall of the gymnasium and entered the hall. They helped to evacuate survivors. Their movements were covered by an APC which came close to the school. No terrorists were found there, but the gymnasium was under fire, probably from terrorist snipers on the first floor.

93. At about 1.40 p.m. part of the burning roofing collapsed.

94. Hundreds of wounded hostages and servicemen were taken to the Beslan hospital in private cars and ambulances. An “Emercom” field hospital had been spread out in tents in the hospital courtyard in order to sort out the wounded and cope with the influx. Many injured were taken to the hospitals in Vladikavkaz. The hostages ’ relatives were not allowed to enter the hospital. Over 750 civilians and over 50 servicemen received medical help on 3 September 2004 (see paragraphs 242 below and subsequent).

(c) Hostages in the southern wing

95. Over 300 hostages who had survived the explosions and fire in the gymnasium were taken by the terrorists to the canteen and kitchen situated on the ground floor in the southern wing. Other hostages were taken to the main meeting room situated above the canteen on the first floor. There they found stocks of water and food and could relieve their thirst for the first time in two and a half days.

96. The women and children in the canteen and meeting room were forced by the terrorists at gunpoint to stand in the windows and wave their clothes; some were killed or wounded by gunfire and explosions.

(d) Ensuing fighting

97. As shown by many witness statements, but not corroborated by the results of the criminal investigation, after 2 p.m. a tank with hull number 320 entered the school yard and fired several rounds at the canteen. It appears that another tank, with hull number 325 or 328, also fired at the school from a distance of about 20-30 metres. Some of the rounds were fired with solid shots, while others were probably done with ammunition (see paragraphs 294 , 298, 303, 411 below).

98. Two APCs entered the school yard and took part in the fighting with their large-calibre machine guns.

99. The army and FSB assault troops were positioned on the roofs of the five-storey apartment blocks, nos. 37, 39 and 41 of Shkolny Lane, located on the eastern side of the school. These servicemen fired at the school with portable grenade-launchers and fire-launchers, although the exact timing of these attacks is disputed (see paragraphs 152, 293, 300, 408, 410 below). Two MI-24 helicopters circled above the school. According to some sources, although not corroborated by the official investigation, at least one rocket was launched from a helicopter on the school ’ s roof (see paragraph 410 below).

100. At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered fire brigades with water cannons to intervene, by which time the gymnasium was ablaze and other parts of the building were on fire (see paragraphs 160, 209, 304 below). At the same time the head of the OH ordered the servicemen of the FSB special forces units Alfa and Vympel to enter the building.

101. At about 3.30 p.m. the entire roof of the gymnasium collapsed. After 4.30 p.m. the fire was contained; the servicemen of the special forces and firefighters entered the gymnasium, but found no survivors there.

102. It appears that the servicemen of the special forces entered the canteen at about 4 p.m. through the openings in the walls and through the windows, once the metal bars blocking them had fallen inside as a result of an explosion or had been pulled out with an APC. Amid fierce fighting they evacuated the surviving hostages.

103. Numerous bodies of terrorists and hostages were found in the canteen, the meeting room and rooms and corridors of the southern wing.

104. At about 5 p.m. a strict security perimeter was established around the school. All civilians, “Emercom” staff, firefighters and servicemen of the army were ordered to leave, leaving only the FSB special forces inside. At about 5.25 p.m. the servicemen of the FSB special units held a minute ’ s silence in the corridor of the southern wing in order to honour the memory of their comrades: ten members of the elite Vympel and Alfa units, including three group commanders, had lost their lives and about thirty were wounded – the biggest losses ever sustained by these units in a single operation.

105. After 6 p.m. several shots were fired at the southern wing of the building from anti-tank missiles and flame-throwers.

106. At about 9 p.m. two tanks fired at the school. There followed several powerful explosions which completely destroyed the walls and roofing of the handicraft classrooms in the southern wing.

107. The gunfire and explosions at the school continued until past midnight.

108. One terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, was captured alive. The rest, it appears, were killed during the storming. Consistent rumours circulated that some terrorists had escaped or were captured clandestinely.

5. Events of 4 September 2004, identification of bodies and burials

109. In the night of 4 September Russian President Putin arrived in Beslan for several hours. He visited the town hospital and administration.

110. The school building remained encircled by soldiers throughout the day of 4 September.

111. At 7 a.m. “Emercom” staff started to collect the bodies and to clear the debris. Between 112 and 116 charred bodies were found in the gymnasium, and about 80 bodies in the adjacent premises (changing rooms, weights room). It appears that between 106 and 110 bodies were found in the southern wing of the school and on other premises, although no exact information has been recorded in this respect (see paragraphs 130-133 below). 18 bodies of men were collected in the courtyard. About 330 bodies (including over 180 children) were placed in the school yard and then taken to the Vladikavkaz morgue.

112 . During the day on 4 September bulldozers and trucks arrived at the school. The remaining debris was loaded onto trucks and taken to the town rubbish dump. The victims alleged that they and other locals later found a number of important items of evidence among this rubbish, including the terrorists ’ personal belongings such as backpacks and razor blades, human remains, hostages ’ clothes, parts of IEDs.

113. At 6 p.m. on 4 September the security lines in Beslan were lifted. On the same day after 8 p.m. the units of the 58th army withdrew from the town.

114. On 5 September 2004 the first funerals took place. Over the following days collective burials of over 100 people followed. The local cemetery was too small and had to be extended; later a special memorial was erected there (see paragraph 425 below).

115. However, many bodies were charred beyond recognition. On 17 September 73 bodies were taken to the forensic laboratory in Rostov ‑ on ‑ Don for identification through DNA tests. The identification and burials continued throughout December 2004 (see paragraphs 340- 341 below).

116. The 5th and 6th of September 2004 were declared days of national mourning. On 6 September 2004 Russian President Putin spoke in a televised address to the nation announcing future measures to improve agencies ’ cooperation in counter-terrorism measures. He called the attack a “direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia”.

6. Assuming of responsibility for the terrorist act

117. On 5 September 2004 the website Chechenpress.org published a message signed by “the President of Ichkeria” Mr Aslan Maskhadov, condemning the hostage-taking and terrorist attacks against civilians, but blaming the Russian authorities for the radicalisation of the Chechens.

118. On 17 September 2004 the website Kavkazcenter.com disseminated an e ‑ mail, allegedly from Mr Shamil Basayev, a leader of the radical wing of the Chechen separatist movement, who used the titles of “ Amir of Riyad ‑ us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs” and “the chief of the high military madjlisul shura of the united Caucasus mujahidin ”. Mr Basayev, who at the time lived clandestinely in the Russian Northern Caucasus, claimed that his “martyrs ’ battalion” had carried out the attack in Beslan, as well as the explosions in Moscow and the plane crashes in August 2004.

119. The e-mail alleged that the special forces had started the storming and that the IEDs set up by the attackers in the gymnasium had not exploded. Mr Basayev further claimed that the following demands had been put to the authorities: that military actions in Chechnya be stopped, that troops be pulled out and that President Putin step down from his post. The note stated that all hostages, including children, had declared a “dry hunger strike” until these demands were granted. The letter contained details about the number and types of IEDs used, indicated the ethnic origin of thirty ‑ three “ mujahedin ” who had taken part in “Operation Nord-West” (as they named the attack at the school) and alleged that the group had gathered and trained for the preceding ten days under Mr Basayev ’ s personal leadership near the village of Batako-Yurt [near Psedakh in Ingushetia]. The letter also mentioned the message to President Putin, which had been transmitted through Mr Aushev, and contained its full text. Mr Basayev alleged that the only surviving terrorist, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, had been taken into the group on the night preceding the operation. The document further stated that the leader of the operation, “ Polkovnik ”, had called him after the storming had started to say that they had counterattacked, and that the last call from him had been received at 2 a.m. [on 4 September]. Finally, the letter cited the alleged costs of the terrorist attacks of August-September 2004: 8,000 euros (EUR) for “Operation Nord-West”, 7,000 US dollars (USD) for the explosions in Moscow and USD 4,000 for the planes.

120. In August 2005 the same website published another message signed by Mr Shamil Basayev. This message contained passages suggesting that a member of the group which had seized the school, Mr Vladimir Khodov, had been a double agent of the FSB and of Mr Basayev and that he had ensured the group ’ s “coverage” during the preparation for the attack and their unhindered passage to North Ossetia.

121. On 10 July 2010 Mr Basayev was killed by an explosion in Ingushetia. It was announced that his death was a result of a special operation by the Russian security services; it was also reported that the blast had resulted from mishandling of explosives.

7. Criminal investigation file no. 20/849

122 . On 1 September 2004 the North Ossetian Prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 20/849 concerning a terrorist attack at the school by an armed group and the murder of twelve male hostages.

123. On 2 September 2004 Mr Fridinskiy, Deputy General Prosecutor, ordered the transfer of the investigation concerning the hostage-taking of over 600 persons to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office in the Northern Caucasus. On the same day Mr Fridinskiy appointed a group of over sixty investigators from the prosecutors ’ offices from the Southern Federal Circuit to take over the investigation, under the command of a special investigator of the General Prosecutor ’ s Office in the Northern Caucasus.

124. This investigation has been extended on several occasions and is still pending (adjourned).

125. Many important investigative steps aimed at establishing the exact circumstances of the preparation and carrying out of the terrorist act, as well as the explosions in the gymnasium and the ensuing storming, have been taken in the course of these proceedings. The applicants claimed that in the course of proceedings they have not been allowed full access to the documents of this file and challenged this aspect of proceedings. Upon the Court ’ s requests, the Government submitted the list of documents contained in this criminal case. According to this list, by 2012 the case-file contained 235 volumes, each ranging, on the average, between 200 and 350 pages. The available information may be summarised as follows.

(a) Reconstruction of the events preceding the hostage-taking and identification of the organisers of the crime

126. The investigation found out that the group which had committed the terrorist act had been organised by Mr Aslan Maskhadov, Mr Shamil Basayev, “a mercenary of Arab descent” called Taufik-al-Jedani (Abu-Dzeyt), and their entourage. The aim of the group was “to break public peace and to scare the population, to put pressure on the State authorities in order to achieve withdrawal of troops from Chechnya”. In July-August 2004 the said persons had put together a plan to seize a large number of hostages among pupils and parents of school no. 1 in Beslan, as well as to commit murders of civilians, police officers and military servicemen.

127. In the second half of August 2004 the said persons put together an organised criminal group (gang), comprising over thirty persons. Its members included residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, other regions of Russia and foreign mercenaries. The organisers of the terrorist act entrusted the command of the operation to an active member of the gang, Mr Khuchbarov from Ingushetia, who used the nickname “Rasul” and radio call “ Polkovnik ” (colonel). Twenty-four terrorists were identified by their names, while at least six persons remained unidentified.

128. On 31 August 2004 the gang gathered in the vicinity of Psedakh in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia. They carried the following arms and ammunition (partly originating from the attacks in Ingushetia on 21-22 June 2004): no less than twenty Kalashnikov assault rifles, four Kalashnikov machine guns (RPK-74 and PKM), one tank machine gun (PKT), two portable anti-tank missile launchers (RPG-7v), four hand pistols and corresponding ammunition, including cartridges of different calibres and grenades of various modifications. In addition, the group carried two identical IEDs comprised of plastic explosives and hexogen, filled with metal pellets and electro detonators, with an impact radius of no less than 200 metres; six IEDs made of OZM-72 anti-personnel circular fragmentation mines; and so-called “suicide bomber belts” – IEDs containing plastic explosives and projectiles made of cut metal wires and metal sheets. The gang also used mobile telephones, a radio station and portable radio transmitters. The members were supplied with camouflaged clothes, balaclava masks and gas masks. They used a GAZ-66 vehicle to travel.

129. On 31 August 2004 Mr Khuchbarov informed the members of the gang about the forthcoming attack and distributed the roles between them. Early in the morning of 1 September 2004 they travelled towards Beslan; in the village of Khurikau along the way they captured local policeman S.G., also seizing his handgun and vehicle.

(b) Examination of the crime scene

130 . Between 7 a.m. and 6.25 p.m. on 4 September 2004 a group of investigators and experts, in the presence of twelve attesting witnesses, compiled a report of the school building and courtyard. The examination of the site was conducted simultaneously with the clearing of the debris and rescue operation. It ran to forty-three pages and was accompanied by video and photo materials (over 150 pages).

131. The report mostly concentrated on the descriptions of the items found in the school, including personal belongings and documents of the hostages, the terrorists ’ equipment and ammunition, damage to the structures of the building, as well as the terrorists ’ bodies. Very little information was given about the location and state of the hostages ’ bodies; most notably, page 24 of the report contained the following passage: “[in the gymnasium] from the floor up to 40-50 centimetres high there are found hundreds of burnt bodies of women, children and men, occupying about half of the gymnasium ’ s surface”. The report noted that the bodies were being carried out by the “Emercom” staff into the courtyard.

132. The description of the canteen on page 15 failed to mention the state of its two windows facing the railway line or to give any details about the nature and extent of damage to its walls other than “signs of damage from firearms on the walls [entailing] falling off of whitewash”.

133 . The description of the southern wing on page 23 was limited to the following: “the said wing is almost destroyed and the “Emercom” servicemen are clearing the debris, as a result of which no examination of this wing is carried out”.

(c) Expert report no. 1

134 . Upon the investigation ’ s requests of October and November 2004, on 23 December 2005 an “all ‑ round forensic expert examination no. 1” (“ комплексная судебная экспертиза ”, hereinafter “expert report no. 1”) was produced. The request was to evaluate the conduct of the OH and of various military and security agencies on 1-3 September 2004. The experts visited the sites in Beslan and examined numerous items of evidence, including testimony of servicemen and other witnesses, photographs, graphic tables, and tapes of telephone and radio conversations. The report comprised over seventy pages. It concluded that the actions of the officials had been lawful and reasonable in the circumstances. In particular, it found that the members of the OH and the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior, the Internal Troops, the FSB and the “Emercom” “had not committed any offences which could bear a causal relationship with the negative consequences resulting from the terrorist act of 1-3 September 2004 in Beslan”.

135. This document was extensively cited and relied upon in the subsequent proceedings, even though it was later declared invalid (see paragraph 166 below).

136. The report focused on several questions.

(i) Actions of the Operative Headquarters (OH)

137. First, the report found that the actions of the OH had been focused on negotiations with the terrorists in order to obtain release and safety for a maximum number of persons. The terrorists ’ demands transmitted through Mr Aushev could not have served as the subject-matter of negotiations, since they threatened the basis of the Constitutional order and Russia ’ s territorial integrity.

138. The involvement of Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev as negotiators, as suggested to the OH by the FSB, and the success of Mr Aushev ’ s mission when he took out twenty-six persons, had served as an antidote against the escalation of the ethnic Ossetian-Ingush conflict.

139 . In respect of Mr Maskhadov ’ s involvement in the negotiations, the report found that Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Aushev had talked to Mr Zakayev on 3 September in the morning and that the latter had told them that his connection with Mr Maskhadov had remained at a one-way level. They suggested to Mr Zakayev that he contacted Mr Shamil Basayev, but he refused in view of their past conflict.

140 . The report also covered the question of Mr Dzasokhov ’ s involvement in the OH. It stated that on the morning of 1 September 2004 Mr Dzasokhov had taken an active part in the work of the OH. Under his command the officials had ensured a security perimeter around the school, informed the public about the measures taken, supplied the local population with the necessary provisions in the Cultural Centre, and set up a field hospital. The information to the inhabitants was provided hourly through Mr Dzugayev, the North Ossetian President ’ s press-secretary. Mr Dzasokhov took care of the immediate needs of the first day of the siege, coordinating various agencies involved, increasing the security of other vital objects in the Republic. When the terrorists named him as a negotiator, Mr Dzasokhov had been prepared to go ahead, but the OH formally prohibited him from doing so.

141. Having scrutinised the taped conversations between the hostage ‑ takers and the OH, as well as between the terrorists inside the building and their collaborators outside (namely several conversations with someone using the call-name “Magas” recorded after the start of the storming), the experts found that the terrorists had unconditionally refused to discuss any measures aimed at alleviating the hostages ’ situation, or any other arrangements except for political demands relating to the situation in Chechnya, and insisted that the hostages had voluntarily joined them in declaring a “dry hunger strike”. The telephone conversations were often ended by them in an aggressive manner and without apparent reason. Furthermore, they had anticipated and planned their own deaths, as well as numerous deaths among the hostages, as attested by the cheers and support received by them from “Magas” once the storming had started. These later conversations contained references to the “meeting in heaven”, “fulfilling the duty”, becoming martyrs ( Shahid ), welcomed the killing of infidels and referred to the situation of the storming as “going normal”.

(ii) Prevention of the terrorist act

142. The report relied on numerous telexes, orders and directives issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the FSB in July – August 2004, indicating a heightened terrorist threat in the Northern Caucasus and ordering various measures to be taken by the local police and security forces. As of 22 August all forces of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit had been put on alert (“ усиленный вариант несения службы ”). On 24 and 31 August special measures were requested from the local police offices to prevent terrorist acts from taking place during the Day of Knowledge on 1 September.

143. In respect of the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan (situated next to the school building) the report concluded that the commanding officers had failed to take certain preventive steps. In particular, the personnel of the ROVD had not been instructed about the actions to be taken in case of emergency, and no plan had been put in place to ensure additional security during the ceremonies in the schools. The only police officer present at school no. 1 was unarmed, namely Mrs D. Two other police officers who had been scheduled to guard the school during the ceremony were absent. Two patrol officers of the transport police had been transferred elsewhere to ensure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov ’ s convoy along the “Kavkaz” federal highway. As a result, the terrorists had unhindered access to the school and were able to force a large number of hostages inside. No reaction from the local law-enforcement bodies had been forthcoming during the first fifteen minutes of the attack.

144. The servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, having received no instructions beforehand and having no preliminary plan of action in the event of a terrorist act, had received arms and ammunitions at the ROVD and by 10 a.m. had set up a security cordon around the school. Information about the school siege had been immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. The report found that the actions of the senior staff of the Pravoberezhny ROVD had amounted to professional negligence.

145. In respect of the situation in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia, the report concluded that the local police had failed to prevent the members of the gang from assembling and training there at the end of August. Reference was made to the pending criminal case against the senior officers of the Malgobek ROVD (see paragraph 363 below).

(iii) Actions of the Internal Troops

146. The report concluded that the servicemen of the Internal Troops had been employed only in the outer security perimeter around the school, the first one being ensured by the FSB special forces. They had taken no part in the fighting; their actions and equipment had been in full compliance with the relevant legal acts and pertinent to their tasks.

(iv) Actions of the special units of the FSB

147. Servicemen of the FSB special forces had taken part in the operation. They were armed with customary weapons, as well as special equipment such as RPG-26 portable grenade-launchers and RPO ‑ A “Shmel” portable flame-throwers.

148. Turning to the events of 3 September 2004, the report presented the following chronology. By 1 p.m. no plan existed to start the storming. Two special forces ’ groups had been out of Beslan training for the possible development of the situation; snipers and intelligence groups kept monitoring the object from their positions; an emergency group of thirty ‑ two persons was positioned behind the housing blocks; and the remaining servicemen stayed at the assembly point.

149. The explosions which occurred at 1.05 p.m. were caused by two IEDs. No shots were fired at that time, as the “Emercom” staff were working in the front yard of the school. In any event, the place of the explosion was invisible from the snipers ’ positions.

150. No flames appeared in the gymnasium after the two explosions. The hostages started to run out through the openings ripped in the walls. The terrorists opened fire on the escaping people using automatic rifles and machine guns. Pursuant to the instruction of the head of the OH, the servicemen of the special forces were ordered to save the hostages. The terrorists were aimed at by the fire-support group and under cover of three APC-80s.

151. A group of servicemen entered the weights room and evacuated from it several women with small children. This group then entered the gymnasium and started to take out the hostages. The terrorists opened fire at them. Two servicemen took positions on the floor and returned fire, while the rest continued to lead the hostages out. At about 1.40-1.50 p.m. the terrorists fired several shots from portable grenade-launchers (RPG ‑ 18 “ Mukha ”) at the gymnasium, killing and injuring several hostages, wounding two officers of the special forces and starting a fire in the gymnasium.

152 . The rescue operation lasted until 2.40 p.m., at which time all available FSB forces had been regrouped pursuant to a previously adopted plan. At 3 p.m., upon an order from the commander, they stormed the building. Their movements inside the building were slowed down by low visibility from smoke and whitewash powder and the presence of hostages whom the terrorists were using as human shields. The terrorists employed automatic weapons, hand grenades and portable grenade-launchers, while the FSB forces were constrained to fire single shots, to avoid excessive harm to the hostages. By 6 p.m. no hostages remained in the building. Only once this had been ensured did the forces of the FSB use heavy weapons against the terrorists who had refused to surrender. Hand grenades, RPG ‑ 20 portable grenade-launchers and “Shmel” flame-throwers were used for the first time after 6 p.m. At 9 p.m. a T-72 tank was used to make openings in the walls and to suppress enemy fire points, since further movements in the building were impossible because of mines laid by the terrorists. The records of the site examinations and video materials showed that no bodies of hostages were found in places where the terrorists were killed by heavy arms and team weapons.

153. Ten servicemen of the special forces were killed during the operation, and eleven received injuries. The fatal casualties included two lieutenant-colonels [group commanders], one of whom had died in the first minutes of the storming when he rushed to the school covering the escaping hostages; the second died in the main meeting room while trying to release the hostages detained there.

154. The report analysed the circumstances of the deaths and injuries of each serviceman of the special forces which occurred between 1.20 p.m. and 3 p.m. on 3 September and concluded that their actions had been lawful and adequate and had demonstrated their high professionalism, courage and self ‑ sacrifice.

(v) Actions of the army

155. The commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, General Sobolev, was informed of the hostage taking at 9.38 a.m. on 1 September. On the same day, by 1.30 p.m. the third ring of the security perimeter had been set up around the school by the 58th army servicemen. The servicemen were armed with various automatic weapons and portable grenade and mine launchers, but they did not use any of them since their task was limited to maintaining the security line.

156. As to the use of military vehicles, the report found, on the basis of various descriptions, plans, logbooks and servicemen ’ s testimony, that on 2 September three T-72 tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 had been transferred under the command of the FSB officers. Tanks with hull numbers 320 and 328 manoeuvred around the school following the commands of the FSB officers but did not open fire. Tank with hull number 325 fired seven high-fragmentation shots, calibre 125 millimetres, at the canteen situated in the right wing of the school, following the directions of the FSB officer in charge. The shots were fired between 9 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004. The report concluded that the use of the tank had occurred after the end of the rescue operation at 6 p.m., when no harm could have been caused to the hostages and was guided by the need to suppress enemy fire in the most efficient way.

157. Several other military vehicles were used during the operation, also under the command of the FSB officers. Eight APC-80s were stationed at various points around the school from 1 or 2 September 2004 onwards. Of them two, with hull numbers 823 and 824, took part in the storming operation. APC number 823 used a heavy machine gun (calibre 7.62 millimetres) between 2 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. to suppress terrorists ’ firing positions on the school ’ s roof. At the same time an APC with hull number 824 fired several rounds from a heavy machine gun at the windows of the first floor, covering the Alpha servicemen who had entered the building. The remaining military vehicles took no active part in the fighting. The experts concluded that the use of the machine guns in the circumstances was fully appropriate and could not have entailed injuries or deaths among the hostages.

(vi) Actions of “Emercom”

158. From 9.35 a.m. on 1 September, various services of “Emercom” from North Ossetia and neighbouring regions began to arrive at school no. 1. They included brigades specialising in extinguishing major fires and fire engines with water tanks or cisterns. Rescue workers arrived with special equipment and search dogs. At 5 p.m. on 1 September 2004 fourteen psychologists started working with the relatives; by 4 September 2004 fifty ‑ one psychologists were working in Beslan. The centre of psychological assistance was in the Cultural Centre, where ambulance doctors were called whenever necessary. In total, between 1 and 4 September 2004, 254 persons and seventy vehicles of “Emercom” were deployed in Beslan.

159. At 12.40 p.m. on 3 September four servicemen of the “Emercom” rescue team were instructed to retrieve bodies from the school ’ s courtyard. They received safety guarantees and a mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists in the school. Following the explosions in the gymnasium, chaotic firing from the upper floor and roof by the terrorists left two servicemen dead and two injured.

160 . The report then focussed on the actions of the fire brigades on 3 September. At 2.51 p.m. a fire alert was given to the firefighting service. At 3.20-3.25 p.m. fire brigades arrived at the scene. The delay in arriving was caused by the order of Mr Andreyev, who had considered that the firemen and their engines could have been attacked by the terrorists, rendering the rescue operation more complex. At 3.26 p.m. two brigades rolled out fire hoses and proceeded to extinguish the fire. Each cistern contained about 2,000 litres of water, which was its full capacity, used within three to five minutes. The fire hydrant in the school could not be used, as it was located in the military engagement area. At 3.35 p.m. two other fire units arrived and were stationed on the northern and eastern sides of the gymnasium. Deputy North Ossetian “Emercom” Minister Colonel Romanov assumed the role of incident commander. Five fire hoses were deployed. A supply of water from a water hydrant situated within 200 metres was ensured; the firemen also used water from newly arrived tanks.

161. The fire was contained and extinguished by 9.09 p.m. The operation was protracted since on two occasions the firemen were removed from the school upon the special forces ’ orders.

162. In the meantime, the “Emercom” rescue workers evacuated hostages from the school building. By 4 p.m. they took out over 300 persons, including 100 children. After the fire was extinguished, rescue teams started to search the debris in the gymnasium. They had to stop at 10.25 p.m. when unexploded IEDs were discovered and sappers were called in.

163. Immediately after midnight on 4 September a fire started in the southern wing of the school building, on the premises occupied by the canteen, handicraft classrooms, library and meeting room. Four firefighting brigades arrived on the spot and the fire was contained and extinguished by 3.10 a.m.

164. At 7 a.m. on 4 September “Emercom” rescue workers, assisted by military servicemen, started to clear the debris and search for the bodies. 323 dead bodies were collected and sent to the forensic unit in Vladikavkaz. At 7 p.m. the search and rescue operation in the school was over.

165. The report concluded, with reference to the evidence contained in the case file, that the deaths of 112 persons whose bodies were found in the gymnasium had been caused by the explosions of the IEDs. The bodies found there had between 70% and 100% of their surface carbonised; the carbonisation had occurred post-mortem. The firefighters had to act in extreme conditions, under threat to their lives. The organisation and equipment supplied were sufficient to ensure the carrying out of their tasks.

(vii) Challenge to the report ’ s conclusions

166 . On 9 November 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz, upon the applicants ’ application, declared the expert report no. 1 invalid owing to a number of grave breaches of the procedural legislation governing the appointment of experts and the carrying out of expert evaluations.

(d) Chronology of the OH ’ s actions

167 . The investigation established the following time-frame of the action of the OH (as set out in expert report no. 1 and subsequent documents):

(i) 1 September 2004

168 . At about 10.30 a.m. the OH was set up, in accordance with the plan of action in case of terrorist threat issued on 30 July 2004. Initially it was headed by the President of North Ossetia Mr Dzasokhov, the head of the North Ossetian FSB Mr Andreyev and the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior Mr Dzantiyev. Prior to his appointment, on 2 September 2004, as head of the OH, Mr Andreyev had been in charge of coordinating the actions of various law-enforcement and military structures, including the FSB units arriving in Beslan. Two deputy directors of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, who had arrived in Beslan on 2 September, acted as consultants and did not interfere in the command of the operation.

169. Between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. the operative headquarters ensured the evacuation of residents from adjacent premises, as well as cordoning off the school. The police and security forces searched basements and attics of the nearby buildings, cleared the adjacent streets of parked vehicles and closed them to traffic, closed the local railway line and took other necessary measures. In order to avoid harm to the hostages and other civilians, it was also ordered not to respond to the random shots fired by the terrorists. Scanning of radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school had been put in place by the Ministry of the Interior, the FSB and the army.

170. At 11.05 a.m. the terrorists transmitted the first note, containing a telephone number and naming possible negotiators. However, the telephone number had been indicated incorrectly and no contact could be established.

171. Between 11.30 a.m. and 13.30 p.m. two safety perimeters were put around the school, composed of police and army servicemen, using seventeen APCs. At noon on that day the APCs were withdrawn out of the terrorists ’ view, in order to avoid provocation.

172. At 11.40 a.m. the OH started compiling a list of the hostages.

173. At 12.35 p.m. the OH invited the North Ossetian mufti to take part in the talks; but the terrorists opened fire on him when he tried to approach the seized building.

174. At 1.55 p.m. all reserve forces of North Ossetia ’ s police, including local policemen in towns and villages along the administrative border with Ingushetia and police academy students, were placed on high alert.

175. At 4.05 p.m. hostage Mrs Mamitova brought out a second note with a corrected telephone number.

176. Between 4.05 p.m. and 5 p.m. a series of gunshots and explosions were heard inside the school. The OH instructed Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, to contact the terrorists by telephone. The hostage-taker presented himself as “ Shakhid ” and said that he had executed ten persons and blown up twenty others because the authorities had been slow in contacting them. Then he insisted that the men indicated in their note (Mr Zyazikov, Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Aslakhanov and Mr Roshal) should arrive at the school together. Mr Z. pleaded for time to bring the four men to Beslan. The terrorist said that the gymnasium had been mined and would be blown up in case of storming.

177. At 4.30 p.m. Mr Kastuyev escaped from the school by jumping out of the first floor window. He identified a photo of one terrorist from Ingushetia; on the same day his relatives were brought from Ingushetia by the FSB. However it transpired that the identification was incorrect. This man was killed in Ingushetia later while actively resisting the authorities.

178. During the day the OH collected information about possible hostage ‑ takers and their relatives, so as to involve the latter in the negotiations.

179. At 5 p.m. the terrorists fired several random shots from automatic weapons and portable grenade-launchers. About a dozen bodies were thrown out of the window. The OH took steps to prepare for the evacuation of injured persons to the local health establishments; psychological support had been called in for the hostages ’ relatives.

180. At 5.45 p.m., in order to prevent dissemination of incorrect information, it was decided that all contacts with the media should be carried out by Mr Andreyev, Mr Dzantiyev and Mr Dzugayev; Mr Peskov from the Russian President ’ s Administration was given the task of liaising with journalists.

181. At 6 p.m. the North Ossetian Ministry of Health designated hospitals to be on stand-by; twenty-eight ambulance vehicles were deployed.

182. At 6.30 p.m. special forces of the FSB (“ подразделения центра Специального назначения (ЦСН) ФСБ России ”) arrived in Beslan and set up their headquarters. They started contemplating various possibilities of liberating the hostages and neutralising the attackers.

183. At 7.20 p.m. hundreds of bottles of water, juice and food rations were stocked by the headquarters for the hostages ’ eventual needs.

184. At 9.30 p.m. Mr Roshal arrived in Beslan. The terrorists refused to accept water or food through him. They continued to insist that all four men indicated by them should arrive. Mr Roshal was permitted to talk on the telephone with the school director, who described the situation inside.

185. At 9.36 p.m. the OH continued talks with the attackers. They tried to involve journalists of an Arab TV company in the negotiation process, but this was rejected by the terrorists. At the same time, they contacted former President of Ingushetia Mr Aushev and an influential businessman Mr Gutseriyev.

186. At 10.20 p.m. the OH tried to arrange the liberation of hostages against payment of money and unhindered passage to Chechnya or Ingushetia; twenty buses were called in case the terrorists agreed.

187. By the end of that day, six hostages who had escaped from the school had been questioned in order to obtain information about the number and location of the terrorists and hostages inside the school, as well as to draw a plan of the IEDs.

(ii) 2 September 2004

188. At 9.30 a.m. some hostages were allowed to call their relatives, in order to put pressure on the authorities.

189. At 10 a.m. the OH authorised Mr Gutseriyev ’ s participation in the negotiations. His offers of money and guarantees of unhindered passage were rejected by the hostage-takers.

190. At 1 p.m. Mr Andreyev spoke in front of the hostages ’ relatives and assured them that no storming would take place. This was done in view of the rumours circulating among the local population and the ideas of forming a “life ring” around the school by civilians.

191. At 1.50 p.m. religious Muslim leaders of Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia spoke in a televised address, calling for peace and trying to prevent further ethnic clashes.

192. At 2.40 p.m. Mr Aslakhanov spoke to the attackers on the telephone; he assured them that their demands would be transmitted personally to Russia ’ s President. The terrorists insisted that he arrive in Beslan together with Mr Aushev.

193 . At 2.45 p.m. the FSB of Russia, by a coded message, appointed Mr Andreyev the head of the OH; the list of members of the headquarters included Mr Dzasokhov, the head of Ingushetia ’ s FSB Mr Koryakov, commander of the 58th army General Sobolev, deputy commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior Mr Vnukov and other officials. All members of the OH were informed of their positions.

194. At 3.23 p.m. Mr Aushev was permitted to enter the school. Between 4 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. he negotiated with the terrorists; as a result of his mission twenty-six persons were released: babies aged under two and their mothers. Mr Aushev also brought out a letter signed by Mr Shamil Basayev with a demand to withdraw troops from Chechnya.

195. At 5.30 p.m. an additional debriefing of former hostages took place, in order to obtain more information about the positions of hostages and terrorists and the locations of IEDs.

196. At 5.40 p.m. the OH ordered measures aimed at identifying and neutralising possible terrorists ’ accomplices outside the school.

197. At 6.05 p.m. Mr Aushev proposed to the terrorists that the bodies be collected. They agreed to consider this proposal.

198. At 7.20 p.m. the attackers told Mr Roshal, Mr Gutseriyev and Mr Z. that the hostages had refused to accept food, water or medicine.

199. At 8 p.m. the terrorists fired random shots from automatic rifles and portable grenade-launchers out of the school ’ s windows. The OH ordered that the surrounding territory be cleared of parked vehicles.

(iii) 3 September 2004

200. In the morning an agreement was reached, through Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev, to evacuate the bodies from the school yard.

201. At 12 noon the “Emercom” officers were appointed and necessary transport was arranged. They received appropriate instructions and means of communication. At 12.40 p.m. the officers started to collect the bodies. One terrorist descended to the courtyard and supervised their work.

202. At 1.05 p.m. two powerful explosions occurred in the gymnasium. Part of the wall collapsed and the hostages, in panic, started to exit through the opening. The terrorists opened fire on them from automatic rifles and RPG ‑ 18 portable grenade-launchers from the windows of the first floor. Twenty-nine persons were killed as a result of gunshot wounds.

203. At 1.10 p.m. the head of the OH, Mr Andreyev, gave written orders to the units of the FSB special forces to commence the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists.

204. At 1.15 p.m. the first hostages were taken to hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz.

205. At 1.20 p.m. one terrorist - Mr Kulayev - was detained, and handed over to the investigators.

206. As a result of the explosions and the ensuing fire at least 250 hostages died; the rest were forced by the terrorists to move to the meeting room and other premises of the school.

207. At 2.50 p.m. a fire broke out in the gymnasium. The expert report on fire and explosions established that the epicentre of the fire was located in the roofing of the gymnasium, above the exit.

208. Mr Andreev ordered the firemen not to intervene immediately, in view of the continuing fighting, the risk to the firemen ’ s lives and the danger of delaying the rescue operation, thus entailing more victims.

209 . The OH ordered the firefighters to intervene at 3.10 p.m. They arrived at 3.20 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire.

210. At 6 p.m. the rescue operation was over. The OH ordered the deployment of heavy weaponry to neutralise the terrorists.

211. At 0.30 a.m. on 4 September the sweeping of the school building was over and a security cordon was set up. At 1 a.m. demining started.

(e) Information about FSB actions and questioning of senior FSB officers

212. The investigation established that two deputy directors of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, had been present in Beslan during the crisis.

213. A number of high-ranking FSB servicemen were questioned in the course of the investigation, including Gen eral Andreyev (questioned on 29 September 2004), General Koryakov (30 September 2004), Generals Anisimov and Pronichev (October 2005). The documents of the criminal investigation submitted by the Government do not contain the record of questioning of General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB Special forces centre, deputy head of the OH in charge of the storming operation. His name is not listed among witnesses – members of the OH in volume 124 of file no. 20/849; the list of documents examined by the experts who had produced the expert report no. 1 does not mention his testimony either.

214. In July 2007 the applicants wrote to the FSB director and referred to the meeting they had had with the Deputy General Prosecutor in charge of the case who had told them that the relevant video and audio materials could not be found. In December 2006 State TV aired a film “The Final Assignment” containing video and audio materials made by the special forces in Beslan on 1-3 September 2004. They sought to ensure that these records would be given to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office. They also asked that the members of the special forces be questioned during the investigation. In September 2007 the FSB informed the applicants that any such actions would be done in response to the relevant requests by the prosecutor ’ s service and in line with the legislation.

(f) Information about the arms and ammunition employed, explosives, fire and ballistics expert reports

215. The investigation file contains a number of documents concerning the use of arms and ammunition by various State bodies; some of them are cited in other documents (see below). Dozens of various experts ’ reports were commissioned by the investigation. The victims challenged certain procedural steps related to the commissioning of some of the reports and complained that they had not been allowed to take copies of them but were able to assess them in the prosecutor ’ s office for a limited amount of time. These reports have been submitted to the Court by the Government, most relevant ones are summarised below.

216 . Dozens of witness ’ statements were collected by the investigation between September 2004 and August 2007 from the military and police servicemen, officers of the “Emercom”, fire-fighters, members of the OH. These statements, consistently and in details, denied the use of grenade-launchers, flame-throwers and tank cannon prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004.

217 . According to a document of 9 September 2004 (act no. 3), one military unit of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence deployed in Beslan used about 6,500 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 and 7.62 mm), 340 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), 450 armour-piercing and incendiary charges (14.5 mm BZT and B-32) and ten hand-grenades (RGD-5).

(i) Fire experts report of 22 December 2005

218 . On 22 December 2005 the Russian Federal forensic expert centre produced a fire expert ’ s report ( заключение пожаро-технической судебной экспертизы ) no. 2576/17, 320-328/18-17. The voluminous report consisted of 217 pages, accompanied by about 60 pages of tables and photographs. The report started by reviewing a number of relevant evidence, including extracts from the witness statements, expert reports, information about the arms and ammunition used, examination of the building materials, review of available photo and video materials.

219 . In particular, the report cited a “joint act” of 10 September 2004 of the arms and ammunitions used by the military servicemen, which included about 7,000 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS), 2,160 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), 10 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG-26), 18 disposable propelled anti-tank grenade-launchers (PG-7VL), 8 high fragmentation warheads for tank gun calibre 125 millimetres (125 mm OF) and 90 smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (page 128 of the report). The same report contained reference to the expert examinations of a number of parts of used flame-throwers RPO-A “ Shmel ” (at least five) and a list of six empty tubes from RPO-A “ Shmel ” collected by the members of the Parliamentary Commission citing their serial numbers (batch 3-02, nos. 109-113 and 116) (see paragraph 409 below). It further mentioned document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel V. from the 58th a rmy. This document stated that the FSB units had received from the military storage seven RPO-A flame-throwers and listed their serial numbers (batch 4-96, nos. 945-948, 486-488). After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different batch and number (batch 1-0, no. 12), had been returned to storage. On 25 September 2004 Lieutenant-Colonel V. from the 58th army was questioned and stated that he had received back five flamethrowers (batch 4-96, nos. 947, 948, 486, 487 and 488), plus one from another batch, which had not been issued from that storage (batch 1-03, no. 12); Major Ts. from the FSB “ Vympel ” group explained that the others had been used (pages 129-130 of the report).

220 . The report further mentioned witness statement of Colonel K. who explained that he had directed a group of officers who had taken part in the storming of the school building. The group had used RPG-26 and RPO-A, but not at the premises where the hostages had been present (page 131 of the report). Witness M.K. who had been a member of a storming group stated on 23 November 2004 that he had used RPG-26 and RPO-A upon “enemy firing points which had been designated in advance and identified during the storming”. The firing points identified in advance were located in the window of the attic area and the third window on the first floor of the main building. No hostages were located there at that time. For the second time the flamethrower was used during night time, at about midnight, upon a group of terrorists in the handcraft classes on the ground floor. At that time the rest of the building had been in firm control of the security forces and the “Emercom” personnel was finishing carrying the bodies out of the gymnasium (page 183 of the report). The report also referred to the records of two experiments carried out on 13 October 2005 whereby disused buildings had been fired at with RPO-A flamethrowers, as a result of which the buildings had been demolished but no fire had started (page 183 of the report). The report concluded as follows on the use of flamethrowers (pages 185 and 217 of the report):

“RPO-A ‘ Shmel ’ were used during the special operation aiming to liberate the hostages. The criminal case file no 20/849 contains no materials to conclude that the flamethrowers RPO-A ‘ Shmel ’ had been used upon the roof and the structure of the gymnasium of school no 1. The use of flamethrower RPO-A ‘ Shmel ’ upon the roof of the gymnasium could not have led to fire in its wooden parts”.

221. In so far as the first explosions were concerned, the report concluded that the explosions in the gymnasium which had occurred within several seconds at about 1.05 p.m. on 3 September 2004 had resulted from the IEDs attached to the basketball hoop near the western wall (equivalent to about 1.2-1.3 kilograms of TNT) and located on a chair placed about 0.5 metres away from the northern wall under the window (and equivalent to 5.2 kilograms of TNT). Both IEDs were filled with multiple small metal objects. The third explosion resulted from the IED placed under the basketball hoop at the northern wall catching fire, its metal filling simply fell on the floor and the explosion, as a result of exposure to heat, of small amount of explosives (about 100 grams of TNT equivalent) (see pages 170-173 of the report).

222. The experts considered and accepted as “probable” the hypotheses that the fire in the gymnasium had started as a result of use of armour-piercing and incendiary charges, which could have been employed by the terrorists (page 185 of the report). As to the place where the fire had started, having analysed the extent and degree of damages to various constructions of the gymnasium, the experts concluded that it had been most probably located in the attic area located more or less above the basketball hoop in the northern part of the room; the fire on the floor started only after the burning parts of the ceiling and roof had fallen down. The extent of damage caused by fire and explosions prevented any detailed analysis of the number of places where the fire had started, its exact cause and distribution in the building (pages 215-217 of the report).

(ii) The expert report no. 4-106

223. On 30 December 2005 the FSB ’ s Institute of Forensic Studies ( Институт Криминалистики ФСБ РФ ) produced expert report no. 4/106. The report focused on the examination of the IEDs used by the terrorists in the gymnasium. In concluded that the terrorists had placed no less than 16 IEDs in the gymnasium, joined into a single chain through electric cables and detonators. On 3 September no less than three IEDs had exploded in the north-western part of the gymnasium: one at the basketball hoop on the western wall (based on anti-personnel mine OZM-72, about 0,66 kilograms in TNT equivalent), the second on the right-hand jamb of the door leading into the gymnasium on the western wall (a sphere-shaped IED, no less than 0,5 kilograms in TNT equivalent) and the third on the window pane of the first window on the north-western wall (IED in a plastic bottle, no less than 1 kilogram in TNT equivalent). The summary power of the explosions had been no less than two kilograms in TNT equivalent, however it was impossible to establish their exact timing and sequence. The most likely cause of the explosions lied in intentional or non-intentional impact upon the detonator pedal; the reasons why the whole chain had failed to react were unclear but it could be suggested that the first explosions had damaged the electric cables connecting the rest of the IEDs (pages 18-29 of the report).

(iii) The expert report no. 16/1

224 . On 25 October 2006 an all-round forensic report on the explosions ( комплексная криминалистическая экспертиза математического моделирования взрывов ) was commissioned from the experts of the State ‑ owned scientific and production company Bazalt ( ФГУП ГНПП “Базальт ”) and the Central Research and Testing Institute, named after Karbyshev, of the Ministry of Defence ( Центральный Научно-исследовательский испытательный институт им. Карбышева Министерства Обороны РФ ). The applicants submitted that this document in its entirety was unavailable to them prior to the exchange of the parties ’ observations in 2012.

225. In January 2007 Mrs Tagayeva applied to the prosecutor ’ s office to have the experts of Bazalt dismissed, as they had been administratively dependent on the Ministry of Defence. Her application was rejected on 30 January 2007 because no subjective bias of the experts could be discerned and, objectively, the Ministry of Defence had not been a party to the criminal proceedings.

226 . The expert report no. 16/1 was produced on 14 September 2007 and run to over 300 pages, accompanied by detailed schemes and photos. It appeared to dismiss the doubts expressed, notably, by a member of the State Duma investigative committee and a renowned expert in the field of explosions Mr Savelyev about the external origins of the first two explosions in the gym (see paragraphs 406, 408, 410 below ). The conclusions of report no. 16/1 are found on pages 264-273. They can be summarised as follows: the first explosion was the result of detonation of a large IED, measuring between three and six kilograms in TNT equivalent. The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator, but resulted, most probably, from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it. This IED exploded in the north-eastern part of the gymnasium, at the spot located about one metre away from the northern wall and five metres away from the eastern wall. The second explosion occurred about 20 seconds later and consisted of simultaneous detonation of several (between five and ten) smaller IEDs in the north-western part of the hall; this explosion most probably resulted from intentional or unintentional use by one of the terrorists of the detonator pedal. It could not have been caused by a cumulative charge launched from the outside. The report also concluded that out of all the recorded damages to the gymnasium ’ s walls, only two marks could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside. These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses nos. 37, 39 or 41 of the Shkolny Lane (as alleged by some experts). The damage caused to the southern wing of the school could have been caused by the use of various weapons and explosives, including tank cannon, flame-throwers and grenade-launchers, however the extent of destruction excluded any detailed reconstruction of the events. The report dismissed as improbable the launching of a thermobaric charge from the helicopter pointing that it could lead to the destruction of the helicopter and death of the crew. Finally, the report listed the following types of weapons used by the members of the counter-terrorist operation, reconstructed on the basis of video materials and the documents contained in criminal case-file no. 20/849:

“- portable grenade-launchers RPG-7V and their modifications with anti-tank charges PG-7VL, PG-7VM, PG-7VS, fragmentary warhead OG-7V;

- disposable anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-26, RPG-27;

- propelled attack grenades RShG ‑ 1 with thermobaric warhead;

- flame-throwers RPO-A “Shmel” with thermobaric warhead;

- light infantry flamethrowers LPO-97 with thermobaric charge (probably);

- firearms and portable grenade-launchers.”

Based on the same sources, the report concluded that the terrorists had used portable grenade-launcher RPG-7V with anti-tank charges PG-7VL; disposable anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-26, possibly a grenade-launcher with thermobaric charge; no less than ten IEDs type “bottle”, no less than two IEDs made out of anti-personnel mines MON-90 and no less than four IEDs made out of anti-personnel mine OZM-72; as well as firearms and portable grenade-launchers (pages 263-273 of the report).

227 . As a follow up to that report, on 14 October 2007 the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior ’ s expert lab examined the explosion marks on the gymnasium southern walls and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges having been fired from the first floor of the southern wing of the school and that these shots could not have been fired from houses nos 37, 39, 41 or the garage roof (report no. S-I-63, page 12).

(iv) The expert report no. 16/2

228 . The expert report no. 16/2 was commissioned by the investigation in April 2007 in order to dispel Mr Savelyev ’ s allegations about the origin of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the northern side. It was completed on 11 December 2009 (see paragraph 406 below). Like report 16/1, it was carried out by the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt . The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by Mr Savelyev, including the employment of various types of grenade-launchers and flame-throwers upon a similar construction and concluded that their impact was incompatible with the damages in the gymnasium. The report ran to over 130 pages and concluded that the “the origin of the hole in the north-western wall of the gymnasium ... lied in the detonation of an IED with TNT equivalent of about six kilograms, put on the height of about 500 millimetres from the floor, near the radiator... The power of this explosion ’ s impact upon the wall was exasperated by almost simultaneous explosion of several other IED ’ s located in the north-western part of the gymnasium, further away from the first explosion” (pages 99-100 of the report).

(g) Decision not to charge servicemen with crimes

229 . On 3 December 2004 the Vladikavkaz deputy military prosecutor issued an order not to prosecute unnamed military servicemen of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence and of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. The document stated that the investigation had established that the personnel of the army and the Ministry of the Interior had used automatic weapons, RPG-25 grenade-launchers, RPO-A “ Shmel ” flame- throwers and T ‑ 72 tanks. The document then proceeded to describe the events of the siege and storming, in line with witness statements of General Sobolev of the 58th army. In particular, the document stated that on 1 September 2004, during the first meeting of the OH, it had been decided that Mr Dzasokhov ’ s involvement in the negotiations was “devoid of purpose” (“ нецелесообразно” ) since there was a threat of his being taken hostage too. It further stated that although the decision to clear the area around the school of civilians and armed “volunteers” had been taken at about 12 noon on 1 September, it had not been implemented until 3 September. Furthermore, on 2 September the terrorists demanded that Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov, Mr Aslakhanov and Mr Roshal arrive for negotiations, but the OH had decided that such talks were also “devoid of purpose”. After the first explosions at 1.10 p.m. the terrorists opened fire at the hostages running out of the gymnasium, following which the servicemen of the second security perimeter opened return fire. At 2 p.m. a group of sappers under the command of Colonel Nabiyev started to demine the gymnasium; at the same time he called for firemen to extinguish the fire. The first fire vehicle arrived at 2.45 p.m. and contained 200 litres of water; the second vehicle arrived at 3.45 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire. At 9 p.m. the storming of the building was over; the search and elimination of terrorists continued until 0.30 a.m. on 4 September 2004.

230. The document then summarised the witness statement of Mr Tsyban, who explained that the OH had officially been created on 2 September 2004 at about 12 noon under the command of General Andreyev. The OH decided that Mr Dzasokhov ’ s involvement in the negotiations could not be authorised in view of the threat of his being taken hostage.

231. The document then related the witness statements of about a dozen servicemen from the 58th army – sappers, tank and APC commanders. They stated that the tanks had fired seven shots in the evening of 3 September 2004 and that none of them had fired at the school during the daytime.

232. The document then referred to several hundred names of military servicemen who had been employed in the security perimeter. Their statements were summarised in the following manner:

“while securing the area no instances of any loss or stealing of arms or ammunition were noted, and there were no attempts by the terrorists to break through or to get away. Since the commanders had issued an order not to open fire unless there was an open breakthrough of the terrorists, no fire was opened and the use of firearms was regulated by section 11 of the [Army Manual]. There were no noted instances of breaches of order or unauthorised use of firearms. No ammunitions were used”.

233. The document concluded that the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence had used “personal, authorised, small ‑ arms weapons, engineering hardware and chemical weapons, destined to cause harm to manpower, but this ammunition was used in line with the [appropriate] legislative acts and owing to the inability to prevent the terrorists ’ actions by any other means; the use of the above weapons resulted in the terrorists ’ extermination or detention”. The document further stated that the investigation had obtained no evidence that the use of the above-listed weapons had resulted in harm to any of the hostages. Accordingly, there was no evidence of an offence having been committed.

234 . The decision of 3 December 2004 was quashed on 12 September 2005 due to certain technical deficiencies. It appears that this investigation is still pending.

(h) Results of internal inquiries and decisions not to charge officials with crimes

(i) “Emercom” staff

235 . On 29 October 2004 a commission of the North Ossetian “Emercom” carried out an internal investigation into the actions of the “Emercom” staff during the hostage crisis. According to its findings, the firefighters were aware in advance of the locations of the fire hydrants in the vicinity of the school, but could not use them since they could have been shot at by the terrorists. Hence, they started to use mobile cisterns first. The responsible staff had drawn up a plan of access of the fire engines to the school, but it was not within the firefighters ’ powers to ensure that these routes would be accessible – that work should have been coordinated by OH on the basis of that plan. The failure to intervene during the initial stage had been based on the OH directions. Finally, the use of more powerful hydraulic cannons has been deemed impractical by the commission, in view of limited choice of location where such cannon could be placed, distance to the source of fire of about 60 metres, narrow access to the fire and the danger to the persons who could still be alive in the burning building from the “hot vapour”. The commission concluded that the actions of the “Emercom” staff had been correct and justified.

236. On 10 December 2004 an investigator of the General Prosecutor ’ s Office Department in the Northern Caucasus ruled not to charge the North Ossetian “Emercom” Minister Mr Dzgoyev and his deputy, head of the firefighting service, Mr Romanov, with crimes under section 293 of the Penal Code – criminal negligence. The decision referred to the witness statements made by Mr Romanov, Mr Dzgoyev and a number of other firefighters and officials of the service. They confirmed that the information about the fire first came in after the first explosions, soon after 1 p.m., but that the OH had only allowed the firefighters to intervene after 3.20 p.m. They noted that seven fire engines were ready to take part in the operation, but that the access routes to the school remained busy with cars and persons. Two closes fire hydrants were not accessible; at first the engines used cisterns to extinguish fire from two water cannons; later a contour to the next hydrant had been made. The decision discussed the question whether the firefighters could have used a more powerful hydraulic water cannon, but the firefighters argued that it could only have produced the desired effects if used from a distance of less than 30 metres to the source of fire, which could not have been ensured in view of the ongoing fighting. The decision concluded that at the time when the firefighters were intervening, the general direction of the operation had been taken by the OH headed by the FSB, without whose permission no actions could have been taken. The FSB did not allow the firefighters to intervene for about two hours, in view of lack of special equipment for them, and thus their members could have been injured or died. In such circumstances, the actions of the “Emercom” officials contained no elements which could lead to the conclusion that a crime had been committed. It is unclear when the applicants had been informed of this decision and whether they had appealed against it.

237. In March 2006 the victims lodged an application to have the competent officials, including Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Andreyev, Mr Popov and Mr Romanov charged with criminal negligence and withholding of information entailing danger to persons ’ lives and health, with serious consequences (sections 293 part 2 and 237 part 2 of the Penal Code). In particular, they argued that no necessary preventive measures had been taken prior to the terrorist act; that the OH had remained passive and failed to ensure meaningful negotiations with the hostage-takers; that as a result of the inaction of the OH the hostages ’ conditions on 1-3 September 2004 had deteriorated and thus rendered them weak by the time of the storming; that the failure of Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov and Mr Aslakhanov to appear for negotiations had excluded the possibility of a dialogue; that the security perimeter around the school had not been properly ensured; and that the storming operation had not been thoroughly prepared. The victims alleged further that the military and security forces had acted without a plan and employed excessive and indiscriminate weapons after 1 p.m. on 3 September. In respect of this last assertion they referred to several dozen witness statements collected during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev and attesting to the use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers, tanks and APCs. They further alleged that the delay between the start of the fire in the gymnasium and the commencement of the extinguishing operation had taken one and a half hours, and that the firefighters had been unprepared since they lacked water. As a result, dozens of hostages including children in the gymnasium had been burnt alive, since they were injured, shell ‑ shocked, disoriented or too weak to leave it on their own.

238. On 14 March 2006 the Deputy General Prosecutor rejected this application, having found that the decisions of the investigating officers had been lawful and that the actions sought by the victims were not necessary as the relevant facts had been established through other steps. On 26 June 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz granted the victims ’ appeal against the said decision and ordered the Deputy General Prosecutor to examine the victims ’ applications in detail and to provide them with reasoned answers to each of their arguments. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court ’ s decision. On 24 August 2007 the District Court confirmed the validity of the decision of 14 March 2006. It was then approved by the North Ossetia Supreme Court on 3 October 2007. The victims ’ subsequent requests for supervisory review proved futile.

239. In the meantime, and in parallel to the above-mentioned proceedings, on 20 April 2006 the chief of the investigative group, an investigator of the General Prosecutor ’ s Office Department in the Southern Federal Circuit, decided not to open a criminal investigation, under the same sections of the Penal Code, in respect of the head and members of the OH. The investigator found that there were no constituent elements of an offence in the officials ’ actions. He relied heavily on the conclusions of expert report no. 1 to the effect that the actions of the OH had been in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations. The victims appealed, and on 3 April 2007 a judge of the Leninskiy District of Vladikavkaz quashed the said decision of the investigator, since expert report no. 1 had been found unlawful. On 2 May 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court decision, having found that it was not based on all the materials available. In a new set of proceedings on 6 June 2007 the Leninskiy District Court rejected all the applications and found that even though expert report no. 1 had been invalidated, the evidence on which it had relied remained valid and supported similar conclusions. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision.

240 . In a separate decision, also dated 20 April 2006, the same investigator ruled not to open criminal proceedings against the first deputy of the Southern Ossetian “Emercom”, head of the fire service Mr Romanov and the head of the fire-fighting service of the Pravoberezhny District Mr Kharkov. The decision referred to sections 293 part 2 of the Penal Code, which concerned criminal negligence. The decision referred to witness statements confirming that the first information about the explosions and fire in the gymnasium has been received soon after 1.00 p.m. on 3 September; as well as to the fact that Mr Romanov had, on several occasions between 1.20 and 3.20 p.m., ordered the firefighters to intervene and then cancelled his orders due to lack of authorisation by the head of the OH. At 3.25 two fire engines arrived to the school with full load of water, which could last for about 3-5 minutes. Once it was exhausted, two other fire engines were called in; later on water has been obtained from a fire hydrant, because the closest hydrants could not be used. The decision referred to the expert report no. 1 and to the fire experts report no. 2576/17, 320-328/18-17 (see paragraphs 218 and subsequent).

(ii) Health Ministry officials

241. On 30 September 2005 the Russian Health Ministry informed the General Prosecutor ’ s office of the results of its internal inquiry into the actions of its staff on 1-3 September. The Ministry conceded that the scale and circumstances of these events had been unprecedented even for its most experienced staff, and that the situation had been “exasperated by lack of verifiable information about the number of hostages, unpredictability of the events and the difficulty in predicting the types of injuries”. The report noted that the situation at the site of the field paediatric hospital set up in Beslan on 2 September 2004 had been made difficult by the presence of a large number of local residents, who had “sometimes turned into a mob displaying signs of emotionally-psychic instability”. The work of a mobile group of psychologists had aided to dispel the pressure and create the conditions necessary to carry out legal aid. The overall input of the Zaschita centre has been described as important and proven its importance.

242 . The Government in their submissions made in September 2013, have summarised the documents contained in file 20/849 relating to the work of the medical staff as follows.

243. On 1 September 2004 the Ministry of Health set up a coordination cell, joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health, “Emercom”, the Zaschita centre and the centre of forensic examinations. As of 1 September evening, special units of psychological aid were put in place for the relatives. A number of other urgent steps were taken, such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby, preparing contingents of necessary equipment and materials, including blood for transfusion, ensuring the preparedness of the local intensive care and surgery units.

244. On 2 September an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in Beslan. The “federal and local headquarters” worked out access to the school and evacuation routes, instructed the drivers and medical and para-medical personnel involved.

245. On 3 September an additional hospital was set up in Beslan, equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care. Measures were taken in order to assist a large number of injured persons. 1300 places were reserved at various hospitals in the region. Both before and after the storming medical teams had been brought in from other regions, including highly qualified doctors from Moscow.

246. Thus, by the time of the first explosions, over 200 doctors, 307 medical staff, 70 ambulances were located in Beslan. This made 94 mobile medical brigades, including 14 reserve ones.

247. Between 1.15 and 6.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004, 556 injured persons, of them 311 children, were transferr ed to the local hospitals. By 7 p.m. on the same day all patients had been placed in hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz; 47 urgent surgeries had been performed.

248. Over one thousand persons had been provided with psychological aid.

249. As of 4 September 2004 special medical brigades visited families at homes, assisting those hostages and their family members who had gone home. Between 5 and 15 September o ver 200 patients (including 137 children) were transferred for treatment to Moscow by special flights.

250. In total, between 3 September and 16 December 2004 about 800 patients received medical aid. 305 died at the school, 26 persons died in hospitals. By 16 December 2004 26 patients (of them seven children) continued to receive medical aid in hospitals, others had been checked out. North Ossetia received 26 tons of medical equipment and supplies in relation to the crisis.

(iii) Other officials and members of the OH

251. In May 2007 the applicants applied to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office in the Southern Federal Circuit to have Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior, charged with criminal negligence. On 1 June 2007 that application was dismissed. Upon the victims ’ appeal, on 18 February 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz, then on 27 March 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court, upheld that decision.

252. In July 2007 the applicants applied to the prosecutor ’ s office to “evaluate” the actions of the North Ossetian senior officials who had failed to prevent the terrorist act and to inform the population about the imminent threat or to ensure a proper security perimeter around the school, also seeking to verify the lawfulness of their actions as members of the OH who had authorised the use of indiscriminate weapons and had failed to ensure that the fire was promptly extinguished. They referred to the information contained in the Federal Assembly report (see paragraphs 398 and subsequent), also seeking the questioning of the officials concerned and the victims. On 2 August 2007 this application was partly dismissed by the investigator, who found that the questions raised by the victims were the subject of the pending criminal investigation.

(i) Establishing the cause of deaths and injuries

253 . On the basis of the medical documents and forensic reports, the causes of death were established for 215 persons; the exact cause of death of 116 persons could not be established due to extensive post-mortem burns. As to the injuries, 79 persons received gunshot wounds, 91 shrapnel wounds, 302 persons suffered from the consequences of explosions, 10 persons received concussions, 83 persons suffered from fractured bones and contusions, 36 persons received thermal injuries and 109 persons suffered from psychological and neurological troubles.

254 . The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions of the State agents, including use of firearms.

255. The applicants in their numerous complaints stressed that the forensic expert reports had been carried out without the extraction of bullets, shrapnel and other objects from the bodies. They also stressed that the forensic reports for many persons failed to establish the cause of death all together, due to extensive burns.

(j) The victims ’ applications and complaints

256 . In the course of the domestic proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications with the prosecutor ’ s office seeking various procedural steps. They appealed against the results of most of these applications to district courts. Copies of most of the applications and complaints, as well as of the authorities ’ reactions, have been submitted to the Court or described by the applicants in their submissions.

257. Thus, in July 2006 the victims requested the investigator in charge of the case to find out who had decided against presenting the four men sought by the terrorists for negotiations; to hold confrontations between the civilian and police witnesses, on the one hand, and the army servicemen, on the other, to find out about the use of tanks and flame-throwers during the day of 3 September 2004. On 24 July 2006 the investigator rejected the application and stated that the decision to employ the appropriate weapons had been taken by the OH; witness confrontations were not considered useful by the investigation.

258. In January 2007 the applicants asked the investigator to find out the following: who had decided that the four men demanded by the terrorists should not participate in the talks; who had authorised the use of tanks and flame-throwers during the storming. On 30 January 2007 the investigator in charge granted the application and informed the applicants that they would be kept up to date with the investigation results.

259. In August 2007 the applicants requested the investigation to find out the number of hostages that had been communicated by the OH to the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and the Russian President on each day of the crisis and to question the relevant officials. On 14 August 2007 this application was granted.

260. In November 2007, referring to the results of the forensic reports and witness statements obtained during the trial of Nurpashi Kulayev (see paragraphs 269 and subsequent), the victim s argued that the bodies of 116 persons had been severely burned, rendering it impossible in most cases for the cause of death to be established. However several forensic reports indicated extensive burns as the cause of death. The victims sought to find out who had ordered the delay in the firefighters ’ intervention in the gymnasium and whether they had been properly equipped upon arrival. On 16 November 2007 the investigator dismissed the application to bring charges against several officials, referring to the pending investigation.

261. Following the victims ’ request, on 23 November 2007 the investigator appended to the file the records of the trials of the officers of the Pravoberezhny and Malgobekskiy ROVDs.

262 . In December 2007 the investigator granted the victims ’ applications, based on the information obtained during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, to question a number of senior officials about the steps taken in August 2004 with the aim of preventing the terrorist act, in order to clarify the extent of local police involvement in the security of Mr Dzasokhov ’ s passage on the morning of 1 September and in order to find out how the OH had come up with the figure of 354 hostages that was aired during the crisis. The investigator also granted the victims ’ application to question General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB Special Forces Centre, in order to find out the details of the use of indiscriminate weapons upon the school.

263. On 10 May 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz reviewed, upon the applicants ’ request, about 120 applications lodged by them with the investigator between December 2005 and March 2007, the results of which they found unsatisfactory. The complaints mostly concerned the following points: the applicants ’ attempts to obtain additional evidence about the exact cause of their relatives ’ deaths and injuries, information about the reasons for the first three explosions in the gymnasium, the details of involvement of various military and security units in the storming, information about the types and results of examination of the weapons found in school, evidence related to the actions of the OH, information about the actions of firefighters immediately after the first explosions, the extent of the officials ’ responsibility for the outcome of the crisis and the victims ’ demands to acquaint themselves with various documents in the file. The applicants ’ complaint was dismissed in full; the District Court found that the investigators had acted lawfully and within the limits of their professional discretion. The court also noted that the proceedings were still pending. The applicants appealed, but on 13 June 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the decision of 10 May 2007.

264. On 23 October 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz rejected the victims ’ complaint about the investigators ’ decisions in response to their seven applications to ascertain the reasons for the first explosions and the origin of the firearms which caused the hostages ’ deaths and injuries, to find out more about the communications with the terrorists, to identify the person who ordered the deployment of tanks, APCs, flame ‑ throwers and grenade-launchers, and to establish the reason for the carbonisation of 116 bodies. The court also rejected the victims ’ complaint about alleged inefficiency and delays on the part of the prosecutor ’ s office. On 8 February 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision.

265 . On 10 January 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court rejected another complaint by the victims in relation to five applications lodged with the investigator. These applications concerned the victims ’ access to the expert report on the explosions, and ballistics reports and documents relating to the existence of a real threat of a terrorist act prior to 1 September. The District Court, referring to A rticle 161 part 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concluded that the limitations on the victims ’ access to the documents had been justified. The remaining actions in the investigation were also found lawful. This decision was upheld on appeal on 27 February 2008.

266 . According to the decision of the Promyshlenny District Court of 13 March 2008, sixty-two victims and their representatives had complained to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office and then to the court about the investigators ’ decisions to reject twelve applications lodged between December 2007 and January 2008. These applications concerned the following issues: to find out the exact reasons for the victims ’ deaths where the conclusions of the post mortem reports had been incomplete; to ascertain whether the carbonisation of the bodies had been caused prior to or after death; to seek an explanation for six victims as to why the conclusions about the reasons for their relatives ’ deaths had been based on external inspection without forensic reports; to establish the causal relationships between the use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers, tanks and APCs during the storming and the hostages ’ deaths; to obtain additional questioning of the servicemen of the Malgobek ROVD and of a military unit stationed in the Malgobek District about the prevention of the terrorist act; to clarify the reasons for the appointment of Mr Andreyev as the chief of the OH on 2 September 2004; and to obtain full access to the materials of the case file and copies of the complex expert report (including mathematical computation of the explosions, ballistics and explosion examinations). The victims further alleged that they had received no timely responses to their applications and requests, that the investigation had been protracted and lacked in objectivity and in particular that they had not had access to the most important case documents. The Promyshlenny District Court dismissed all the applications, having found that the victims ’ demands had been satisfied by the investigation wherever possible, or had not been based on the pertinent legislation. On 23 April 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld that decision on the victims ’ appeal.

267 . On 10 December 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court dismissed another complaint lodged by a group of victims against the decisions taken in response to their applications to the investigators. Eleven applications, lodged between February and September 2008, concerned the victims ’ access to the results of ballistics reports and the records of negotiations with the terrorists, with a request to obtain copies of certain documents in the case file and the decisions ordering expert reports. The victims also alleged that the investigation had been unnecessarily protracted, with important steps being delayed, which in turn could lead to a loss of evidence and make the judicial examination of the matters less effective. They asked for the actions of the investigators to be declared unlawful in so far as they had not conducted an effective investigation, had refused to allow victims access to the case file and had failed to establish the degree of responsibility of the officials. The court found that some documents requested by the victims were secret, while access to others was based on Article 161 part 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the District Court ’ s decision on 11 February 2009.

268. The victims ’ subsequent attempts to seek supervisory review of these decisions have proved futile.

8. The criminal investigation in respect of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev

269 . The applicants submitted voluminous documents related to the criminal investigation and trial concerning Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, the only terrorist captured alive. In particular, they submitted four volumes of the trial records (about 2,000 pages), copies of the trial court jud gment (319 pages) and the cassation court decision, as well as their appeals to the cassation and supervisory courts. The most relevant documents and the applicants ’ submissions can be summarised as follows.

(a) Investigation and trial before the North Ossetia Supreme Court

270. On 19 January 2005 the criminal investigation in respect of the only surviving terrorist, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, was separated from criminal case no. 20/849 and assigned number 20/870.

271. On 17 May 2005 the North Ossetia Supreme Court opened the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev. He was charged with aggravated murder, terrorism, taking of hostages, membership of a criminal gang, illegal handling of firearms and attempts on the life of law-enforcement personnel (sections 105, 205, 206, 209, 222 and 317 of the Penal Code). Between May 2005 and February 2006 the trial court held sixty-one sessions.

(b) Statements by Mr Nurpashi Kulayev

272. In the courtroom Mr Kulayev stated that he had joined the group on 31 August 2004. His brother, Mr Khanpash Kulayev, had been a clandestine fighter since the early 1990s, but had lost his arm and lately lived in Psedakh, their home village. On 31 August 2004 a group of armed men arrived in VAZ-2110 and accused his brother of working for the FSB. Both brothers and two of their friends went with the armed men to a camp situated about 300 metres away from the road. Late at night on 31 August 2004 the man in charge of the camp, “ Polkovnik ”, told all those present to get into the GAZ-66 truck. There were thirty-two persons, including two women wearing masks. The explosives and arms in backpacks were placed under the benches and the men took seats on the floor of the truck. Responding to the victims ’ questions, Mr Kulayev stated that he had not seen wooden boxes for cartridges, which had later been found in the school canteen.

273. They spent the night in the valley and early in the morning travelled further. The truck ’ s body had been covered with canvas and they could not see outside. At some point the vehicle stopped and Mr Kulayev heard someone asking for the driver ’ s documents. Then they were told that a policeman had been captured and they travelled further. Later this policeman was released because he was a relative of one of the fighters. The ride lasted around two and a half hours. During the capturing of the school one fighter was fatally injured and “ Polkovnik ” ordered the killing of twenty male hostages. In the school Mr Kulayev was assigned to the canteen. On 1 September there was a dispute among the fighters and “ Polkovnik ” detonated the explosive device on a woman suicide bomber. This explosion fatally wounded the other woman and another fighter of Arab origin. According to Mr Kulayev, many members of the group, including himself and his brother, had been unaware of the nature of their mission, but “ Polkovnik ” referred to Basayev ’ s orders and executed those who attempted to object. The terrorists talked in Ingush between themselves and “ Polkovnik ” called someone to receive instructions in Russian.

274. Referring to the conversations among the terrorists, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev said that “ Polkovnik ” had told Mr Aushev that if the four men indicated by them came to the school, they would release 150 hostages for each of them. He also understood that some hostages and fighters would be able to move in buses to Chechnya, if the Russian troops had pulled out of the mountainous districts.

275. Speaking about the first explosions in the gymnasium, Mr Kulayev testified that “ Polkovnik ” had said that a sniper had “killed the man [holding the switch]”, then he cried to someone over the telephone “What have you done!” and broke his mobile telephone; after that he encouraged the terrorists to fight until the bitter end. Mr Kulayev jumped out of the canteen window and shouted to the soldiers that they should not shoot there because there were women and children. He denied that he had used his machine gun and that he had walked into the gymnasium while the hostages were detained there.

276. Two persons convicted earlier for terrorist activities had testified that they had known Mr Khanpash Kulayev, the defendant ’ s brother, as an active member of the terrorist underground and that in 2003 both brothers and several other members of the armed group, together with their families, had lived in a rented house in Ingushetia (Ganiyev R., volume 4 page 1562 of the trial records, Muzhakhoyeva Z., v. 4 p. 1611).

(c) Reconstruction of the events preceding the hostage-taking and identification of the leaders

277. Some local residents stated in court that they had seen unknown men and suspicious boxes at the school prior to 1 September 2004 (Tomayev V. v. 1 pp. 360-363; Gutnova L. v. 1 p. 458; Levina Z. v. 1 p. 474; Kokova R. v. 3 p. 1243; Rubayev K. v. 3 p. 1305). During August 2004 the school building was partially renovated, but the teachers and director denied that anyone except the school staff and their families had been involved (Guriyeva N., v. 2 p. 542; Ganiyeva Ye. v. 3 p. 1157; Digurova Z. v. 3 p. 1238). Teachers testified that they had inspected the school early in the morning on 1 September and that there was no one there (Tsagolov A. v. 1 p. 265; Avdonina Ye. v. 2, p. 871; Komayeva ‑ Gadzhinova R. v. 2, p. 874; Shcherbinina O. v. 2 p. 931).

278. The police officer who had been seized by the terrorists on the administrative border in the morning of 1 September 2004 testified that he had stopped the GAZ-66 vehicle between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The armed men had taken his service pistol, VAZ vehicle and police cap and had driven to Beslan, where he escaped as soon as the shooting started. He denied having known any of the terrorists; he confirmed that the terrorists spoke Ingush between themselves and to him (G.S., v. 4 p. 1546).

279. As to the prevention of the terrorist act, a senior police officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified in court in November 2005 that at about 8 a.m. on 1 September the school had been inspected, possibly with a service dog. He admitted that, unlike previous years, no police had been deployed to the school (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1215). Mr Aydarov M., the former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD was aware that the school had been inspected with service dogs in the morning of 1 September, but no copies of the appropriate records had been provided (v. 3 p. 1410).

280. The trial court noted that criminal proceedings in respect of the organisers of the terrorist act were the subject of a separate criminal investigation (no. 20/849, see above). The court cited statements and documents from investigation file no. 20/849. It identified nineteen terrorists (including Mr Kulayev) and referred to thirteen unidentified persons (including “Abu-Radiy” and “Abu-Farukh”).

(d) Questioning of the hostages and granting of victim status

281. It transpires that between October and December 2004 numerous hostages and the victims ’ relatives were questioned and accorded victim status. By the opening of the trial several hundred persons were granted the status of victim in the proceedings. Over 230 victims were questioned during the trial; statements by others given to the investigation were read out.

282. The victims questioned in the courtroom mostly denied having seen Mr Kulayev in the gymnasium, although several hostages had seen him in the gymnasium, in the corridor on 1-3 September and in the canteen during the final stage of the assault. Most of the hostages had not seen Mr Kulayev ’ s brother Khanpash, who had his right arm missing. Several of them also referred to one particular terrorist: a shaven man with a large scar on his neck, who had been particularly cruel to the hostages and whom they had not identified after the siege was over (witness Mitdziyeva I. v. 2 p. 520). Most hostages saw two women suicide bombers, although some hostages referred to seeing another woman of Slavic appearance on the first floor of the school on 2 September and possibly a fourth one also on 2 September (Mitdziyeva I. v. 2 p. 518; Misikov K. v. 2 p. 571; Scherbinina O. v. 2 p. 935). One woman told the court that on 2 September the terrorist “Abdulla” had asked her if she was Ingush and suggested that they would let her family members go free if she agreed to act as a suicide bomber, since “their two girls had been killed by an ammunition round” fired from the outside (Kudziyeva L. v. 2 p. 525). The hostages estimated the number of terrorists at between 30 and 70 persons.

283. In respect of the taking of the school, many hostages testified that as soon as the fighters had encircled the gathering in the courtyard and started to shoot in the air, another group of fighters had fired from the top of the building. Some witnesses stated that when the shooting started some children tried to escape through Shkolny Lane, but there were fighters there who had forced them to return. Many saw fighters running to the school from the railway line (Kusayeva R. v. 1 p.147; Misikov Yu. v. 1 p. 471; Daurova M. v. 2 p.574). Others said that when they entered the school there were already armed fighters guarding the stairs to the first floor. One boy aged nine at the time testified that on 2 September he and about ten elder boys had been forced to take boxes with grenades and mines from an opening under the stage in the meeting hall (Khudalov S. v. 2 p. 866), but no one else from this group could be identified. One witness testified that when the fighters had broken the floors in the gymnasium on 1 September they had taken out a long tube which she supposed had been a grenade launcher (Tsakhilova A. v. 2 p. 896).

284. Police officer Fatima D. gave detailed submissions about the hostage taking and subsequent events. According to her, the second police officer had not arrived at the school. At about 8.50 a.m. one mother told her that a strange truck had been parked near the school. When she went out to check, she heard a suspicious noise. She ran to the teachers ’ room on the first floor to alert the police but as soon as she took the telephone, she was surrounded by several fighters wearing camouflage uniforms. They told her that “everything would be serious this time” and led her to the gymnasium. She estimated that there were about seventy fighters (v. 1 p. 365).

285 . On 1 September, under the terrorists ’ orders, the teachers drew up lists of children aged below seven, although these lists were never used (Levina Z. v. 1 p. 475; Shcherbinina O. v. 2 p. 937). Numerous hostages told the court that the terrorists had been extremely annoyed by the information about the number of persons being held in the school and that their attitude had become harsher after the figure of 354 persons had been announced. They testified that the terrorists had refused to allow them to drink or to go to the toilet since “nobody needed them anyway and there would be only 350 of them left” (Kokayeva I. v. 1 p. 413; Kaloyeva F. v. 1 p. 448; Pukhayeva Z. v. 1 p. 461; Daurova Z. v. 1 p. 481). The hostages complained about mocking, insults and ill-treatment, related how the terrorists had hit the elderly and children, subjected them to false executions, held parents and grandparents at gunpoint in the children ’ s view, and had fired into the air in order to keep them quiet.

286. The hostages saw the terrorists ’ attitude deteriorating further on 2 September after Mr Aushev had left the school. Several of them said that on 2 and 3 September the terrorists attempted in vain to liaise with the authorities through those who had relatives among officials or public figures.

287. The school director Mrs Tsalitova was a hostage, together with her family members. She stated that she had inspected the school in the morning of 1 September; she denied allegations that anyone except staff and their relatives had been involved in the renovation. Mrs Tsalitova was called by the fighters to negotiate; she testified that they had been annoyed by the absence of contact with the authorities. On 3 September she attempted to involve the children of Mr Taymuraz Mamsurov and a prosecutor ’ s mother in the negotiations, but to no avail (Tsalitova L., v. 1 p. 432).

288 . Many hostages testified about the explosions in the gymnasium. They said that prior to the explosions the fighters had behaved in a relaxed manner and were preparing lunch. Others mentioned some agitation probably caused by electricity failure in the gymnasium. Some hostages testified that they had seen the explosion of an IED fixed to the basketball hoop (Dzarasov K. v. 1 p. 213; Archinov B. v. 1 p.274). Others insisted that when they had been leaving the gymnasium they could still see the large IEDs intact on the basketball hoops (Sidakova Z. v. 1 p. 315) or that only the third explosion had come from that IED (Bekuzariva I. v. 2 p. 962). Some described the first blast as a “fireball” (Dzestelova A. v. 2 p. 538). Many testified about the fire and heat emanating from the explosions, enflaming their clothes and hair and causing burns (Agayeva Z. v. 2 p. 600; Dzheriyeva S. v. 2 p. 614; Kochiyeva F. v. 2 p. 631; Tsgoyev A. v. 2 p. 748; Bugulova F. v. 2 p. 764; Makiyev V., v. 2 p. 826; Khanikayev Sh. v. 2 p. 831; Kokova T., v. 2 p. 884). Many testified that the fire could have killed injured and shell-shocked persons who were unable to leave the gymnasium on their own (Tomayeva L. v. 1 p. 357; Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444; Kudziyeva L. v. 2 p. 526; Fidarova S., v. 2 p. 584; Skayeva T. v. 3 p. 1001; Mitdziyeva Z., v. 3 p. 1043; Alikova F. v. 4 p. 1577). Some hostages described how they had been saved by local men from the gymnasium and adjacent premises after the explosions (Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444). Numerous witnesses also gave evidence that when the hostages started to run from the gymnasium through the opening in the wall they had been shot at from the first floor of the school, and many women and children were wounded.

289. Those hostages who had been taken by the fighters to the canteen and the meeting room testified about the fierce fighting which had taken place there. They stated that the fighters had tried to force the hostages – women and children – to stand in the windows and to wave their clothes, and some had been killed by shots fired from the outside and by powerful explosions (Kusayeva R., v. 1 p. 152; Sidakova Z., v. 1 p. 313; Urmanov S. v. 1 p. 426; Daurova Z., v. 1 p. 483; Badoyeva N. v. 2 p. 823; Makiyev V. v. 2 p. 826; Svetlova T. v. 2 p. 956; Katuyeva V. v. 2 p. 971).

290. Many also stated that they had not been satisfied with the results of the criminal investigation and that they did not intend to seek damages from the accused, since they considered that the State officials had borne responsibility for the deaths and injuries.

(e) Testimony of the Pravoberezhny ROVD police officers

291. Mr Aydarov M., former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, was questioned in court (v. 3 pp. 1394-1414) while under investigation in criminal case no. 20/852 for criminal negligence (see paragraph 355 below). He explained that he had only been appointed in mid-August 2004. The administrative border with Ingushetia in the district was 57 kilometres long and was mostly unguarded. Many small roads through the fields were formally closed and rendered impassable in view of the heightened terrorist threat; however this did not suit the locals, who very often removed the barriers. In August 2004 some information had been reported about a gathering of armed groups in the Psedakh district in Ingushetia and a number of steps had been taken on both sides of the administrative border, but at the time these measures had produced no known results.

292. He also explained that out of 53 officers of the ROVD who were present on 1 September over 40 were women. It was difficult to maintain the staff on alert for long time. As soon as the shooting was heard from the school, at about 9.15 a.m. on 1 September, he ordered his staff to maintain security around the building. Two servicemen of the ROVD had witnessed the hostage-taking and exchanged fire with the terrorists.

293 . Mr Murtazov T., deputy head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, at the time of questioning was also under investigation for criminal negligence. Mr Murtazov gave detailed submissions about the use of “Shmel” flame ‑ throwers upon the school from three snipers ’ positions situated on the roofs of a technical building in Lermontova Street, a five-storey housing block on the corner of Shkolnaya and Batagova Streets and the gatekeeper ’ s house (v. 3 p. 1418). He did not know where the snipers came from. He witnessed the tank shooting at the school and the use of grenade-launchers by the military; these events occurred between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. The officer remarked that not a single bullet had been extracted from the bodies of the deceased hostages which could have led to the identification of the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior (v. 3 p. 1424).

294. Mr Dryayev, another senior ROVD officer, testified that immediately after the first explosions on 3 September he had seen soldiers [of the army or Internal Troops] firing with automatic weapons upon the school in response to enemy fire. Soon after 3 p.m. the witness saw the tank stationed in Kominterna Street firing about ten shots at the school corner from a distance of about 30 metres. These shots, possibly carried out without explosive heads, damaged the wall and the roof (v. 3 p. 1428).

295. Police officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that by the evening of 1 September they had carried out a house-to-house inspection of the district and had a list of 900 hostages ’ names which they had submitted to the officer on duty of the ROVD (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1212; Friyev S. v. 3 p. 1217).

296. The policemen also explained that two men had been beaten by the crowd on 2 September and detained at the ROVD on suspicion of aiding the terrorists. They turned out to be civilians from a nearby town; both men had been identified and testified in court about this incident.

(f) Statements by civilians and police officers who participated in the rescue operation

297. The court questioned several civilians who had helped to evacuate hostages from the gymnasium. Mr Dudiyev testified that he had entered the gymnasium after the first explosions, together with the special forces units, searching for his wife and three children. Mr Dudiyev brought out his wounded wife and the body of his daughter, while his brother evacuated his injured son; his eldest child had also been killed (Dudiyev A. v. 1 p. 251). Other witnesses, both civilian and police, told the court that they had entered the burning gymnasium several times, taking out injured women and children before the roof had collapsed (Adayev E., v. 2 p. 659, Totoonti I., v. 4 p. 1595). One policeman witnessed the fire spreading very quickly on the roof of the school, while the firemen failed to intervene (Badoyev R. v. 3 p. 1295).

298 . Some witnesses saw the tanks shooting at the school soon after the explosions (Khosonov Z. v. 3 p. 1110); one man was injured by an explosion while taking a child out of the gymnasium (Gasiyev T. v. 2 p. 676). Witness E. Tetov explained that he had served in the army as a tank crew member and was well acquainted with the tanks and the ammunition used by it. Shortly after 1 p.m. on 3 September he had counted between nine and eleven shots without explosive heads fired from a tank gun. He was also of the opinion that the first explosions and the fire had been started from the outside, either from a flame-thrower or a tracer bullet (v. 2 pp. 729 ‑ 730). One civilian witness stated that he had served in the army as a grenade launcher operator and that he had identified at least two shots fired from grenade- or flame-throwers between the second and third major explosions in the gymnasium (Totoonti I., v. 4 p. 1603).

299. Several police officers testified that the storming of the building had started unexpectedly and that this explained the casualties. Some of them did not have time to don the protective gear and rushed to the school as soon as they had heard the shooting. Some servicemen described the situation after the first explosions as “chaotic”, when various forces shot at the school building using automatic weapons and other arms (Khosonov Z., v. 3 p. 1109). They referred to the terrorists ’ high level of training and preparedness, which allowed them to mount resistance in the face of the elite Russian units (Akulov O., v. 1 p. 492).

300 . An officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that while he was ensuring the security cordon around the school, on 3 September at about 9 a.m. he saw two full carloads of portable grenade launchers (RPG) and flame-throwers (RPO “Shmel”) delivered by servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior driving a white Gazel vehicle. He estimated that at least twenty flame-throwers had been unloaded and taken to the snipers ’ positions, located about 200 metres from the school. The snipers and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior used these flame-throwers soon after the explosions at the school, responding to enemy fire from grenade-launchers and machine guns (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1212). Up to ten shots from flame ‑ throwers were counted by another policeman at around 2 p.m. in the direction of the gymnasium roof (R. Bidzheov, v. 3 p. 1222). Other policemen testified that between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. they had seen a tank firing at the school (Friyev S. v. 3 p. 1218; Khadikov A. v. 3 p. 1224; Khayev A. v. 3 p. 1227; Karayev A. v. 3 p. 1231;) and that shots were fired from grenade-launchers (Karayev A. v. 3 p. 1231; Aydarov M. v. 3 p. 1400).

(g) Statements by local residents

301. The hostage-taking and subsequent events were witnessed by numerous local residents; some of them were questioned in the courtroom. Several passengers of vehicles who had found themselves in the morning on 1 September in the street in front of the school had seen the GAZ-66 truck arriving in the school yard and some of them said that they had seen three or four women jumping off the vehicle. Mr K. Torchinov had been a teacher at school no. 1 and a former investigator of the prosecutor ’ s office; he lived in the house opposite the school and watched the ceremony from his window, from a distance of about 200 metres. He gave detailed explanations about the hostage-taking. In particular, he had counted the men who jumped out of the GAZ-66 vehicle and said that there had been twenty-seven, he also saw two other fighters in the school yard and between seven and eight who had run from the railway lines; at the same time there were shots fired from the roof and the first floor of the school; he thus estimated the number of fighters at no less than forty or forty-five persons. Mr Torchinov also stated that on 1-3 September there were no soldiers or police lined up along the backyard of the school and that it was possible to walk there to and from his house (v. 2 pp. 847-859).

302. Numerous local residents whose relatives were held in the school stated that they had been appalled by the announcement of the number of hostages. They said that the school had about 900 students – lists could have been obtained in the local department of education – and that numerous parents and relatives had also been captured. Officials from the local department of education testified that in the morning of 1 September the number of students (830) had been transmitted to the administration, with an indication that many relatives could be present at the ceremony (Dzukkayeva B. v. 3 p. 1334; Burgalova Z. v. 3 p. 1349). Moreover, on 1 September volunteers and police drew up lists of hostages which counted over 1000 persons. In view of this they could not explain how the officials had arrived at the figure of 350 persons (Khosonov Z. v. 3 p. 1107).

303 . Many local residents testified that they had seen or heard the tank shooting at the school after the explosions (Duarov O. v. 3 p. 1083; Pliyev V. v. 3 p. 1085; Dzutsev Yu. v. 3 p. 1121; Gagiyev E. v. 3 p. 1300; Malikiyev A. v. 3 p. 1308; Savkuyev T. v. 3 p. 135; Ilyin B. v. 1 p. 1453). Mrs Kesayeva E. remained outside the school, where four members of her family had been held hostage. She testified that a tank positioned in Kominterna Street had fired several rounds between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. (v. 1 p. 325). One local resident saw a tank enter a courtyard in Pervomayskaya Street and heard it shooting at the school before 3 p.m. on 3 September. The witness was about 50 metres away from the tank (Khabayeva A. v. 3 p. 1289). All those witnesses described the tank cannon shots as being particularly strong and clearly identifiable despite the overwhelming noise of fierce fighting.

304. Several residents testified about the firemen ’ s actions. They alleged, in particular, that the firemen had lost time before intervening in the gymnasium and that once the fire engines had arrived, they were of little use since the water in the cisterns was quickly exhausted; moreover the water hoses had been weak and could not reach the gymnasium from where the machines were stationed. Some witnesses deplored the lack of preparedness by the firemen who had failed to find out beforehand where to find water locally around the school rather than bringing it in cisterns (Tetov E. v. 2 p. 729; Katsanov M. v. 2 p. 802). Other witnesses told the court that they had seen a fire engine stuck in the courtyard and trying to find water for the cistern (Pliyev V. v. 3 p. 1086).

(h) Statements by the servicemen of the Internal Troops, army and FSB

305. Colonel Bocharov, brigade commander of the Internal Troops deployed in Beslan on 1-4 September, testified in November 2005 that servicemen under his command had ensured the security cordon. Their task was to prevent the terrorists from breaking through. Four APCs from his brigade had been transferred to the FSB forces on 2 September (v. 3 p. 1209).

306. Officers of the 58th army testified that their task had been to ensure the “third ring” of security around the school. One officer explained that General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th army, had instructed him to follow the orders of the FSB officers. Each army vehicle deployed in Beslan had been completed by an officer of the FSB who had given orders and coordinated the crews ’ actions (Isakov A. v. 3 p. 1260; Zhogin V. v. 3. p. 1265). They denied having heard or seen grenade-launchers, flame ‑ throwers or tanks being used prior to late in the evening on 3 September. The tank unit commander stated that between 8.56 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. one tank had fired seven high-fragmentation shells at the school (the seventh shell had failed to explode), following orders of the FSB officer in charge. No shots had been fired from the tank guns before or after that (Kindeyev V. v. 3 p. 1277).

307. One officer, a sapper, testified that he had entered the gymnasium at around 2.40 p.m. on 3 September and deactivated one IED attached to the basketball hoop. Most IEDs had not exploded and were deactivated on the following day. This officer testified that he had entered the gymnasium in a group of seven servicemen and fifteen or twenty civilians who had evacuated the hostages for about one hour. Initially there was no fire there, but the premises were under attack from the northern wing of the school. Soon afterwards he noted fire starting in the roof, above the entrance to the gymnasium from the side of the weights room (Gagloyev A. v. 4 pp. 1715, 1733).

308. Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, was called to Beslan at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September. He had a meeting with Mr Andreyev and then informed him of the talks and received instructions from him. He was placed in a separate room, with a psychologist, and maintained telephone contact with the terrorists with an interval of 30 ‑ 35 minutes. His efforts to establish psychological contact with his interlocutor who called himself “ Shahid ” were unsuccessful and he failed to obtain any concessions aimed at alleviating the hostages ’ situation. The conversations were conducted in a rude manner; the gangsters insulted him and Mr Roshal. The terrorists repeatedly said that they would talk to the four men enumerated by them and did not present any other demands. They did not specify the number of hostages they were holding, saying only that they had “enough”; they spoke of about twenty people shot dead on the first day and said that they had three days to wait for the authorities to bring the four men together. When asked if Mr Dzasokhov could come alone, the terrorists refused. The first telephone conversation took place on 1 September at about 4 p.m., the last one – after 1 p.m. on 3 September immediately following the first explosion. The witness recalled saying “What have you done?!” and “ Shahid ” responded “We have fulfilled our duty”. Responding to the victims ’ questions, Mr Z. admitted that the negotiations involving Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev had been carried out independently of him and that he had only been informed of these developments after they had occurred (v. 4 pp. 1819 -1843).

309. The head of the FSB department in Beslan at the relevant time stated in court in January 2006 that he had not been aware of the information and telexes sent by the Ministry of the Interior in August 2004 about the heightened terrorist threat during the Day of Knowledge. The FSB had not been involved in the protection of the administrative border, but their services cooperated with the Ministry of the Interior in examining the area around the border (Gaydenko O. v. 4 pp. 1847-1854). He did not have any information about the possible fleeing of terrorists from the school after the storming had started.

310. The former head of the FSB department in Ingushetia, Mr Karyakov, confirmed that there was sufficiently precise information about the activities of terrorist groups in Ingushetia in the summer of 2004, a number of successful special operations had been carried out, but there was no information about the armed group in the Malgobekskiy district. The witness testified that he had arrived in Beslan in the morning of 1 September and remained there for three days, working in close cooperation with Mr Andreyev. He was not certain if he had been a member of the OH, but was fully aware of its work. In the morning of 1 September Mr Karyakov called Ingushetia ’ s President Mr Zyazikov and informed him about the terrorist act; at that time no demand to involve Mr Zyazikov in the negotiations had been made. Later on he could not reach Mr Zyazikov since his mobile telephone had been switched off. By questioning the escaped hostages they tried to identify terrorists from Ingushetia and to involve their relatives in the negotiations. Thus, they brought the wife and children of a presumed terrorist, but her appeal had had no effect. The witness was not aware of the note taken out by Mr Aushev (v. 4 pp. 1841-1890).

311. Most of the army and Internal Troops servicemen had failed to testify in the courtroom; their witness statements collected during the investigation of criminal case no. 20/849 were read out (see paragraph 216 above).

(i) Statements by members of the OH and other senior officials

(i) Mr Tsyban

312 . On 15 November 2005 the court questioned Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban (v. 3 pp. 1192-1203), who at the relevant time had headed the operative direction group at the Ministry of the Interior of North Ossetia ( начальник группы оперативного управления по РСО при МВД РФ ). The group was created on 11 August 2004 by an order of the Minister of the Interior with the mission to prevent terrorist acts, plan and carry out special operations, and control and direct resources allocated for counter-terrorism activities. When asked about the meetings, functions and actions of this commission prior to 1 September 2004, Mr Tsyban could not recall any details.

313. Mr Tsyban learnt of the hostage-taking at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September and went to Beslan. There, by late morning, he had organised the security perimeter around the school. As of noon on 1 September he reported to the deputy chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, General Vnukov. Although he was a member of the OH, he stated that his participation had been limited to ensuring the second security perimeter. He was not aware of the number of hostages, the nature of the terrorists ’ demands or the negotiation attempts. He had not taken part in any meetings or discussions of the OH. As to the rescue operation, Mr Tsyban stated that the servicemen of the Internal Troops had not used weapons, had not approached the school and had not taken part in the rescue operation. He was not present at the school on 3 September. He refused to answer the question whether any terrorists could have permeated the security perimeter.

(ii) Mr Sobolev

314. General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, was questioned in November 2005 (v. 3 pp. 1316-1330). Mr Sobolev was a member of the OH as the most senior officer from the Ministry of Defence. He described the OH ’ s principal strategy as negotiation with the hostage takers. However, these attempts were futile because the terrorists had been prepared to talk only if the four persons designated by them arrived. Mr Roshal attempted to contact the terrorists, but they refused to talk to him; Mr Dzasokhov had been prevented by the OH from going to the school; no contact had been established with Mr Zyazikov. The danger to the lives of the four men had been too high in the absence of any goodwill shown by the terrorists. In General Sobolev ’ s view, no negotiations were possible under the circumstances; the storming of the school should have taken place immediately, before the IEDs had been assembled. He believed that the terrorists had been supported and funded by foreign services, including the Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States). His task had been mostly limited to ensuring the security perimeter around the school and to providing the necessary equipment; he was not aware of the number of hostages, negotiation strategies or the rest of the plan drawn up by the OH.

315. He enumerated the forces and equipment brought in by the army. Eight APCs and three tanks had been transferred under the FSB command to be used as cover in case of storming. A group of sappers demined the gymnasium in the afternoon of 3 September; they found four mines and ten smaller IEDs connected by a “double chain” which allowed them to be activated all at once or one by one. Three IEDs had exploded prior to demining; in one of them only the detonator had exploded without causing any harm.

316. Turning to the storming, General Sobolev explained that it had started unexpectedly. Officers of the FSB ’ s Alpha group had been training in Vladikavkaz and had to be brought in urgently; many of them had no time to prepare. This had led to extremely high casualties: one third of the elite troops storming the building had been injured or killed. General Sobolev was not aware of the use of flame-throwers or grenade- launchers. The tank cannon fired seven shots after 9 p.m. He was of the opinion that the army has successfully concluded its mission.

(iii) Mr Dzantiyev

317. Mr Dzantiyev testified in November 2005 that at the relevant time he had been the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. He arrived in Beslan at about 10 a.m. on 1 September and followed Mr Dzasokhov ’ s orders. As of 3 p.m. on 1 September Mr Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB, had taken over the command of the operation. The witness ’ s primary task was to ensure security around the school and to evacuate civilians from the area. The victims referred to the decree of the Chairman of the Russian Government of 2 September 2004 by which Mr Dzantiyev had been appointed deputy head of the OH; however the witness insisted that he had not been informed of this, had not assumed such responsibilities and had been excluded from the OH meetings. Mr Dzantiyev received orders from the Russian Minister of the Interior and his deputy Mr Pankov who had arrived in Beslan; on two occasions the deputy head of the FSB Mr Anisimov had asked him to check the situation in two villages. Mr Dzantiyev had been aware by the evening of 1 September, from the lists drawn up by the local police, that the number of hostages had been no less than 700 persons. He did not know where the figure of 354 had come from. The Minister had no information about the use of heavy weapons during the storming except that after 3 September a number of empty tubes from “Shmel” flame-throwers had been found on the nearby roofs (v. 3 pp. 1371 ‑ 1394).

(iv) Mr Dzugayev

318. In November 2005 the court questioned Mr Dzugayev (v. 3 pp. 1430 ‑ 1445). At the relevant time Mr Dzugayev had been the head of the information and analytical department of the North Ossetian President ’ s Administration. He testified that he had arrived in Beslan on 1 September 2004 at about 10 a.m. He was instructed by Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Andreyev to liaise with the press. He was not aware of the OH ’ s work, composition and strategy. Mr Dzugayev was asked a number of questions about the figure of 354 hostages which he had consistently announced to the press on 1 -3 September. He explained that he had been so informed by Mr Andreyev, who had referred to the absence of exact lists. He had always underlined the preliminary nature of this information.

(v) Mr Andreyev

319. Mr Andreyev, who at the relevant time was the head of the North Ossetian FSB and head of the OH, was questioned in court in December 2005 (v. 3-4, pp. 1487-1523). He gave a detailed account of his actions and of the work of the OH during the crisis. According to him, no formal leadership over the operation had been assumed prior to 2 p.m. on 2 September, but informally all the responsible persons – members of the operative directions group – had carried out their tasks under the guidance of Mr Dzasokhov and his own. According to Mr Andreyev, as of 2 September the OH included seven officials: himself as the head, Mr Tsyban as his deputy, Mr Dzgoyev, Mr Goncharov, Mrs Levitskaya, the Minister of Education of North Ossetia, and Mr Vasilyev from the State TV.

320. Mr Pronichev, deputy director of the FSB, had assisted the OH in a personal capacity but had assumed no formal role. Mr Andreyev referred to the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which stipulated the plan of action in case the hostage-takers had put forward political demands. The same law excluded political questions from the possible subjects of negotiations. He believed that the terrorists ’ primary aim had been to achieve a resumption of the Ossetian-Ingush ethnic conflict, of which there existed a real threat. From the first hours of the crisis, work had been carried out in close cooperation with the head of the FSB department in Ingushetia.

321 . Mr Andreyev enumerated the authorities ’ unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the terrorists: their mobile telephone had initially been switched off, and the school telephone was disconnected. The terrorists often interrupted the contacts and said that they would call back. The OH involved a professional negotiator, who was a staff member of the FSB. The terrorists had behaved in an aggressive and hostile manner and refused to discuss any proposals unless the four men indicated by them arrived in Beslan. Mr Andreyev insisted that Mr Zyazikov, Ingushetia ’ s President, could not be found, while the three other men had been in contact with the OH (Mr Aslakahnov talked to the terrorists over the telephone and arrived in Beslan in the afternoon of 3 September). The OH had invited two influential persons of Ingush origin – Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev – to take part in the negotiations. The terrorists had been inflexible and refused to consider any proposals aimed at aiding the hostages or the possibility of ransom and exit. No written demands had been issued and a number of political demands had been made orally through Mr Aushev. Responding to the questions about the number of hostages, Mr Andreyev insisted that no exact lists beyond the 354 names had existed and the OH did not want to air unreliable information. Responding to the victims ’ questions he reiterated that the terrorists in the course of the negotiations had not referred to the number of hostages and that in his opinion they were not particularly interested in the figure announced. The witness testified that in the evening of 2 September Mr Gutseriyev had talked to Mr Zakayev in London and the latter had promised to establish contact with Mr Maskhadov. However, no direct line of communication with Mr Maskhadov had been established.

322. The OH ’ s strategy had been to negotiate, and no plan consisting of resolving the situation by force had been considered. Mr Andreyev explained that the involvement of the special forces had been foreseen only in case of massive killing of the hostages.

323. Turning to the special forces of the FSB, Mr Andreyev clarified that the FSB Special Services Centre ( ЦCН ФСБ России ) under the command of General Tikhonov had their own temporary headquarters, located on the third floor of the Beslan administration building on the premises of the local department of the FSB. Questions concerning the types and use of special weapons, such as flame-throwers, lay within the competence of that Centre. Mr Andreyev issued an order to start the operation aimed at liberating the hostages and at neutralising the terrorists as soon as the latter had started to shoot at hostages escaping from the gymnasium. He conceded that at the beginning of the operation there had been shots fired by other servicemen and the FSB forces were in danger of friendly fire. He insisted that the tanks and flame-throwers had been used only after 9 p.m. on 3 September when there were no hostages still alive left in the school. Mr Andreyev stated that two terrorists had been captured alive, but one of them had been lynched by the locals.

324. During the questioning, the victims openly accused Mr Andreyev of incompetence, concealing the truth and of bearing responsibility for the fatalities. They were called to order by the presiding judge.

(vi) Mr Dzgoyev

325. The court heard the statement by the Ossetian “Emercom” Minister Mr Dzgoyev (v. 4 pp. 1523-1544). He explained that he had been informed that he was a member of the OH in the evening of 2 September; however both before and after that time he had functioned semi-autonomously. He had estimated the number of hostages at around 800 persons and on 2 September Mr Aushev informed him personally that there were over 1000; this information was sufficient to provide for the rescue operation.

326. Mr Dzgoyev answered numerous questions about the extinguishing of the fire in the gymnasium. He stated that the information about a fire at the school (but not in the gymnasium) had been noted by their service at 1.05 p.m. on 3 September. The message that the roof of the gymnasium was starting to collapse had been noted at 2.40 p.m. General Tikhonov, the commander of the Special Services Centre, authorised the firemen to move in at 3.10 p.m. and at 3.20 p.m. they arrived at the scene. Mr Dzgoyev was told that by that time there were no hostages still alive in the gymnasium; this information was later confirmed by the forensic reports. Five fire brigades had been involved. By 4 p.m. the fire had been contained. Later the fire brigades had been ordered by the FSB to leave the gymnasium. Then they entered again and left the building at 6 p.m.

327. The witness explained that another fire vehicle had been brought in by a relative of a hostage from the nearby factory; it had been seen by many witnesses but was not an “Emercom” car. He also insisted that the vehicles and cisterns had been fully prepared, that hoses had been laid from the nearest water hydrants and that the fire equipment had been sufficient.

328. At 7 a.m. on 4 September the “Emercom” teams started the clearance operation. They worked in parallel with the staff of the FSB, army sappers and the prosecutor ’ s office. They collected the remains of 323 hostages, of which 112 had been found in the gymnasium and adjacent premises. 31 terrorists ’ bodies were also found. During the day the “Emercom” staff cleared the debris with the use of cranes, bulldozers and excavators; the debris was first shifted manually to collect human remains and other relevant items. Only after sifting was the rubble loaded onto the trucks supplied by the local administration. Mr Dzgoyev had personally inspected the destroyed wing of the school, where two floors had collapsed onto the cellar. He saw the terrorists ’ bodies but no hostages ’ remains. “Emercom” had finished the clearance work by 7 p.m. on 4 September, after which the building was rendered to the local administration.

(vii) Mr Dzasokhov

329. Mr Dzasokhov was questioned on 27 December 2005 (v. 4 pp. 1562 ‑ 1690). Then President of North Ossetia, he stated that at about noon on 1 September Mr Andreyev had received an oral instruction from the FSB, with reference to the Russian Government, to head the OH. Mr Dzasokhov was not a member of the OH, which he considered had been a mistake. However he did whatever he thought was right and within his powers. Mr Dzasokhov was prepared to go and negotiate with the terrorists, but he had been told that he would be placed under arrest if he did so. Nor did he talk to the terrorists over the telephone, since this was done by a professional negotiator. He participated in the meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre on 1 and 2 September. He also had several talks with the head of the FSB Special Services Centre General Tikhonov, who shared his concerns about the use of force.

330. Mr Dzasokhov believed that too much operative information of low quality had been sent around prior to the terrorist act, which made it difficult to react. In particular, there was insufficient clarity about the terrorists ’ plans in the summer of 2004, although the heightened security threat was evident.

331 . Turning to the negotiations, Mr Dzasokhov testified that he had seen the handwritten note allegedly signed by Mr Basayev which Mr Aushev had taken out of the school. Mr Dzasokhov also explained that on 2 September he had talked to Mr Zakayev in London. At 12 noon on 3 September Mr Zakayev confirmed that the request to take part in the negotiations had been transmitted to Mr Maskhadov. Mr Dzasokhov had informed the OH accordingly.

(viii) Other officials

332. A former member of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia and secretary of its security council testified that the OH appointed on 2 September had excluded from its meetings all other persons. He had had no access to the OH, and Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Mamsurov had only been invited on two occasions to its meetings (Ogoyev U. v. 3 p. 1362). Mr Ogoyev could not recall the work of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia created on 23 August 2004 and of which he had been a member.

333 . Mrs Levitskaya had been the Minister of Education of North Ossetia at the relevant time. She had come to Beslan on 1, 2 and 3 September, was present at the town administration and had a number of discussions with Mr Dzaskohov and several other Ossetian officials. She had not participated in any OH sessions or other meetings. She learnt that she had been a member of the OH on 10 September 2004 during a meeting of the North Ossetian Parliament (v. 4 p. 1696). She was informed on 1 September by the local department of education about the number of pupils at the school; she was also told that this information had already been transferred to the district authorities.

334. The North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior admitted that their resources had been insufficient to monitor the border-crossing points with Ingushetia. He was also aware of the attempts to block small roads in the Pravoberezhny district and the problems that had been encountered in August 2004 – lack of staff, sabotage by the locals and absence of funds to pay for the works (Popov V., v. 4 p. 1807).

(j) Questioning of doctors

335. The director of the All-Russia Centre of Disaster Medicine at the Ministry of Public Health ( Zashchita ) Mr Goncharov (v. 3 pp. 1166-1178) testified that on 2 September he had been told that about 300 persons were being held hostage and that the medical assistance had been planned accordingly. Only after he had met with Mr Aushev on 2 September had he realised that the number of hostages was actually much higher. On the same day, in the evening, he set up emergency paediatric brigades, assembled ambulances from the region, carried out training and prepared for the arrival of patients. They mostly expected victims of injuries; the probability of gas poison was considered low. Mr Goncharov testified that though he was a member of the OH as an official of the Ministry of Public Health, he had not taken part in any meetings or discussions. He did not receive any information from the OH, as, in his view, the number of hostages was the only relevant factor and that was communicated to him personally by Mr Aushev. His own experience and available resources had been sufficient. Being highly experienced in providing emergency treatment to large number of victims, his work had been relatively independent from the rest of the OH. Besides, his previous experience had shown that the “power structures” would not share their plans with the medics, out of a need to keep such considerations secret.

336. Turning to the organisation of medical assistance, Mr Goncharov explained that by the morning of 3 September they had on standby in Beslan about 500 persons, including 183 doctors, over 70 ambulances, one field paediatrician hospital and several reanimation units. “Carriers” with stretchers were grouped about 700 metres from the school, with ambulances and sanitary vehicles placed in several spots around the building. The idea was to bring the injured to the Beslan hospital where the sorting would take place, urgent operations and life-saving measures would be carried out in the field paediatric hospital and, for adults, in the Beslan hospital and then those who could be transported to Vladikavkaz would be taken there (about 20 kilometres).

337. Immediately after the explosions on 3 September at 1 p.m. Mr Goncharov received a call from the OH to bring in the medical rescue team. For four hours on 1 September the sorting centre at the Beslan hospital treated 546 patients and carried out 76 urgent surgeries. Five persons were brought to the hospital in agony and died within a few hours; 14 other patients died within 24 hours. 199 adults were evacuated to other hospitals after urgent medical assistance; 55 children were in life ‑ threatening condition and had to be treated on the spot, seven children had emergency surgery. On the night of 3 to 4 September six children in critical condition were taken to Moscow in a specialised plane. Mr Goncharov mentioned difficulties in maintaining the necessary security around the school, and later around the hospital, in order to avoid disruption of services by the relatives.

338. Mr Soplevenko, then North Ossetian Minister of Public Health was questioned in court on 15 November 2005 (v. 3 pp. 1179 – 1191). He also testified that on 1-3 September he had not received any particular instructions, except rather general indications by Mr Dzasokhov that “adequate medical aid” should be provided. He had not been part of the OH or any other body during the crisis. He learnt that more than 1,000 persons were being held in the school from the nursing mothers who had walked out with Mr Aushev on 2 September. In cooperation with Mr Goncharov he prepared the hospitals in Vladikavkaz to admit patients: beds were freed at five hospitals, surgery and reanimation brigades were put on standby, stocks of medical and dressing material were set aside.

339 . Dr Roshal, director of the Moscow institute of emergency paediatric surgery, was questioned in February 2006. He stated that he had been informed by journalists on 1 September about the hostage-taking and immediately went to Beslan. There he was taken to the town administration where the OH and other officials were stationed. He was taken to the room with Mr Z. and received brief instructions from him. On several occasions he called the terrorists; each time they reacted in a hostile manner and refused to discuss anything unless all four men demanded by them arrived. His attempts to convince them to accept water, food, medicines or to allow him to examine and treat the wounded and sick were flatly rejected, moreover, the terrorists said that all hostages had declared a “dry hunger strike” in support of their demands. On 2 September at about 11 a.m. the terrorists called him and let him talk to the school director, who pleaded with him to intervene since their situation was dire. On 2 September Dr Roshal personally telephoned Mr Zakayev in London and let Mr Dzasokhov talk to him (v. 4 pp. 1900 – 1925).

(k) Information about forensic reports

340 . In December 2005 the court, upon the victims ’ application, questioned a senior expert of the State forensic centre in Rostov ‑ on ‑ Don, who on 13 September 2004 had been appointed the chief of the group in charge of identification of the remains by DNA tests. The expert explained that their centre was the best equipped in Russia and that the delay in genetic tests was between three days and five weeks, depending on the quality of the material under examination. All work in the Beslan cases had been completed within a month and a half. Mr Korniyenko stated that the results obtained through genetic pairing had been final and allowed no disputes about possible misidentification. He admitted that many relatives had refused to believe in the deaths of their loved ones and that on some occasions they had carried out second rounds of tests with other relatives ’ genetic material, primarily out of respect for the relatives ’ doubts. The expert cited difficulties in the identification of the remains which had been burnt “to the ashes” and in the identification of body fragments which had lasted until summer 2005. The same expert group had worked with the terrorists ’ remains: twenty-three had been identified, while eight remained unidentified (v. 3 p. 1469).

341 . Hundreds of forensic reports on the victims had been examined by the court. They included examinations of bodies, results of identification of the remains through DNA tests, conclusions of experts on the level of damage to the health of the surviving hostages and other documents. Over 110 forensic reports concluded that the cause of death could not be established in view of extensive charring and burning of the remains and the absence of other injuries; other reports named extensive burns, gunshot wounds, traumatic amputation of extremities, and injuries to the head and body as the causes of death. Injuries from gunshots and explosions, burns and psychological traumas were recorded for the surviving hostages.

(l) Additional requests and applications lodged by the victims

342. In the course of the proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications. Some of them were lodged with the district courts in Vladikavkaz, where the investigation was being conducted, while others were lodged directly with the North Ossetia Supreme Court. Some of them have been submitted to the Court, others are mentioned in the statement of facts or in the trial records.

343. Thus, on 29 September 2005 the victims requested the withdrawal of the State prosecutor heading the investigation team, Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Shepel. They argued that the investigation had been incomplete and failed to take into account all the relevant information about the crime. They indicated that the copies of expert reports ordered in the case had been unavailable to them, that the prosecutor ’ s office had ignored numerous facts and statements which had differed from the facts “selected” to form the basis of Mr Kulayev ’ s indictment, and that the role of various officials in the hostages ’ deaths had not been clarified. This application was dismissed.

344. In January 2006 the victims applied for the withdrawal of the prosecution and the judge presiding in the case, referring to the incomplete nature of the investigation and the repeated dismissal of their applications by the judge. They also questioned the logic behind separating the investigation concerning the terrorist act and its consequences into several sets of criminal proceedings. These applications were also dismissed (v. 4 p. 1801).

345. In November to December 2005 and January 2006 the victims applied to the trial court for permission to call and question a number of additional witnesses: members of the OH, senior civilian and FSB officers who had been present in Beslan during the operation, members of the Ossetian Parliament ’ s investigative commission on Beslan, and persons who had negotiated with the terrorists, including Mr Gutseriyev, Mr Roshal, Mr Z. and Mr Aslakhanov. The court granted the applications concerning several Ossetian officials who were members of the OH, but refused to call other officials, negotiators and members of the Ossetian Parliament. It also refused to include the results of the investigation of the Ossetian Parliamentary Commission in the case file (v. 3 pp. 1311-1312, v. 4 pp. 1570, 1589, 1651, 1778-1783, 1796, 1929). In January 2006 the court granted the victims ’ application to question Mr Z., Mr Roshal and some senior FSB officials.

346. In February 2006 the victims again sought the withdrawal of the prosecutor in the trial. They argued, with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete in ascertaining the most important elements of the crime. They sought to appoint independent experts in order to clarify key questions concerning the preparation of the terrorist act, the composition and powers of the OH, the reasons for the first explosions, the use of flame-throwers, grenade launchers and tank guns, and the belated arrival of the firefighters. This application was dismissed (v. 4 p. 1936).

347. In July 2006 the victims sought to acquaint themselves with the entire set of documents in the criminal case and to be allowed to take copies. Similar requests were lodged in March and July 2007, but apparently to no avail.

(m) The judgment of 16 May 2006

348. In his final submissions of February 2006 the prosecutor requested the court to apply the death penalty to the accused. The victims argued that the investigation and the trial had failed to elucidate many key elements of the events and that the officials responsible should be prosecuted for their actions which had led to the tragedy.

349. On 16 May 2006 the North Ossetia Supreme Court found Mr Nurpashi Kulayev guilty of a number of crimes, including membership of a criminal group, unlawful handling of arms and explosives, aggravated hostage taking, murder, and attempts to kill State officials. The 319-page judgment summarised witness and victim statements, and referred to forensic reports and death certificates, expert reports and other evidence. The court found that 317 hostages, one Beslan civilian and two “Emercom” workers had been killed; 728 hostages had received injuries of varying degrees (151 – grave injuries; 530 – injuries of medium gravity; and 102 – light injuries). Ten servicemen of the FSB had been killed and fifty-five servicemen of the army and law-enforcement bodies wounded. The actions of the criminal group had caused significant material damage to the school and private property in Beslan. Mr Kulayev was sentenced to life imprisonment.

(n) Cassation at the Supreme Court

350. The victims appealed against the court ’ s decision. In particular, in their detailed complaints of 30 August and 8 September 2006 they claimed that the court had failed to undertake a thorough and effective investigation into the crime and that its conclusions had not been corroborated by the facts. They argued that the court had failed to investigate the authorities ’ failure to prevent the terrorist attack, to apportion responsibility for the decisions taken by the OH, to establish the exact places and circumstances of the first explosions in the gymnasium, and to assess the lawfulness of the use of indiscriminate weapons by the security forces. They also complained that the court had not allowed them full access to the case materials. Their complaints were supplemented by reference to the relevant statements and documents.

351. On 26 December 2006 the Supreme Court held a cassation review. Four victims and the defendant ’ s lawyer, as well as the prosecutor, addressed the court. The Supreme Court slightly amended the characterisation of one offence imputed to Mr Kulayev; the remaining part of the parties ’ complaints had been dismissed. In particular, the Supreme Court found that the questions raised by the victims had no bearing on the characterisation of Mr Kulayev ’ s deeds and that the victims had been allowed full access to the case documents after the completion of the investigation.

352. On the same day the Supreme Court issued a separate ruling (“ частное определение ”) in respect of Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Shepel, who had acted as the State prosecutor in the trial. The Supreme Court noted that his request to the trial court to apply the death penalty to Mr Kulayev had been contrary to the applicable legislation and as such incited the court to adopt a manifestly illegal decision.

(o) The applicants ’ view of the investigation

353. The applicants in application no. 26562/07 Tagayeva and Others submitted that during the trial they had heard testimony and examined other evidence. It had allowed them to draw conclusions about the actions of the OH and other officials, most of which could not be elucidated within the course of the trial. Referring to the case materials and other evidence the applicants made the following inferences:

- on 1-3 September the hostages had been detained in inhuman conditions, subjected to intense physical and emotional stress including deprivation of food and water, humiliation, the witnessing of suffering and deaths of family members, and a feeling of helplessness in the absence of meaningful negotiation attempts from the outside world;

- the conclusion that the IEDs had been the origin of the first explosions was not supported by the hostages ’ statements and the state of the gymnasium;

- after the first explosions the servicemen of the army and FSB had employed heavy indiscriminate weapons including a tank gun, APC machine-guns, flame-throwers and grenade-launchers;

- the OH had not made the saving of hostages its primary aim and had authorised the use of heavy weapons during the storming;

- the firefighters ’ intervention had been significantly delayed, entailing additional victims in the gymnasium.

9. Criminal proceedings against police officers

354 . In parallel to the proceedings in criminal case no. 20/849 and that concerning the actions of Mr Kulayev, two additional criminal investigations were conducted against police officers on charges of professional negligence.

(a) Criminal proceedings against the servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD

355 . On 20 September 2004 the Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Kolesnikov ordered the opening of a separate criminal investigation for negligence on the part the head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, Mr Aydarov, his deputy on issues of population security, Mr Murtazov, and the ROVD ’ s chief of staff, Mr Dryayev. This criminal case was assigned number 20/852.

356. The police officers were charged with negligence entailing grave consequences and the death of two or more persons under section 293-2 and 293 ‑ 3 of the Penal Code. They were accused of having failed to properly organise an anti-terrorist defence and to prevent terrorist attacks in August 2004, despite the heightened terrorist threat and the existence of relevant telexes and orders of the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior.

357. Over 180 persons were granted the status of victim in the proceedings. Although no procedural documents have been submitted, it appears from the cassation appeal by the victims that only those whose relatives had died were granted victim status in the proceedings, while other hostages had been refused this status.

358. On 20 March 2006 the Pravoberezhny District Court of North Ossetia started hearing the case. The applicants submitted four volumes of trial records, comprising about 1,500 pages and covering sixty-nine court sessions.

359. On 29 May 2007 the court terminated the criminal proceedings against the three officials, having applied to them the provisions of the Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006. The officers agreed to the application of the Amnesty Act, which absolved them from criminal responsibility for the acts committed during the period covered by it (see paragraph 437 below). The prosecutor ’ s office supported the application of the amnesty, while the victims objected. The victims present in the courtroom, outraged by the verdict, ransacked the premises.

360 . On 5-8 June 2007 seventy-five victims appealed against this decision. They challenged the applicability of the Amnesty Act to the circumstances of the case at issue and, in particular, noted that the counter ‑ terrorism operation in Beslan had started after the commission of the crime in question. They also complained that the court had refused to consider civil claims at the same time, that many other hostages and relatives of injured persons had been refused the status of victim in the proceedings, that one volume of the criminal investigation file (no. 43) had been declared secret by the trial court and thus the victims were denied access to it, that a number of material witnesses had not been called, and that the trial court had refused to take into account additional evidence such as the report of the North Ossetian Parliament about the investigation into the terrorist act.

361. On 2 August 2007 the Supreme Court of North Ossetia at last instance upheld the judgment of 29 May 2007. It found the victims ’ allegations about procedural deficiencies to be irrelevant to the conclusion and confirmed the applicability of the Amnesty Act.

362 . The victims appealed against the above decisions through the supervisory review procedure, but to no avail.

(b) Criminal proceedings against the servicemen of the Malgobekskiy ROVD

363 . On 7 October 2004 a separate criminal investigation was opened in respect of the head of the Malgobekskiy ROVD, Mr Yevloyev, and his deputy, Mr Kotiyev, for negligence entailing grave consequences (section 293 ‑ 2 and 293-3 of the Penal Code). It appears that at least about one hundred former hostages or their relatives were granted victim status in these proceedings.

364 . The applicants submitted various documents related to this trial, including about 200 pages of the trial court records, the victims ’ corrections to these records, copies of their complaints and other documents. As shown by these documents, the officials of the Malgobek ROVD had been charged with failure to spot the terrorists who had gathered and trained in the district and had travelled on 1 September 2004 to North Ossetia. The investigation obtained a number of documents which contained sufficiently clear and precise information about the possible terrorist threat and the actions to be taken to counter it. In particular, on 22 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior had issued order no. 611 concerning a terrorist threat to public security, putting all staff of the Ministry on heightened alert until further notice. This document instructed all heads of district departments of the interior, inter alia , to contact the local municipalities, hunters and forest workers, in order to keep track of movements of suspicious men, and to check all trucks and other vehicles capable of transporting illicit cargo, if necessary using service dogs. On 23 August 2004 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding order on measures to be taken in the Malgobek District.

365. On 25 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior issued order no. 617 about security measures in schools and educational facilities. By this order the police were called to take special measures aimed at the protection of educational facilities against possible terrorist acts. On 28 August 2008 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding document for the Malgobek District.

366. On 31 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior sent a directive to all district departments, citing operative information about a possible terrorist act in educational facilities on the opening of the academic year. Again, a number of urgent steps involving the local self-government and the schools administration were recommended.

367. The trial was conducted by the Supreme Court of Ingushetia in closed sessions in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. The defendants opted for jury trial. On 5 October 2007 the jury declared the defendants not guilty. On the same day the Supreme Court of Ingushetia fully acquitted the defendants and rejected the civil suits lodged by the victims within the same proceedings.

368. The victims appealed, and on 6 March 2008 the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the judgment. The victims ’ subsequent appeals for supervisory review were futile.

10. Civil proceedings brought by the victims

(a) First group of claimants

369. In November 2007 a group of victims submitted a civil claim directed against the Ministry of the Interior, seeking to obtain compensation for the damage caused by the terrorist act. The victims referred to the judgment of the Pravoberezhny District Court of 29 May 2007 in respect of the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan. They argued that the application of an Amnesty Act did not exclude the possibility of claiming damages in civil proceedings. Arguing that the Ministry of the Interior had failed to take steps to prevent the terrorist act, they sought financial compensation in respect of each family member who had died or had been a hostage.

370. The Pravoberezhny District Court, on several occasions, requested the applicants to supplement the claims. On 22 May 2008 the Pravoberezhny District Court ordered the case to be transferred to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz, at the location of the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. On 26 September 2008 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the case to be transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, at the location of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia. On 21 October 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court, upon the applicants ’ appeal, quashed the District Court ’ s ruling and remitted the case to the Leninskiy District Court.

371. On 10 December 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the applicants ’ civil action against the Ministry of the Interior. It explained that the Suppression of Terrorism Act, relied on by the claimants, did not provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage by a State body which had participated in a counter-terrorism operation. As to the applicants ’ attempt to link the compensation claim to the decision not to prosecute the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, the court dismissed it as addressed to another defendant.

372. On 24 February 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court rejected the applicants ’ appeal against the above decision. The applicants ’ subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review of these decisions proved futile.

(b) Second group of claimants

373. In separate proceedings another group of victims attempted to sue both the Russian and the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior for non ‑ pecuniary damage caused to them by the terrorist act. With similar reasoning, on 9 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the claim. On 17 March 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision at last instance.

11. Report prepared by the North Ossetian Parliament

374. On 10 September 2004 the North Ossetian Parliament put together a Commission to examine and analyse the events in Beslan on 1 ‑ 3 September 2004. In its work the Commission relied on the available materials, including official documents, photographs, video footage and audio materials, press articles, witness statements and their own information sources. The Commission ’ s report was published on 29 November 2005. The report was forty-two pages long and contained chapters on the chronology of the terrorist act, facts and analysis of the events preceding the hostage-taking, the actions of the OH and various State agencies involved, examination of the reasons for the first explosions in the gymnasium, detailed information about the fighters involved in the crime and various statistical information relevant to the act. The report ended with recommendations to the authorities.

(a) Prevention of terrorist act

375 . The Commission strongly criticised the local police and FSB branches in Ingushetia and North Ossetia. It expressed particular dismay at the fact that despite a “heightened security threat” the terrorist group had been able to gather and train unnoticed in the vicinity of a village and a major local road; as well as the group ’ s unhindered passage to the school in the centre of a town across the administrative border, which was supposed to be under special protection. The Commission argued that the police ’ s attention had been diverted to the presidential elections in Chechnya which had taken place on 29 August 2004 and following which no real attention had been paid to other security threats.

(b) The work and composition of the OH

376. Turning to the work of the OH, the report was highly critical of its composition and functioning. It concluded that the “first, so ‑ called ‘ republican ’ OH” had been created on 1 September 2004 at 10.30 a.m., in line with the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the preliminary plan dated 30 July 2004. It comprised eleven persons under Mr Dzasokhov ’ s command and included the heads of the North Ossetian FSB, Ministry of the Interior and other officials. In the presence of the OH members, Mr Roshal and a number of other public figures, Mr Dzasokohov announced that he was prepared to go to the school; however, the deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Mr Pankov, responded that in such case he would be authorised to arrest him. Mr Dzasokhov himself confirmed that he had been informed by senior officials in Moscow that he should not take “any steps which could lead to further complications of the operation aimed at liberation of the hostages”. This “republican” OH continued to consider possible strategies aimed at liberating the hostages throughout the crisis. They also considered the possibility of inviting Mr Maskhadov to negotiate.

377. In the meantime, in the afternoon of 1 September 2004 the President of Russia, pursuant to a secret order of the Russian Government (no. 1146-rs), determined the composition of the OH under the command of General ‑ Major V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. This OH included the commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, General-Lieutenant V. Sobolev, the head of the North Ossetian “Emercom”, Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Education Minister, Mrs Levitskaya, the director of the Zashchita Centre for Disaster Medicine, Mr Goncharov, and the deputy head of the information programmes department of the Rossiya State TV company, Mr Vasilyev. The report criticised the composition of the OH, which had excluded not only Mr Dzasokhov – North Ossetia ’ s President – but also a number of other high-level officials from the Republic. It further noted that two deputy directors of the FSB who had arrived in Beslan – Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev – had not been officially designated to take on any tasks in the OH. This had led to a situation of a multitude of “leaderships”.

378. The report described the situation as follows:

“The striking disunity of the headquarters is further proved by their locations. The Beslan administration building saw the following distribution of bodies and officials.

In the left wing of the ground floor – FSB (Generals V. Andreyev and T. Kaloyev). In the office next to them – Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov. On the third floor, in the left wing were situated the Republic ’ s President, Mr Dzasokhov, Parliament ’ s speaker Mr Mamsurov, Representative plenipotentiary of Russia ’ s President in the Southern Federal Circuit, Mr V. Yakovlev, and a group of Duma deputies headed by Mr D. Rogozin. In the right wing of the third floor worked the commanders of the Alfa and Vympel special forces ’ units under the leadership of General Tikhonov.

However, the most closed and mysterious structure was situated in the southern wing of the ground floor of the [administration building], keeping its work secret from all members of the above-listed headquarters. In it worked persons who did not belong to any official headquarters structure: Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev, Mr Pankov, Mr Kaloyev and others.

Another mysterious structure was located on the second floor of the building, in the centre. This was a sort of ‘ ideological headquarters ’ where all information going public was verified and edited prior to publication. Most probably, the announcement of the figure of 354 hostages had been decided there. ...

In addition, the commander of the 58th army, Mr Sobolev, had set up his headquarters outside the administration building. Mr Dzgoyev, who, according to his own statement, had been “in reserve”, was also stationed outside the building; as was the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. ...

The formal nature of Mr Andreyev ’ s appointment as OH commander is supported by well-known facts. The head of the North Ossetian FSB had left the headquarters on dozens of occasions and thus lost control over the situation: he talked to the Beslan citizens outside the OH, met with journalists, accompanied Mr Aushev to the school on 2 September and the “Emercom” group on 3 September. How could the General, on whose decisions the lives of hundreds of persons depended, behave in this way? This is either excluded or, to the contrary, quite possible, if real decisions for Mr Andreyev had been taken by his immediate superiors – Mr Pronichev, Mr Anisimov and, probably, the head of the North Caucasus department of the FSB, Mr Kaloyev.

There are reasons to believe that Mr Andreyev ’ s orders and directives were not formally recorded, that no meetings of the OH had taken place, and that everything was decided in oral form in the course of working discussions with various agencies. ...

One gets the impression that the OH under Mr Andreyev ’ s command oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, without making public the terrorists ’ demands, it was searching (or pretending to search) for negotiators who would be able to participate in such talks; on the other hand it constantly announced the impossibility of a forced solution, while at the same time being obliged not simply to consider this option but to take steps in order to implement it. ...

By the end of the second day, not a single federal official who could at least partially discuss the terrorists ’ demands had contacted them with the aim of negotiating. Becoming more and more convinced that their demands were not being considered and that the topic of negotiations remained the hostages ’ supply with food and water, liberation of the infants and elderly, an ‘ escape corridor ’ to Chechnya and the like, the terrorists hardened the hostages ’ conditions. As to the terrorists ’ agreement to allow the evacuation of two dozen bodies from the school courtyard, it was probably caused by the fighters ’ wish to scare the population and to make the OH more flexible, since one could easily predict the impression on the relatives of an “Emercom” truck loaded with corpses.

Incomplete information about the development and content of the negotiations, and the lack of clarity about the videotape transmitted to the headquarters, leave many questions unanswered. ...

Without questioning the principle of non-compliance with the terrorists ’ demands, although the Suppression of Terrorism Act speaks about minimal concessions to the terrorists, it appears that it would have been much more reasonable if the federal authorities, to whom the terrorists ’ demands had been directed, had undertaken to implement it, rather than delegating this problem to the regional authorities or even a paediatrician. It is obvious that any promises of the regional authorities not supported by appropriate guarantees by the highest officials could not have inspired the fighters ’ confidence, and they could not have taken seriously the so called ‘ security corridor ’ .”

(c) The first explosions

379. The report argued that the first two explosions could not have come from the IEDs. The first explosion, according to the hostages ’ testimony, had occurred in the northern part of the gymnasium ’ s roofing space; it had destroyed part of the roof and created a mushroom-shaped smoke cloud above the explosion. The report argued that this could not have been the result of an IED explosion for a number of reasons: the terrorists had not mined the roof or the roofing space of the gymnasium, not a single electric cable had led there; a mine in the gymnasium could not have destroyed the ceiling and roof six metres above; there should have been several simultaneous explosions because they had been connected in a single chain; the mushroom-shaped cloud could not have risen within seconds to about 13 ‑ 15 metres above the roof from an IED explosion inside the gymnasium; the damage to the basketball hoop and the brick wall of the gymnasium bore evidence of the passage of an externally fired device. The second explosion, which had created a half-metre-wide opening in the brick wall under the window, had not been the result of an IED either, since the floorboards immediately near the hole had not been damaged; unlike the floorboards under the basketball hoop where the IED had later detonated.

380. The report stated that the video-recording of the events had captured not only the smoke cloud from the first explosion, but also the sounds of both explosions, leading to the conclusion that the shots had been fired from a grenade-launcher or a flame-thrower. The report considered that the nature of the destruction was consistent with this version. The choice of targets inside the gymnasium was determined by the presence there of the pedal ‑ holding fighter; since the sniper could not have reached him, the grenade had resolved this situation.

381 . The report found that the third explosion most probably resulted from an IED being affected by spreading fire, following which the fire spread from the ceiling to the floor of the gymnasium.

382 . The document concluded by saying that the exploration of the first explosions should have been carried out properly within the framework of the criminal investigation. The report deplored the hasty clearing of the site, which had been opened to the public on 5 September 2004 and referred to “hundreds of people who had found objects which should have been of interest to the investigation”. A number of items had apparently been collected at the rubbish dump where the debris had been taken on 4 September in trucks.

383. In a separate conclusion, the report stated that the active involvement of civilian volunteers immediately after the explosions had saved many hostages ’ lives. The evacuation had been carried out by those persons who had taken on “the functions of police, firemen and emergency workers”.

(d) The actions of rescue and security forces

384. The report evaluated the number of army and police forces (excluding the FSB) deployed within the security perimeter around the school at about 1,750 persons. Three security lines were judged to be of little effect and had basically fallen apart once the operation had started. Hundreds of civilians and dozens of private cars had circulated without hindrance through the lines; filtration groups, formed in advance out of servicemen of the police special forces (OMON) and the Pravoberezhny ROVD, had not stopped for identity check any of the volunteers who had helped to evacuate the hostages. The report remarked that many men had arrived from elsewhere in Ossetia and spent two days around the school; they were often unshaven, dirtied with blood and soot, and could not have been distinguished from terrorists.

385. The report then addressed the problem of ambulance and fire ‑ brigade access to the school, commenting that it was made difficult by the vehicles parked in the adjacent streets and which had not been towed away. The first fire vehicle which arrived at the school at about 2 p.m. had not carried a full load of water in its cistern. Other fire brigades which arrived even later had allowed civilian volunteers to operate the water hoses.

386. The report found it established that on 3 September between 2 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. a tank with hull number 328, stationed behind the railway line, had fired several times at the canteen and kitchen with non-explosive warheads; around 4.30 p.m. tank with hull number 325 in Kominterna Street had fired from a close distance at the canteen, at the area immediately above the entrance to the cellar. The Commission ’ s members could not agree that the use of the tank to fire at the canteen before 5 p.m. had been justified in view of the probable presence of the last group of hostages with the terrorists. The Commission had entered the cellar and found it entirely intact and bearing no traces of the terrorists ’ alleged stay there. No complete information could be obtained about the use of tanks, helicopters, flame ‑ throwers or other heavy weapons.

387. The document separately noted the multitude of responsibility lines within the various agencies involved. Thus, according to the Commission ’ s information, the commander of the 58th army had regularly reported to the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defence in Moscow and had obtained directions from him in return. The Ministry of the Interior had commanded the largest contingent in Beslan and it had initially followed the orders of its own headquarters based in the administration building; later it followed the directions issued by the FSB.

388. Turning to the role of the FSB, the report stated the following:

“The Russian FSB has remained the most closed structure in terms of the Commission ’ s efforts to obtain information in order to find out about its actions on 1 ‑ 3 September 2004. Therefore it is very difficult to accept, without further verification, the statement that, according to the operative groups of the Special Services Centre, by 6 p.m. there remained no living hostages with the terrorists (in the classes, cellar and roofing space).”

(e) The fighters ’ identities

389. The report devoted some attention to the number of fighters and their identities. It noted discrepancies in the names and number of identified and non-identified terrorists in the documents issued by the prosecutor ’ s office in relation to the investigation in criminal case no. 20/849. Relying on the information provided by the General Prosecutor ’ s Office, the report listed 38 names or aliases; of them 22 persons (including Mr N. Kulayev) were identified by their full name, date of birth, ethnic origin and place of residence, and 14 persons were identified provisionally. In the list of 38 persons, at least nine had previously been detained by the law-enforcement authorities; some of them had been released for unknown reasons. Thus, according to the report, Mr Iliyev had been detained in 2003 in Ingushetia on charges of illegal handling of weapons and ammunitions, but the case had been closed two months later; Mr Khanpash Kulayev had been sentenced to nine years in prison in 2001; Mr Shebikhanov had been charged with attacking a military convoy in August 2003 and released by jury in July 2004; Mr Tarshkhoyev had been convicted at least three times and given suspended sentences for illegal handling of arms and theft, most recently in March 2001; Mr Khochubarov (“ Polkovnik ”) had been on trial for illegal handling of arms; Mr Khodov had been wanted for a number of serious crimes including terrorist acts and had been detained in 2002 but released. Most other identified terrorists were known to the law ‑ enforcement authorities, who had retained their fingerprints, on the basis of which their bodies were identified. Many were on wanted lists for various crimes.

390. Some persons initially announced by the General Prosecutor ’ s Office as identified bodies in Beslan had later been killed in other places. Thus, Mr Gorchkhanov ’ death had first been announced in Beslan; in October 2005 his name was again announced by the Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Shepel among the organisers of the attack at Nalchik, Kabardino ‑ Balkaria, who had been killed. Mr Kodzoyev was first identified among the terrorists in Beslan and apparently had a telephone conversation with his wife, whom the authorities had brought to the school on 2 September; then his death had been announced in an anti-terrorist operation in Ingushetia in April 2005. The report deplored the lack of clarity in such an important aspect of the investigation and called the prosecutor ’ s office to issue clear and exhaustive information in this regard.

(f) Statistical information

391. The report contained a table, composed on the basis of information provided by the General Prosecutor ’ s Office, with various figures related to the total number of hostages, the number of killed and injured, persons liberated as a result of the anti-terrorist operation, etc. In this respect the Commission noted that the causes of death for 331 persons were distributed as follows: 20 persons had died in hospital; 51 persons (including 21 men killed on 1 September) had died of gunshot wounds; 150 had died of shell wounds; 10 of fire injuries; and 4 of blunt injuries. In 116 cases the cause of death could not be established owing to extensive fire damage. 83 bodies were identified through DNA matching; six cases called for exhumation and a DNA test; these procedures lasted until April 2005. The Commission concluded that the real reasons for many victims ’ deaths and injuries had not been established: the bullets and shell fragments had not been extracted from the bodies; no ballistics reports had been made to analyse the bullets and cartridges found at the scene. Thus, concluded the report, the real reasons for many victims ’ deaths had not been established.

(g) The report ’ s publication, reactions and further information

392. The Commission ’ s report was made public in December 2005. Mr Torshin stated that the report posed more questions than it gave answers; its findings and conclusions were not mentioned in the report prepared by the Federal Assembly (see part L below).

393. In 2007 the report was published as a separate book. By that time the authors had prepared additional statistical data. It included a complete list of hostages, with indications of injuries and dates of death, and other important findings. Many figures arrived at by the authors of the report differed from those used by the prosecutor ’ s office.

394. In particular, the authors stated that 1,116 persons (not 1,127 as indicated by the General Prosecutor ’ s Office) had been taken hostage; three persons had escaped on 1 September; 17 (not 21) men had been shot dead on 1 September; 24 (not 26) persons had been led out by Mr Aushev on 2 September. By 1 p.m. on 1 September 1,072 hostages remained alive in the school; 284 had been killed during the storming; ten died in hospital within two months and three more by 2006. 10 special forces servicemen were killed, two servicemen of “Emercom” and seven civilians: three were killed on 1 September by the assailants and four more during the storming, while evacuating the hostages. 35 civilians were wounded, the majority of them while evacuating the hostages from the school.

395. The publication gave a list of the servicemen of the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and “Emercom” who had been killed (12 persons) and injured (52) during the terrorist act.

396. Turning to the causes of death, the publication stated that the Commission had examined over 300 orders for forensic expert reports issued by the prosecutor ’ s office on 3-4 September 2004 and the forensic reports issued by the North Ossetia State Forensic Bureau ( Бюро Судебно ‑ медицинской экспертизы, БСМЭ ). The document recalled that the investigation ’ s orders had suggested that the experts should examine the bodies externally, and carry out a full forensic report only “where necessary”. Only a few cases had thus entailed a full forensic examination; one third of the expert reports had concluded that “the cause of death could not be established”. In total the document stated that signs of burns were noted on 159 bodies out of 333, although for most cases the experts had noted that the carbonisation had most probably occurred post mortem. They also noted the disproportionally high number of victims who had died of gunshot wounds: 44 civilians, including 11 women and 9 children; while only 7 servicemen out of 11 had died of gunshot wounds.

397. Finally, the report noted that nine (and not six as indicated in the official documents) exhumations for additional verification of remains had been carried out. The report listed these cases.

12. The Federal Assembly report

(a) Report prepared by the Commission chaired by Mr Torshin

398 . On 20 and 22 September 2004 both chambers of the Federal Assembly (the Russian Parliament) – State Duma and Federation Council – decided to create a joint commission in order to investigate the reasons for and circumstances of the terrorist act in Beslan. About twenty members of both chambers were appointed to the Commission, chaired by Mr Aleksandr Torshin, Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council. The Commission undertook a number of investigative measures, including several visits to Beslan as well as to Ingushetia, Chechnya and Rostov-on-Don.

399. The Commission questioned 45 high-ranking officials, including the Prime Minister, several federal ministers, Mr Aslakhanov, aide to Russia ’ s President; Mr Patrushev, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov - the head of the FSB and his two deputies; General Tikhonov, head of the FSB Special Services Centre; several high-ranking officials from the General Prosecutor ’ s Office, including four deputies to the General Prosecutor; North Ossetian and Ingushetian officials, including Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zyazikov; and persons who had negotiated with the terrorists: Mr Aushev, Mr Gutseriyev and Mr Roshal. The Commission received several hundred telephone calls to a special line and letters.

400. On 22 December 2006 the Commission ’ s report was presented to the Federal Assembly. The written report ran to 240 pages. It included a chronology of the terrorist act, chapters on the actions of the State authorities, a historical and political analysis of terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and a number of legislative recommendations. Two Commission members refused to sign it; one of them, Mr Savelyev, prepared an alternative report (see below).

401. The report ’ s main conclusions were principally in line with the conclusions of the criminal investigations. In particular, the report noted the following:

- Prior to the terrorist act, a number of security measures had not been taken by the local administration and police forces in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The conduct of police in the Malgobek district was described as professional negligence and the actions of police in Ingushetia in general – as “keeping aloof” from following orders from the Ministry of the Interior (pages 107-108 of the report). The police force of North Ossetia failed to comply with certain precautionary measures and this had facilitated the terrorists ’ attack at the school.

- The actions of the federal authorities were adequate and correct.

- The OH had been correct in its actions aimed at negotiations with the terrorists, however a number of weak points had been identified in the composition of the OH, the conducting of its work, and the informing of the population about the developments (pp. 84, 94).

- The first explosions in the gymnasium were caused by two IEDs (p. 87).

- The use of flame-throwers and the tank gun against the school had been authorised by the head of the FSB Special Services Centre after 6 p.m. on 3 September and had not caused any harm to the hostages, who by that time had been evacuated (p. 89).

(b) Separate report by Mr Yuriy Savelyev

(i) The report

402. Mr Yuriy Savelyev, a deputy of the State Duma elected in 2003 from the Rodina party, was a member of the Parliamentary Commission headed by Mr Torshin. Mr Savelyev is a rocket scientist by profession, holds a doctorate in technical sciences, was the director of the St Petersburg Military Mechanics Institute, and is the author of numerous scientific works and training manuals on rocket construction, ballistics, thermodynamics and pertinent fields.

403. In the summer of 2006 Mr Savelyev announced a serious disagreement with the report drafted by the Commission. Later that year he published a separate report, based on the examination of the materials to which he had access as a Commission member. The report, entitled “Beslan: The Hostages ’ Truth” (“ Беслан: Правда Заложников ”), contained seven parts:

- Part 1. The first explosions in the gymnasium, 259 pages with 58 photos.

- Part 2. The origin and development of the fire in the gymnasium, 133 pages with 43 photos.

- Part 3. Use of portable fire-launchers and grenade ‑ launchers, 97 pages with 49 photos.

- Part 4. Use of T-72 tanks and APC-80 military vehicles, 140 pages with 52 photos.

- Part 5. Women in the terrorist group, 69 pages with 12 photos;

- Part 6. Losses among hostages sustained outside the gymnasium, 145 pages with 54 photos.

- Part 7. The circumstances of the seizure of hostages, 296 pages with 21 photos.

404. This report was submitted to the Court, its entire content being published on the Internet site pravdabeslana.ru.

405. Although based on the same factual materials, the report also relied on the author ’ s own technical expertise and drastically differed in its presentation and conclusions from the document signed by the majority of the Parliamentary Commission and thus from the conclusions reached by that time by the criminal investigation.

406 . To sum up the most important distinctions, in Part 1 Mr Savelyev concluded that the first explosion had resulted from the detonation in the attics over the north-eastern part of the gymnasium of a thermobaric grenade launched by a portable grenade-launcher from the roof of house no. 37 in Shkolny Lane. The terrorist holding the “dead man ’ s switch” right under the detonation had been killed instantly. The explosion created a zone of powerful smouldering combustion in the wood and insulation material of the attics, which later turned into fire. The second explosion occurred twenty-two seconds later under the first window of the northern side of the gymnasium, destroying the brick wall and throwing the bricks outside, while the window pane situated immediately above the opening had remained intact. Mr Savelyev concluded that the nature and extent of destruction in this particular area ruled out the idea that it came from an IED inside the gymnasium. He argued that the explosion had been caused from the outside, probably by a portable anti-tank missile fired from the roof of house no. 41 in Shkolny Lane. The projectile had entered the gymnasium from the opposite window and created the opening in the wall.

407. Mr Savelyev further argued in Part 2 that the fire which had been triggered by the first explosion in the attics had continued to spread unabated until 3.20 p.m. The broken windows of the gymnasium and the opening torn in the roof by the explosion had created a powerful draught, feeding the smouldering insulation with oxygen. The fire raged in the attics with sufficient force to destroy the wooden beams holding the roof slates, which finally collapsed by 3.20 p.m., burying under the burning fragments those hostages who were unable to leave. The firemen intervened after 3.20 p.m., when the fire from the collapsed roof had spread to the floor and walls of the gymnasium.

408 . Part 3 of the report included detailed information and analysis of the type and number of arms and ammunitions used between 1 and 4 September 2004. This information was made available to the Commission, whilst the victims had no direct access to it. According to the report, volume 1 of the criminal investigation file no. 20/849 contained a “joint record of use of arms and ammunition during military operation” (“ cводный акт об израсходовании боеприпасов при выполнении соответствующей боевой задачи ”) no. 27 of 10 September 2004. Pursuant to this record, various military units had used over 9,000 cartridges for automatic weapons (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS, 5.45 mm T), 10 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG-26), 18 disposable propelled anti-tank grenade-launchers (PG-7VL), 8 high fragmentation warheads [for tank gun] calibre 125 millimetres (125 mm OF) and 90 smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (see paragraphs 217 and 219 above).

409 . The report further noted that on 20 September 2004 the members of the Parliamentary Commission had discovered in the attics of house no. 39 in Shkolny Lane six empty tubes from RPO-A flame-throwers and three empty tubes of disposable RPG-26 anti-tank rocket launchers, the serial numbers of which had been noted by the Commission members in an appropriate record on 22 September 2004. These tubes were transmitted to the prosecutor ’ s team carrying out the criminal investigation. According to the report, volume 2 of criminal case file no. 20/849 contained a document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev from military unit no. 77078 of the 58th army. This document stated that the FSB units had received from the military storage seven RPO-A flame-throwers and listed their serial numbers. After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different serial number, had been returned to storage (see paragraph 219 above) At the same time, Mr Savelyev noted that the serial numbers of flame-throwers noted in the Commission ’ s record of 22 September 2004 and in the document issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev on 25 September 2004 differed. He referred to other contradictory evidence given by military servicemen and the statements by the Deputy General Prosecutor in relation to the use of flame-throwers and concluded that no less than nine disposable RPO-A flame-throwers had been used by the special forces. Mr Savelyev also referred to the witness statements of one serviceman of the FSB given to the investigation and contained in volume 5 p. 38 of file no. 20/849, according to whom the RPG-26 and RPA had been used during the storming (in daytime) (see paragraph 220 above) and the statement of FSB General Tikhonov to the Commission made on 28 October 2004 that the RPG and RPO-A had been used at 3 p.m.

410 . Mr Savelyev listed detailed characteristics of each type of projectile in question. According to his conclusions, after the first two explosions at 1.03 p.m., the school building was exposed to the following assault: between 1.30 p.m. and 2 p.m. the windows of the first floor of the southern wing were fired at with portable grenade launchers, probably types RPG ‑ 26 and RShG ‑ 2; between 2.50 p.m. and 3.05 p.m. flame-throwers (RPO-A) were used upon the roof of the main building, RPG-26 and RShG-2 grenade-launchers were fired at the south-facing windows of the first floor of the southern wing and a RPO-A flame-thrower upon the roof of the southern wing at the point where it joined the main building. He also argued that at least one thermo-baric explosive grenade had been launched from a MI ‑ 24 helicopter at the target in the central area of the main building ’ s roof above the Ossetian language class, at the position of a terrorist sniper which could not have been suppressed by any other means.

411 . Part 4 concentrated on the use of tanks and APCs during the storming. Having analysed numerous witness statements and material evidence, the report drew the following conclusions: three tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 took positions around the school. Tanks with hull numbers 325 and 328 were positioned near house no. 101 on Kominterna Street. These two tanks repeatedly fired at the school building at 2.25 p.m. and then between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on 3 September. Seven additional shots were fired from tank with hull number 325 at the canteen windows and the wall and stairwell of the southern wing.

412. Part 5 of the report was devoted to the analysis of the witness statements and other evidence about the number of women in the terrorist group. Mr Savelyev concluded that the group had counted five women: four suicide bombers who changed places with each other so that two of them remained at any one time in the gymnasium, while the fifth woman was probably a sniper and remained on the top floor of the school.

413. Part 6 of the report examined the situation of the hostages whom the terrorists had forced to move from the gymnasium to the southern wing after the first explosions. From the photographs and video footage of the events and the witness ’ accounts, Mr Savelyev construed that between 1.05 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. the terrorists had evacuated about 300 persons to the southern wing. There the hostages were distributed in more or less equal numbers between the premises of the canteen and kitchen on the ground floor and the main meeting room on the first floor. The southern wing became the area of fierce fighting between the terrorists and the assault troops; eight out of ten FSB elite officers died there. The presence of hostages in that wing was not taken into account by the assaulting troops, who had employed indiscriminate weapons. Mr Savelyev noted the absence of a detailed description of the location of the hostages ’ bodies, whereas this could have allowed the circumstances of the hostages ’ deaths in the southern wing to be established. He argued that the bodies in the gymnasium had been exposed to fire; the number of persons who had been found dead on the premises adjacent to the gymnasium was known. He thus estimated the number of hostages who had lost their lives during the fighting in the southern wing at about 110 persons.

414. To Part 6 was appended a “study case” – a document prepared by several authors including the head of the North Ossetian State Forensic Bureau, summarising their experience in the Beslan terrorist act and the completion of forensic reports. The document listed various problems related to the collection, transportation and storage of remains, the organisation of the identification process and the compiling of forensic reports. In view of the large number of remains, many with extensive injuries and difficult to identify, together with the presence of numerous aggrieved relatives, on 4 September the prosecutor ’ s office had taken the decision first to permit identification of the remains by the relatives and then to carry out forensic examinations. As a result, there were a number of incorrect identifications which later had to be corrected. Furthermore, in view of these constraints most identified bodies were subjected only to an external examination. The exact cause of death had been established in 213 cases: of those, gunshot wounds in 51 cases (15.5 %), shell wounds in 148 cases (45%), burns in 10 cases (3%), and blunt injuries in 4 cases (1.2%). The cause of death had not been established in 116 cases (35.6%) due to extensive injuries by fire. The document concluded by giving a number of recommendations for the future, including establishment of a single information centre and careful compliance with various procedural stages, with persons responsible for each stage.

415. Part 7 of the report covered the first moments of the school seizure on 1 September. On the basis of witness accounts, Mr Savelyev construed that a small group of terrorists – between five and seven persons – had been present in the crowd by 9 a.m. Upon the signal of one of them, who started to shoot into the air, another group of ten to twelve persons entered the school building from Shkolny Lane and other sides. Some of them ran to the first floor while others broke windows and doors on the ground floor so that the hostages could enter the building. At this point the GAZ-66 vehicle stationed in Kominterna Street near the school fence approached the main school entrance and up to fifteen persons descended from it. This vehicle left after the fighters had descended. Finally, the second GAZ-66 vehicle with a different registration plate entered from Lermontovskaya Street to Kominterna at high speed, raising a large column of dust noted by many witnesses. Over twenty fighters, including four women, descended from it and ran towards the school; the vehicle then broke the school gates and stopped in the courtyard. The overall number of terrorists in the school was between 56 and 78.

(ii) Official and public reaction

416. In response to Mr Savelyev ’ s allegations about the origins of the first explosions and the use of indiscriminate weapons upon the gymnasium, the Prosecutor ’ s Office commissioned expert reports. In 2007 and 2008 the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt and the Ministry of Defence Central Research and Testing Institute, named after Karbyshev, produced two criminalist expert report on the explosions (see paragraphs 224 and 228 above). Its results were not published, but were cited by several Internet sites and by Mr Savelyev. The reports ruled out the idea that the first explosions came from externally delivered sources such as thermo-baric grenades or projectiles.

417. In March 2008 Mr Savelyev published an extensive interview in the Novaya Gazeta , illustrated by diagrams of the gymnasium that indicated four different places and origins of the first explosions in the gymnasium: three from expert reports commissioned by the investigation and his own. He argued that the results of the three experts ’ reports differed to such an extent that it was impossible to reconcile them. He further argued that the conclusions about the reasons and yield of the explosions contained in the latest expert report were inconsistent with the witness statements and material evidence. Finally, he drew attention to the fact that the remaining parts of his report concerning issues other than the first explosions had not been addressed by the investigation.

13. Other relevant developments

(a) Political consequences

418. In September 2004 the entire North Ossetian government was dismissed by Mr Dzasokhov.

419. On 6 September 2004 Russia ’ s President Putin appeared in a televised address to the nation. He referred to the events in Beslan as an “attack on Russia”, called for mobilisation of society and promised a series of radical measures to improve security, both internally and at an international level.

420. On 13 September 2004 the President signed a decree aimed at setting up a more efficient system of anti-terrorist measures in the North Caucasus region. On the same day, at a joint meeting of the Government of Russia and heads of Russia ’ s regions, President Putin announced the following measures aimed at achieving greater national unity and better representation of the population ’ s concerns: cancellation of direct elections of the regional heads of the executive, who would be elected by the regional parliaments upon the Russian President ’ s nomination; the setting up of a purely proportional system of parliamentary elections; establishment of a consultative body comprised of representatives of non-governmental organisations – a Civic Chamber (“ Общественная Палата ”); reinstatement of a special federal ministry charged with inter-ethnic relationships; implementation of a plan for social and economic development of the North Caucasus region, and some other steps. By the end of 2004 these administrative and legal measures had largely been implemented.

(b) Humanitarian relief

421. Pursuant to Russian Government order no. 1338-r of 11 September 2004, the victims of the terrorist act were awarded the following compensation: 100,000 roubles (RUB) (approximately 1,520 euros (EUR)) for each person who had been killed, RUB 50,000 for each person who had received serious and medium gravity injuries and RUB 25,000 for each person with minor injuries. Persons who had been among the hostages but escaped unharmed received RUB 15,000 each. In addition, the families received RUB 18,000 for each deceased person in order to cover funeral expenses.

422. The President of North Ossetia ordered, on 6 and 15 September 2004 (orders 58-rpa and 62-rp), the payment of RUB 25,000 in funeral costs for each person who had died, RUB 100,000 for each deceased, RUB 50,000 to each person who had suffered serious and medium injuries and RUB 25,000 to each of the other hostages.

423. The terrorist act in Beslan triggered a major humanitarian response, resulting in collections of significant sums of money.

424. Pursuant to Ossetian Government decree no. 240 of 17 November 2004, the North Ossetian Ministry of labour and social development distributed the funds paid into their account devoted to humanitarian relief to the victims in the following manner: RUB 1,000,000 for each person who had died; persons who had received grave injuries were granted RUB 700,000; persons with medium gravity injuries received RUB 500,000 each; persons who had minor injuries or were among the hostages received RUB 350,000 each. In addition, each child who had lost their parents received RUB 350,000 and other persons who had been briefly detained but were not among hostages, received RUB 75,000 each. Similar sums were allocated to the families and victims among the servicemen of the FSB and “Emercom” who had been killed or wounded.

425 . In 2005 a memorial complex “City of Angels” was opened at the Beslan town cemetery. It comprised a single monument to the victims, individual burials of over 220 persons and a monument to the FSB servicemen who had died on 3 September 2004.

426. In 2004-2008 there followed a number of other measures by the Russian and Ossetian Governments, aimed at covering additional medical and social costs for the victims, as well as financing other projects in Beslan. Thus, in November 2004 the Russian Government Decree no. 1507 ‑ r provided for the construction of two new kindergartens and schools in Beslan, a multi ‑ functional medical centre, an institute of social support to children and families and a number of housing projects aimed specifically at the victims ’ families. Most of these projects, financed from the federal budget, were completed by 2010.

427. One sports boarding school opened in Beslan was constructed with the participation of Greece and was named after Mr Ivan Kanidi (also spelled Yannis Kannidis), a sports teacher from school no. 1. Mr Kanidi, a Greek and Russian national, was 74 years old at the time and refused the terrorists ’ offer to leave the school. After the explosions in the gymnasium on 3 September he struggled with an armed fighter while trying to rescue children and was killed. In December 2004 he was posthumously awarded a Golden Palm Order by the Greek Prime Minister.

(c) Media and public reactions, most important publications

428. During and after the Beslan terrorist act, numerous journalists from all over the world covered the events.

429. On 1-3 September 2004 a number of incidents occurred with journalists who had been in Beslan or were attempting to get there. Thus, on 2 September Mr Babitskiy, a correspondent of Radio Free Europe, was detained in a Moscow airport while boarding a plane to the Northern Caucasus; on the following day he was sentenced to fifteen days ’ detention for an administrative offence. On the same day, a journalist from the Al ‑ Jazeera TV company was arrested in the Mineralnye Vody airport in the Stavropol Region, on charges of possession of ammunition. Also on 2 September a well-known Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who had written about the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus and who had acted as a negotiator during the “Nord-Ost” hostage crisis in Moscow in 2002, was severely poisoned in a plane travelling to the Rostov-on-Don airport. She fell into a coma and was treated over the following days in Rostov, and then in Moscow. A number of other Russian and foreign journalists were questioned, had their materials confiscated or were detained briefly while in Beslan. The editor-in-chief of the influential Russian daily Izvestia , Mr Raf Shakirov, was dismissed immediately after publishing explicit photos from the school on 4 September 2004.

430. In January 2005 the US network CBS in their programme 48 hours aired a film about the hostage-taking. In it, for the first time, was shown an extract filmed by the terrorists. The network alleged that the tape had been found by locals among rubble on the site and thus obtained by their journalist. The tape was made on 2 September 2004 inside the school and showed the fighters ’ leader, “ Polkovnik ”, about a dozen other terrorists in full military gear and the talks with Mr Aushev. It also showed the mothers with nursing babies being led out by Mr Aushev. At the last moment one baby girl (the youngest hostage aged six months) was handed to Mr Aushev by her mother who could not force herself to part with her two elder children (aged three and ten, only the three-year-old boy survived). The extract ended with the school door being closed and locked by the terrorists filming from inside. The extract was tagged by the operator “Fun Time ‑ 2/09/2004”.

431. Several large reports were produced by the journalists who had been in Beslan during the siege and by those who had investigated the tragedy afterwards. Notably, over the years the Moscow-based Novaya Gazeta and Moskovskiy Komsomolets ran a series of reports dedicated to the hostage-taking and the investigation; Der Spiegel published a large report in its December 2004 issue; The Esquire published a story entitled “The School” in March 2007.

432. A significant number of other TV productions, documentary films and books have covered the subject. The applicants in the present cases, in particular, have referred to the relevant chapter from Mr Rogozin ’ s book “Public Enemy”. An Internet site http://pravdabeslana.ru is dedicated to the tragedy and subsequent proceedings.

(d) Victims ’ organisations

433. The relatives and victims of the terrorist act have joined efforts, striving primarily to obtain a comprehensive investigation into the events of 1 ‑ 3 September 2004 and to determine the degree of the officials ’ responsibility.

434. In February 2005 the victims set up a non-governmental organisation Materi Beslana ( “ Beslan Mothers ” ). Today this organisation counts about 200 members – former hostages and relatives of the victims. It is headed by Mrs Dudiyeva.

435. In November 2005 several hundred victims set up another organisation, Golos Beslana ( “ The Voice of Beslan ” ), chaired by Mrs Ella Kesayeva. In November 2005 the NGO issued a public statement labelling the criminal investigation inefficient and fraudulent. It called anyone who could assist them with obtaining or gathering factual information about the events to do so. On 15 October 2009 the Pravoberezhny District Court of Vladikavkaz found that it had contained statements defined as “extremist” pursuant to The Suppression of Extremism Act (Federal Law no. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002) and put it on the federal list of extremist materials, making it an offence to diffuse it by any means.

436. These organisations have played an important role in collecting and publishing materials about the terrorist act in Beslan, advocating the rights of victims of terrorist acts in general, supporting victims in similar situations, and organising public gatherings and events. On two occasions – in September 2005 and in June 2011 – their representatives met with the Russian Presidents; they also regularly meet with local and federal officials and high-ranking international visitors.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

The Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006 enacted by the State Duma

437 . The Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006 was passed in respect of perpetrators of criminal offences committed during counter-terrorism operations within the territory of the Southern Federal Circuit. It applied to military servicemen, officers of the Ministry of the Interior, the penal system and other law-enforcement authorities, and covered the period from 15 December 1999 to 23 September 2006. It extended to criminal proceedings, whether completed or pending.

COMPLAINTS

A. Article 2

438. Relying on Article 2 of the Convention, all applicants complained about a violation of the right to life.

1. The applicants in applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11

(a) First application form

439. The “first group of applicants” submitted that there has been a three-fold violation of the right to life. First, they argued that the first explosion in the gymnasium was the cause of death for about half of those who lost their lives in the events. They considered that the domestic law-enforcement bodies, including the courts, should have attributed responsibility for the occurrence of this explosion. The ensuing fighting, which entailed numerous deaths and injuries, was the direct consequence of the first explosion and the responsibility of the OH should have been elucidated in this respect.

440 . Second, they argued that there has been a breach of the positive obligation to protect life. The school security had not been properly ensured by the law-enforcement authorities. Further, the OH, in its negotiation strategy, chose not to be guided by the need to preserve the hostages ’ lives above all. The storming of the building was not undertaken with the primary aim of preserving lives.

441. Third, the applicants argued that the obligation to investigate the loss of life has not been complied with. Criminal and other procedures have failed to establish all the relevant circumstances of the tragic events and to identify the persons responsible; only one person has been found guilty. The victims and their relatives have not been accorded full access to the documents of the criminal investigation, as a result they have not been able to argue their positions. Many of their demands and applications brought in the proceedings have been dismissed or left without proper consideration.

(b) Second application form

442 . In the second application form submitted in October 2011 the applicants formulated different complaints under Article 2. They considered that the Russian authorities were directly responsible for the deaths in the gymnasium, since they had attacked and killed the terrorists first. The deaths and injuries were the result of a disproportionate use of force by the authorities. Furthermore, the authorities failed to negotiate with the assailants to secure the hostages ’ peaceful release and failed to exhaust all peaceful means to resolve the situation. They also argue that Article 2 has been breached since there was no adequate plan for the treatment and medical care of victims and insufficient resources to prevent the loss of life from fire.

443. Turning to the procedural obligations under Article 2, the applicants argued that there has been no effective investigation into the circumstances, causes and manner of death of the victims and punishment of those responsible for using disproportionate lethal force. In this respect the applicants noted that the victims have not been allowed effective access to case materials, and thus that the protection of their interests has been hampered; that there has been no proper investigation into the causes and circumstances in which the people died on 3 September; and that the victims have had no opportunity to submit their arguments to an independent and impartial judicial body with the possibility of seeing those responsible brought to justice.

2. The applicants in applications nos. 14755/08, 49339/08 and 51313/08

444. The “second group of applicants” complained principally about the State authorities ’ failure to prevent the occurrence of the terrorist attack upon the school. In particular, no measures had been taken to properly guard the administrative border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia and to ensure the security of large gatherings such as a school ceremony.

445 . The applicants in application no. 14755/08 Dudiyeva and Others also complained about the failure to take a number of positive steps aimed at protecting the hostages ’ lives. This included a failure to negotiate, lack of preparation for the ultimate storming, the use of indiscriminate heavy weapons during the storming and a failure to swiftly contain the fire in the gymnasium.

B. Article 3

446. The “first group of applicants” alleged in their first application forms that the right guaranteed by Article 3 has been breached in respect of the hostages. Without giving more details, they suggest that cruel and inhuman treatment was inflicted upon them not only by the terrorists, but also by the State officials. Additional suffering has been inflicted upon them by the fact of their being witnesses to the deaths and injuries of their close relatives.

447. In the second application form these applicants argued that the authorities had been directly responsible for using weapons upon the school which entailed the deaths of 385 people, including 334 hostages, 186 of them children. The deaths were caused in an extreme and severe manner, through the effect of lethal force and fire in the gymnasium. The violation of this provision was caused further by the failure to provide adequate medical care, to provide for effective fire-fighting, to allow the relatives ’ access to their deceased family members and to carry out burials in accordance with their wishes and customs; to allow the applicants access to their deceased relatives ’ full medical records in order to determine the manner and cause of their deaths; and the absence of judicial remedies in respect of the relatives ’ deaths.

C. Article 6

448. All applicants considered that their rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention have been violated.

1. The applicants in applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11

449. The “first group of applicants” argued in their first application form, without further details, that they did not have access to a fair trial in the determination of their civil rights.

450. In the second application form, the applicants specified that the alleged breach resulted from the authorities ’ failure to ensure that they participated effectively and obtained justice in the proceedings opened in respect of the violent deaths of their kin.

2. The applicants in applications nos. 14755/08, 49339/08 and 51313/08

451. The “second group of applicants” complained, in essence, about deficiencies in the criminal proceedings. They argued that the investigation carried out by the General Prosecutor ’ s Office was incomplete and lacked in objectivity in so far as it had failed to establish the circumstances of the hostages ’ capture and deaths. No officials had been found responsible for the tragic events despite the victims numerous submissions to this effect. The applicants in applications nos. 49339/08 and 51313/08 argued, in addition, that the North Ossetia Supreme Court had failed to include all names of persons who had signed the cassation appeal in its decision of 27 March 2008 (proceedings arising out of the victims ’ appeal against the investigator ’ s decision not to charge Mr Dzantiyev with crimes within the pending proceedings of criminal case no. 20/849).

D. Article 8

452. The “first group of applicants” argued in their initial applications that the right to respect for family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, has been violated in respect of those who have been affected by the tragic events in Beslan.

453. In their second application form these applicants alleged a violation of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention, relying essentially on the same arguments as under Articles 2 and 6.

E. Article 10

454. The “first group of the applicants” argued in their initial submissions that there has been a breach of Article 10 in so far as they have been denied unrestricted access to the relevant information.

F. Article 13

455. All applicants complained under Article 13 of the Convention about a lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of the violations alleged.

1. The applicants in applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11

456. These applicants argued that they have been unable to exercise their rights as victims in the criminal proceedings, to protect their interests in these proceedings and to claim civil compensation for the losses incurred.

457. In their second application form the applicants added that the authorities failed to investigate properly the deaths of 3 September; failed to impose adequate sanctions on those responsible for the application of lethal force; failed to force those bearing responsibility for the deaths and injuries to adequately compensate and grant redress to the victims; and, finally, failed to allow the victims ’ relatives to establish the cause and manner of their deaths.

2. The applicants in applications nos. 14755/08, 49339/08 and 51313/08

458. These applicants argued that the General Prosecutor ’ s Office failed to carry out a complete and effective investigation within a reasonable time and thus did not identify the officials who should be held responsible. They submitted that the investigation ’ s approach was in direct contradiction not only with the law, but also with common sense and the right to a fair trial. They relied on the relevant extracts from the report of the Federal Assembly which laid the blame for the failures in ensuring the school ’ s security before the attack and during the hold-up primarily on the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior.

THE LAW

A. Joinder of applications

459. Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

B. Issues of standing and other admissibility criteria

1. The list of applicants and issues of standing under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention

(a) The parties ’ submissions

(i) The Government ’ position

460. In their letter of 14 September 2012 and observations of 24 October 2012, the Government noted that the list of applicants required clarification. They pointed out that some applicants had lodged complaints on behalf of their relatives who had been victims of the terrorist act, while others were themselves hostages. They noted that there were instances of “double” presentation of the same complaints, that some of the applicants have lodged complaints on behalf of their children who had reached majority in the meantime, that some applicants died after the complaints have been lodged, that several applicants had escaped from the school in the early minutes of the hostage-taking and thus had no standing, etc. They referred, by way of example, to the decision in the case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia (nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, (dec.), § 204), where the Court had removed the name of one person from the list of applicants because his wife, who was also an applicant, had been among the hostages and survived. In their letter of 14 September 2012 the Government stated that “the issue of composition of the [list of] applicants... could not be resolved by the applicants... It is, no doubt, the matter for the Court to resolve”.

461. In their answers to the Court ’ s additional questions submitted in September 2013, the Government reaffirmed their position on the admissibility of the applications. They made a particular emphasis on the composition of the list of applicants. They expressed an opinion that the attitude taken in respect of such a basic question of admissibility as victim status was “absolutely unacceptable” and amounted to disregard of the admissibility criteria as such. In their view, the nature of the admissibility criterion remained inflexible and could not be dropped in view of the circumstances of a particular case. They reiterated their position at the oral hearing in October 2014.

(ii) The applicants ’ position

462. In April 2012 the applicants, through their representatives, were asked by the Court to verify the accuracy of the list. The “first group of applicants” on several occasions submitted corrections, additions and updates to the list, which are indicated in the attached table (see Appendix). The “second group of applicants” answered, in their initial and additional observations, that the composition of their group remained unchanged and that the list of applicants had been correct.

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

463. The Court notes that in view of numerous victims touched by the events in question, the list of applicants in this case is a complex and evolving matter which requires a closer examination (see Appendix). The Court stresses that the inevitable changes made to the list of over four hundred persons do not affect the standing of the vast majority of applicants who had been taken hostages or lost their close family members in the events.

464. Two types of issues need to be addressed at the present stage and in view of the Government ’ s challenges: (i) matters related to the situation of the applicants who have, over time, withdrawn their applications, died and are succeeded by their heirs; and (ii) questions of standing of some of the applicants under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. The situation of each applicant affected by these changes and the Court ’ s conclusions reached below is reflected in the Appendix in the last column (“Admissibility under Articles 2 and 13”).

(i) Striking out and succession

465 . By the time of the present decision, three applicants (Mr Amiran Urusov, applicant no. 59 in application no. 26562/07, Mr Zaurbek Tsorayev, applicant no. 17 in application no. 49380/08 and Mr Soslan Dzugayev, applicant no. 18 in application no. 21294/11) by letters of 14 September 2012 and 5 March 2014 informed the Court that they no longer wished to maintain their complaints and asked to withdraw their applications. One applicant (Mrs Venera Kazakhova, applicant no. 14 in application no. 49380/08) died and no intention has been expressed by her heirs or relatives to maintain the case in her stead.

466 . The situation of these four applicants falls within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention and should lead to striking out of their complaints. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine , the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of their complaints.

467 . The Court next remarks that two applicants submitted their application twice – Mr Vladimir Oziyev, applicant no. 54 in application no. 26562/07 and no. 91 in application no . 49380/08, and Ms Natalya Salamova, applicant no. 32 in application no. 49339/08, and no. 42 in application no. 21294/11. The Court decides that their earlier applications are maintained, and their names are deleted from the list of applicants in applications nos. 49380/08 and 21294/11, respectively.

468. Six applicants died (see Appendix; for example, applicant no. 69 in no. 26562/07), and their close relatives expressed the intention to continue in their stead. The Court reiterates that where an applicant has died after the application was lodged, the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC] no. 47848/08, § 97, ECHR 2014; and Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 33071/96 , ECHR 2000 ‑ XII). In line with the Court ’ s practice, the names of the deceased persons can be maintained, as they were the ones who had originally launched the applications. The successors can maintain the applications on behalf of their deceased relatives (see Balenko v. Russia , no. 35350/05 , § 39, 11 October 2011, and Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia , no. 35254/07 , § 52, 22 November 2011).

469. Having regard to the above and the transferrable nature of the complaints concerning fundamental human rights, the Court accepts that the six applicants ’ close relatives have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in their stead. It will therefore continue dealing with the deceased applicants ’ complaints in question, at their request.

(ii) Question of standing under Articles 2 and 13

470 . In the present case, a number of applicants submitted complaints under Articles 2 and 13 on behalf of their surviving relatives, mainly children, who had been taken hostage. The Government disputed the standing of some of these applicants. These applicants were requested by the Court to clarify their position vis-à-vis the complaints lodged, especially in view of the fact that many of the direct victims of the events had in the meantime reached the age of majority. Where no complaints had been submitted by the surviving hostages, they were asked to indicate whether they wished to be included as direct victims.

471 . According to the applicants ’ submissions, received in 2013 and 2014, most surviving hostages who were minors at the time of the events (i.e. born in or after 1986) and have since reached the age of majority confirmed their wish to be applicants in their own right. Several applicants informed the Court that their relatives – direct victims – had no intention of pursuing the complaints before the Court; others specified that only the indirect victims should be considered applicants (see Appendix; for example, applicant nos. 17 and 26 in no. 26562/07; applicant no. 1 in no. 51313/08 ).

472. The Court is sensitive to the particular vulnerability of certain victims, and acknowledges that special considerations should apply where allegations are made of breaches of fundamental rights at the hands of the national authorities. Thus, applications lodged by individuals on behalf of the victim(s), even though no valid form of authority was presented, have previously been declared admissible. Particular consideration has been shown with regard to the victims ’ vulnerability on account of their age, sex or disability, which rendered them unable to lodge a complaint on the matter with the Court, due regard also being paid to the connections between the person lodging the application and the victim (see, mutatis mutandis , İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 55, ECHR 2000 ‑ VII , where the complaints were brought by the applicant on behalf of his brother, who had been ill-treated; Y.F. v. Turkey , no. 24209/94, § 29, ECHR 2003–IX, where a husband complained that his wife had been compelled to undergo a gynaecological examination; and S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, where a complaint was brought by a solicitor on behalf of children whom he had represented in domestic proceedings, in which he had been appointed by the guardian ad litem ).

473. These examples attest to the Court ’ s reasonable flexibility in ensuring that formal criteria related to admissibility and representation do not result in unjustified exclusion of the most vulnerable victims from the protection guaranteed by the Convention. At the same time, t he Court must ensure, having regard to its case law on victim status and the notion of “standing”, that the conditions of admissibility governing access to it are interpreted in a consistent manner (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu , cited above, § 105) .

474 . As the first conclusion, applying these principles to the present case and taking into account, in particular, the vulnerability of many of the victims and the initial submissions made on their behalf by their close relatives under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the Court finds it justified to correct the list of applicants, as compared to the initial submissions by adding nineteen names of direct victims of the alleged violations (see paragraphs 470 and 471 above). Of these persons, eleven had reached the age of majority by the time of submission of these additional observations; for the remaining eight their parents, the original applicants, remain the legal guardians and representatives (see Appendix; for example, applicants no. 131 in no. 26562/07 and no. 99 in no. 49380/08).

475 . The next question to address is the situation of those applicants who complained, under Articles 2 and 13, on account of events which had involved their surviving relatives. At present, there are fifty-one such applicants (see Appendix; for example, applicants nos. 17 and 26 in no. 26562/07; applicant no. 1 in no. 51313/08); most of them indicated to the Court, in their additional observations, their intention to maintain these complaints in their own right, independently of the intention of those close relatives who had been the direct victims of the events.

476. The Court ’ s case-law on the issues of direct and indirect victim status and the representation of applicants who have deceased or are unable to represent themselves has recently been summarised in the judgments delivered in the cases of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu (cited above , §§ 96-103) and Lambert and Others v. France ( [GC], no. 46043/14 , §§ 93-102, 5 June 2015 ) . As a general principle, in order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an individual must be able to show that he or she was “directly affected” by the measure complained of (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 33, ECHR 2008, and Ä° lhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 52, ECHR 2000 ‑ VII). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings (see Karner v. Austria , no. 40016/98, § 25, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX, and Fairfield and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24790/04, ECHR 2005 ‑ VI).

477. More specifically, the Court has on many occasions recognised the standing of the victim ’ s next-of-kin to submit an application where the victim has died or disappeared in circumstances allegedly engaging the responsibility of the State (see Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 92, ECHR 1999 ‑ IV, and Bazorkina v. Russia (dec.), no. 69481/01 , 15 September 2005). In the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey ( [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, ECHR 2009 ), the applicants lodged the applications both in their own name and on behalf of their disappeared relatives. The Court did not consider it necessary to rule on whether the missing men should or should not be granted the status of applicants since, in any event, their close relatives were entitled to raise complaints concerning their disappearance (ibid., § 112 ). The Court examined the case on the basis that the relatives of the missing persons were the applicants for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. The applicant ’ s participation in the domestic proceedings has been found to be only one of several relevant criteria (see Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany , 25 August 1987, § 33 , Series A no. 123 ; Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 48-49 , ECHR 2009 ; and Kaburov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 9035/06, §§ 52-53, 19 June 2012).

478. Lastly, the Court reiterates that in the case Finogenov and Others (cited above, (dec.), § 204) it found it justified to delete from the list of applicants the husband of an applicant who had been held hostage and who had lodged her own complaint, while the husband ’ s complaint was based exclusively on the events concerning his wife ’ s situation as a direct victim. Similarly, it refused to grant standing to the relatives of direct victims where the latter had failed to lodge complains or to argue their inability to do so (see Benzer and Others v. Turkey , no. 23502/06 , §§ 100 and 102, 12 November 2013).

479. The Court acknowledges the exceptional nature of the present case. It understands that the hostages ’ relatives, mainly parents, first, lived through gnawing uncertainty and fear for the fate of their loved ones, including minor children, taken hostage by a ruthless and heavily armed group, and subsequently through the tragic climax of the three-day stand-off; and, second, have borne the burden of participation in the numerous domestic proceedings, some of which remain pending to this day. It also understands that many of the direct victims were unable, for objective reasons, to assume entirely their proper roles in the proceedings which followed, both before the domestic authorities and at the time when the applications were lodged before the Court. The decisions by the domestic authorities to grant the status of victims not only to the direct victims, but also to their close relatives, appear fully justified in such circumstances, and must be seen as a measure to ensure the most effective protection of vulnerable victims.

480. However, as noted above, the question of participation in the domestic proceedings is only one of the factors to be taken into account. The scope and purpose of the domestic criminal investigations and of the related civil proceedings cannot be amalgamated with the complaints lodged under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, which raise issues of State responsibility under the positive, negative and procedural aspects of the right to life and the right to have effective remedies against the alleged violations and which constitute the crux of the applicants ’ grievances in the present case.

481. On the basis of the Court ’ s approach to relatively similar cases (see Finogenov and Others , (dec.), § 204, and Benzer and Others , §§ 100 and 102, both cited above), it appears possible to conclude that wherever there are direct victims of the violations alleged, it is first and foremost their role to bring the complaints before the Court, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify the transfer of this standing, usually to a close family member. A review of exceptional circumstances reveals the following two main criteria: the risk that the direct victim will be deprived of effective protection of his or her rights, and the absence of a conflict of interests between the victim and the applicant (see Lamber t and O t hers , cited above, § 102).

482. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the Court is of the opinion that the direct victims ’ intention to lodge such complaints is of primary importance and should be given due consideration. Wherever the hostages (children) confirmed their own intention to be applicants, this should be taken into account (see paragraph 474 above). In these cases, the relatives who lodged the initial complaints on behalf of direct victims should be designated as additional representatives. They cannot be said to have been directly or separately affected by the violations alleged under these Articles in respect of their relatives, but may continue to represent the direct victims, if they so wish.

483. By the same token, wherever the initial complaints under Articles 2 and 13 were lodged on behalf of surviving direct victims who have reached the age of majority and did not confirm their intention to pursue the applications, the Court finds that the relatives cannot be considered to be directly affected by the alleged violations for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, and they thus lack standing unless another reason exists for it (i.e. they themselves were among the hostages or they complain about the loss of another family member; see Appendix for details).

484 . It follows that the complaints lodged under Articles 2 and 13 by fifty-one persons (see Appendix) who are not direct victims of the alleged violations are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

2. Other objections of admissibility

(a) The parties ’ submissions

(i) The Government

485. In their answers to the additional questions received by the Court in September 2013, the Government reaffirmed their position on the admissibility of the applications.

486. The Government contested the Court ’ s approach to treat the applicants as a single “restricted group” rather than a number of individual applications. They considered that as a result of that, the Court unreasonably relieved some of the applicants from the obligation to comply with the admissibility criteria, such as exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six months limit. They pointed out that in the domestic proceedings each complaint lodged by the victims, for example under Article 125 of the Criminal Procedural Code, had been treated separately and its results had applied only to those persons who had participated in that round. In view of the number and variety of proceedings employed by the applicants at the national level, they could not be said to have formed a single group, at least not before they have submitted their applications to the Court.

487. The Government further stated that the applicants ’ intention to apply to the Court has formed within a period of several years, and that it has been due to the efforts, persuasion and public position of two “activity centres” – Mrs Kesayeva and Mrs Tagayeva. In such circumstances the adoption of a single date of lodging of application in respect of the whole group was contrary to the idea of an individual petition, which in this case becomes a “collective application irrespectively of the individual circumstances of each applicant only because ... all of them share the same organiser and/or [are] led by one small group of activists”. The applicants had signed various procedural documents (first letters, application forms, powers of attorney) at different dates. In the Government ’ s opinion, this should result in recording different dates for the lodging of their individual applications.

488. In turn, this has repercussions on t he calculation of the six-months limit. In the Government ’ s opinion, already in 2006 persons affected by the terrorist attack had formed the opinion that the domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 had been ineffective. This distrust was stated in numerous letters and documents published on the web-sites devoted to the Beslan tragedy; in February 2006 a hunger strike had been staged by the members of NGO Golos Beslana with the aim of attracting public attention to the inefficiency of the investigation into the terrorist attack. Although it could not be established precisely when the applicants had realised that no effective domestic remedies were available against their complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Government was convinced that it had been prior to February 2006. Since the earliest communication with the Court was dated 25 June 2007, the applicants had failed to demonstrate due diligence and to present their complaints within a reasonable time.

489. The Government further noted that the domestic criminal proceedings initiated in connection with the terrorist act could be divided, broadly, into two clusters: the proceedings against the perpetrators of the terrorist act, namely, the trial of Mr Kulayev; and the proceedings against the State officials in connection with their respective roles in the prevention and aftermath of the hostage-taking. The Court should take into account the applicants ’ individual involvement in each set of proceedings in order to determine their compliance with the admissibility criteria of exhaustion of domestic remedies and compliance with the six-months limit.

490. Furthermore, the Government argued that the “activist groups” had been convinced of the inefficiency of the domestic proceedings no later than February 2006. Nevertheless, in order to artificially increase the number of applicants and to drag the proceedings in respect of the later submissions into the six-months ’ time limit, they submitted repeated complaints to the domestic authorities. Such strategy in respect of two latest cases in the “first group of applicants”, nos. 21294/11 and 37096/11, amounted to abuse of the right of individual petition.

491. In their letter of 14 June 2014 the Government reiterated their request to review the situation of the applicants individually. They proposed that the correspondence of each applicant with the Court be reflected in a separate table, containing the dates when various procedural documents, such as introductory letters, powers of attorney and application forms had been signed and dispatched by each of them or their representatives. It should then be determined which date should, in respect of each applicant, be regarded as the date of lodging of application. On the basis of the above calculations, questions of exhaustion and six-months limits should be calculated individually in respect of each applicant.

(ii) The applicants

492. In their observations received by the Court in February 2013, the applicants in the “first group of applicants” disputed the Government ’ s interpretation of the “restricted group” notion. They argued that such approach, developed by the Court in the judgments Abuyeva and Others v. Russia (no. 27065/05, 2 December 2010) and Finogenov and Others (cited above), was fully applicable to the case at hand on three grounds: (i) the group was restricted in that the applicants have essentially identical complaints and all of its members were affected by the ineffectiveness of the investigation; (ii) the coordination of efforts was necessary due to the scale of the proceedings and the number of persons involved, thus there was no obligation for each member of the group to have the same status in the domestic proceedings; and (iii) the failure to apply such principle could result in unjust exclusion of the members collectively affected by the same situation.

493. They also asked the Court to reject the Government ’ s objections as to non-exhaustion, since the violations alleged have been carried out by the agents of the State, the national legal system was ineffective and the investigation carried out was not in compliance with the Convention standards.

494. The applicants in the “second group of applicants” in their observations of 7 January 2013 also asked the Court to reject the challenges to the admissibility of the complaints, for reasons similar to those stated by the first group.

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

495. In the communication report the Court decided to treat the applicants as a “restricted group”, based on the assumption that the substance of their complaints and their position vis-à-vis the domestic investigation have been relatively similar, whether or not each of them had participated in every given procedural step on the domestic level, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others , § 181, and Finogenov and Others , § 196, both cited above).

496. The Court notes, in particular, that the applicants in the present case form a restricted group in so far as they had been directly and personally affected by the events that took place between 1 and 3 September 2004, they have very similar complaints, have coordinated their efforts and have taken similar steps vis-à-vis the domestic authorities. More specifically, the requests lodged by various applicants in the context of the criminal investigation no. 20/849 demonstrate that they aimed to influence the scope of the investigation as a whole, and thus the outcome was relevant to the entire group (as examples, see paragraphs 266 and 265 above). In such circumstances, the applicants who have not pursued the same remedy that had proven ineffective for the other applicants in the same position can be reasonably absolved from doing so (see, mutatis mutandis , Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, § 156, ECHR 2003 ‑ VI).

497. As to the Government ’ s argument that the dates of the applications should be calculated individually in respect of each applicant, based on the dates on which certain procedural documents had been signed, the Court finds that their intent to lodge applications was expressed sufficiently clearly already in the first communications with the Court, when provisional lists of applicants were submitted with each of the applications forming the present case (see paragraphs 3 - 12 above). It would anyway be unrealistic to expect that hundreds of persons, many of them still suffering from the consequences of the events, could have participated in each step of the proceedings domestically, or signed all the interim complaints and other documents necessary to lodge a complaint to the Court on the same date, as the Government seem to suggest.

498. As to compliance with the six months criteria, criminal investigation no. 20/849 into the organisation of the terrorist act is still pending, and most of the applicants ’ grievances are inseparably linked with this set of proceedings. In so far as the Government argue that the applicants should have realised that the investigation was futile no later than February 2006, this stands in contrast with the applicants ’ continued and steadfast efforts to obtain an effective investigation after that date (see, for example, paragraphs 262 - 67 above). It cannot be said that by the time of lodging of the complaints the applicants had remained idle in the face of a dormant investigation for significant periods of time, or that the overall length of proceedings has been such so as to alert them to the obvious ineffectiveness of the investigation (see Bucureşteanu v. Romania , no. 20558/04 , § 42 , 16 April 2013; and compare and contrast with Nasirkhaeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721/07, 31 May 2011; Finozhenok v. Russia (dec.), no. 3025/06 , 31 May 2011; and Dzhamaldayev v. Russia (dec.), no. 39768/06, 22 January 2013). The Court is mindful of the need to maintain a strict and predictable application of its admissibility criteria, including the six months limit; however it does not find that any of the applications lodged in the present proceedings raise an issue under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

499. In view of the above, the Court maintains the “restricted group” approach as outlined above, rejects the Government ’ s request to apply the criteria of exhaustion and six months to each applicant separately, and dismisses the objections of six months and non-exhaustion in so far as they concern the complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.

3. Loss of victim status

(a) The parties ’ submissions

(i) The Government

500. In the observations of 24 October 2012 the Government pointed out that the status of victims in various domestic proceedings had been accorded to all persons concerned. Such persons have been fully appraised of the procedural steps and have been accorded all rights associated with such status. Those applicants who had not fully used their procedural powers, for example, to appeal against the decisions or to acquaint themselves with the case files, should be regarded as having waived their rights under the Convention and could no longer claim to be victims of the violations alleged. To prove this point, the Government submitted a table containing information about 130 victims ’ positions on their wish to assess the documents of criminal case no. 20/852 (the trial of the Pravoberezhny ROVD officers for professional negligence).

501. In addition to the above, the Government pointed out that the victims of the terrorist act had been compensated for their losses on the basis of the Counter-Terrorist Act (Federal Law no. 35-FZ) and implementing legislation. The relevant monetary compensations, social and medical support for the applicants have resulted in the loss of victim status under the substantive limb of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The Government submitted detailed background information in this respect, covering period up to April 2012.

(ii) The applicants

502. In their observations submitted in February 2013, the applicants in the “first group of applicants” asked the Court to reject the Government ’ s objection. They stressed that the financial compensations paid to the victims could not, under the Court ’ s case-law, lead to the loss of victim status under Articles 2 and 3, since no investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for a fatal assault has taken place.

503. The applicants in the “second group of applicants” also asked the Court to maintain their position as victims of the alleged violations of the procedural and positive aspects of Article 2.

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

504. The Court recalls that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive that individual of his or her status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria , no. 7888/03, § 49, 20 December 2007 , and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, and the cases cited therein). The applicants ’ principal complaints concern the authorities ’ alleged failures to prevent the terrorist act, their response to the situation of hostage-taking and the investigation of the events effectively and in full. The existence of these violations, or at least their scope, are disputed between the parties, and it therefore appears premature to speak of their acknowledgement and redress.

505. In so far as the Government refer to the payment of compensations, the Court ’ s practice confirms that confining the authorities ’ reaction to incidents of deprivations of life to the mere payment of compensation would also make it possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibitions on killing, despite their fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice (see Leonidis v. Greece , no. 43326/05, § 46, 8 January 2009). In any event, the compensations in the present case have been paid to the applicants as victims of a criminal act by third parties and do not cover their principal complaints as stated above.

506. The Government ’ s objection to the loss of victim status should, therefore, be dismissed.

4. Representation of applicants

(a) The parties ’ submissions

507. In the observations of 24 October 2012 the Government questioned Mr Kay ’ s authority to represent all applicants in four applications of the “first group of applicants”. They were of the opinion that the Court should apply the Rules of the Practice direction on Institution of Proceedings in a strict manner and accept that Mr Kay had represented only those applicants who had presented powers of attorney in his name within eight weeks after the Registry ’ s letter.

508. The applicants were requested, on several occasions, to clarify the questions of representation. Most of the applicants in the “first group of applicants” informed the Court, in October 2013, of their intention to terminate their representation by Mr Kay (see paragraph 9 above). In 2014 the applicants in this group entrusted their representation to the lawyers of NGO EHRAC/Memorial Human Rights Centre (Mr Koroteyev, principally) (see Appendix).

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

509. The Court recalls that the parties have a duty to cooperate with it fully in the conduct of the proceedings (Rule 44A of the Rules of Court) and to participate effectively in the proceedings, within the meaning of Rule 44C of the Rules of Court. These rules may be applicable to the situation of communication with the Court and, in certain cases, extend to the situations arising out of the relations between the applicants and their representatives, or lack thereof (see, for example, Havelka v. the Czech Republic , no. 29725/11 (dec.), and Gross v. Switzerland [GC] , no. 67810/10, § 33, ECHR 2014). Failure to comply with these rules allows the Court to draw such inferences as it deems necessary (Rule 44C).

510. The Court notes that at present all applicants in the “first group of applicants” are represented by the EHRAC/ Memorial Human Rights Centre lawyers (Mr Koroteyev, principally). All applicants in the “second group of applicants” are represented by Mr Trepashhkin and Mr Knyazkin. It therefore finds that no issues arise under the above mentioned Rules of the Court that need to be examined.

511. Finally, as to the Government ’ s suggestion that the Practice Direction on Institution of Proceedings, as issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and supplementing Rules 45 and 47, should have been construed so as to exclude Mr Kay from representing some of the applicants, the Court notes that the Direction was in any event inapplicable to the present situation, since Mr Kay had entered the proceedings after the requirements of Rule 47 had already been complied with.

C. Alleged viola tion s of Article 2 of the Convention

512. The applicants alleged a number of violations of their rights guaranteed under Article 2 of the Convention. Essentially, and depending on the group of applicants concerned, these complaints touched upon several aspects of the obligation to prevent the life-threatening acts by third parties, the planning and control of the operation involving use of force by the authorities and the investigation of the events. Article 2 reads as following:

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

1. General questions

(a) Article 2 - positive obligations to prevent threat to life

(i) The parties ’ submissions

513. In so far as the prevention of the terrorist act was concerned, the Government in their additional submissions in September 2013 essentially relied on the “all-round forensic expert examination no. 1” of 23 December 2005 (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent above). Although in November 2006 this document was declared void by a domestic court, it was still relied upon in later proceedings due to its extensive factual scope. As cited by the Government, the report found that the Ministry of the Interior, as well as other federal authorities, had taken all the necessary and adequate precautions in relation to the expected terrorist attack. At the same time, the actions of the local teams of the Ministry of the Interior in Ingushetia and in Beslan had been deficient, as a result of which the illegal armed group had been able to get together and train in Ingushetia, travel to Beslan across the administrative border with North Ossetia and then proceed to the hostage-taking without much opposition. These conclusions served as the basis for the criminal prosecution of the local police officers in Ingushetia and in Beslan (see paragraph 354 and subsequent paragraphs above).

514. The applicants in the “first group of applicants” in their additional observations of 15 October 2013 cited the report of the North Ossetian Parliament of 29 November 2005 (see paragraph 375 above) that “to argue that the terrorist act in Beslan had been unexpected would be as absurd as to deny the previous terrorist acts in North Ossetia. It ’ s striking that the preparation of dozens of fighters which had lasted for many days in a populated district of Ingushetia remained unnoticed by anyone”. In particular, they recalled that in the days immediately preceding the terrorist act the relevant information had been forwarded to the local police in North Ossetia. The applicants referred to telexes of the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior no. 1751 of 18 August 2004, no. 1825 of 22 August 2004, no. 1802 of 25 August 2004 (see paragraphs 27- 2 9 above), which described the terrorist threat and instructed the local police to take preventive measures aimed at ensuring the population ’ s security. They also referred to the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior order no. 447 of 31 July 2004 about the measures aimed at prevention of terrorist acts in the republic. According to the applicants, this information allowed to consider school no. 1 in Beslan, being an education facility holding a large public gathering and situated in the vicinity of the administrative border with Ingushetia, as one of the primary potential aims of the terrorists.

515. The applicants also relied on the testimonials of the Pravoberezhny ROVD servicemen given by them in the course of the investigation no. 20/852 which had ended on 2 August 2007 by the application of an a mnesty act (see paragraphs 355- 62 above). Some of these statements revealed that in the morning of 1 September a large part of the police force of the ROVD had been sent elsewhere and the school building had not been properly guarded. Not even a mobile post of traffic police had been stationed at the school, contrary to the usual practice. The only police officer – a woman, F.D., who had been also taken hostage, had not been armed and had no portable radio for communication. As a result, the terrorists were able to cross the border with Ingushetia, pass through busy streets of Beslan without being stopped or at least noticed by any police post. Having arrived at the school, within the next half an hour the terrorists proceeded to round up over a thousand persons and gather them in the school building without encountering any resistance, which could have given at least some persons an opportunity to escape. The police at the Pravoberezhny ROVD, whose office was situated a mere 300 metres from the school, learned of the event when they had heard shots being fired at the school. Similar information was available in Ingushetia, too (see paragraphs 364 and subsequent).

516. The applicants of the “second group of applicants” reiterated their initial complaints.

(ii) The Court ’ s assessment

517. The Court recalls that A rticle 2 of the Convention may imply a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman v. the United Kingdom , 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports 1998-VIII). For the Court to find a violation of the positive obligation to protect life, it must be established that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Osman , cited above, § 116; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom , no. 46477/99, § 55, ECHR 2002 ‑ II; Medova v. Russia , no. 25385/04, § 96, 15 January 2009; and Tsechoyev v. Russia , no. 39358/05, § 136, 15 March 2011).

518. In the Finogenov and Others case (cited above, (dec.) § 173), the Court concluded that there was no evidence that the authorities had any specific information about the hostage-taking being prepared and declared this complaint inadmissible.

519. In the present case, in view of the parties ’ submissions and the domestic proceedings cited above, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

(b) Procedural obligation under Article 2

(i) The parties ’ submissions

( α ) The Government ’ s position

520. In their additional submissions of September 2013, the Government referred to large number of materials and inter-related proceedings which had addressed the question from various angles. They recalled that there were four different sets of criminal proceedings: the first criminal investigation file, opened on 1 September 2004, no. 20/849, which was still pending; criminal proceedings against the only surviving terrorist Mr Nurpashi Kulayev (no. 20/870); and two sets of proceedings against the officers of the interior in Ingushetia (no. 04540064) and in Beslan (no. 20/852). The main investigative measures, such as examination of the crime scene, collection of witness testimonials, carrying out of expert examinations, were done in the framework of the first set of proceedings (no. 20/849). Later, three other sets of proceedings have been built up on the basis of the materials collected within this first investigation. The criminal case no. 20/849 was still pending, due to the need to identify the remaining bodies of the terrorists (five at the time of submission). Upon the Court ’ s request, the Government submitted the list of documents contained in this criminal case by that date. According to this list, the case-file contained 235 volumes, each ranging, on the average, between 200 and 350 pages (see paragraph 122 and subsequent).

521. Within the proceedings in criminal investigation no. 20/849 the investigators examined the lawfulness of the actions of the State officials in planning and control of the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists. The actions of the members of the Operative Headquarters (OH), military servicemen, members of the “Emercom”, medical professionals, fire-fighters etc. had been examined; it had been determined that no reasons to open criminal investigation into their actions had existed. The Government referred to the decision of 3 December 2004 not to charge officials with crimes (see paragraphs 229-34 above). The decision of 3 December 2004 was quashed on 12 September 2005; the subsequent situation was not clear.

522. The cause of death was established for 215 persons; the exact cause of death of 116 persons could not be established due to extensive post-mortem burns. The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions of the State agents, including use of firearms (see paragraphs 253-54 above).

523. As to the origin of the first explosions in the gymnasium, the Government argued that the circumstances and places of the explosions had been thoroughly analysed. It had been established, by qualified experts, that the explosions had been caused by the detonation of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Government pointed, in particular, to the expert report no. 16/1 of 14 September 2007, counting over 300 pages, accompanied by detailed schemes and photos (see paragraphs 224 and subsequent). It dismissed the doubts expressed, notably, by a member of the Federal Assembly and a renowned expert in the field of explosions Mr Savelyev about the external origins of the first two explosions in the gymnasium (see paragraphs 226, 406, 408, 410 above). The Government recalled the conclusions of report no. 16/1: the first explosion was the result of detonation of a large IED, measuring between three and six kilograms in TNT equivalent. The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator, but resulted, most probably, from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it. The IED exploded in the north-eastern part of the gymnasium, at the spot located about one metre away from the northern wall and five metres away from the eastern wall. The second explosion occurred about 20 seconds later and consisted of simultaneous detonation of several smaller IEDs in the north-western part of the hall; this explosion most probably resulted from intentional or unintentional use by one of the terrorists of the detonator pedal. Finally, the report concluded that out of all the recorded damages to the gymnasium ’ s walls, only two marks could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside. These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses nos. 37, 39 or 41 of the Shkolny Lane (as alleged by Mr Savelyev).

524. As a follow up to that report, on 14 October 2007 the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior ’ s expert lab examined the explosion marks on the gymnasium walls and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges (report no. S-I-63) (see paragraph 227 above).

525. In addition, the Government submitted a copy of another expert report, no. 16/2, also commissioned by the investigation in order to dispel Mr Savelyev ’ s allegations about the origin of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the northern side. It was commissioned in April 2007, and completed on 11 December 2009. Like report 16/1, it was carried out by the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt . The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by Mr Savelyev, including the employment of various types of grenade-launchers and flame-throwers upon a similar construction. The report ran to over 130 pages and concluded that the “the origin of the hole in the north-western wall of the gymnasium ... lied in the detonation of an IED with TNT equivalent of about six kilograms, put on the height of about 500 millimetres from the floor, near the radiator ... the power of this explosion ’ s impact upon the wall was exasperated by almost simultaneous explosion of several other IED ’ s located in the north-western part of the gymnasium, further away from the first explosion” (see paragraph 228 above).

526. The Government pointed out that the investigative authorities had conducted a most comprehensive inquiry into the terrorist attack. Testimonials had been collected from virtually every person who had been involved in the events, both private individuals and State officials. A large number of professional experts ’ reports had been ordered and conducted in order to asses and reconstruct the most important events. The outcomes of this large-scale investigation were reflected in the judgment rendered in the case of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, as well as in other proceedings.

527. Unlike the above-cited Finogenov and Others case, the Government were of the opinion that the domestic investigation had thoroughly examined the question of whether there existed a nexus between the use of force by the State agents and the deaths and injuries among the hostages. The conclusion of the investigation was clear in that such nexus was absent: the deaths of the victims had been caused by the terrorist ’ s actions. Again, in contrast to the Finogenov and Others case, the Government referred to the specific inquiries into the actions of the armed forces, security servicemen, other State personnel, which had ultimately resulted in the decision not to prosecute anyone. They stressed that the investigation had been independent and that there were no reasons to suspect that the investigators, or any of the numerous experts who had prepared the reports, had been subordinate to the bodies involved in the security operation in Beslan. They referred to the conclusions and the composition of the experts ’ board which had prepared the expert report no. 1 of 23 December 2005 (see paragraph s 134 and subsequent).

528. As to the question of safeguarding and collecting the evidence in the aftermath of the terrorist act, the Government stressed that the first investigative actions had taken place immediately after the end of the security operations. Thus, on 4 September 2004 a group of investigators, accompanied by experts, examined the site. Their work was recorded in a forty-three page document, complete with more than 150 pages of photographs and video recordings (see paragraphs 130-33 above). This document was used as a basis for a number of subsequent expert examinations. The questioning of the eye-witnesses and officials involved in the operation started immediately in the aftermath of the events, to ensure that their recollections were as detailed as possible.

529. The Government stated that “the investigation has been comprehensive and lacked any deficiencies which could have influenced the completeness, clarity and adequacy of the establishment of the facts. In other words, the investigation left little, if any, room for any speculations, picturing an alternative course of events”.

530. Finally, as to the access of the case-file by the victims, the Government were of the opinion that all those persons who wanted to do so had acquainted themselves with the relevant documents. The Government stressed that some of the victims had waived their right to access the documents in the case-file, of which there were written statements.

( ß ) The applicants ’ position

531. The initial set of observations submitted by the “first group of applicants” in February 2013 stated that the investigations carried out into the circumstances of the civilians ’ deaths and injuries did not satisfy the Convention requirements on a number of points. First, they argued that there existed a practice of non-compliance with the requirement to investigate abuses committed by military and security personnel in the course of anti-terrorist operations. Second, they submitted that the public scrutiny requirement has not been complied with, since they have not been properly informed of its terms of reference, scope, important procedural decisions etc. They rejected the Government ’ s reliance on the victims ’ participation in the criminal trials in cases nos. 20/852 (charges against the Beslan ROVD officers) and 20/870 (trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev). Both these proceedings, in their view, had concerned very limited scope of issues and could not provide them with redress for the violations alleged. As to the investigation file no. 20/849, the applicants stressed that the time-frame and scope of this investigation were not clear, that their meaningful participation in these proceedings has been hampered by the limited communication with the authorities and the victims ’ restricted access to the case file and the relevant documents within.

532. In their additional observations submitted in October 2013 the “first group of applicants” reiterated that the obligation to investigate has not been complied with, despite the carrying out of four criminal investigations. The applicants argued that the criminal investigations had failed to elucidate a number of important points which were crucial for the reconstruction of the sequence of events, establishment of truth and, ultimately, identifying personal liability. Among the investigations ’ main failures, the applicants recalled that the exact route taken by the terrorists from their camp site near Psedakh to school no. 1 had not been established, that the investigation had failed to explain why the first documents concerning the terrorist act had mentioned another vehicle – Gazel minivan – allegedly used by the terrorists; that the work of the OH had not been properly investigated; that the investigation had failed to establish with precision the time and circumstances of use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers and tanks upon the school building; that the identities of some terrorists had not been established and the investigation had failed to explain the absence, for post mortem identification, of some terrorists whom the hostages had described in details; that the cause of death for dozens of persons had not been established and for others – had been established only on the basis of external examination which did not allow, for example, to determine the provenance of the weapons used (bullets, splinters). The exact location of the bodies in the building had not been recorded.

533. More specifically, the applicants expounded their arguments on the breaches of the domestic legal rules which governed the carrying out of autopsy reports. They cited the Federal Law “On the performance of State forensic expertise”, the Criminal Procedural Code and the Instruction of the Ministry of Health of 24 April 2003 No 161 on the carrying out of the forensic expert reports. In particular, they pointed at the lists of questions which the experts should normally answer in respect of the bodies carrying signs of gunshot wounds, impact of explosions and fire. They were of the opinion that these directions had been disregarded by the experts upon directions of the investigation. They stressed that when the decisions had been rendered to carry out forensic reports, starting on 3 September 2004, the applicants had been effectively excluded from this aspect of the proceedings.

534. The applicants made a particular emphasis on the investigation ’ s failure to ensure public scrutiny by allowing the victims ’ access to the crucial materials contained in the case-file. They referred to their own numerous and futile attempts to obtain, directly and through the courts, copies of the decisions to appoint experts and the results of the most important expert conclusions, decisions not to prosecute certain officials, witness statements and other documents (see paragraphs 265- 67 above). They stressed that in October 2013 they still had no access to many of the relevant materials collected by the investigation.

535. The “second group of applicants” considered that the ineffectiveness of the investigation has been evident. They stressed the absence of a meaningful examination and description of the site of the crime prior to its “cleaning” by heavy machinery, which they thought had amounted to “destruction of evidence of crimes committed by the authorities” (see paragraph 112 above). They regretted the absence of the specialist expert reports that could have allowed tracing of bullets and projectiles that had caused deaths and injuries.

536. Some applicants cited their complaints lodged in the criminal proceedings against the police officers of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. They argued that within these proceedings, too, the investigation had failed to establish the essential facts, to call the necessary witnesses and to ensure the victims ’ rights (see paragraph 360 above).

(ii) The Court ’ s assessment

537. In view of the parties ’ submissions, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

2. Applications nos. 26562/07, 49380/08, 212994/11, 37096/11 and 14755/08

(a) Planning and control of the operation

(i) The parties ’ submissions

( α ) The Government ’ s position

538. In so far as the planning and control of the operation was concerned, the Government were of the opinion that the actions of the authorities were fully consistent with the demands of Article 2 of the Convention. The special units of the FSB, who were in charge of the operation potentially involving lethal force, were the most professional teams of such sort in the country. Their experience in the areas of dealing with terrorists and hostage-taking crisis was unparalleled. During the crisis and before the storming, the officers of Alpha and Vympel conducted trainings in order to work through all possible scenarios of the takeover of the school building, including practical training at a similar school nearby.

539. The Government drew the Court ’ s particular attention that the questions put by the Court have been at the centre of domestic investigation which had fully elucidated them. The appointment and the process of decision making at the OH have been examined in details and the conclusions of the investigation as to the absence of criminal liability of the OH ’ s members had been well grounded.

540. In so far as the complaints concerned the actions of the OH, the Government pointed out that its actions had been examined by the investigation. They listed the OH members, as established by the investigation and provided copies of their witness statements given to the investigation between September 2004 and October 2005. The Government stated that all members of the OH had been questioned and that particular attention of the investigation had been drawn to the question of whether the actions of the OH members had been lawful.

541. More specifically, the Government explained that the first OH had been set up on 1 September 2004, as soon as the news of the hostage taking had been communicated to the authorities. Pursuant to the North Ossetia plan of application of anti-terrorist forces and means of 30 July 2004, this OH had been headed by the North Ossetia President Mr Dzasokhov. On 2 September 2004 at 2.45 p.m., pursuant to the directive of the Russian Government, a new OH was appointed, under command of the head of the North Ossetia FSB Mr Andreyev. His deputies were Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetia Minister of the Interior and General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB special forces centre; its members included Mr Dzasokhov; Mr Koryakov, the head of the Ingushetia FSB; Mr Sobolev, the commander in chief of the 58th army of the Ministry of defence; Mr Vnukov, deputy head of the commander in chief of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior; Mr Tsyban, deputy head of the counter-terrorist commission of North Ossetia; Mr Soplevenko, the North Ossetia Minister of Health; Mrs Levitskaya, the North Ossetia Minister of Education; Mr Dzgoyev, the head of the North Ossetia “Emercom”; Mr Goncharov, the head of the disaster medicine centre Zaschita ; and Mr Vasilyev, deputy head of the information programs department of the State TV company Rossiya .

542. In view of the dynamic development of the situation, the OH had not held formal meetings and had not kept notes of its discussions and most of the decisions. The Government argued that the ensuing investigations confirmed that the OH actions had been in line with the pertinent legislation, in particular with the Federal Anti-terrorist Act of 25 July 1998, as it stood at the material time, and the Model Regulations on operative headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation, adopted by the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission on 11 June 2003. Among others, the relevant legislation established the principle of subordination of all participants of the anti-terrorist operation to the head of the OH who ensured a single line of command. Interference of other officials, irrespective of their rank, was directly prohibited in the work of the OH (see paragraph s 167 and subsequent).

543. In so far as the applicants ’ allegation concerned the precautions taken by the authorities to protect lives and the strategy of negotiating, the Government made special emphasis on Article 14 of the Anti-terrorist Act, which provided that negotiations with the terrorists were allowed with the aim of saving human lives and health, protection of property and with the aim of supressing the terrorist act without recourse to force. Only those directly authorised by the OH to take part in the negotiations could do so. However, the said provision contained an outright prohibition to consider, in the course of negotiations, the possibilities of transferring any other persons to the terrorists, handing them weapons or any other dangerous substances or items, as well demands of political nature.

544. In line with these directions, on 1 September the OH took a range of urgent steps. These included cordoning of the territory around the school, evacuation of population from the secured area, establishing control over the radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school, compiling a list of hostages and establishing means of communication with the terrorists. The OH also took care of accommodating and assigning areas of responsibility to the arriving members of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, “Emercom”, health services. Four persons were put in charge of the contacts with the media: Mr Andreyev, Mr Dzugayev, Mr Dzantiyev and Mr Peskov from the Russian President ’ s Administration. Later on the same day there arrived the FSB special forces who immediately started preparing for the various scenarios of the rescue operation.

545. On 2 September the OH continued its attempts to reach an agreement with the terrorists. Through the FSB professional negotiators and public figures they were offered money and a possibility to leave. The terrorists were not ready to negotiate and interrupted the contacts, rejecting any offers and denying anything which could have alleviated the hostages ’ situation. Nevertheless, the release of some of the hostages on 2 September came as the result of the OH negotiating strategy (see paragraph s 167 and subsequent).

546. On 3 September another compromise had been agreed upon – the terrorists acceded to the evacuation of the hostages ’ bodies from the school yard. After the first explosion at 1.10 p.m. the head of the OH had issued a written order to the FSB special units to start the rescue operation and extinguish the threat posed by the terrorists to the hostages. The subsequent examination of the servicemen ’ actions and equipment by the experts had been found to be adequate to the situation.

547. Answering whether the storming had been planned and controlled so as to ensure minimal risk to lives and the use of firearms and other weapons, the Government recalled that the investigation had devoted special attention to the “alternative” versions of the origin of the first explosions. These versions, in particular, suggested that the terrorists who had been holding the pedal detonators had been killed by an FSB sniper, or by a projectile launched from a portable grenade-launcher or a flame-thrower. These versions were thoroughly examined and rejected by the expert reports and the investigation. The Government referred, in particular, to the expert report no. 16/1 and the expert report no. 1 (see paragraphs 224, 134 and subsequent).

548. Accordingly, the explosions in the gymnasium at 1.10 p.m. on 3 September 2004 had triggered the development of the events which had not been wished for by the OH and whereby the decision to engage in combat had remained the only way to save the hostages ’ lives. The threat to the hostages ’ lives by that time has been clearly established and followed from the terrorists ’ statements and actions. This decision, taken under the pressure of time and in difficult circumstances, was perceived by the OH as the only means to eliminate the threat.

549. Once the operation started, the servicemen of the special forces had entered the gymnasium and ensured evacuation of the hostages, while opening aimed fire at the terrorists. During the fight in the gymnasium, the terrorists had fired several shots at the officers from grenade-launchers, killing two officers and several hostages, and setting fire to the gymnasium roof. The battle continued in the same manner in other parts of the building; by 6 p.m. the rescue operation had been over and all living hostages had been evacuated from the building.

550. Only after verifying the absence of alive hostages, the special forces had moved out of the building and resorted to heavier weapons, such as grenade-launchers and flame-throwers. The participation of the 58th army personnel and equipment had been limited to the use of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and their crews. Between 9.10 and 9.20 p.m. on 3 September one tank fired several shots at the canteen wall. Other tanks were not involved. Three APCs were involved in the storming: two were stationed near the school windows and covered the movements of the servicemen and the evacuation of the hostages. The third APC employed its stationary machine-gun in order to supress the terrorists ’ firing point on the second floor of the school prior to 3 p.m.; it was then used to evacuate one of the wounded members of the special forces.

551. At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered the deployment of fire-fighting units.

552. The school building was secured o n 4 September 2004 at 12.30 a.m. and at 1 a.m. the sappers started to deactivate the remaining explosive devices.

553. Turning to the preparation of and communication with rescue, medical and fire teams, the Government provided a detailed summary of the information contained in the criminal case no. 20/849 (see paragraph s 242 and subsequent). In particular, it informed the Court that on 1 September 2004 the Russian Ministry of Health had set up a coordination cell, joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health, “Emercom”, the Zaschita centre and the centre of forensic examinations. As of 1 September evening, special units of psychological aid were put in place for the relatives. A number of other urgent steps had been taken, such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby, preparing contingents of necessary equipment and materials, including blood for transfusion, ensuring the preparedness of the local intensive care and surgery units.

554. On 2 September an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in Beslan. On 3 September an additional hospital was set up, equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care.

555. Thus, by the time of the first explosions, over 200 doctors, 30 7 medical staff, 70 ambulances had been ready in Beslan. This made 94 mobile medical brigades, including 14 reserve ones.

556. Between 1.15 and 6.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004, 556 injured persons, of them 311 children, have been transferred to the local hospitals. By 7 p.m. on the same day all patients have been placed in hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz; 47 urgent surgeries have been performed.

557. Over one thousand persons had been provided with psychological aid.

558. In total, between 3 September and 16 December 2004 about 800 patients received medical aid. 305 died at the school, 26 persons died in hospitals.

559. As to the situation with the fire-fighters, the Government referred to expert report no. 1 in the part concerning the actions of fire-fighters and other “Emercom” staff (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent). They also recalled the decisions not to open criminal investigation in respect of the “Emercom” staff (see paragraphs 235 and subsequent). The decision of 10 December 2004 not to charge the North Ossetia “Emercom” Minister Mr Dzgoyev and his first deputy Mr Romanov with the crimes of professional negligence concluded that “the leadership of the anti-terrorist operation had been carried out by the FSB OH, and no actions could have been taken without their permission” (ibid). The decision then stated that the two hours ’ delay between the call for firemen to intervene and the time when they had done so had been the result of absence of protective gear, which could lead to the situation that the firemen could have died without achieving their professional duties. In addition, on 20 April 2006 the investigation ruled not to open criminal proceedings in respect of Mr Romanov and Mr Kharkov, the head of the fire-fighting service of the Pravoberezhny district, since the conclusions of the expert report no. 1 and the fire-technical expert report had given no grounds to conclude that their actions had contained constituent elements of the crime of professional negligence (see paragraph 240 above).

560. The Government further specified that had the fire-fighters been deployed immediately, their lives and the safety of the equipment would be put at serious risk. Such development would in any event render the rescue operation ineffective.

561. The “Emercom” staff at the site counted 254 persons, 70 rescue units.

562. The investigation concluded, on the basis of the expert reports, including autopsy reports, that none of the victims had been killed as a resu lt of fire (see paragraphs 253- 54 above). The burns received by the surviving hostages had been received as a result of the explosions of IEDs. Referring to the expert report no. 1 and the sources cited therein (such as pictures taken during the evacuation), the Government recalled that the fire in the gymnasium had started after the rescue operation was over; the hostages evacuated from the gymnasium recalled only smouldering in the ceiling but not open fire.

( ß ) The applicants ’ position

563. In their observations of January 2013 and additional observations of October 2013, the “first group of applicants” reiterated their complaints about the violations of several aspects of Article 2 (see paragraphs 440, 442, 445 above). They were of the opinion that once the hostage taking had occurred, the authorities ’ had not acted with the required diligence to protect the hostages ’ lives. In October 2013 the applicants stressed that they still had no access to many of the relevant materials collected by the investigation and so they could only repeat their initial complaints.

(ii) The Court ’ s assessment

564. In view of the parties ’ submissions, the Court considers that this complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

(b) Use of the lethal force

(i) The parties ’ submissions

( α ) The Government ’ s position

565. As to the circumstances of the use of lethal force by the State agents and their possible responsibility for the loss of life, the Government disputed the parallel drawn with the case of Finogenov and Others (cited above). In their opinion, in the latter case the (potentially) lethal force had been applied to the hostages – the applicants and their relatives – “intentionally and consciously, either as a mean of achieving a distant aim (e.g., liquidation of a terrorist threat, in the course of which applicants or their relatives were affected by the measure applied) or as an aim in itself (where an applicant himself posed a threat to the others).” Thus, the Government stressed that the use of lethal force in the circumstances as described in the Finogenov and Others case (cited above) [use of an unknown gas following which over 120 hostages died] had been indeed indiscriminate since the hostages were affected along with the terrorists. In contrast to that, the case at hand concerned a situation where lethal force had been applied “directly and precisely” to the terrorists, aiming to eliminate the threat they had posed to the hostages and others. In such circumstances, the Government argued that the examination of the applicant ’ s grievances in the present case should be limited to the procedural aspect of Article 2.

566. The Government insisted that the investigation had failed to impute a single death among the hostages to the actions of the security forces. The 331 deaths had been caused by the terrorists ’ actions (see paragraph 254 above). In such circumstances, they argued that the complaint about the use of lethal force by the State agents had been inadmissible for reasons of incompatibility with the ratione personae criteria.

567. The Government referred to the conclusions of expert report no. 1 and to the investigator ’ s decision of 3 December 2004 not to initiate criminal proceedings against officials (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent, paragraphs 229- 34 above). These documents contained an exhaustive reconstruction of the chronology of the events, in particular of the first explosions of 3 September 2004 and the ensuing storming. In addition to the above mentioned documents, they relied on expert report no. 16/1 (see paragraph s 224 and subsequent), to argue that the possibility that the first explosions could have been caused by external action had been thoroughly examined and dismissed by highly qualified and independent experts. Equally, the allegations that the security services had used indiscriminate weapons, such as grenades, grenade-launchers and flame-throwers, as well as tank cannons, prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004, i.e. when the evacuation of surviving hostages had been completed, was dismissed as one for which there was no fac tual basis (see paragraphs 229- 34 above).

568. The Government reminded that the OH decision to start the storming of the building and the rescue operation was taken after the first explosions of the IEDs had killed dozens of persons in the gymnasium and, moreover, when the terrorists had started to shoot at the fleeing hostages. Thus, the decision had been adopted under tremendous pressure and in a situation where the authorities ’ control was minimal, that is, in the circumstances where the rigorous standard of “absolutely necessary” could be departed from (the Government referred to Finogenov and Others , cited above, § 211). Even if the Court found that the situation at hand did not “lie far beyond the Court ’ s expertise” and that the standard of “absolute necessity” should be applied, the Government repeated that since there were no known victims of the lethal force employed by State agents, the traditional test under Article 2 had been passed.

569. As to the storming itself, it had been performed by the special forces of the FSB – Alpha and Vympel groups – which had counted 329 servicemen. They were assisted by the forces of the 58th army. The servicemen had been equipped with ordinary weapons and special weapons, including grenade-launchers and flame-throwers.

570. The Government referred to copies of dozens of witness ’ statements collected by the investigation between September 2004 and summer 2007 from the military and police servicemen, officers of the “Emercom”, fire-fighters, members of the OH. These statements, consistently and in details, denied the use of grenade-launchers, flame-throwers and tank cannon prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004 (see paragraph 216 above).

(ß ) The applicants ’ position

571. The applicants concerned were of the opinion that the official investigation ’ s conclusions had failed to take into account or explain the testimonies given by the surviving hostages ’ and other witnesses, including police officers, about both the external reasons of the first explosions in the gymnasium and the use of powerful weapons, such as tank cannon and grenade-launchers upon the canteen and adjoining premises during day time. They cited the testimonials made during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, which contained statements to that effect (see paragraphs 293, 294, 298, 300 and 303 above). They concluded that the results of the independent investigations had given grounds to conclude that a significant number of victims had lost their lives through the use by State agents of indiscriminate lethal weapons, such as flame-throwers and tank cannon.

572. Moreover, the failure of the criminal investigation to take the necessary steps in order to establish the cause of death for each of the victims had rendered the accountability of the operation commanders impossible.

573. In respect of the steps taken by the investigation to protect the evidence, the applicants, once again, referred to the fact that the building of the school had been closed only during the day on 4 September 2004, while the investigation and rescue teams had worked at the site. During that day numerous relevant pieces of evidence, such as personal belongings, bullets, cartridges and pieces of explosives, even body parts were loaded onto trucks and taken to a dump site (see paragraphs 112 and 382 above). Since then, the building had suffered numerous alterations which rendered the collection of evidence and reconstruction of the events even more difficult.

(ii) The Court ’ s assessment

574. In view of the parties ’ submissions, the Court considers that these complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that they are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.

D. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention

575. A number of applicants from the “first group of applicants” raised two complaints under Article 3: that the applicants hostages had been subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 for which the State was responsible, and that the positive obligations under this provision had not been complied with in the organisation of the medical and rescue aid to the victims. Article 3 reads as following:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The Government ’ s position

576. As to the first allegation, the Government, in their submissions of September 2013, were of the opinion that the authorities have born no responsibility for the treatment of the hostages at the hands of the terrorists and that, accordingly, this complaint was inadmissible ratione personae .

577. As to the provision of medical aid and rescue, the Government provided a detailed outline of the measures taken by the authorities in order to render adequate and efficient assistance to the victims. The aid and rehabilitation continued in the aftermath of the events. Specialised medical facilities were constructed in Beslan, groups of children and other victims have been taken to resorts and for medical treatment to other regions and abroad, where needed; teams of qualified specialists came from elsewhere in Russia and from foreign countries.

578. As to the adequacy of the fire-fighting measures, the Government again referred to the conclusions of the expert report no. 1 and the decisions by which it was decided not to prosecute the officials, including fire-fighters. In such circumstances, the actions of the fire-fighters could give no rise to any issues under Article 3 of the Convention.

(b) The applicants ’ position

579. In their initial submissions and in the additional observations submitted in October 2013, the applicants concerned reiterated their argument that the State had born responsibility for the suffering of the hostages, notably through the failure of duty to prevent the terrorist act. Additional suffering had been inflicted upon the hostages ’ relatives by the fact of their being witnesses to the deaths and injuries of their close relatives.

580. As to the failure of the fire-fighting service to intervene timely, they referred to the relevant passages of the North Ossetia Parliament ’ s report which had established that after the third explosion, at about 1.30 p.m. on 3 September the fire from the ceiling had started to spread on the floor of the gymnasium (see paragraph 381 above). A number of wounded, shell-shocked and unconscious hostages remained in the gymnasium. The fire-fighters ’ intervention came at 3.25 p.m., after the partial collapse of the roofing at 1.42 p.m. This constituted a breach of the State ’ s positive obligation under Article 3 to intervene and deliver extremely vulnerably persons from the effects of the spreading fire.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

581. The complaint under Article 3, as formulated by the applicants in this group, contains two distinct aspects. Their first argument is that the suffering of the hostages in captivity of the terrorists (and their relatives, by witnessing that suffering) could be attributed to the State as such, in so far as the authorities had failed to alleviate this situation. In this respect, the Court notes that, according to a general rule of international law, “the conduct of private persons is not as such attributable to the State” (International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001. Vol. II, Part 2, p. 38, para. 3). This principle holds also true in respect of the Convention: human rights violations committed by private persons are outside of the Court ’ s competence ratione personae . Independently of the outcome of the complaint which concerns the alleged omissions of the Russian authorities for the prevention of the life-threatening terrorist attack, in the present case the Court finds no grounds to conclude that the authorities should bear the responsibility under the Convention for the acts of the terrorists causing suffering to the hostages. It follows that this aspect of the complaint is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 (see Finogenov and Others , cited above, § 229).

582. In so far as the complaint concerns the second aspect of applicants ’ argument – the provision of rescue, medical care and fire-fighters ’ response, the Court finds that this allegation essentially raises issues under Article 2 of the Convention, and concerns the planning and control of an operation involving lethal force. There is nothing in the applicants ’ submissions to indicate that there are separate aspects of this complaint which raise issues under Article 3 of the Convention.

583. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

E. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention

584. All applicants argued that they had no access to effective remedies against the violations alleged, especially under Article 2 of the Convention. Article 13 provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The Government ’ s position

585. As outlined in their additional submissions received in September 2013, the Government were of the opinion that the rights of the applicants, as victims or relatives of victims in the criminal proceedings, were fully protected by the domestic legislation and practice. In particular, those persons who had expressed a wish to do so, have been granted the status of victims in the criminal proceedings. They thus acquired the procedural rights inherent to such status: to be informed about the developments, to be familiarised with the case-files, to lodge complaints and otherwise participate in the proceedings, as well as to lodge civil claims in order to compensate for the damage caused by the crime. Some of the victims have made use of these rights, while others have waived their rights to do so.

586. The Government also referred to the wide range of measures taken by the State authorities in the aftermath of the crisis independently of the criminal proceedings. They referred to the documents which had detailed the compensations and other measures taken in respect of the hostages and their families, as well as the Beslan community as a whole.

587. In such circumstances, the Government argued that the applicants have had effective domestic remedies as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

(b ) The applicants ’ position

588. The “first group of applicants” argued in their observations received in February 2013 that the payment of financial compensations and other measures of support to the victims had not replaced the obligation arising under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 to carry out a thorough and effective investigation. Relying on the Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia judgment (nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, 24 February 2005), the applicants argued that since the criminal investigation in their case had been ineffective, “ civil action is incapable, without the benefit of the conclusions of a criminal investigation, of making any meaningful findings as to the perpetrators of fatal assaults, and still less to establish their responsibility. Furthermore, a Contracting State ’ s obligation under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible in cases of fatal assault might be rendered illusory if, in respect of complaints under those Articles, an applicant would be required to exhaust an action leading only to an award of damages” (see Khashiyev and Akayeva , cited above, § 122).

589. In their additional observations of October 2013 they further stressed that the domestic proceedings had been ineffective. Their numerous applications to the courts, especially in the course of criminal proceedings as provided for by Article 125 of the Criminal Procedural Code, had not rendered the investigation effective and had not resolved their grievances under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention).

590. Thus, they submitted that only between December 2005 and September 2008 in the criminal investigation no. 20/849 the victims had lodged about 260 motions with the prosecutor ’ s office. Most of their motions had been dismissed by the investigators. The applicants then appealed these rejections to the Promyshlenny and Leninskiy District Courts of Vladikavkaz in nine separate sets of proceedings and then to the North Ossetia Supreme Court. Their appeals had been dismissed by the courts, without seeking to examine the criminal case file (see paragraphs 256- 67).

591. The “second group of applicants” also stressed that the judicial remedies turned out to be ineffective in their situation.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

592. In view of the parties ’ submissions, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

F. Other alleged violations of the Convention

593. Certain applicants presented, in addition, complaints under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention. Having regard to their complaints under Articles 2 and 13 arising out of the same facts considered above, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

594. It follows that the complaints lodged by certain applicants under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court,

Decides unanimously to join the applications;

Decides unanimously to strike four persons out of its list of applicants (see Appendix);

Declares unanimously the applications lodged by fifty-one applicants under Articles 2 and 13 inadmissible (see Appendix);

Declares , by a majority, admissible, without prejudging the merits, the remaining applicants ’ complaints under Article 2 of the Convention concerning both substantive and procedural obligations of the Respondent State, and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2;

Declares unanimously inadmissible the remainder of the applications.

Done in English and notified in writing on 2 July 2015 .

             André Wampach Isabelle Berro Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

Application number / title /

Lodged on

Represented by

Applicant no. /Applicant ’ s name

Date of birth

Place of residence

Grounds of complaints/ Personal details: relation to the applicant; name; year of birth; death or injury sustained

Admissibility under Articles 2 and 13 (see paragraphs 465, 466, 475 and 484)

26562/07

Tagayeva and Others v. Russia

25/06/2007

Mr Kirill Nikolayevich KOROTEYEV,

EHRAC/ Memorial Human Rights Centre

04/02/1962 Beslan

mother of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

03/11/1933

(died on 14/06/11)

legal successor Alan TAGAYEV

Moscow

grandfather of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)

Admissible / Legal successor no. 4

12/07/1927 Beslan

grandmother of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

14/02/1967 Beslan

uncle of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

10/01/1949 Beslan

father of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)

Admissible

07/10/1959 Beslan

hostage (grave injuries); mother of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)

Admissible

19/05/1956 Beslan

brother of hostage Margiyeva Svetlana 1959 (grave injuries) ( 6 ) and uncle of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)

Admissible

07/02/1964 Beslan

father of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased) and hostage Tsirikhova Zalina 1993 ( 10 )

Admissible

02/11/1967 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased) and hostage Tsirikhova Zalina 1993 ( 10 )

Admissible

14/06/1993 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased)

Admissible

26/01/1970 Moscow

uncle of Tsirikhova Yelizavieta 1996 (deceased)

Admissible

26/02/1960 Beslan

husband of Salkazanova Larisa 1961 (deceased), father of Salkazanova Rada 2000 (deceased) and hostage Salkazanov Ruslan (1997) (grave injuries) ( 131 )

Admissible

01/05/1934

(died on 23/04/11)

legal successor Valeriy SALKAZANOV

Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries); grandmother of Salkazanova Rada 2000 (deceased)

Admissible / Legal successor no. 12

father of Normatova Lira 1978 (deceased), grandfather of Bakhromov Amirkhan 2000 (deceased) and Normatova Zarina 1997 (deceased)

Admissible

16/04/1971 Beslan

mother of Dzarasov Aslanbek 1994 (deceased) and hostage Dzarasov Zaurbek 1993 (medium gravity injuries) ( 16 )

Admissible

07/01/1993 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Dzarasov Aslanbek 1994 (deceased)

Admissible

01/09/1963 Beslan

mother of hostage Kesayeva Zarina 1992 (medium gravity injuries) ( 18 )

Inadmissible rationae persone , representative of no. 18

11/07/1992 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries)

Admissible

12/09/1962 Beslan

mother of Khuadonova Regina 1989 (deceased)

Admissible

05/06/1984 Beslan

sister of Khuadonova Regina 1989 (deceased)

Admissible

26/09/1972 Beslan

mother of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased) and hostage Tigiyeva Alana 1993 (grave injuries) ( 23 )

Admissible

15/03/1972

Moscow

father of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased) and hostage Tigiyeva Alana 1993 (grave injuries) ( 23 )

Admissible

23/12/1993 Beslan

hostage (grave injuries), sister of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

07/04/1957 Vladikavkaz

sister of Betrozov Ruslan 1958 (deceased)

Admissible

10/11/1967 Lesken

sister of Betrozov Ruslan 1958 (deceased)

Admissible

23/12/1963 Beslan

father of hostage Torchinova Layma 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (132)

Inadmissible rationae persone , representative of no. 132

12/05/1934 Beslan

mother of Misikov Artur 1974 (deceased), grandmother of hostage Misikov Atsamaz 1996 ( 28 )

Admissible

15/11/1996 Beslan

hostage (medium grave injuries), son of Misikov Artur 1974 (deceased)

Admissible

29/04/1962 Beslan

father of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased) and hostage Daurova Diana 1994 (medium gravity injuries) ( 31 )

Admissible

14/04/1967 Beslan

mother of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased) and hostage Daurova Diana 1994 (medium gravity injuries) ( 31 )

Admissible

24/11/1994 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased)

Admissible

05/07/1965 Beslan

mother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)

Admissible

24/03/1941 Vladikavkaz

grandmother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)

Admissible

03/12/1987 Beslan

brother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)

Admissible

23/09/1950 Vladikavkaz

father of Savkuyeva Inga 1974 (deceased), grandfather of Tomayev Totraz 1997 (deceased)

Admissible

16/07/1962 Beslan

mother of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased) and hostage Ktsoyev Atsamaz 1990 (medium gravity injuries) ( 38 )

Admissible

25/03/1953 Beslan

father of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased) and hostage Ktsoyev Atsamaz 1990 (medium gravity injuries) ( 38 )

Admissible

27/04/1990 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased)

Admissible

27/06/1960 Beslan

mother of hostages Godzhiyev Kazbek 1993 (grave injuries) ( 40 ) and Godzhiyev Amran 1989 (medium gravity injuries) ( 41 )

Inadmissible rationae persone , representative of nos. 40 and 41

08/03/1993 Beslan

hostage (grave injuries)

Admissible

16/09/1989 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries)

Admissible

(died on 25/09/2009)

legal successor Oleg BALIKOYEV (08/01/1975)

Beslan

father of Balikoyeva Larisa 1976 (deceased)

Admissible / Legal successor Oleg Balikoyev (not an applicant)

20/11/1971 Beslan

mother of Bzykova Agunda 1994 (deceased) and hostage Bzykov Alan 1992 ( 44 )

Admissible

21/11/1992 Beslan

hostage, brother of Bzykova Agunda 1994 (deceased)

Admissible

01/06/1942 Beslan

grandmother of Dzhimiyev Oleg 1989 (deceased)

Admissible

01/06/1933

Beslan

grandmother of Tsinoyeva Inga 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

01/01/1933

(died on 04/01/2014)

legal successor Zareta KADOKHOVA

Beslan

grandfather of Tsinoyeva Inga 1990 (deceased)

Admissible / Legal successor no. 46

16/05/1934 Beslan

mother of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased), grandmother of Dyambekov Mayram 1998 (deceased) and Dyambekova Luiza 1995 (deceased)

Admissible

04/12/1961 Nogir

sister of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased)

Admissible

20/06/1973 Beslan

sister of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased)

Admissible

08/09/1949 Beslan

mother of Bazrova Dzerassa 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

20/08/1956 Beslan

father of Gatsalova Agunda 1992 (deceased)

Admissible

15/09/1942 Beslan

grandmother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased) and hostage Oziev Vladimir 1996 (grave injuries) ( 54 )

Admissible

23/11/1996 Beslan

hostage (grave injuries), brother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased)

Admissible

16/05/1961 Beslan

mother of Malikiyev Arsen 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

15/09/1958 Beslan

father of Malikiyev Arsen 1990 (deceased)

Admissible

12/10/1950 Beslan

grandmother of Gutnov Zaurbek 1994 (deceased)

Admissible

10/10/1964 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of Urusov Aleksandr 1996 (deceased) and hostage Urusov Amiran 1993 (medium gravity injuries) ( 59 )

Admissible

15/09/1993 Beslan

hostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Urusov Aleksandr 1996 (deceased)

Strike out from the list upon requests of 14/09/12 and 05/03/2014