FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 36522/15 Tony Eric LE LIEVRE and O thers against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 1 March 2016 as a Chamber composed of:

Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska , President, Ledi Bianku , Paul Mahoney, Aleš Pejchal , Robert Spano , Armen Harutyunyan , Pauliine Koskelo , judges, and André Wampach , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 20 July 2015,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

A. The circumstances of the case

1. Introduction

1. In 2008, the island of Sark, an autonomous part of the Bailiwick of Guernsey in the Channel Islands with a population of some 600 residents, enacted a new electoral system.

2. The applicants are three British nationals, Tony Eric Le Lievre, Peter Tonks and Robert Knight, who were born respectively in 1953, 1948 and 1983. They are residents of Sark and, although they bring this application in their individual capacities, they have formed an unincorporated association called “Sark First”, which seeks reform of the island ’ s new electoral system. Their principal complaint to the Court is that the system does not comply with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the right to free elections.

3. Sark ’ s constitutional position, the history of the reforms which led to the new electoral system, and the conduct of recent elections under that system are summarised at paragraphs 4–18 below. That summary is taken from the facts as submitted by the applicants and from two judgments of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom concerning Sark: R (Barclay) v. Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (“ Barclay (no. 1) ”) and R (Barclay) v. Secretary of State for Justice (“ Barclay (no. 2) ”) (see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraphs 23–32 below).

2. Sark

4 . The Channel Islands consist of the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey. The Bailiwicks are United Kingdom Crown Dependencies. The Bailiwick of Guernsey consists of the island Guernsey itself, the islands of Sark and Alderney, and several smaller islands. Sark and Alderney are autonomous from Guernsey.

5. The United Kingdom is responsible for the Bailiwick of Guernsey ’ s international obligations and has extended the application of the Convention and Protocol No. 1 to it through declarations under Article 56 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 1. That responsibility is exercised primarily through the Privy Council.

6. Sark ’ s constitutional position can be traced back to the Anglo-French wars of 1202-14, when it came under the jurisdiction of the English Crown. Throughout its history Sark has, like the rest of the Channel Islands, retained its own customs, laws, courts and legislature.

7. Sark ’ s present constitutional position derives from letters patent issued by Queen Elizabeth I in 1565 which granted a perpetual lease of island to its first “ Seigneur ”. The lease has passed, either by sale or inheritance, down to the island ’ s current Seigneur , who still plays a role in the government of the island.

3. Legislation in Sark

8 . Guernsey, Alderney and Sark all have their own legislatures and, in general, the three islands legislate for themselves.

9 . Sark ’ s legislature is called the Chief Pleas. The Chief Pleas legislates by two methods, Laws and Ordinances. In respect of Laws, after the Chief Pleas passes a Law, it is remitted as a Projet de Loi to officials in the Ministry of Justice, London. It is then remitted to the Committee for the Affairs of Jersey and Guernsey, a Committee of the Privy Council (“the Committee”). The Committee includes the Secretary of State for Justice, the member of the United Kingdom cabinet responsible for the Ministry of Justice. If the Committee recommends that Royal Assent be granted, the Projet de Loi is presented to the Privy Council for Royal Assent so that it may become law. Royal Assent will then be given through an Order in Council. The Projet de Loi will not be presented to the Privy Council if the Committee decides not to recommend it for Royal Assent (see the Supreme Court ’ s judgment in Barclay (no. 1) at paragraph 17).

10 . In considering whether or not to recommend approval, the Committee will in general respect the decision of the Chief Pleas, and there would tend to be a presumption in favour of recommending Royal Assent. But consideration is given to the Crown ’ s responsibilities, so that if a Projet de Loi violates the Crown ’ s international obligations or any fundamental constitutional principle or if it is clearly not in the public interest for it to become law, then a recommendation may be made to withhold Royal Assent (see the Barclay (no. 1) judgment at paragraph 18).

4. Reform of the membership of the Chief Pleas.

11 . Historically, Sark was divided into 40 plots of land or “tenements”. Anyone who owned one of the tenements (“a tenant”) was entitled to a seat in the Chief Pleas. In 1922 the tenants were joined in the Chief Pleas by twelve elected members.

12 . In March 2006, the Chief Pleas voted for a reform which would have provided for a legislature to consist of 16 tenant s elected by the tenants and 16 deputies elected by the rest of the population. In April the Chief Pleas withdrew its support for the reform, a position supported by the Secretary of State for Justice, who wrote to the Seigneur stating that he “would not have been able to recommend for Royal Assent legislation about which there are serious or substantial ECHR compliance issues” (quoted in Barclay (no. 1) at paragraph 26). He continued:

“[ a] ny option which falls short of a wholly democratic process would cause me serious difficulties. ... I am concerned that Sark should give itself, and the UK, the best protection it can from ECHR challenge and its possible consequences ... [i]t is the UK which is vulnerable to an ECHR challenge. The UK cannot stand by and give that situation its tacit approval by doing nothing.”

13 . In April 2007, the Chief Pleas approved another version of a new law which would still reserve seats in the Chief Pleas for tenants, but with those tenants elected by universal suffrage. The Secretary of State decided not to submit that proposal to the Privy Council over doubts as to whether it complied with the United Kingdom ’ s international obligations ( Barclay (no. 1) at paragraph 27).

14. In 2008, the Chief Pleas then passed a Projet de Loi which proposed removing tenants from the Chief Pleas and replacing them with twenty ‑ eight elected members or “ conseillers ”. The Seigneur was to be an ex officio member of Chief Pleas, with a voice but no vote. The Seigneur did not have the right to veto Laws passed by the Chief Pleas (and this is would not change in the Projet de Loi ). He would, however, retain the right to veto an Ordinance. In that case, the Ordinance would be placed again before the Chief Pleas within twenty-one days for its decision on whether to override the veto. The Projet de Loi also provided that the Seigneur could not sit on executive committees of the Chief Pleas, the main means through which the executive government of the island is conducted.

15. The 2008 Projet de Loi created the following electoral system for the island. All persons who had been resident on the island for 24 months could vote. Conseillers would serve four-year terms, but those terms would be staggered so that, subject to special rules governing by-elections and unforeseen vacancies, only fourteen of the twenty-eight conseillers would be elected at any one general election (save for the first general election at which all twenty-eight seats would be contested).

16. For any election, the island would be a single constituency with all eligible voters able to vote for all candidates. A voter would receive a number of votes equal to the number of vacancies being contested at the election (normally fourteen vacancies unless there were additional vacancies). The fourteen candidates gaining the most votes would be elected.

17 . The Committee of the Privy Council recommended that the Reform Law should receive Royal Assent, concluding that it would not violate any of the United Kingdom ’ s international obligations. Royal Assent was accordingly given on 9 April 2008 and the Projet de Loi entered into force as the Reform (Sark) Law 2008 (“the 2008 Reform Law”).

5. Elections on Sark since the 2008

18 . Once Royal Assent was given to the 2008 Reform Law, Sark ’ s first general election on took place on 10 December 2008. Since then there have been three further general elections and two by-elections. The applicants have provided the following summary of the results for those elections:

Date of election

Number of vacancies

Number of candidates

Electoral roll

Number of people voting

Votes obtained by the last successful candidate

10 December 2008

28

57

476

412

18410 December 2010

14

21

456

362

16714 September 2011

4

6

470

335

17812 December 2012

14

22

444

344

1554 December 2013

4

7

434

280

13710 December 2014

16

16N/A

N/A

N/A [1]

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. The Sark courts

19. Traditionally, sessions of the Chief Pleas were chaired by the island ’ s “Seneschal” who also serves as the island ’ s resident judge. Subsequent reforms have separated the Seneschal ’ s judicial and legislative functions: he now holds purely judicial office, his presiding role in Chief Pleas has been taken by a President of Chief Pleas.

20. Sark ’ s court of first instance is the court of the Seneschal. His court has unlimited jurisdiction in civil matters and shares jurisdiction in criminal matters with the Royal Court of Guernsey. When civil and criminal matters are decided at first instance by the court of the Seneschal, there is a right of appeal to the Royal Court of Guernsey then to the Court of Appeal for Guernsey and, finally, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

21. Sark ’ s laws can, under certain circumstances be challenged in the United Kingdom courts. This arises because, under the law of England and Wales, there is the possibility of bringing a legal challenge to the making of an Order in Council. This is done by way of judicial review in the High Court for England and Wales and, on appeal, to the Court of Appeal and, finally, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Given that Royal Assent to legislation from the Bailiwick of Guernsey is given by an Order in Council (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above), it is, therefore, possible to challenge Guernsey legislation in the High Court through judicial review proceedings. This is, however, a limited jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has made clear should not always be exercised: see Barclay (no. 2) at paragraphs 30–32 below.

2. The Human Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000

22 . The Human Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000, a Law modelled on the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, applies throughout the Bailiwick of Guernsey, including Sark. In summary, like the Human Rights Act, the Law constrains public authorities in the islands from acting contrary to Convention rights and requires the courts of the islands to take account of the case-law of the Convention bodies. It also requires the courts, so far as it is possible to do so, to read and give effect to primary legislation and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. When it is not possible for them to do so, the islands ’ courts, like their counterparts in the United Kingdom, may make a declaration that the legislation is not compatible with the Convention (a declaration of incompatibility).

3. The Supreme Court ’ s judgments in Barclay (no. 1) and Barclay (no. 2)

( a ) Barclay (no. 1)

23 . In Barclay (no. 1) certain aspects of the Reform Law were challenged by way of judicial review in the High Court of England and Wales, including whether the continued presence of the Seigneur and (at that time, the Seneschal) in the Chief Pleas was compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

24. That judicial review challenge ultimately reached the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which gave judgment on 1 December 2009 dismissing the challenge: [2009] UKSC 9.

25. Lord Collins gave the lead judgment for the unanimous court. After reviewing the general principles which emerged from this Court ’ s case law on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (including the need to consider electoral rules in the round and in the light of historical and political factors), Lord Collins observed that there was no breach of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 arising from the Seigneur and Seneschal ’ s continued membership of Chief Pleas. He observed (at paragraph 66 of the judgment):

“The starting point is that only Conseillers are entitled to vote in the Chief Pleas, and therefore it is only Conseillers who determine whether legislation is to be enacted. The electorate of Sark consists of fewer than 500 voters, who choose 28 elected Conseillers by a process of casting 28 votes each and electing the 28 candidates with the largest number of votes. There is therefore one Conseiller for every 17-18 persons in the electorate. It is not easy to envisage, in the words of Article 3, conditions which are more likely to ensure the expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

26. Lord Collins went on to find that there was nothing in the travaux préparatoires of the Convention or the case-law of this Court which established that all members of the legislature should be elected, irrespective of their powers and irrespective of the circumstances. Indeed, to the contrary, the travaux préparatoires indicated that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 had been drafted to recognise that, in some States, part of the legislature was not elected.

27. Instead, the effect of this Court ’ s case-law under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was that all circumstances had to be considered. The presence of the Seigneur (and, at that time, the Seneschal) in the Chief Pleas did not contravene that Article. Even if their membership in the Chief Pleas was to be regarded as a limitation on the people ’ s right to choose the legislature, in light of the constitutional history and the political factors relevant to Sark, that limitation fell well within the margin of appreciation allowed by Article 3, not least given the long history of both positions and the difficulties that had occurred since 1922 in reforming the Chief Pleas (see paragraphs 11–17 above).

28. In respect of the Seigneur , his right to speak but not vote could not reasonably be said to frustrate the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. Nor was that conclusion affected by the Seigneur ’ s other powers and responsibilities on the island. For instance, the present Seigneur had never exercised his right of temporary veto over Ordinances and he had stated that he only envisaged using it in very limited circumstances. The remainder of the Seigneur ’ s other powers, such as the limited power to appointment certain of the island ’ s executive officials, did not affect the democratic process.

29. Finally, Article 14 could not assist the claimants in the case: their complaint under Article 14 was essentially the same as that made under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

( b ) Barclay (no. 2)

30 . In Barclay (no. 2) , the same claimants challenged Reform (Sark) (Amendment) (No. 2) Law 2010, which removed the Seneschal from the Chief Pleas and made new provisions for his or her appointment, removal, renewal and remuneration. They did so by way of judicial review proceedings, commenced in the High Court for England and Wales, alleging that the provisions were incompatible with Article 6 and thus that the decision of the Committee of the Privy Council to recommend that Royal Assent be given to the Law through an Order in Council was unlawful.

31. The High Court rejected the challenges to provisions on appointment, removal and renewal of the Seneschal. It found, however, that the power of the Chief Pleas to reduce the Seneschal ’ s remuneration was incompatible with Article 6.

32 . The latter part of the judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court, which allowed the appeal: [2014] UKSC 54. The Supreme Court found that, although the High Court had jurisdiction to hear such a challenge, it should not have exercised its discretion to hear it. For the courts of England and Wales to entertain challenges to the compatibility of Channel Islands legislation with the Convention would be to subvert the islands ’ own human rights legislation (see, for instance, the Human Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000, set out at paragraph 22 above). The courts of the Bailiwick of Guernsey were infinitely better placed to assess the issues involved in human rights cases and there was the ultimate safeguard of an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Unlike the courts of England and Wales, the Judicial Committee had the inestimable benefit of the considered judgment of the courts of first instance and appeal in the island jurisdictions, and the island authorities would have every opportunity to take part in the case. The courts of the Bailiwick were the appropriate forum in which challenges to island legislation on grounds of incompatibility with the Convention should be heard (Lady Hale at paragraphs 37 and 39 of the Supreme Court ’ s judgment).

COMPLAINTS

33. The applicants make three complaints. Their first and principal complaint is that the electoral system enacted by the Reform Law breaches Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 either alone or ta ken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. Their second complaint is that it is a further breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 that the Seigneur is a member ex officio of Chief Pleas. Their third complaint is that the ability of the Seigneur to appoint the Seneschal and other office holders on the island is a breach of the Article 6 of the Convention.

34. The applicants accept that they have not taken any domestic proceedings in respect of their complaints. They give two reasons for not having done so. First, they consider that the island ’ s judiciary is not independent. Second, the only means of challenging the 2008 Law would be to seek a declaration of incompatibility, which this Court held in Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, §§ 40–44, ECHR 2008 was not a remedy which needed to be exhausted.

THE LAW

35. As a preliminary matter the Court notes that, as indicated above, the applicants accept they have not taken any domestic proceedings in respect of their complaints. However, it is unnecessary to consider whether they have exhausted domestic remedies, for instance, by seeking a declaration of incompatibility either in the courts of the Bailiwick or in courts of the United Kingdom (see Barclay (no. 2) at paragraphs 30–32 above). This is because the Court considers that, in any event, the application must be dismissed for the following reasons.

A. The complaint concerning Sark ’ s electoral system

36. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 provides:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

37. Article 14 of the Convention:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

1. The applicants ’ submissions

38. In respect of this principal complaint, the applicants make the following four submissions.

39. First, they state that the island has no formal political parties as such but candidates tend to coalesce either around a conservative or a reformist viewpoint. The applicants submit that, because the 2008 Reform Law combines a “first-past-the-post” electoral system with a single, island-wide constituency, it produces a system of pure majoritarianism rather than a true democracy. This is because a single grouping or viewpoint which is able to field fourteen candidates at a general election can win all fourteen seats without necessarily winning a majority of the votes cast. An analysis of the electoral data for the elections held so far shows that winning 45% of the vote would be sufficient for one “viewpoint” (in reality the conservative one) to win all fourteen seats at a general election. Moreover, since only half of the seats are ever vacant at a general election, this has created, in effect, a single-party state for those adhering to the island ’ s conservative viewpoint.

40. Second, the applicants consider that their case can be distinguished from the case of Liberal Party, Mrs R. and Mr P. v. the United Kingdom , no. 8765/79, Commission decision of 18 December 1980, DR 21, p. 211, where the Commission considered the United Kingdom ’ s first-past-the-post electoral system to be compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In the United Kingdom, there are 650 separate first-past-the-post contests to fill each of the 650 constituency seats in the House of Commons. Thus, the House of Commons comprises many different political parties. In Sark, there is a single, island-wide constituency.

41. Third, the applicants submit that their case can be distinguished from Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, ECHR 2008. Their case is not about thresholds, but that, at any given election, it is possible for 55% of the electorate to end up without any representation whatsoever.

42. Finally, in respect of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, they submit that the system is discriminatory because it excludes those with minority opinions from having any representation.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

( a ) General principles concerning Article 3 of Protocol No. 1

43. The general principles which guide the Court ’ s examination of complaints relating to electoral systems were re-stated in the Grand Chamber ’ s judgment in Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, §§ 110–112 and 121, ECHR 2008. They provide (internal references omitted):

- The Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to determination of the type of ballot through which the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature is mediated. In that regard, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 goes no further than prescribing “free” elections held at “reasonable intervals” “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”. Subject to that reservation, it does not create any “obligation to introduce a specific system” such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots.

- The rules in this area vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State; the large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of numerous member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. For the purposes of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.

- Moreover, it should not be forgotten that electoral systems seek to fulfil objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and, on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not imply that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes”.

- The Court ’ s task is to determine whether the effect of the rules governing parliamentary elections is to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country and whether the discrepancies created by a particular electoral system can be considered arbitrary or abusive or whether the system tends to favour one political party or candidate by giving them an electoral advantage at the expense of others.

44. The wide margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting States when organising their electoral systems was reaffirmed by the Court inter alia in Saccomanno and Others v. Italy ( dec. ), no. 11583/08, §§ 51 and 71, 13 March 2012 and Filini v. Greece ( dec. ), no. 30244/11, §§ 15 and 20, 6 May 2014.

( b ) The present case

45 . In applying these principles to the present case, the Court begins by observing that Sark ’ s history and constitutional position are unquestionably unique in Europe. Inevitably, this means its needs are very different from other political communities in the Convention system. However, it is not the Court ’ s task to consider whether a different electoral system could be devised which might better suit Sark ’ s needs or which might ensure a broader representation of different viewpoints in the island ’ s legislature, the Chief Pleas. Instead, the Court ’ s task is to consider whether the current electoral system oversteps the wide margin of appreciation which Contracting States enjoy in this field.

46. Certainly, there are four features of the Sark electoral system, which, in their cumulative effect, distinguish it from previous electoral systems that the Court has considered. First, the system creates a single constituency for the whole island. Second, it then applies a variant of the first-past-the-post system: within that single constituency, the fourteen candidates with the highest numbers of votes are elected. Third, as the applicants observe, it is not one in which there are any formal electoral thresholds: at a general election, the fourteen candidates with the highest numbers of votes are elected without further ado. Fourth, it is the first democratic electoral system ever to be enacted in Sark. However, when all four of these features of the Sark electoral system are considered in the round, it is clear that the system complies with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

47. The applicants have focused on the first two features of this system and submit that it creates an injustice because it enjoys neither the advantages of the Westminster system of 650 separate constituencies (each returning one Member of Parliament) nor the advantages of a system of proportional representation. However, the reality is that, on an island where there are no formal political parties and an electorate of just under 500, designing a workable system of proportional system would prove difficult. The same may be said for attempting to divide such a small island into different constituencies when there are no obvious geographic or demographic lines along which it could be divided. Those considerations provide ample justification for the decision to reject a system of proportional representation and to conduct general elections on the basis of a single, island-wide constituency.

48. In respect of the third feature of the system – the absence of any electoral threshold and the automatic election of the fourteen candidates with the highest number of votes – it may be the case that the system makes it easier for one viewpoint to win all of the contested seats, provided also that it can field candidates to fill all of the contested seats and command widespread support across the island. But that would be the case whether there was an electoral threshold or not, and the possibility of one viewpoint winning all of the contested seats is surely tempered by the fact that voters are not obliged to cast all of their votes for a single viewpoint: they vote by secret ballot for individual candidates and are free to distribute their votes as they see fit. They therefore have ample opportunity to choose the individual candidates who best reflect their views rather than cast their votes entirely for candidates representing one viewpoint or the other. That freedom goes some way to ensuring that the system itself does not favour one viewpoint or another and does not give any one viewpoint an electoral advantage at the expense of others. It may also be the case that, as the applicants have submitted, staggering the terms of conseillers so that only half the Chief Pleas are elected at a general election makes it easier for one viewpoint to retain a majority in the Chief Pleas. However, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 contains no rule which specifies that all members of a legislature must be elected at the same general election.

49. A further consideration is that, as Lord Collins observed in Barclay (no. 1) , an electorate fewer than 500 voters choose twenty-eight conseillers , giving one conseiller for every 17-18 persons in the electorate. Admittedly, the full force of his observation applied only to Sark ’ s first general election when, exceptionally, all twenty-eight seats in the Chief Pleas were contested, but this remains a powerful consideration indeed: even taking the lower figure of 14 contested seats (the number of seats contested at subsequent general elections) one con seiller is elected for every 35 ‑ 36 persons in the electorate. As Lord Collins was moved to remark, it is not easy to envisage conditions which are more likely to ensure the expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. That conclusion is surely fortified by the election results which have taken place since the Supreme Court ’ s judgment in Barclay (no. 1 ) (see the data set out at paragraph 18 above). With the exception of 2014 when no election was necessary, Sark ’ s elections have been marked by high voter turnout. The result is that the island ’ s legislators enjoy a high level of public support and its legislature, by extension, commands the public ’ s confidence.

50. Of even greater importance is the fourth feature of the Sark electoral system: that it finally abolished the last vestiges of feudalism on the island and sought to bring, for a first time, genuine political democracy to the island. It is beyond question that the electoral system now in use is an improvement on the previous system where the most of the seats in the Chief Pleas were reserved for landowners. The process of reform which ultimately led to the 2008 Reform Law was long and difficult. It required the agreement of the Chief Pleas, composed as it then was of the tenement owners and only twelve elected members. Reform of the Chief Pleas was the subject of a number of exchanges between the island ’ s authorities and the authorities in London. Two previous attempts at reform were not enacted: the 2006 reform was not enacted because the Chief Pleas withdrew its support; the 2007 reform because the Secretary of State for Justice declined to submit it to the Privy Council precisely because of concerns that it did not comply with the United Kingdom ’ s international obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No 1 (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). The 2008 Reform Law only received Royal Assent because the Committee of the Privy Council was now satisfied that the Chief Pleas had devised a system which complied with those international obligations (see paragraph 17 above). It is clear, therefore, that close consideration has been given to ensuring that Sark reformed its legislature in a manner which both respected its own political process and the United Kingdom ’ s obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Grand Chamber recalled in Yumak and Sadak , cited above, § 111, that any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another (see also Py v. France , no. 66289/01, § 46, ECHR 2005, cited in Yumak and Sadak ). That consideration must apply with even greater force when part of a Contracting State attempts to introduce a fairer system of representation and does so while specifically taking care to ensure that it does so in a manner compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

51 . For these reasons, the Court concludes that the United Kingdom, responsible as it is for Sark ’ s new electoral system, has not overstepped the wide margin of appreciation it enjoys in this field. Accordingly, the applicants ’ complaint concerning the fairness of that electoral system is manifestly ill-founded and falls to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

52. The Court now turns to the applicants ’ alternative complaint that the Sark electoral system is contrary Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 because it discriminates against those holding minority viewpoints.

53. The Court reiterates that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations ( Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, § 81, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, § 42, ECHR 2009; and Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina , no. 3681/06, § 26, 15 July 2014). There will be a difference in treatment if it can be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 125, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).

54. In the present case, the applicants have not provided any precise definition of what constitutes a “minority viewpoint” in Sark. In any case, the Court finds that any difference in treatment has a reasonable and objective justification. That justification is found in the factors, set out at paragraphs 45–51 above, which have led the Court to conclude that the electoral system is compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone. Accordingly, this complaint is similarly manifestly ill-founded and must also to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B. The complaint concerning the Seigneur ’ s membership of the Chief Pleas

55. The applicants have also complained that the Seigneur ’ s continued membership of Chief Pleas is a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

56. The Supreme Court fully considered this issue in Barclay (no. 1) . It reviewed the travaux préparatoires and the relevant case-law of this Court. It considered Sark ’ s constitutional history and the political factors affecting the island. It considered the Seigneur ’ s role in the Chief Pleas and weighed that role against the other powers he has on the island. Having done so, it concluded that his membership of the Chief Pl eas was compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

57. It is apparent, therefore, that the Supreme Court has given the greatest possible scrutiny to this grievance on the basis of the Convention and its case-law. As the Court has frequently observed, when that is the case, serious reasons would be required for the Court to depart from its findings (see, mutatis mutandis , Friend and Others v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), § 58, nos. 16072/06 and 27809/08, 24 November 2009). From the applicant ’ s submissions, the Court can discern no such reasons; accordingly, this complaint must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

C. The complaint concerning the Seigneur ’ s powers of appointment

58. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants complain that the Seigneur ’ s ability to appoint certain of the island ’ s officials is incompatible with the rule of law.

59. Article 6 of the Convention, where relevant, provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

60. The rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, among many authorities, AliÅ¡ić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642/08, § 103, ECHR 2014). However, in order to be able to lodge a petition by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, a person, non ‑ governmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be a victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. To claim to be a victim of such a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure: the Convention does not, therefore, envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for the interpretation of the rights set out therein or permit individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention (see Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04 , § 50, ECHR 2012 with further references therein).

61. The applicants in the present case have not shown that they were parties to any litigation – civil or criminal – in Sark which was unfair because of the involvement of officials appointed by the Seigneur . They cannot therefore claim to be victims of a violation of Article 6. This complaint is therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 24 March 2016 .

André Wampach Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska              Deputy Registrar President

[1] . T here being an equal number of candidates and vacancies, no election was required: all tho se standing were deemed elected.