FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 37326/13 UNIFA U N THEATRE PRODUCTIONS LIMITED and others against Malta

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 29 March 2016 as a Chamber composed of:

András Sajó, President, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Nona Tsotsoria, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Egidijus Kūris, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, judges, and Marialena Tsirli , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 28 May 2013 ,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.

They are represented by Prof. I. Refalo and Dr M. Zammit Maempel, lawyers practising in Valletta.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

1. Background to the case

Unifa u n Theatre Productions Limited is a limited liability company which produces theatrical pe rformances in Maltese theatres. The second and third applicants are the two directors of the company. The fourth applicant is the artistic director of the theatrical production known as “Stitching”, a play written by the Scottish playwright Anthony Nielsen, originally published in 2002 in the United Kingdom by the publishing house Metheun Drama. The fifth as well as the third applicants are two actors engaged to perform in the mentioned production (as Stu and Abby, the main characters).

In October 2008, the applicant company, via the first applicant, decided to produce the play Stitching, in Malta and proceeded to obtain the necessary performance licence from the author and his agent. The relevant authorisation was granted to the applicant company by the author and agent of the production following the payment of a fee.

On 23 December 2008 the applicant company lodged an application with the Board for Film and Stage Classification (“the Board”), in order for a rating certificate to be issued in terms of the Stage Regulations (see relevant domestic law). The relevant fee was paid and the clean copy of the script submitted.

At the same time, the applicant company entered into a reservation agreement with a theatre for eight dates between 13 February and 1 March 2009 and hired the third, fourth and fifth applicants in connection with the services for such play.

On 20 January 2009 the Board issued a certificate stating that the play had been examined by its chairperson and that it was decided that it was “Banned – Banned and disallowed”. No reasons were provided for the decision.

On 23 January 2009 the applicant company, via the second applicant, sent an email, followed by a telephone call, to the chairperson of the Board enquiring about the decision. No reasons were provided by the chairperson.

On 25 January 2009 the applicant company, via its legal counsel, sent a letter to the chairperson requesting a reconsideration of the decision in terms of Article 47 (1) of the Stage Regulations.

By means of a letter of 29 January 2009 the Board informed the applicant company, via the latter ’ s legal counsel, that the original decision was reconfirmed. The letter contained no reasons and did not list the names of the persons who had been involved in the review.

On 31 January 2009 another letter was sent to the applicant company by the chairperson. It enclosed a document dated 30 January 2009 addressed “to whom it may concern”, which had been deposited with the Commissioner of Police, containing the reasons why the production was banned, namely:

“1. Blasphemy against the State Religion – pages 10 and 17

2. Obscene contempt for the victims of Auschwitz – page 29

3. An encyclopaedic review of dangerous sexual perversions leading to sexual servitude – pages 33, 34 and several others

4. Abby ’ s eulogy to the child murderers Fred and Rosemary West – page 35

5. Reference to the abduction, sexual assault and murder of children – page 36

In conclusion, the play is a sinister tapestry of violence and perversion where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. The Board feels that in this case the envelope has been pushed beyond the limits of public decency.”

On 2 February 2009 the applicants filed a judicial protest against the chairperson, in her personal capacity and as Chairperson of the Board, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General claiming that the actions of the board were illegal in so far as they constituted a violation of Article 39 of the Maltese Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. They considered the defendants responsible for any damage suffered.

By 14 February 2009 (the day following what had to be the first performance date), no reply was received to the mentioned judicial protest. In consequence, the applicants called a press conference explaining the situation, noting that they were adhering to the law but that they were determined to perform the play at some stage.

In the evening of the same day, the applicants and their legal counsel were summoned for questioning at the Police Headquarters. The applicants were sternly warned by a police inspector that they would face immediate arrest if they attempted to stage the play.

Rehearsals for the production carried on unabated. According to the applicants around two hundred persons watched the rehearsals and none of them found the play objectionable.

The Board ’ s decision was not revoked, and an invitation to the Chairperson to attend a rehearsal (as was sometimes the case with members of the Board) remained unanswered.

2. Constitutional redress proceedings

On 3 March 2009 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that they had suffered a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. They also claimed damage and redress. Complaining under Article 6 they claimed that they did not have a fair hearing before the Board for Film and Stage Classification in so far as they had no hearing and no possibility to make submissions, nor were any reasons for the decision ever communicated to them.

By a decree of 20 October 2009 the court rejected a request for the production to be shown behind closed doors to the court and the defendants.

During these proceedings the court heard several witnesses which it classified as (i) those who acted in the play and had thus read the script and performed it in rehearsals, (ii) persons who watched the rehearsals but did not read the script and (iii) the defendants who read the script but did not watch the rehearsal.

The court heard the applicants, four witnesses (who had watched the rehearsals) produced by the applicants, namely, PM a consultant psychiatrist, JS an educator, child psychologist and actress, KD a tourism marketing executive and actor, a priest who was a former film classifier for the Archdiocese of Malta, as well as the author of the play. The latter testified that the play had been performed uninterruptedly in all parts of the world and extensively in Europe, during which time it had collected a number of awards.

The author described the play as follows:

“A couple called Stewart and Abby, a very normal couple but however a couple who find themselves in relationship difficulties, there have been betrayals, they ’ re wondering whether to continue with their relationship. Abby discovers that she is pregnant by Stewart and so a large part of the play is concerned with them discussing whether or not to have the child. Ultimately they decide to have the child but they decide to do so in order to save their relationship, one might say for somewhat impure motives, they feel that having this child will keep them together. However their relationship continues to disintegrate and at one point during a fight they are having between themselves when their attention is diverted elsewhere, the child is involved in an accident and then dies. Obviously this is a huge trauma for them and they are driven apart. They come back together again sometime later, maybe a year later and meet and for them their relationship is not quite finished and they come back together in their grief because they are the only other people who understand the depths of their grief. When they come together they can only do so in a perverted fashion, where Abby actually poses as a prostitute. She wants to make their sexual relationship a matter of commerce in order to distance herself from the emotions.

What then ensues is a very violent and dark relationship, a kind of a punishment of themselves, confessions of their guilt. Eventually Abby is tipped into clinical mental illness and performs an act of self-mutilation which she believes will restore her to a virginal state, and that is what finally blows apart their relationship. In a final coda Stewart meets Abby sometime later when she has obviously received treatment for her mental illness and has in fact converted to Christianity and both of them decide to go their separate ways.”

He further testified as follows:

“(Concerning pornographic references) I would not for instance have used real pornographic pictures. I felt that that would be needlessly offensive for people however another director might chose to do so. ...

(Concerning women in Auschwitz walking towards death) it should not be an unfamiliar concept that in their grief that couple confess to thoughts, to feelings that they feel guilty about. The play to some extent is about life and about death. When he talks about masturbating and using as his material pictures of women from Auschwitz, this is something that occurs when he is a small child, this occurs when he is a very young child. He says that it is the first time that he masturbated which would imply that it is reasonably early. At that time of life a young man is completely concerned with procreation, with the creation of life and he understands nothing of death, of mortality. So in fact that is what actually that phrase is about, the fact that he is confessing, he is saying I knew nothing about death, I did not look at the atrocity of life, I saw only the nudity. So it ’ s actually nothing to do with Auschwitz, it ’ s to do with sexual urges and it ’ s to do with him, you know small children don ’ t understand Auschwitz.

(In reply to a court ’ s question concerning the swearing/blasphemy ( daag ħ a )) well that ’ s not a concept that ever crossed my mind. I ’ m not a religious person.

(Domestic court ’ s question - Does the script allow the director to put aside certain references to things that could be described by people as hard? Will the text lose by the director leaving it out? ) I dare say that a director could remove one or two swear words but that would all have to be taken on the case by case basis, but largely speaking I would say they would suffer yes because there is a reason why every line is in every one of my plays. There ’ s a reason for it and I ’ m happy to stand here and justify them all day.

(Domestic court ’ s question - As far as Stitching is concerned an omission by the director could affect the whole performance?) Yes absolutely.”

PM a consultant psychiatrist stated that in his opinion the play was a love story which unfortunately turned very badly. He explained that following the death of their son through their own negligence, the main characters had a relationship based on various fantasies, until the female character became mentally ill. It was a sad story, with however a redeeming feature, in that the two finally manage to get back a balance in their life. He testified that there was nothing pornographic in the story and the bad language was in the context of the emotions being felt by the couple.

JS, a child psychologist, stated that in her opinion the play concerned a tragedy of a couple going through a crisis, which reached its peak when their son had died in an accident. She explained that the couple tried to connect in ways which were not necessarily conventional. She considered that it was a sensitive play that called for a mature audience. In reply to a court ’ s question concerning a specific part of the text, JS replied that she was not shocked because she could not dissociate her female gender from her being a psychologist.

The priest (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) considered that he would have classified it for wise adults ( bil-ghaqal ). He explained that when a person was suffering she or he “may lose it” and enter into areas which decent people may object to. However, in his view that was the human reality. When one was ready to study illnesses and the suffering of people who were going through pain one must be democratic and tolerant and give society the chance to understand those not living normally.

KD (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) testified that most of the dialogue was between two people who had certain hang-ups and inter personal problems, and who in a quest to get closer, nearly started a competition between them as to who was the more outrageous. Nevertheless, in his view, at some point one could tell that they were flirting with each other despite them being outrageous.

The third applicant who was performing as Abby stated that she did not find the play offensive in any way, noting that the emotions were very real and that she felt that it was a love story. She also testified that no pornography was used as props.

The applicants also submitted that the script could be purchased and read by any person in Malta, without hindrance.

The defendants also produced the witness testimony of the members of the Board and other individuals, as explained below.

Another priest (who read the script but did not see the play) felt that the script was offensive in various parts and dehumanising. He was annoyed by the blasphemous words and the reference to the Moors murderer, and very annoyed at the reference to the Holocaust. Further, he considered that the woman was being put forward as an object, and while it was possible that it was her choice, he thought she was totally subordinate to the man.

TM (a member of the Board who only read the script) had no doubt that it would have been better had they watched the theatrical production. He however, explained that there were instances, such as the one in the present case, where the script was so objectionable, that he did not feel the need to watch it, since the two elements which he objected to (the words concerning Auschwitz and the passage about Fred and Rose Mary West) would always remain objectionable, no matter the way in which they were presented, be it a tragedy or a comedy. They would nonetheless remain offensive to certain sectors of Maltese society or indeed society anywhere. While shock was a legitimate theatrical weapon and may be used repeatedly, one could not offend other people ’ s sensibilities. Both in the case of the holocaust and that of child murders, humanity was at stake, and the relevant passages offended the sense of decency one individual should have towards another.

DM (a psychologist and member of the Board) found the script barely credible in so far as it was unlikely that a person would go through so many situations one after the other. While perversions did exist, this couple was being put forward as a normal couple. In his view a normal couple, a couple who went through a normal life experience such as the death of a child, would not react like the characters in the play, who for example, re-enacted a killing which had greatly marked England. Further the scene concerning Auschwitz desecrates the memory of the persons who suffered.

A retired Chief Justice and professor of law (who only read the script) examined the play from the point of view of public morals. He considered that certain parts of the play were disgusting, such as that describing Auschwitz, and the blasphemous words. He explained that the word “fuck” combined with the word “God” was unacceptable because it offended public morals, not only that of Catholics, but that of half the world. Thus, in his view those parts had to be deleted from the play. The parts concerning sex and sexual perversions, such as the part where the male figure wanted to pay the female figure to allow him to do certain things, gave him goose flesh ( tqabbdekk l-ibrezz ), but he considered that certain people could accept that.

JC, the member of the board who confirmed on appeal that the play should be banned considered that, apart from other concerns mentioned by other members of the board, it was not justifiable for a couple to do certain things in public just because they were going through a bad patch. It was not acceptable that a woman had to give her vagina to a man to show him she loved him. In his view, if one were to make the appropriate deletions to the script, there would be nearly nothing left, and he could not find anything positive about it.

The Chairperson of the Board testified that there were entire scenes which she considered went against morality and were an affront and atrocious attack on human rights and the dignity of the individual. She was shocked and very annoyed by what she considered to be unadulterated pornography were the woman was becoming the man ’ s absolute slave. She considered that the play in its entirety, and not one scene here and there, was objectionable and offensive. The fact that the play ended with the couple possibly deciding to have a baby, did not suffice to hold that the play had a positive message, given the preceding eighty (sic.) pages.

(a) First-instance judgment

In an eighty-two-page judgment of 28 June 2010, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicants ’ claims.

The c ourt considered that the second applicant had no further interest than that of the director of the company, thus it sufficed that the company was an applicant, and he, thus, had no victim status in his own capacity. Nevertheless, the artistic directors as well as the actors were victims of the alleged violation, as persons who were giving life to a script by means of their artistic representation - a theatrical performance which was a form of expression for the purposes of Article 10.

It rejected the Government ’ s objection as to non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies since the applicants ’ complaints concerned mainly issues of a constitutional and conventional nature, and thus were best dealt with by the courts of constitutional jurisdiction. For the purposes of the present case, the applicants were complaining of a human rights violation, thus an action for judicial review could not be an effective remedy in so far as it could not award the relevant damage, and could not order that the performance go ahead irrespective of the ban.

As to the merits, the court made extensive reference to the Court ’ s case-law, in particular Handyside v. the United Kingdom (7 December 1976, Series A no. 24), Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, Series A no. 295 ‑ A) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ V) as well as prominent authors in the field of human rights. It considered that the decision of the Board to ban the play had been correct and in accordance with the law and established guidelines. The court, having read the entire script, could not tie the plot which the author wanted to transmit with the means employed to do so. Indeed the author did not need to make use of such perversions in order to show the troubled reality of the characters.

It considered that the Board was correct to conclude that the play in its entirety was offensive to Maltese society. Indeed the specific scenes referred to, as well as other parts of the play, were an affront to the dignity of the individual, which was an integral part of the civil and moral fabric ( tessut ) of the country. Even in a pluralistic and democratic society, such as the Maltese one, human dignity could not be trampled on, even if the aim was “presumably” a genuine one. As problematic as the relationship of the couple may have been, one could not make extensive use of vulgar, obscene and blasphemous language to highlight perversions, vilify ( ikasbar ) the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as vilifying the respect towards a woman ’ s dignity. It was not acceptable to publicise uncivil behaviour, which broke the law, debased the suffering of women during the holocaust, portrayed women as the object of sexual satisfaction, as well as ridiculed family life and the responsibilities parents have towards their children. A democratic society, while being tolerant, could not permit its values to be turned on their head in the name of freedom of expression. In the court ’ s view, the stitching of a vagina as an act of sexual pleasure, bestiality, the depravity arising from the thought of a woman eating another woman ’ s excrement, the pleasure obtained in raping children, the murder of children and sexual intercourse with parents of violated and murdered children, were unacceptable even in a democratic society. The court noted that under Maltese law, blasphemy was a contravention, and a person could not be immune from punishment simply because he or she was acting on stage. “The Shoa,” the court went on, “was a historical fact where innocent victims underwent unprecedented suffering. Instead of treating this sensitive and delicate subject ... with due respect to the dignity of the victims, the character Stu shows only sexual depravity ... the author permits the demeaning and humiliation of that tragedy totally out of context and for no other reason than for perversions. No matter how the text of the play is looked at, it runs aground on the reef of the inalienable dignity of the human person, and the court understands that this was the underlying reason for the Board ’ s decision.”

The court rejected their complaint under Article 6 on the basis that the proper procedure had been undertaken, the applicants had been free to put forward their views in their request for reconsideration, which was carried out by a further person and no bias had been shown.

(b) Appeal judgment

By a judgment of 29 November 2012, the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment and ordered the applicants to pay all costs.

The Constitutional Court noted that the first-court had chosen to exercise its jurisdiction and rejected the defendants ’ objection of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies, which in the absence of an appeal on the matter had become final. Nevertheless, it noted that the applicants had not instituted judicial review proceedings of the administrative action (the Board ’ s decision); thus they were not complaining that the Board ’ s decision was based on improper motives or irrelevant considerations. Moreover the ordinary court, in judicial review proceedings, could have also examined the reasonableness of the decision, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Thus, the applicants could no longer complain about the Board ’ s decision ut sic , and people ’ s opinions on the play were irrelevant given that the applicants considered the decision to be reasonable.

As to the constitutional and conventional complaint raised by the applicants, the Constitutional Court held that the existence of the Board did not breach any of the applicants ’ rights, and indeed the applicants had not impugned the law establishing the Board. It further considered that freedom of expression had limits and that it was accompanied by duties and responsibilities. Both the Convention and the Constitution provided for inter alia the protection of morals and the reputation and rights of others, and the Maltese Constitution also included public decency.

The Constitutional Court, having read the script, shared the first-instance court ’ s view about various scenes of the play. It considered that such scenes all throughout the play affected the morality and decency of the entire production, and it was within the Board ’ s competence to assess that in line with the relevant guidelines. The Constitutional Court had no doubt that there were phrases which constituted disparaging and insolent remarks towards more than one belief, towards women and towards the suffering of the Jews in the Second World War.

Referring to the Court ’ s case-law it recalled that those who chose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, “must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines.” ( Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria § 47).

In its view the limits of decency had been breached, due to the blasphemy which was an offence under Maltese law, and to the vilification of the dignity of a people, of a woman, of children, and of the human being, as well as the extreme glorification of sexual perversion. These instances were so strong that they affected the play in its entirety and prevailed over any genuine aim presumably intended by the play. The court emphasized that the production despised the dignity of the individual, in particular sectors, such as women and children, whether because of their nationality or religion, and opined that even though the main characters were acting in this way because of tension, pressure and depression, such contempt could not be justified as art. In the court ’ s view while art was a wide concept covering any type of manifestation of expression, it could not include language which was obscene and despised the trauma of a genocide, and which, in itself, was against the laws of the country. For a strong moral message to be portrayed it was possible to discomfort and annoy other persons, but not to the extent of insulting them because of their beliefs, their people, or simply because they were a woman or a child.

Recalling that it was the duty of the State to protect the morality of the country, the Constitutional Court considered that the Board had fulfilled its duty. What was morally correct depended on the State and the relevant religion, and could not be determined universally. Thus, the fact that the production was performed elsewhere did not mean that it had to also be produced in Malta, particularly in the light of the laws in force in each country. This was precisely why states had latitude in applying certain restrictions on freedom of expression.

It further noted that under the laws in force the Board could ban the play, as opposed to classifying it to a mature audience. In any event it considered that adults, who could chose to watch the play in such a case, would also be deserving of protection, and thus limitations could also be necessary in such cases. It highlighted the states ’ duty to preserve the sensitivities of the silent citizen (as opposed to the vociferous ones, who inundated media forums) and considered that no remedy after the performance could heal any harm already done to society. Thus in the Constitutional Court ’ s view the Board ’ s decision was correct, was not capricious or exaggerated, and it corresponded to the need to protect public morality in Maltese society and the rights of others.

The Constitutional Court concluded that it was not necessary to watch the play as the script was enough. In the absence of an Article 14 complaint, it was also unnecessary to compare the performance to other performances which had been allowed by the Board. The applicants having refused to make any changes to the text, despite its invitation to do so, the Constitutional Court confirmed that it would remain banned and that there was no breach of Article 10.

In connection with their Article 6 complaint, t he Constitutional Court held that the applicants did not institute judicial review proceedings and in any event there had been no breach of their rights. Furthermore, in their view there had been no determination of any civil right.

B. Relevant domestic law

The Cinema and Stage Regulations (Subsidiary Legislation 10.17) obtaining at the relevant time provided as follows:

Regulation 45 provided that after the application of their discretion in connection with the needs of morality, decency and good behaviour as well as the public interest as to whether an application (for the screening of a film) should be allowed or amended in part, the examining classifiers may classify in one of six categories, namely U, PG, 12, 14, 16, or 18. A report to this effect was to be sent to the Commissioner of Police.

According to Regulation 47 when an applicant feels aggrieved by the decision (including a decision that the film cannot be shown under any of the established categories), he or she may, within ten days, apply in writing to the Chairperson for a revision of that decision. Such revision has to be conducted by at least three classifiers, and their decision was, at the time, final (save for the possibility of reapplying one year later). If the chairperson had not taken part in the first decision, the revision should be made by the chairperson and two other persons chosen by him or her. If the chairperson had taken part in the first decision, then the revision must take place by not less than three persons appointed by the Chairperson, and who did not take part in the original examination.

Regulation 64(1) provides that plays and other stage productions are subject to the classification as provided in the same regulations.

Regulation 64(2) provides that any person who performs a play or other stage production in public, whether against payment or free of charge, without having obtained a classification certificate, is guilty of an offence under the Cinema and Stage Regulations.

According to the Guidelines for Film Classification (referred to in Regulation 42 (2), and drawn up by the Board itself, on the basis of criteria suggested in the same regulation) a film may be banned ( miżmum ) if, in the opinion of the classifiers, it is contrary to the law concerning morality, decency and good behaviour in public.

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complain under Article 10 of the Convention about the complete ban on the production of the play “S titching”. They further complain under Article 6 that they did not have a fair hearing before the Board for Film and Stage Classification. Lastly, they complain that they had not had an effective remedy given the outcome of the constitutional redress proceedings.

THE LAW

A. Article 10

The applicants complain under Article 10 of the Convention about the complete ban on the production of the play “S titching”, which they considered was not in accordance with the law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The provision reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

B. Article 6

The applicants complain under Article 6 that they did not have a fair hearing before the Board for Film and Stage Classification in so far as they had no hearing and no possibility to make submissions, nor were any reasons for the decision ever communicated to them. The provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

The Court notes that there is no doubt that freedom of expression is a civil right (see Kenedi v. Hungary , no. 31475/05, § 33, 26 May 2009). Nevertheless, the procedure leading to the decision of the Board in the present case was only a preliminary administrative action, by a body not considered a tribunal. Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention it is sufficient that decisions of administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of that Article should be subject to subsequent control by a judicial body (see, inter alia , Lay Lay Company Limited v. Malta , no. 30633/11, § 55, 23 July 2013 ).

In the present case, the decision could have been challenged before the ordinary courts in an action of judicial review which includes the relevant Article 6 guarantees which the applicants found to be lacking before the Board. However, they failed to undertake it. Furthermore, other aspects of their complaint were brought before the constitutional jurisdictions, which the applicants did not claim lacked any Article 6 guarantees.

It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

C. Article 13

The applicants complain that given that the Constitutional Court rejected their complaints they had been deprived of an effective remedy.

T he Court reiterates that the effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 98, ECHR 2006 ‑ VII), and the mere fact that an applicant ’ s claim fails is not in itself sufficient to render the remedy ineffective ( Amann v. Switzerland , [GC], no. 27798/95, §§ 88-89, ECHR 2002-II).

Assuming that the applicants have an arguable claim under Article 10 of the Convention, and therefore that Article 13 is applicable in the instant case, there is no doubt that had the Constitutional Court found in favour of the applicants it would have given the relevant redress (see, mutatis mutandis , Deguara Caruana Gatto and Others v. Malta , no. 14796/11, § 82, 9 July 2013 and Lay Lay Company Limited v. Malta , no. 30633/11, § 100, 23 July 2013) . The mere fact that the applicants ’ claim failed, cannot raise an issue under Article 13.

It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicants ’ complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 21 April 2016 .

Marialena Tsirli András Sajó Registrar President

Appendix