SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 51506/13 Suzana OREL and others against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 June 2016 as a Chamber composed of:

Işıl Karakaş, President, Julia Laffranque, Paul Lemmens, Valeriu Griţco, Ksenija Turković, Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, Georges Ravarani, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 August 2013,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicants, Ms Suzana Orel (“the first applicant”), Mr Mislav Orel (“the second applicant”) and Mr Silvio Orel (“the third applicant”) are Croatian nationals who were born in 1966, 1995 and 1997 respectively and live in Zagreb. They were represented before the Court, first by Ms L. Kušan, an advocate practising in Ivanić-Grad, and subsequently by Ms N. Owens from the law firm Owens and Houška, an advocate practising in Zagreb .

2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. The first applicant married a certain Mr H.A. in 1993. The second and third applicants were born of the marriage. H.A. and the applicants lived in the first applicant ’ s flat in Zagreb until 2002.

5. On 3 November 2002 H.A. went to work and never returned home. After a couple of days, the first applicant found out that he had moved to the United States of America.

1. Divorce proceedings

6. By a judgment of 28 January 2003 the Zagreb Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Zagrebu ) granted the divorce of the first applicant from H.A., who was ordered to pay 400 United States dollars (USD) of child support a month for the maintenance of the second and third applicants (hereafter “the child support” or “the maintenance”). The judgment became final and enforceable on 17 February 2003.

7. In the period between January 2003 and 31 May 2006 H.A. paid the child support irregularly. In that period, he paid a total of USD 7,600. He stopped paying the maintenance in June 2006. He does not own any property in Croatia.

2. Criminal proceedings against H.A.

(a) The first set of criminal proceedings

8. On 14 October 2004 the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint against H.A. with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney ’ s Office ( Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu ), accusing him of non-compliance with maintenance obligations ( povreda dužnosti uzdržavanja ), a criminal offence defined in Article 209 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below).

9. On 3 June 2005 the State Attorney ’ s Office indicted H.A., thereby instituting criminal proceedings against him before the Zagreb Municipal Court.

10. On 21 October 2005 the State Attorney ’ s Office dropped the charges, whereupon, three days later, the Zagreb Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings.

(b) The second set of criminal proceedings

11. On 30 April 2008 the first applicant lodged another criminal complaint against H.A. with the same State Attorney ’ s Office, on the same grounds as before.

12. On 28 August 2008 the State Attorney ’ s Office indicted H.A., thereby instituting criminal proceedings against him before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court ( Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu ). The court conducted a trial in absentia .

13. By a judgment of 27 September 2010 the court found H.A. guilty as charged. It imposed a suspended sentence of seventeen months ’ imprisonment with a four-year probation period, with the additional condition of regular payment of future child support instalments as they became due, and payment of USD 25,400 of maintenance arrears to the applicants.

14. Upon an appeal by the State Attorney, on 28 September 2011 the Zagreb County Court ( Županijski sud u Zagrebu ) amended the sentence by setting a two-year time-limit for the payment of maintenance arrears.

(c) Proceedings for revocation of a suspended sentence

15. On 4 October 2011 the first applicant informed the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court that H.A. had not been paying the child support instalments as they were becoming due, nor had he paid the arrears.

16. For those reasons, on 6 February 2012 she applied for revocation of the suspension of the sentence ( prijedlog za opoziv uvjetne osude ) to the same court.

17. At a hearing held on 16 May 2012 the first applicant informed the court that H.A. ’ s address in Glendale (Arizona) mentioned in the judgment of 27 September 2010 (see paragraph 13 above) was not correct and that his address was difficult to establish. She provided the court however with the address of his employer and his mother.

18. The notice of the next hearing, scheduled for 10 September 2012, was sent via regular post, more specifically by registered mail, to the address of H.A. ’ s employer in the United States.

19. At the hearing held on 10 September 2012 the court established that the service was not valid because the notice, which had been returned by H.A. ’ s employer, had not been signed by H.A.

20. On the same day the court asked the Croatian embassy in the United States to supply H.A. ’ s address.

21. On 9 October 2012 the embassy replied that, like the court, it was only aware of H.A. ’ s old address in Glendale (Arizona) and that it had been unable to identify his new address.

22. The court then scheduled the next hearing for 15 July 2013, and on 7 November 2012 asked the Ministry of Justice to request, by means of letters rogatory, the relevant United States authorities to serve notice of the hearing on H.A.

23. On 8 March 2013 the Ministry of Justice forwarded to the court a letter from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, in which it was stated that the Croatian embassy in the United States had no funds in its budget for service abroad and thus could not pay the USD 90 requested by the United States ’ authorities for personal service.

24. The hearing scheduled for 15 July 2013 was adjourned. Before the hearing the law clerk ( sudski savjetnik ) assigned to the case informed the first applicant that the summons could not be served on H.A. by letters rogatory because the Croatian embassy in the United States did not have funds to pay for the service (see the preceding paragraph). According to the applicant the law clerk also advised her to lodge another criminal complaint against H.A. for another count of the same offence (which would eventually result in his unconditional conviction). The next hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2014.

25. At the hearing held on 21 March 2014 the judge hearing the case informed the first applicant that the summons had to be served on a party living abroad via diplomatic service and that service via regular post by registered mail at his employer ’ s address was not valid. The first applicant replied that the message she had received from H.A. on 10 January 2014 on her Facebook page suggested that he had received the summons sent by regular post.

26. It would appear that these proceedings are still pending.

27. Meanwhile, by a decision of 9 October 2013 the president of the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court dismissed a request of 28 August 2013 by the applicants for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, finding no violation of that right. He held that the length of the proceedings complained of was primarily attributable to objective factors, namely the difficulties associated with service of process on H.A., who lived in the United States. On 9 December 2013 the president of the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants and upheld the first-instance decision.

3. Administrative proceedings concerning substitute maintenance

28. In 2009 the first applicant, relying on section 352 of the Family Act, instituted administrative proceedings before the Zagreb Social Welfare Centre ( Centar za socijalnu skrb Zagreb – Ured Trešnjevka , hereafter “the local social welfare centre”) seeking substitute maintenance for the second and third applicants.

29. By a decision of 5 March 2009 the local social welfare centre granted the first applicant ’ s request and awarded her substitute maintenance in the monthly amount of 532.51 [1] Croatian kunas (HRK) for the second applicant and HRK 484.20 [2] for the third applicant. The decision specified that these amounts would be paid in the period from 22 January 2009 until H.A. started paying the child support, and until 21 January 2012 at the latest.

4. The first applicant ’ s correspondence with the Croatian diplomatic and consular authorities in the United States

30. On 4 December 2006 the first applicant wrote to the Croatian consulate in Los Angeles asking for assistance in instituting relevant proceedings in the United States with a view to recovering child support payments. In her letter she mentioned that she had contacted an attorney in the United States who, given her indigence, had asked for “too much money” for his services without any guarantees that the proceedings would be successful. It would appear that she received no reply.

31. On 11 May 2012 the applicant sent an email to the Croatian embassy in Washington D.C. asking for assistance in identifying H.A. ’ s address.

32. The embassy replied on the same day, informing her first that in response to her earlier request (see paragraph 30 above) it had contacted the relevant United States authorities, who had in turn informed it that foreign court judgments concerning maintenance could be recognised only if there was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the country concerned. No such agreement existed between the United States and Croatia (see paragraphs 42-45 below).

33. The embassy also informed the applicant that it had no database of contact details of Croatian nationals living in the United States. Moreover, each time it had asked the United States authorities to provide such information in the context of requests for international legal assistance, those authorities had informed it that they had no such data either, and that in any event they would not be able to disclose them because of the personal data protection laws.

34. The embassy further informed the first applicant that the results of its web search indicated that a person with the same last name as H.A. lived in Glendale (Arizona), and provided the address. It also suggested that she ask the court in the above proceedings for revocation of the suspended sentence to try serving the summons at that address. Lastly, the embassy gave the applicant the contact details of a private investigator who could assist her in identifying H.A. ’ s address.

B. Relevant domestic law

1. Family Act

35. The original text of section 352 of the Family Act (Obiteljski zakon, Official Gazette no. 163/03), which was in force between 22 July 2003 and 31 December 2007, read as follows:

Eighth part

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

V. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY PROCEEDINGS

3. Enforcement of maintenance orders

Section 352

“If a parent who is bound to contribute to the support of his or her child by a final judicial decision or settlement concluded before the social welfare centre does not comply with his or her obligations for more than three months, the social welfare centre shall, at the initiative of the other parent or of its own motion, if it considers that this could endanger the child ’ s standard of living, take measures to provide funds for substitute child support until the parent bound to [do so] again starts to comply with his or her obligation.”

36. Section 352 of the Family Act was amended by the 2007 Amendments to the Family Act ( Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Obiteljskog zakona , Official Gazette no. 107/07 – the 2007 Amendments), which entered into force on 1 January 2008. The text of section 352, as amended by the 2007 Amendments, read as follows:

“(1) If a parent who is bound to contribute to the support of his or her child by a final judicial decision, the provisional measure ... or settlement concluded before a court or a social welfare centre, does not comply with his or her obligations for more than six consecutive months, or does not pay at least six monthly instalments within a period of seven months, the social welfare centre shall, at the initiative of the other parent or of its own motion, issue a decision on substitute child support and in accordance with it shall pay child support until the parent bound to [do so] again starts to comply with his or her obligation, but for no longer than three years.

(2) The right to substitute child support shall be recognised from the date the application [to that effect] was lodged [by the other parent], or from the date [the social welfare centre] instituted the proceedings of its own motion.

(3) The substitute child support shall be established at 50% of the amount of [the minimal child support] specified in section 232(4) of this Act [which sets it at 17%, 20% or 22% of the minimum wage, depending on the age of the child].

(4) An appeal against a decision on substitute child support does not suspend its enforcement.”

37. Section 61 of the 2007 Amendments provided as follows:

“(1) If before the entry into force of [these Amendments] a first-instance decision has been adopted in proceedings concerning maintenance by the court or the social welfare centre the [earlier version of] the Family Act, shall [continue] to apply to the subsequent [stages of] the proceedings.

(2) If after the entry into force of [these Amendments] the first-instance decision referred to in paragraph 1 of this section was quashed or set aside [these Amendments] shall apply to the subsequent proceedings.”

2. Criminal Code

38. The relevant provision of the Criminal Code ( Kazneni zakon , Official Gazette no. 110/97 with subsequent amendments), which was in force from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2012, reads as follows:

CHAPTER SIX (VI)

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Revocation of suspended sentence

Section 69(7)

“Regardless of the grounds for revocation, a suspended sentence may be revoked no later than one year after the expiry of the probation period.”

CHAPTER SIXTEEN (XVI)

CRIMINAL OFFENCES AGAINST MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY AND THE YOUTH

Non-compliance with maintenance obligations

Section 209

“(1) Anyone who, by avoiding employment or by changing jobs, domicile or place of residence, by alienation of assets, or otherwise, avoids providing maintenance for a person he or she is bound to support by virtue of an enforceable decision or in-court settlement, or who refuses to comply with such an obligation, shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment not exceeding one year.

(2) If the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 of this section concerns child support, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment of from three months to three years.

(3) When imposing a suspended sentence, the court may set as a condition [of the sentence being suspended], that the perpetrator pays maintenance arrears and in the future regularly complies with maintenance obligations.”

3. Criminal Procedure Act

39. The relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Act ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku , Official Gazette no. 152/08 with subsequent amendments), which has been in force since 1 September 2011, reads as follows:

CHAPTER XXIX

PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION OF A SUSPENDED SENTENCE

Section 564

“(1) Where a suspended sentence stipulates that a sentence will be executed if the convicted person does not return the pecuniary gain, pay the compensation for the damage, or does not meet other obligations, and the convicted person has failed to comply with those obligations within the set time-limit, the first-instance court shall conduct proceedings for revocation of the suspended sentence at the request of an authorised prosecutor or the injured party.

(2) The judge assigned for such a purpose shall examine the convicted person, if available, and take the steps necessary to establish the facts and collect evidence relevant to the decision.

(3) Thereafter, the presiding judge shall schedule a session of the panel of which he or she shall inform the prosecutor, the convicted person and the injured party. If they have been duly notified, failure of the parties, including the injured party, to attend shall not prevent the panel from holding the session.

(4) If the court finds that the convicted person has not complied with the obligation imposed upon him or her by the judgment, it shall issue a judgment revoking the suspended sentence and ordering the execution of the imposed sentence, or it shall set a new time-limit for compliance with the obligation, or replace that obligation with another or relieve the convicted person of the obligation. If the court finds that there are no grounds to take any of these decisions, it shall discontinue the proceedings for revocation of a suspended sentence by [means of] a decision [to that effect].

(5) If it is subsequently established that the convicted person committed a criminal offence during the probation period for which he or she was sentenced to a sentence for which the suspended sentence should or could have been revoked under the Criminal Code, and the court which sentenced omitted to decide on that, the first-instance court which imposed the suspended sentence shall issue a judgment revoking the suspended sentence and ordering execution of the imposed sentence. If the court finds that there are no grounds for revocation of a suspended sentence, it shall discontinue those proceedings by [means of] a decision [to that effect].

(6) ...

(7) ... ”

4. Travel Documents Act

40. The relevant provisions of the Croatian Nationals ’ Travel Documents Act ( Zakon o putnim ispravama hrvatskih dr žavljana , Official Gazette no. 77/99 with subsequent amendments), which has been in force since 1 January 2000, read as follows:

Section 41

“Applications for travel documents shall be refused in respect of those applicants in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that they:

1. ... ,

2. would avoid complying with [their] outstanding pecuniary obligations arising from marriage or parental responsibility, or with tax obligations or other statutory pecuniary obligations for which there is an enforcement title – at the request of the competent court.

3. ...

Section 42

“Travel documents shall be seized by the relevant authority, diplomatic mission or consular office on the grounds referred to in section 41(1) and (2) of this Act ...

A decision on seizure of a travel document, referred to in paragraph 1 of this section, shall be delivered by the administrative authority in charge of the issuance of travel documents.

An appeal against the decision referred to in paragraph 3 of this section shall not postpone its enforcement.”

C. Relevant international and European law

1. Convention on the Rights of the Child

41. Article 27 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 2 September 1990, which Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia on 12 October 1992, read as follows:

Article 27

“4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad. In particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.”

2. International conventions concerning recovery of child support abroad

42. Croatia has, since 20 September 1993, been a party to the Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance of 1956, which is a United Nations treaty which allows individuals to enforce judicial decisions regarding child support and alimony extraterritorially. It can be used only if the person seeking maintenance and the person paying maintenance are both resident in States that have ratified that Convention.

43. Croatia is not a party to the Hague Convention concerning the recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to maintenance obligations towards children of 1958, or to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations of 1973.

44. The United States of America is not a party to any of the above-mentioned conventions.

45. As a member State of the European Union Croatia is also bound by the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance of 2007, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, and to which the European Union acceded on 1 August 2014. The United States of America signed that Convention on 23 November 2007 but has not yet ratified it.

46. As a member State of the European Union Croatia is also bound by the Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.

COMPLAINTS

47. The applicants complained, under Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, about non-enforcement of a final judgment awarding them child support, which represented the financial basis of their family life.

THE LAW

48. The applicants complained that they had been unable to recover child support payments, which constituted the financial basis of their family life and to which they were entitled by a final court judgment. They relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

Article 8

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

49. The Government disputed the admissibility of the application by arguing that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, that they had failed to comply with the six-month rule and that they had abused the right of application, and that their complaints were in any event manifestly ill-founded .

1. The parties ’ arguments

(a) The Government

50. The Government in their observations of 23 April 2014 first argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that they had not applied for substitute maintenance under section 352 of the Family Act (see paragraph 35 above). Once it became evident from the applicants ’ observations in reply of 4 June 2014 that the applicants had been receiving substitute maintenance (see paragraphs 28-29 above), the Government went on to argue that by mentioning that essential fact as late as in their observations in reply the applicants had abused the right of application.

51. In reply to the applicants ’ argument that the substitute maintenance they had been receiving was significantly lower than that awarded them by the Zagreb Municipal Court in its judgment of 28 January 2003 (see paragraphs 6 above and 58 below), the Government submitted that H.A. had stopped paying child support as early as June 2006 (see paragraph 7 above). That being so, they argued, the applicants could have applied for substitute child support at that time, that is before 1 January 2008 when section 352 of the Family Act was amended (see paragraph 36 above) . Had they done so they would have been awarded substitute maintenance under the original text of that provision, that is without limitations introduced by the 2007 Amendments , which decision could not have been affected by those amendments (see paragraph 37 above). Since under the original text of section 352 of the Family Act the applicants had been entitled to receive, as substitute maintenance, the full amount of child support they had been awarded by the judgment of 28 January 2003 until H.A. a gain started to comply with his obligation (see paragraphs 6 and 35 above), applying for such maintenance in the period indicated would have completely offset the objective impracticability of enforcement of that judgment.

52. The Government further averred that the applicants had failed to observe the six-month rule. They explained that the applicants seemed to consider criminal prosecution and the related threat of criminal sanctions as a means of forcing H.A. to comply with the judgment of 28 January 2003 and pay the child support. Even if lodging a criminal complaint and instituting criminal proceedings was an effective remedy in the given circumstances, the Government averred that this remedy had become ineffective once it became evident that H.A. had not complied with the conditions of his suspended sentence (see paragraphs 13-15 above). That had indicated that even the threat of a prison sentence had not made him change his conduct and start paying the child support. According to the Government, this had become evident on 6 February 2012 at the latest, because on that date the first applicant applied for revocation of H.A. ’ s suspended sentence (see paragraph 16 above), whereas the applicants lodged their application with the Court on 6 August 2013, that is more than six months later. The Government further argued that pursuing the proceedings for revocation could not have been considered an effective avenue of redress, because even if H.A. was to be sentenced to imprisonment there was no international agreement under which the United States would have been bound to extradite him to Croatia on account of the criminal offence of which he had been convicted.

53. As to the substance, the Government emphasise that the domestic authorities could not have discharged their positive obligations to secure the enforcement of the judgment in the applicants ’ favour, for several objective reasons. First, the judgment debtor was living in the United States at an unknown address, and he had no property in Croatia. Second, there was no bilateral agreement between the United States and Croatia, nor was the United States a party to any international convention for recovery of maintenance abroad (see paragraphs 42-45 above).

54. Even though the State could not have been responsible for the situation thus created it had, as already explained above, provided for a mechanism in the form of substitute maintenance capable of fully compensating the applicants and ensuring that they suffered no negative consequences on account of H.A. ’ s refusal to pay the child support (see paragraphs 35-37 and 50-51 above).

55. In the Government ’ s view the applicants argued that the domestic authorities should have found a way to enforce the judgment in their favour in the United States by using “other measures”, without specifying those measures. The Government also argued that neither the Convention nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child conferred on individuals the right to have an international treaty concluded to their benefit. The obligation arising from Article 27 of the latter Convention was limited to promoting accession to, or conclusion of, the relevant international agreements (see paragraph 41 above); it did not grant to each child the right to such an agreement. Nevertheless, by signing and ratifying all relevant international treaties for recovery of maintenance abroad (see paragraphs 42 and 45 above), the State had fulfilled its obligation arising from Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and had ensured that all its citizens could enforce in foreign countries domestic judgments delivered in their favour.

56. Against that background, the Government concluded that in the given circumstances, by convicting H.A. for the criminal offence of non-payment of maintenance, the domestic authorities had done everything in their power and thus complied with all their positive obligations under the Convention.

(b) The applicants

57. The applicants rejected the Government ’ s arguments adduced in support of their inadmissibility objections based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and non-compliance with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 49-52 above).

58. The applicants submitted that substitute maintenance was a form of social assistance and not a remedy for the violations complained of. The substitute maintenance they had been awarded constituted only half of the amount H.A. had to pay them pursuant to the judgment of 28 January 2003 (see paragraph 6 and 29). Moreover, they could have received substitute maintenance for the maximum period of three years (see paragraphs 29 and 36 above).

59. The applicants further submitted that they had become aware that the proceedings for the revocation of the suspended sentence had become pointless only on 15 July 2013, and not before that date as the Government had suggested (see paragraph 52 above), thus some three weeks before they lodged their application with the Court on 6 August 2013.

60. As to the substance, they emphasised that the judgment of 28 January 2003 (see paragraph 6 above) entitling them to child support from H.A. had remained unenforced for almost ten years (see paragraph 7 above). They argued that the State ’ s obligation under the Convention to secure enforcement of judgments was even greater in matters concerning maintenance of minor children.

61. The applicants rejected the Government ’ s argument that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in question just because H.A. lived in the United States, which was not a party to any international treaty concerning recovery of maintenance abroad (see paragraphs 42-45 and 53 above). The applicants first emphasised that H.A. was a Croatian national and that the State must have measures in place to enable enforcement of final judgments against its nationals. In particular, in reply to the Government ’ s argument that the domestic authorities had done everything they could under the domestic law (see paragraph 56 above), the applicants submitted that H.A. had been issued with a new passport while the first set of criminal proceedings was pending against him. The fact that he had not complied with his basic civil obligations and stood trial for a criminal offence had apparently not been considered an obstacle to the domestic authorities ’ providing him with a travel document.

62. Second, the applicants submitted that although the United States was not a party to any relevant international convention concerning recovery of maintenance abroad (see paragraphs 42-45 above), the State had had other measures available to it to resolve the matter bilaterally. Despite this, the domestic authorities had not even tried discussing the issue of enforcement of the judgment with the relevant United States authorities or otherwise assisted the applicants in enforcing it.

63. The applicants submitted in particular that concerning the enforcement of decisions in the sphere of family law the Court had repeatedly held that what was decisive was whether the national authorities had taken all the necessary steps to facilitate execution that could reasonably be demanded in the special circumstances of each case (see, for example, Hokkanen v. Finland , 23 September 1994, § 58, Series A, no. 299 ‑ A; Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania , no. 31679/96, § 96, ECHR 2000 ‑ I; Nuutinen v. Finland , no. 32842/96, § 128, ECHR 2000 ‑ VIII; and Sylvester v. Austria , nos. 36812/97 and 40104/98, § 59, 24 April 2003 ). The applicants further relied on the judgment in the IlaÅŸcu case, in which the Court held ( see IlaÅŸcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 331, ECHR 2004 ‑ VII):

“However, even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.”

64. The applicants further submitted that under Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child the States were obliged to take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents, both within the State Party and from abroad. Where the person having financial responsibility for the child lived in a State different from that of the child, the States were not only required to promote the accession to or conclusion of international agreements, but also to make other appropriate arrangements (see paragraph 41 above).

65. In view of the foregoing (see the three preceding paragraphs), the applicants argued that the Croatian authorities had a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take diplomatic and other measures to secure the enforcement of the judgment in their favour on the territory of the United States. Since that was a country with which Croatia had more than good diplomatic and other relations there was no reason to doubt that the United States authorities would have assisted the Croatian authorities in the activities aimed at recovering maintenance. To do so would not have been an impossible or disproportionate burden, given Croatia ’ s diplomatic and consular network in the United States (an embassy and altogether nine consular offices) and the fact that some 1,200,000 people of Croatian origin lived there. Lastly, the applicants submitted that even in the absence of a bilateral or multilateral agreement a number of States had been declared “reciprocating countries [3] ” for child support purposes by the United States authorities, which made it possible to recover maintenance in that country. However, there was no evidence that the Croatian authorities had ever tried to obtain such a status.

66. That being so, and given that the Government admitted that the proceedings for revocation of the suspended sentence were not effective in the sense of forcing H.A. to comply with the judgment in their favour, for the applicants it had to be concluded that the measures undertaken by the domestic authorities to assist them in recovery of maintenance had been neither adequate nor sufficient.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

67. The Court, having regard to its case-law (see, notably, Panetta v. Italy , no. 38624/07 , § § 29 and 31, 15 July 2014, as well as Romańczyk v. France , no. 7618/05 , 18 November 2010 and Matrakas and Others v. Poland and Greece , no. 47268/06 , 7 November 2013 ), considers that this case falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention only.

68. The Court does not find it necessary to examine all inadmissibility objections (see paragraph 49 above) raised by the Government because the application is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

69. It reiterates that the right to a court protected by Article 6 would be illusory if a Contracting State ’ s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party (see Matrakas and Others , cited above, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 33509/04, § 65, ECHR 2009; and Hornsby v. Greece , 19 March 1997, § 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ II). However, this right does not impose an obligation on a State to execute every judgment of a civil character without having regard to the particular circumstances of a case (see, for example, Kesyan v. Russia , no. 36496/02, § 64, 19 October 2006). For example, in the Kalogeropoulou case the Court held that although the Greek courts had ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this had not necessarily obliged the Greek State to ensure that they could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece (see Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), no. 59021/00, 12 December 2002).

71. The specific feature of the present case is that the applicants sought enforcement of the judgment of a Croatian civil court against a debtor who is a Croatian national but has been living at an unknown address in the United States, a country that is not a party to the Convention and is not bound by any international instrument to give effect to any judgment of Croatian civil courts on its territory. Naturally, in such circumstances the measures at the disposal of the Croatian authorities to comply with their obligation under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to secure the enforcement of the judgment of 28 January 2003 were rather limited.

(a) Diplomatic measures

72. In view of the applicants ’ arguments (see paragraph 62-65 above), the Court considers that it must first examine whether in circumstances such are those prevailing in the present case States could be required to take certain diplomatic measures in order to comply with their positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to secure the enforcement of judgments.

73. The Court reiterates that the Convention organs have repeatedly stated that the Convention does not require a High Contracting Party to exercise diplomatic protection, or to espouse an applicant ’ s complaints under international law or otherwise intervene with the authorities of another State on his or her behalf (see M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria , no. 40020/03 , § 127, 31 July 2012, and the cases cited therein). It sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.

74. The applicants ’ reliance on the Court ’ s judgment in the Ilaşcu case is largely misplaced and taken out of context. In that case the State ’ s positive obligations under Article 1 of the Convention, including, inter alia , the taking of diplomatic measures, were defined in relation to the specific situation where a State Party to the Convention had no effective control over a part of its territory. In particular, the Court held ( see Ilaşcu and Others , cited above, § 333):

“The Court considers that where a Contracting State is prevented from exercising its authority over the whole of its territory by a constraining de facto situation, such as obtains when a separatist regime is set up, whether or not this is accompanied by military occupation by another State, it does not thereby cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over that part of its territory temporarily subject to a local authority sustained by rebel forces or by another State.

Nevertheless, such a factual situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the State under Article 1 must be considered by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State ’ s positive obligations towards persons within its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.”

75. Lastly, by way of observation, the Court would add that the Convention does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States (see Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 141, ECHR 2011 ).

(b) Other measures

76. The Court must further examine whether other measures taken by the domestic authorities with a view to enforcing the judgment in the applicants ’ favour were adequate and sufficient for the respondent State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

77. In this connection the Court first notes that by a judgment of 27 September 2010 H.A. was convicted of the criminal offence of non-compliance with maintenance obligations and received a suspended sentence under the condition of regular payment of future child support instalments and payment of maintenance arrears (see paragraph 13 above). It thus cannot be said that by refraining from applying sanctions the Croatian authorities failed to discharge their obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to secure the enforcement of judgments (contrast with Pini and Others v. Romania , nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, § § 186 and 188, ECHR 2004 ‑ V (extracts), and Ruianu , cited above, §§ 72-73, where this was an element the Court took into account when finding violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and compare with Ciprová v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 33273/03, 22 March 2005, and Fociac v. Romania , no. 2577/02, § § 73-74, 3 February 2005, where imposition of criminal sanctions was an element taken into account by the Court when declaring the non-enforcement complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention inadmissible or finding no violation of that provision).

78. This finding is not called into question by any alleged shortcomings in the proceedings for revocation of the suspended sentence related to service of process (see paragraphs 15-25 above). That is so for two reasons.

79. First, while it is true that the resultant delay rendered revocation legally impossible on the grounds proposed by the applicants (see section 69(7) of the Criminal Code in paragraph 38 above), H.A. can under Croatian law be prosecuted and convicted on another count of the criminal offence of non-compliance with maintenance obligations committed in the period after his first conviction. Nothing has prevented the applicants from lodging another criminal complaint and thereby providing the initiative for such a prosecution and conviction.

80. Second, the Court considers that revocation of the suspended sentence and/or the second conviction and imposition of an unconditional sentence would most likely have no impact on H.A. in terms of his compliance or otherwise with the judgment of 28 January 2003. His failure to pay child support even after the imposition of the suspended sentence suggests that the threat of criminal sanctions had no effect on his conduct (compare with Fociac , cited above, § § 71, 73-74 and 78, where the Court held that, after having convicted its representative, there had been nothing more the Romanian authorities could do against a debtor company which had preferred to suffer the penal and pecuniary consequences its non-compliance with the court orders entailed). Therefore, another conviction and imposition of an unconditional sentence in a situation where he is beyond the reach of the Croatian authorities, and where there is no extradition treaty whereby the United States would be bound to extradite him to Croatia for the criminal offence in question, would not, in the Court ’ s view, increase the chances that he would change his behaviour.

81. As regards the applicants ’ argument that the domestic authorities should not have provided H.A. with a new passport, it is sufficient to note that the applicants have never asked the domestic courts to make an order to that effect. The Court reiterates in this connection that successful litigants may be required to take certain procedural steps in order to allow or speed up the enforcement of a judgment even in cases where they obtained a judgment against the State (see Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) , cited above, § 69 ). This applies a fortiori to cases involving enforcement of judgments against private debtors where the creditors ’ over-reliance on the State may be held against them (see Ciprová , cited above).

82. The Court also notes that Croatian diplomatic and consular authorities in the United States offered and provided some assistance in identifying H.A. ’ s address (see paragraphs 33-34 above, and compare with Ciprová , cited above).

83. Lastly, the Court notes that the domestic authorities also addressed the material difficulties of the applicants by awarding them substitute maintenance (see paragraphs 28-29 and 35-36 above, and compare with Ciprová , cited above). In this connection the Court also takes due note of the Government ’ s argument that if the first applicant had applied for it earlier the amount of that maintenance would have been higher and the entitlement not limited to three years (see paragraph 35, 37 and 51 above).

84. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that in the present case the measures taken by the authorities with a view to assisting the applicants in the enforcement of the judgment in their favour were adequate and sufficient in the given circumstances, and that the State thus discharged its positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to secure the enforcement of judgments.

85. It follows that this application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 30 June 2016 .

             Stanley Naismith Işıl KarakaÅŸ Registrar President

[1] Approximately 72 euros (EUR) at the time.

[2] Approximately EUR 65 at the time.

[3] For example, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of the Council of Europe Member States.