SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no 67390/10 Goran MARÄŒAN against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 13 September 2016 as a Chamber composed of:

Işıl Karakaş, President, Nebojša Vučinić, Paul Lemmens, Valeriu Griţco, Ksenija Turković, Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, Georges Ravarani, judges, and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 September 2010 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant ,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

1 . The applicant , Mr Goran Mar č an, is a Croatian national, who was born in 1967 and lives in Rijeka.

A. Background to the case

2 . The applicant is a lawyer practising in Rijeka.

3 . In the period between September 2002 and January 2004 the applicant acted as a privately-appointed defence lawyer for B.P., who was indicted in the Rijeka County Court ( Županijski sud u Rijeci ­ ) on charges of abuse of power and authority and aiding and abetting the conclusion of onerous contracts.

4 . The applicant in particular, together with another lawyer, assumed B.P. ’ s defence at the hearings before an investigating judge. He also lodged several appeals concerning the decisions on B.P. ’ s pre-trial detention and he lodged an objection against the indictment. In this period he also had a number of meetings and consultations with his client in detention.

5 . During the trial B.P. retained the services of another lawyer, and the applicant was no longer representing him. On 18 April 2008 the Rijeka County Court acquitted B.P., and this was upheld on 16 October 2008 by the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ).

6 . When acquitting B.P. the Rijeka County Court did not rule on the entirety of the costs and expenses of the proceedings, reserving its decision in respect of further possible claims.

B. The applicant ’ s request for compensation of lawyers ’ fees

7 . On 26 February 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the Rijeka County Court seeking remuneration for his legal representation of B.P. during the period between September 2002 and January 2004. He relied on the 2004 Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees (see paragraph 20 below) and claimed a total of 40,748 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately EUR 5,500) as his fees in the proceedings, enumerated as follows:

- HRK 7,600 for attending fifteen hearings before the investigating judge and four hearings before the three-judge panel (item 4 of the fee scale) between 9 September 2002 and 29 January 2004;

- HRK 2,800 for drafting seven appeals lodged during the proceedings (item 5 of the fee scale);

- HRK 300 for drafting an objection against the indictment (item 5 of the fee scale);

- HRK 12,000 for 104 visits and consultations with his client in detention, amounting to some 120 hours, in the period between 9 September 2002 and 4 June 2003 (item 31 of the fee scale);

- a special increase of 100 percent in respect of the complexity of the case for the first three amounts (item 37 of the fee scale); and

- 22 percent VAT.

8 . On 4 March 2009 the Rijeka County Court awarded the applicant HRK 5,100 (approximately EUR 700) for attending the fifteen hearings before the investigating judge and drafting the appeals and objection against the indictment, and dismissed the remainder of his claim. The relevant part of the decision reads:

“ ... [item 48 of] the 2004 fee scale ... provides that the 1993 fee scale applies to any work carried out before the former scale entered into force ...

The fee scale applicable at the investigation stage did not provide that the lawyer was entitled to VAT, this [being] covered for the first time in the 2004 fee scale. Besides, according to the applicable 1993 fee scale ... item 3 provided that for preliminary proceedings lawyers were entitled to a single defence fee for the hearing under item 4.1, plus the hourly rate for every subsequent hour worked in the amount of 10 points, while under item 50 the value of one point was HRK 8 ...

...

The hearings lasted a total of 28 hours and 55 minutes, and since the lawyer is entitled to a single defence fee of 40 points and the value of one point is HRK 8, the single defence fee amounts to HRK 320, while the hourly rate amounts to 280 points – 10 points per hour ... meaning that the lawyer is entitled to ... HRK 2,560 in total.

As regards the part of the lawyer ’ s claim [for the four hearings before the three-judge panel] it is to be noted that these were hearings before the ... first-instance court, and for such hearings the lawyer was not entitled to remuneration according to the applicable fee scale.

As regards ... the drafting of the seven appeals, the lawyer requests HRK 2,800 which is not entirely reasonable given that the value of one point at the relevant time was HRK 8, which means that the lawyer is entitled to HRK 2,240 and no VAT.

The claim of HRK 300 for drafting the objection against the indictment is reasonable, but the claim of HRK 12,000 for the meetings with his client is [not]. The lawyer is relying on item 31 of the fee scale which provides that for conferences and meetings where factual and legal matters were discussed with the client, opposing party and other participants in the client ’ s case, the lawyer shall be remunerated 50 points for every hour. It is clear that the lawyer did not attend any conferences where factual and legal matters were discussed ‘ with the client, opposing party and other participants in the client ’ s case ’ and the requested amount cannot be awarded to [him]. In addition, the applicable fee scale did not anticipate remuneration for every conversation [he had] with the defendant in detention ... as it is provided under the Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees (Official Gazette, nos. 91/2004, 37/2005, 59/2007) and therefore he cannot be remunerated on this ground either.

As regards the lawyer ’ s claim under item 37 for a special increase in respect of the ‘ complexity of the case ’ , such a claim is manifestly unreasonable ... as this particular case was not complex ...

From all the above-mentioned considerations it is to be concluded that the lawyer is entitled to HRK 5,100 but no VAT, as it was not covered in the applicable fee scale.”

9 . On 16 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with a three-judge panel of the Rijeka County Court. He argued that he should have been awarded a single fee for each hearing before the investigating judge and that his claim should have been calculated on the basis of HRK 10 per point. Moreover, under item 42 of the fee scale he had been entitled to a lump sum increase of 25% on his remuneration. The applicant contended that the lengthy preparation of his client ’ s defence in detention which, in his view, had been crucial for a successful defence, had been unaccounted for. He also pointed out that the case file consisted of more than 10,000 pages, that the proceedings had lasted for more than seven years and that the trial court itself had released a public statement characterising the case as complex. Lastly, the applicant argued that he should be awarded VAT.

10 . On 27 January 2010 a three-judge panel of the Rijeka County Court awarded the applicant an additional amount of HRK 1,122 (approximately EUR 150) in respect of VAT, and dismissed the remainder of his complaints. In particular, the three-judge panel explained that the applicant was not entitled to any remuneration for the visits to his client in detention under item 31 of the fee scale as it had not concerned conferences involving other participants in the proceedings. He was also not entitled to a lump sum increase of 25% as it was not clear for what ancillary actions he should be granted such an increase.

11 . On 5 March 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ), complaining that the Rijeka County Court had failed to appreciate the particular circumstances of the case related to a request for remuneration of a defence lawyer in the context of criminal proceedings, and had thus arbitrarily deprived him of his earnings. He stressed in particular:

“ ... when a request for remuneration of costs by a defence lawyer is not recognised, the defence rights are breached. [B.P. ’ s] lawyer was a lawyer of his own choosing. A person of his confidence. In order for the defence to be on equal footing with the prosecution, the defence lawyer must be remunerated for his work. ... When the accused is acquitted the costs for all actions aimed at the defence of his innocence must be remunerated. Only then are the parties to the proceedings on an equal footing. Only then is there equality before the law. A refusal to remunerate the lawyer for his fees breaches Articles 14 § 2 and 29 §§ 1 and 2 of the Constitution. A trial where the lawyer is brought into a position that the costs of his work are not recognised is not and cannot be a fair trial.

Perhaps it would be best if the lawyer would not even be there?

By not recognising the lawyer ’ s costs according to the fee scale, Article 27 of the Constitution is breached. If the lawyer ’ s right to a fair remuneration is not recognised the autonomy and independence of the legal profession is disturbed. Autonomy and independence presuppose remuneration [of work]. The legal profession cannot be autonomous and independent if the court without any reasons or arguments refuses to recognise the lawyer ’ s right to remuneration for his work. How can the principle of autonomy and independence [of the legal profession] be secured when the court considers that such autonomy and independence should not be remunerated. And this all [occurs] in a situation where the defendant was acquitted. ... ”  

12 . On 27 May 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant ’ s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that the contested decisions did not concern any of his civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge against him. The relevant part of the decision reads:

“Article 62 of [the Constitutional Court Act] reads:

‘ Anyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if he or she deems that the individual act of a state body ... concerning his or her rights and obligations, or a suspicion or an accusation of a criminal offence, has violated his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms ... guaranteed by the Constitution (hereinafter “a constitutional right”). ’

It follows that only a decision by which the competent court decided on the merits of a legal matter, that is to say on the rights and obligations, or a suspicion or an accusation of a criminal offence, is an individual act within the meaning of section 62 § 1 of the Constitutional Court Act, in respect of which the Constitutional Court is obliged, upon a constitutional complaint, to protect the human rights or fundamental freedoms of an appellant guaranteed under the Constitution.

In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court it was established that the impugned decisions are not individual acts within the meaning of section 62 § 1 of the Constitutional Court Act, in respect of which the Constitutional Court is obliged to provide constitutional protection.

It was therefore decided, under section 72 of the Constitutional Court Act, as noted in the operative part of this decision.”

13 . This decision was served on the applicant on 23 June 2010.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Constitution

14 . The relevant provision of the Croatian Constitution ( Ustav Republike Hrvatske , Offici al Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000, 28/2001, 41/2001, 55/2001, 76/2010 and 85/2010) provides:

Article 48

“The right of ownership shall be guaranteed.”

B. Code of Criminal Procedure

15 . The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku ; Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 63/2002, 62/2003 and 115/2006) provided:

Article 120

“Every judgment or a decision terminating the proceedings shall set out the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

(2) If the information on costs and expenses is incomplete, a separate decision shall be adopted ... A request [for compensation] with full information on costs and expenses may be submitted within the maximum period of three months from the date of service of the final judgment or decision on the person authorised to make such a request.”

Article 123

“(1) When the criminal proceedings are terminated, or when a judgment on acquittal or a judgment on dismissal of charges is rendered, the decision or the judgment shall state that the costs of the criminal proceedings ... and the necessary expenses of the defendant, as well as the necessary expenses and the lawyer ’ s fees of the defence lawyer shall be paid from the State budget ... ”

C. Legal Profession Act

16 . The amendment to the Legal Profession and Legal Aid Act ( Zakon o izmjeni Zakona o odvjetni š tvu i slu ž bi pravne pomo ć i , Official Gazette no. 8/1990), incorporating the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia legislation into the Croatian system, provided that the Scale of Lawyers ’ fees shall be established by the Croatian Bar Association.

17 . On 27 January 1994 a new Legal Profession Act ( Zakon o odvjetni Å¡ tvu , Official Gazette no. 9/1994) was introduced, which, in its relevant part, provided:

Autonomy and independence of the legal profession

Section 2

“Autonomy and independence of the legal profession shall be secured in particular through: autonomy and independence in the performance of legal work as a free activity; organisation of the legal profession within the Croatian Bar Association as an independent organisation of lawyers in Croatia; adoption of the Statute and other acts of the Bar Association, ... ”

Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees

Section 18

“(1) Lawyers have the right to remuneration of their costs and expenses under the scale of lawyers ’ fees, which shall be established and adopted by the Bar Association.

... ”

18 . Thereafter the Legal Profession Act changed several times ( Zakon o odvjetni Å¡ tvu , Official Gazette, nos. 117/2008 of 13 October 2008, 50/2009 of 22 April 2009, 75/2009 of 30 June 2009 and 18/2011 of 9 February 2011) providing that:

Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees

Section 18

“(1) Lawyers have the right to remuneration of their costs and expenses under the scale of lawyers ’ fees, which shall be established and adopted by the Bar Association with the consent of the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice, when giving his consent, shall take into account the protection of social and economic interests and equality of those participating in the exchange of services, in view of their inequality in the relevant profession knowledge.

... ”

D. Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees

19 . The relevant part of the 1993 Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees ( Tarifa o nagradama i naknadi troškova za rad odvjetnika ; Official Gazette, nos. 69/1993, 87/1993, 16/1994, 11/1996), in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Item 3

“For attendances at the pre-trial [stage of the] proceedings, a defence lawyer or lawyer representing the injured party is entitled to a single defence fee under item 4, paragraph 1, depending on the offence to which the proceedings relate, and for the second and each subsequent hour of attendance at the hearing, remuneration of ten points.”

Item 4

“1. Defence of the accused, representation of a private prosecutor and representation of the injured party before a court or a minor-offences judge, for each day of the hearing:

...

in respect of criminal offences liable to a prison sentence up to ten years, remuneration of forty points, ... ”

Item 31

“For attending conferences and meetings where factual and legal matters are discussed with the client, opposing party and other participants in the client ’ s case, the lawyer is entitled to remuneration of ten points per hour.”

Item 37

“For special professional and expert knowledge required for the elaboration of a case, for a particularly difficult case or special responsibility for work carried out, Scale items may be increased by 100%.”

Item 42

“For all ancillary actions carried out in all proceedings for which special remuneration is not envisaged and which are not accounted for (gathering information, orally informing the client of the progress of proceedings, copying annexes, submitting writs to the court or post office etc.), the lawyer is entitled to a lump sum increase of 25% of the aggregate amount of the fee set and calculated in accordance with the Scale.”

Item 50

“The value of one point is 8 Croatian kunas.”

XVIII Interpretation of the Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees

“(1) The Management Board of the Croatian Bar Association or another body designated by the Management Board shall give explanations on the application and interpretation of the Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees.

(2) The explanations or opinions on the application of the Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees shall be given upon a request of the party, lawyer, court or another relevant domestic or international authority.”

20 . On 5 July 2004, a new Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees entered into force (Official Gazette, nos. 91/2004, 37/2005, 59/2007; hereinafter: the “2004 Scale of Lawyers ’ Fees”). Its relevant part reads as follows:

Item 4

“ ...

5. For every discussion with the defendant in detention, the lawyer is entitled to remuneration of fifty points, and for every further hour [her or she is entitled to further] remuneration of fifty points.”

Item 48

“For actions carried out prior to the entry into force of this Scale, the Scale published in the Official Gazette no. 69/1993, as amended in nos. 87/1993, 16/1994 and 11/1996 shall apply.”

Item 50

“The value of one point is 10 Croatian kunas.”

COMPLAINTS

21 . The applicant complained, relying on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that he had not been appropriately and fairly remunerated from the State budget for the legal work he had carried out as a defence lawyer in the criminal proceedings against his client B.P., who had been acquitted by a final judgment of the competent criminal court.

22 . The applicant also complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, that he had been discriminated against because he had not been remunerated and his client had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

23 . Complaining of a failure of the State to remunerate his legal services the applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

24 . The Court, being the master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy , 19 February 1998, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ I), considers that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

1. The parties ’ arguments

(a) The Government

25 . The Government argued that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit as he had lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance decision of a three-judge panel of the Rijeka County Court of 27 January 2010, which was not a remedy to be exhausted. They also considered that the applicant did not have victim status, and that he had had no legitimate expectations with regard to his claim for remuneration. In particular, the amount he had claimed in connection with B.P. ’ s representation had been exaggerated and unfounded.

26 . The Government further contended that the remuneration of the applicant ’ s fees had been calculated properly and in accordance with the applicable fee scale. They pointed out that, according to the Croatian Bar Association ’ s interpretation of the fee scale, the time when the applicant had carried out his professional activities had been of relevance, and not the time of invoicing his fees. The domestic courts had correctly considered that for the pre-trial stage of the proceedings the applicant should be remunerated for one procedural action increased by the hourly rate, and had correctly dismissed his request to apply the value of a point at HRK 10, as well as decided not to remunerate him for the hearings before the three-judge panel, as that had not been provided for under the applicable fee scale. Moreover, in the Government ’ s view, the applicant had not shown that the case had been complex or what specialist knowledge would have had to be deployed in the case, and therefore his request for an increase of the remuneration in that respect had been accordingly rejected.

27 . The Government also submitted that there had been no legal basis for remunerating the applicant for the visits to his client in detention, since item 31 of the fee scale had provided for remuneration for conferences and meetings with parties to the proceedings where legal and factual issues would be discussed, but not where lawyers were visiting defendants in pre-trial detention. In these circumstances, the Government considered that the applicant had had no legitimate expectation to be remunerated in the amount of HRK 40,748, which he had requested. Thus, in the Government ’ s view, the interference with the applicant ’ s possessions had pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring legal certainty in the application of the relevant domestic law, and had not imposed an excessive individual burden on him.

(b) The applicant

28 . The applicant maintained that he had properly complied with the six-month time-limit and that he had victim status. He also stressed that he had duly performed his work as a defence lawyer in the criminal proceedings, and that he should have been therefore remunerated for the work he had carried out.

29 . The applicant further argued that the approach of the domestic courts, by which they had considered all procedural actions taken during the pre-trial proceedings as a single action, remunerated by a single fee increased by the less favourable hourly rate, had been unreasonable because different procedural actions, namely the fifteen hearings before an investigating judge, had taken place at different times, had involved different witnesses and had had different durations. Thus, the applicant considered that by the correct application of items 3.1 and 4.1 of the fee scale, he should have been remunerated for each of these procedural actions separately.

30 . The applicant also argued that the domestic courts had failed to apply a lump sum increase of 25% on his remuneration, as provided under item 42 of the fee scale and to award him HRK 10 per point instead of HRK 8. He pointed out that he had not been remunerated for the meetings with his client in detention. In the applicant ’ s view, it had been impossible to guarantee his client an effective defence without seeing him in person in detention, where they had held confidential discussions on various factual and legal issues of the case. This had been a central requirement in securing his client a fair trial, and it had been impossible for the applicant to argue any point of the case without verifying it with the client first. Thus, he had had no other reason to visit his client in detention than to have meetings with him over the case. He had spent some 120 hours in these meetings, and for that work he had not received any remuneration. Lastly, the applicant pointed out that the case had concerned complex issues of banking undertakings and that the case file had consisted of approximately 10,000 pages. This had required specialist knowledge from those involved in the case and a lot of work, bringing the duration of the proceedings to more than seven years.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

31 . The Court finds that it is not necessary to address all the Government ’ s objections, as the applicant ’ s complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

32 . The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applies only to a person ’ s existing possessions; it does not guarantee the right to acquire possessions (see Malik v. the United Kingdom , no. 23780/08 , § 88, 13 March 2012). “Possessions” can be existing possessions or assets, including claims by virtue of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a property right (see, amongst many others, Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99 , § 121, ECHR 2002 ‑ II extracts; and Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX). By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, §§ 82-83, ECHR 2001-VIII; and Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002-VII).

33 . The concept of “possessions” in the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership of material goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law. In the same way as material goods, certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as a “possession” for the purposes of this provision. In each case the issue that needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 1999-II; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 100, ECHR 2000 ‑ I; and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 129, ECHR 2004-V).

34 . As regards the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to income, the Court reiterates that income can constitute “possessions” in the circumstances in which it has been duly earned (see Ambruosi v. Italy , no. 31227/96, § 35, 19 October 2000; and Lelas v. Croatia , no. 55555/08, § 58, 20 May 2010, and the cases cited therein).

35 . In the assessment of whether a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been conferred on the applicant the Court cannot in principle substitute its view for that of the domestic authorities so long as the decisions of the domestic authorities do not disclose any arbitrariness, are sufficiently reasoned, and, if appropriate, provide references to the relevant domestic case-law and practice (see Kopecký , cited above, § 56; see also Jantner v. Slovakia , no. 39050/97, §§ 30-32, 4 March 2003; and Damjanac v. Croatia , no. 52943/10 , § 91, 24 October 2013).

36 . The Court notes in the case at issue that the applicant ’ s request for remuneration related to fifteen hearings before the investigating judge, four hearings before the three-judge panel, the drafting of seven appeals and an objection against the indictment, 104 visits and consultations with his client in detention (amounting to some 120 hours), a special increase of 100 percent in respect of the complexity of the case, and the applicable VAT (see paragraph 7 above).

37 . The Rijeka County Court, applying the relevant 1993 fee scale to the applicant ’ s claim (see paragraphs 8 and 1 0 above), awarded the applicant HRK 6,222 in total (approximately EUR 850), related to the hearings before the investigating judge, the drafting of the appeals and objection, and the applicable VAT on those amounts, whereas it dismissed the applicant ’ s claim for remuneration for the four hearings before the three-judge panel and the 104 visits and consultations with his client in detention on the grounds that these actions were not accounted for in the applicable fee scale, as well as the special increase in respect of the complexity of the case on the grounds that there was nothing in the case at issue warranting such an increase (see paragraphs 7 - 8 above).

38 . With regard to the amount awarded to the applicant for the hearings before the investigating judge and the drafting of the appeals and objection against the indictment, the Court notes that the domestic courts ’ decisions are sufficiently reasoned and, in view of the applicable law, do not appear arbitrary. Thus, given that the Court ’ s duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention, and that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court, unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, inter alia , J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44302/02, § 75, ECHR 2007 ‑ III) , the Court sees no reason to call into question the domestic courts ’ decisions in this respect. Similarly, because of their direct knowledge of the particular circumstances, the Court is ready to accept the domestic authorities ’ judgment as to whether the criminal case at issue required a special increase of 100 percent in respect of its complexity.

39 . Accordingly, the applicant ’ s complaints in this respect must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

40 . As to the remainder of the applicant ’ s request for remuneration, the Court notes that in his appeal against the first-instance decision he contended in particular that he had been arbitrarily denied remuneration for the consultations and meetings with his client in detention (see paragraph 9 above). However, the domestic courts explained that the applicable 1993 fee scale did not provide for a possibility of remuneration of the meetings with a client in detention and thus dismissed the applicant ’ s claim as unfounded. Given that the domestic courts ’ decisions are sufficiently reasoned and do not disclose any arbitrariness, there is no reason for the Court to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts as to whether the applicant had any legitimate property expectations and thus “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this respect.

41 . For these reasons, the Court is not satisfied that the applicant ’ s claim for remuneration for the meetings with his client in detention gave rise to claims sufficiently established to qualify as assets for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

42 . It follows that this part of the applicant ’ s complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

B. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention

43 . The applicant also complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, that he had been discriminated against as he had not been remunerated and his client had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings.

44 . In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) as manifestly ill-founded, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 October 2016 .

             Stanley Naismith Işıl KarakaÅŸ Registrar President