FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 5294/14 Józsefné ALBERT and others against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 April 2017 as a Chamber composed of:

Ganna Yudkivska, President, Vincent A. De Gaetano, András Sajó, Nona Tsotsoria, Egidijus Kūris, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Marko Bošnjak, judges,

and Ma rialena Tsirli, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 10 January 2014,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in rep ly submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.

2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, Ministry of Justice.

3. The applicants were represented by Mr I. Gárdos, a lawyer practising in Budapest.

A. The circumstances of the case

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

5. At the time of lodging the application, the applicants held shares with an aggregate par value of 2,043,342,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) , representing 98.28% of the total registered capital of Kinizsi Bank Zrt. (a savings bank – “Kinizsi”), shares with an aggregate par value of HU F 1,833,300,000, representing 87.65% of the total registered capital of Mohácsi Takarék Bank Zrt. ( a savings bank – “Mohácsi”), and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 8,100,000, representing 5.61% of the total share capital of Pátria Takarékszövetkezet (a savings cooperative – “Pátria”). [1] Kinizsi, Mohácsi and Pátria will hereafter be collectively referred to as “the Institutions”.

1. Antecedents

6. In 1993 a voluntary and restricted integ ration took place involving 235 savings cooperatives in order to enhance their market position and financial security. With the active support of the Hungarian State and the PHARE Program of the European Union, they entered into an integration agreement. The key institutions of the integration were the National Association of Savings Cooperatives ( Országos Takarékszövetkezeti Szövetség – “OTSZ”), the Savings Bank ( Takarékbank Zrt .) and the National Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings Cooperatives ( Országos Takarékszövetkezeti Intézményvédelmi Alap – “OTIVA”), which was created as part of the integration. OTIVA, on the one hand, improved the security of deposits placed with the savings cooperatives by supplementing the National Deposit Insurance Fund ( Országos Betétbiztosítási Alap – “OBA”), and, on the other hand, served to prevent crisis situations and improved the stability of savings cooperatives.

7. The Savings Bank, by cooperating with OTIVA, harmonised and improved the effectiveness of the business operations of savings cooperatives. Until changes were introduced by the Integration Act (see paragraphs 11-13 below), the share of the savings cooperatives and certain banks in the Savings Bank exceeded 60%. In 2012 the Hungarian State emerged as an indirect owner of the Savings Bank, when the Hungarian Development Bank Ltd. ( Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zrt. – “MFB”) purchased a stake in Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, representing 38.5% of its shares.

8. According to Risk Report 2013/I issued by the Supervisory Authority in June 2013, which provided a comprehensive analysis of the financial system ’ s stability and its potential risks, out of all the financial institution sectors only the cooperative credit institution sector remained profitable. The Report found that that had been the case throughout the entire economic crisis, and in 2012 the sector had been able to improve its results, which had been higher than those of other players in the money markets.

9. According to publicly available information, before the Integration Act entered into force, savings cooperatives were stable and had capital adequacy and profitable operations. The total earnings before tax of cooperative credit institutions in the second quarter of 2013 was HUF 3.983 billion and their capital adequacy ratio was 16.94% (the ratio for credit institutions operating as companies limited by shares was 16.55%).

10. The profitability and capital adequacy ratio of the Institutions (see below) exceeded both those of the banking sector and the savings cooperatives. In 2012 Kinizsi had profits before tax of HUF 315 million, representing a 8.72% return on equity, and had a capital adequacy ratio of 17.73%. In the same year Mohácsi had profits before tax of HUF 613 million, representing a 14.6% return on equity, and had a capital adequacy ratio of 19.39%. Pátria had similar results in 2012, having profits before tax of HUF 372 million, representing a 7.3% return on equity, and a capital adequacy ratio of 17.68%.

2. Integration

11. Act no. CXXXV of 2013 on the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions and the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding Economic Matters (“the 2013 Integration Act”) entered into force on 13 July 2013, the day after its proclamation. The Act was then amende d in several aspects by Act no. CXCVI of 2013 on the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions (“the Integration (Amendment) Act”) with effect from 30 November 2013.

12. The 2013 Integration Act concerned most savings cooperatives operating as a cooperative, including Pátria, and certain banks operating as a company limited by shares, such as Kinizsi and Mohácsi.

13. The 2013 Integration Act abolished the integration of cooperatives organised on a voluntary basis, with voluntary membership, and terminated OTIVA. Instead, it introduced mandatory integration under close State control. In particular:

(a) the Integration Organisation of Cooperative Credit Institutions ( Szövetkezeti Hitelintézetek Integrációs Szervezete ) was created, a body under indirect State control (“the Integration Organisation”);

(b) the Bank of Hungarian Savings Cooperatives ( Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Zrt .), the central bank of the integration, over which the savings cooperatives had previously had a controlling majority, was effectively nationalised;

(c) the economic independence and autonomy of the savings cooperatives operating as cooperatives and that of certain banks operating as companies limited by shares, was restricted, a measure targeting the Institutions, amongst others; and

(d) the exercise of the ownership rights of the members and shareholders of the savings cooperatives and banks falling under the scope of the 2013 Integration Act was restricted.

3. Scope of the 2013 Integration Act

14. Until the entry into force of the Integration (Amendment) Act, Act no. CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises (“the 1996 Banking Act”) contained certain regulations for banks operating as companies limited by shares, which were different from those regarding cooperative credit institutions with respect to their scope of business, capital requirements and other matters (prior to the Integration (Amendment) Act, only savings cooperatives operating as cooperatives and credit cooperatives belonged to the group of cooperative credit institutions).

15. However, the 2013 Integration Act had, already before the Integration (Amendment) Act and contrary to the 1996 Banking Act, reclassified certain banks operating as companies limited by shares as cooperative credit institutions and extended its scope to them, based on the fact that, since 1 January 2013, those banks had been members of OTIVA.

At the same time, the 2013 Integration Act did not classify the following entities as cooperative credit institutions:

(a) all the other banks, including those which were members of the fourth protection fund, the First Domestic Voluntary Deposit Insurance and Institution Protection Fund of Credit Institutions (“HBA”), and

(b) those savings cooperatives and credit cooperatives which had applied to the Supervisory Authority for permission to convert from a cooperative into a company limited by shares before the entry into force of the 2013 Integration Act and their requests were pending on the date of entry into force of the Act.

16. The scope of the 2013 Integration Act was extended to Kinizsi and Mohácsi as well as two additional banks, which – complying with capital requirements and other conditions and with the permission of the Supervisory Authority – had been converted into banks from savings cooperatives and had been operating as such since that time.

17. In sum, the 2013 Integration Act brought a heterogeneous circle of entities under uniform regulation as cooperative credit institutions, except those savings cooperatives and credit cooperatives which had pending conversion requests.

4. New regulations

18. The 2013 Integration Act abolished the voluntary nature of cooperation and, by extending its scope to savings cooperatives, credit cooperatives and some banks (including the Institutions) by creating its own definition of cooperative credit institution, ordered a mandatory integration of those entities by introducing the following measures:

(a) it terminated the integration agreement of 1993, which had been entered into voluntarily on a civil law basis, and abolished OTIVA;

(b) it made almost all savings cooperatives and credit cooperatives, including the Institutions, ipso jure members of the Integration Organisation, which had been newly created as a legal successor of OTIVA and other voluntary institutional protection funds;

(c) it prohibited cooperative credit institutions operating as cooperatives from terminating their membership in the Integration Organisation and, in the case of cooperative credit institutions operating as companies limited by shares, made that practically impossible;

(d) the mandatory membership in the Integration Organisation and the fact that the sanction for breaching the rules created in order to enforce the governing powers of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation is the mandatory withdrawal of the operational licence or the exclusion from the Integration Organisation (which in fact also has the effect of terminating the operational licence), would necessarily result in the termination of the entities concerned.

5. Legal provisions indirectly influencing the applicants ’ property rights

19. After the date of issuing by the Savings Bank of mandatory risk management regulations regarding the subjects of the new law, including the Institutions, they will bear direct, joint and several liability, with all their equity, for the debts of all other members of the Integration Organisation, the debts of the Savings Bank and of the Integration Organisation itself, resulting in the abolition of the economic and financial independence of the particular institution.

20. The Integration Organisation is authorised to issue mandatory regulations for the subjects of the law covering essential issues regarding the operations of the Institutions, such as the accounting principles, internal control and eligibility of their managing officials. The Savings Bank is authorised to issue mandatory regulations covering essential, and other, issues regarding the operations of the Institutions, such as risk management, credit authorisation, risk monitoring, receipt of deposits, cash flow management, investment policy, rating and depreciation, special equity ratio requirements, business policy, joint marketing and integrated IT systems.

21. The Savings Bank supervises the operations of the Institutions and is authorised to issue instructions in order to ensure compliance with the law and the regulations issued by the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank.

22. At the general meeting of the Savings Bank held forty-five days following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the Institutions were obliged to approve the new articles of association of the Savings Bank – as drafted by the board of directors of the Integration Organisation – and also approve the increase of the Savings Banks ’ ca pital by HUF 654,986,000 to HUF 3,389,704,000 from the previous amount of HUF 2,735,038,000. Out of this capital increase, the State-owned Hungarian Post exercised its statutory subscription rights and acquired ordinary shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 654,666,000. The Institutions took series “C” preference shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 320,000. Hungarian Post was entitled to acquire the ordinary shares at par value, which was considerably less than the reasonable value based on the Savings Bank ’ s equity situation.

23. Several savings cooperatives and some banks held series “B” preference shares in the Savings Bank, ensuring that no decisions on strategic matters could be made without the approval of the holders of those shares. This approval could be given by a simple majority of shareholder votes. Under the integration legislation, the Institutions were obliged to deposit their series “B” Savings Bank shares with the Savings Bank, and sell them to the Hungarian Development Bank, an entity entirely owned by the State, by the date of the first general meeting of the Savings Bank following the entry into force of the Integration Act, as well as sign a written undertaking to take over one series of “C” preference shares of the Savings Bank with a par value of HUF 2,000. No such preference was represented by the series “C” shares which had to be taken over. The Hungarian Development Bank was entitled to exercise the rights attached to the series “B” shares acquired by it.

24. The Institutions could not transfer their shares in the Savings Bank within a year of the entry into force of the Integration Act; the shares could not be pledged at all, be used as security for credits, be subject to a number of other transactions, and had to be continuously kept with a depositary appointed by the board of directors of the Savings Bank. There are a number of situations in which the Institutions are not entitled to exercise their shareholder rights over their shares in the Savings Bank.

25. The Integration Act created a call option for the Hungarian Development Bank with respect to the shares of the Institutions in the Savings Bank in the event that they voted against the proposed resolutions on certain matters, abstained from voting or did not attend the general meeting. Bank accounts and securities accounts of the Institutions must be held at the Savings Bank, and they must keep their free financial assets solely in financial instruments traded by the Savings Bank. Other organisations holding bank accounts of the Institutions were obliged to terminate their banking agreements.

26. The Savings Bank has exclusive power to give prior approval to the acquisition of any stake by the Institutions in any other business entity or the sale of such property if its value or purchase price exceeds 0.1% of the solvency capital of the integration calculated on a consolidated basis. The Institutions must therefore obtain the approval of the Savings Bank for their investments on a case-by-case basis.

27. The Institutions must inform the Integration Organisation, the Savings Bank and the Mutual Capital Coverage Fund of Cooperative Credit Institutions ( Szövetkezeti Hitelintézetek Tőkefedezeti Közös Alapja ) without delay if claims or any other legal proceedings may be – or are – started against them. The Savings Bank is entitled to issue further regulations both to handle the above proceedings and regarding the obligations to provide information.

28. In certain cases the transactions and undertakings of the Institutions are subject to the prior approval of the Integration Organisation on a case ‑ by ‑ case basis.

29. The Institutions were obliged to apply to the Supervisory Authority for a new operational licence within twenty days of the entry into force of the Integration Act. They were also obliged to approve their new articles of association according to the model established by the board of directors of the Integration Organisation within forty-five days and to reobtain their operational licence within seventy-five days.

30. The Integration Organisation may, as a sanction applied for a number of reasons, exclude one of the Institutions from membership, which results in the withdrawal of the operational licence; moreover, the Integration Act includes several provisions directly stipulating that the Supervisory Authority may or must withdraw the operational licence, which results in liquidation. Under the Integration Act it is the Integration Organisation which is entitled to decide if the preconditions exist to apply a particular sanction.

6. Legal provisions regarding the exercise of the applicants ’ ownership rights

31. At the general meetings of the Institutions, the applicants, together with all other shareholders, were obliged to approve new articles of association in compliance with the model provided by the Integration Organisation. As a result, the Institutions were obliged to approve measures allegedly contrary to the provisions of the 2006 Companies Act and the 2006 Cooperatives Act. The applicants are from time to time obliged to amend, within sixty days, the articles of association of the Institutions in accordance with the then actual model issued by the Integration Organisation or the Savings Bank. In the event that the court keeping the corporate registry refuses to register the articles of association or its amendments as drafted by the Integration Organisation, the applicants and other owners must approve new articles of association according to a model established by the Integration Organisation, and the Institutions must submit the new text to the court within thirty days in full compliance with all relevant regulations.

32. Prior approval of the Savings Bank is required for all decisions by the shareholders over the election, revocation and remuneration of the members of the board of directors and supervisory board of the Institutions. The board of directors of the Savings Bank is authorised to suspend or terminate the mandate of the managing officials of the Institutions; it may appoint a managing official for an interim period if the Institutions do not comply with the orders of the Savings Bank, their operations are not in compliance with law or regulations, or if they are in a so-called crisis situation.

33. The Integration Organisation is entitled to suspend the applicants ’ voting rights for one year, if in its opinion they threaten the reliable and secure operation of the Institutions. It is authorised to define from time to time the level of the Institutions ’ solvency capitals on a case-by-case basis; if they do not reach the level defined, the Integration Organisation is authorised to increase the capital of the Institutions, even if the applicants and other owners have not decided on a capital increase, or even contrary to the resolution of the owners.

34. The applicants and other owners cannot pass a valid resolution at a general meeting of the Institutions if they do not simultaneously inform the Savings Bank of the general meeting by sending it the invitation with all its annexes. For a resolution by the board of directors and supervisory board of the Institutions to be valid, the invitation to the relevant meeting of the board of directors or supervisory board, together with all related material, must be simultaneously sent to the Savings Bank. The procedural rules of the board of directors and supervisory board of the Institutions must not conflict with the articles of association and the relevant regulations established by the Savings Bank and must be amended within fifteen days at and according to the request of the Savings Bank. Minutes of the general meetings and meetings of the board of directors of the Institutions must always be submitted to the Savings Bank, and minutes of the supervisory board meetings must be sent to the Savings Bank in certain cases.

35. The applicants ’ statutory rights as shareholders and members are restricted, in that the following measures regarding the Institutions are subject to the prior approval of the Savings Bank, and are taken solely according to that approval: the approval of Annual Reports; issuing of bonds, reductions or increases in its capital; and reductions in their subscribed capital or any payment that is made to them under any legal title that is connected to their status as owners (for example dividends or decreases in capital).

B . Relevant domestic law and practice

36. A constitutional challenge against the Integration Act as amended in November 2013 was first lodged by the OTSZ. That initial complaint was followed by complaints from 135 individuals (members of savings cooperatives), three cooperative credit institutions and a joint complaint submitted by banks.

They complained, among other things, about the restrictions imposed by the Integration Act on the exercise of shareholders ’ ownership rights and the diminution in value of their assets, amounting to expropriation.

37. In decision no. 20/2014 (VII.3) given on 30 June 2014, the Constitutional Court repealed some of the provisions of the Integration Act, concerning the joint and several liability of the cooperative credit institutions for the debts of other members of the Integration Organisation in so far as they determined the order of liability provided for by the Integration Act.

Otherwise, it upheld the constitutionality of the Integration Act.

38. Act IV of 2006 on Companies (as in force on 12 July 2013, a day before the Integration Act ’ s entry into force – “the 2006 Companies Act”) provided, in respect of a general meeting of a limited liability company as follows:

Section 231

“(1) The general meeting is the supreme body of a private company limited by shares, and consists of all shareholders.

(2) The following shall fall within the exclusive competence of the general meeting:

(a) decisions to approve and amend the articles of association, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;

(b) decisions on changing the operating form of the private limited company;

(c) decisions on converting or terminating the company without succession;

( d) with the exception of the provisions in section 37 (concerning the delegation of certain competences to the supervisory board), the election and removal of the members of the management board or the general director, members of the supervisory board and the auditor, and establishing their remuneration;

(e) approval of the annual report prepared pursuant to the Accounting Act;

( f) decisions to pay interim dividends, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;

(g) decisions to convert printed share certificates into dematerialised shares;

( h) alteration of the rights attached to the various series of shares, and the conversion of categories or classes of shares;

(i) decisions to issue convertible bonds or bonds with subscription rights, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;

( j) decisions to increase the share capital, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;

( k) decisions to reduce the share capital, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;

(l) decisions to abolish preferential subscription rights, or for authorising the management board for the exclusion or restriction of preferential subscription rights;

( m) decisions on all issues which are assigned to the competence of the general meeting by law or the articles of association.”

39. Act X of 2006 on Cooperatives (as in force on 12 July 2013, a day before the Integration Act ’ s entry into force – “the 2006 Cooperatives Act”) provided, in respect of a general meeting of cooperatives, as follows:

The General Meeting

Section 20

“ (1) The general meeting is the supreme body of a cooperative and consists of all members.

(2) The following shall fall within the competence of the general meeting:

(a) amendment of the statutes;

(b) election and removal of the chairman and members (managing director) of the administrative body, the chairman and members of the supervisory body, and establishing their remuneration;

(c) election and removal of the auditor and establishing his remuneration;

(d) transferring a certain part of the cooperative ’ s assets into the fellowship fund, and decisions on the general principles for the appropriation of the fellowship fund;

(e) approval of the annual report prepared pursuant to the Accounting Act, a decision regarding the appropriation of taxed profits;

(f) expulsion of members in the cases specified in the statutes, or a review of resolutions for expulsion;

(g) decisions for lodging any action in damages against an executive officer of the cooperative;

(h) decisions for joining a federation of cooperatives, or for withdrawing from it;

(i) decisions concerning the merger or demerger of the cooperative, conversion into a business association or winding up without legal succession;

(j) decisions for launching a petition for bankruptcy proceedings, and on the approval of a composition agreement;

(k) decisions for winding up the cooperative going into liquidation, and on the approval of a composition agreement reached during the liquidation proceedings;

(l) decisions for admitting an investor member, including an agreement with the investor member concerning the date and manner of settlement for the eventuality of termination of the investor ’ s membership;

(m) decisions for ordering supplementary payments;

(n) changing the face value of shares;

(o) where membership is terminated by either party, setting a date for the payment of any excess over the face value of shares, which shall be determined in the light of all other obligations of the cooperative no later than eight years after the date of termination of membership;

(p) all other matters referred to the competence of the general meeting by law or the statutes.”

COMPLAINT

40. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the cumulative effect of the legislative measures taken under the integration legislation enacted in 2013 in respect of the Institutions amounted to an unjustified interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions within the meani ng of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

THE LAW

41. The applicants complained about the impact which the integration legislation had had on the effective exercise of their rights as shareholders. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

42. The Government were of the view that the interference complained of complied with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The applicants disagreed.

A. Applicabili ty of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

43. The Court has consistently held that a company share with an economic value can be considered a possession (see, among other authorities, Company S. and T. v. Sweden , no. 11189/84, Commission decision of 11 December 1986, DR 50, p. 138; Reisner v. Turkey , no. 46815/09, § 45, 21 July 2015; Olczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 30417/96, § 60, 7 November 2002; Marini v. Albania , no. 3738/02, § 165, 18 December 2007 and Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine , no. 48553/99, § 91, ECHR 2002 ‑ VII). It is not in dispute in the present case that this provision was applicable to the circumstances of the case. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.

B. Victim status

44. The Government argued that the applicants had lost their victim status, as in decision no. 20/2014 the Constitutional Court had explicitly acknowledged that certain provisions of the Integration Act were unconstitutional. Although the Constitutional Court could not award any damages as a result of a judgment finding statutory provisions unconstitutional, it had explicitly acknowledged that in the present case certain provisions of the Integration Act were incompatible with the Constitution.

45. The applicants disagreed. They argued that the Constitutional Court had not repealed the provisions on which their case before the Court was based and they remained in effect. The only provisions deemed unconstitutional had been those which provided that cooperative credit institutions were jointly and severally liable for the debts of other members of the Integration Organisation. The decision of the Constitutional Court only affected the order of liability provided for by the Integration Act. That finding was relevant with respect to the Institutions, but had not affected the situation of the shareholders. The court had upheld all the provisions related to the restrictions imposed on the shareholders ’ ownership of shares.

46. The applicants further submitted that, in any event, by their very nature the proceedings before the Constitutional Court could not be deemed relevant for the purposes of the determination of victim status. That court could only establish an infringement of fundamental rights and repeal the offending provisions pro futuro . It had no power to provide just satisfaction to a successful applicant or prevent the past effects caused by the provisions prior to its own judgment finding them unconstitutional. No restitutio in integrum had been possible or effected under the judgment of that court, either in general or in the case relied on by the Government.

47. The Court reiterates that th e term “victim” used in Article 34 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission at issue (see, among other authorities, Eckle v. Germany , 15 July 1982, § 66, Series A no. 51 , and Vatan v. Russia , n o. 47978/99, § 48, 7 October 2004). A decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him or her of his or her status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010 and Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08 , § 128, ECHR 2012 ).

48. In the present case a number of individual shareholders and Institutions challenged the Integration Act unsuccessfully, save for the provisions concerning the order in which joint liability for the debts incurred by other members of the Integration Organisation was to be enforced. It has not been argued, let alone shown, that the judgment of the Constitutional Court offered any redress to the applicants.

This limb of the Government ’ s preliminary objection must therefore be rejected.

49. The Government were also of the view that the applicants could not be considered victims of a breach of their rights. They relied on the Court ’ s approach in the case of Agrotexim and Others v. Greece ( 24 October 1995, Series A no. 330 A). In their view, the shareholders in the Institutions could not claim to have been affected by the measures complained of because only the Institutions, not the shareholders themselves, had been affected by the Integration Act. Only the Institutions as separate legal entities could bring a case before the Court. They further referred to the Court ’ s view expressed in the same case that a mere loss of value of shares caused by an intervention would not be sufficient grounds for conferring victim status on shareholders of a company.

50. The Government also submitted that piercing the corporate veil in the present case would not be justified because the Institutions affected by the integration legislation would undoubtedly have been able to act as independent legal entities directly affected by the alleged violation. To sum up, they argued that the applicants as shareholders could not be identified with the companies affected by the legislation complained of.

51. The applicants disagreed with the view expressed by the Government. They submitted that the Integration Act had directly infringed their ownership rights as shareholders of credit institutions and that they were seriously restricted thereby.

52. The Court reiterates that a share in a company is a complex object which certifies that the holder possesses a share in the company together with the corresponding rights. This encompasses an indirect claim over the company ’ s assets, including the right to a share in them in the event of it being wound up, but also other unrestricted rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company ’ s conduct and policy (see Company S. and T. v. Sweden , Commission decision cited above; Reisner , cited above, § 45; Olczak , cited above, § 60; and Marini, cited above , § 165).

53. In certain circumstances the sole owner of a company can claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in so far as the impugned measures taken with regard to his or her company are concerned (see, among other authorities, Ankarcrona v. Sweden (dec.), no. 35178/97, 27 June 2000, and Glas Nadezh da EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria , no. 14134/02, § 40, ECHR 2007).

54. However, when that is not the case the disregarding of legal personality of a company can be justified only in exceptional circumstances, in particular where it is clearly established that it is impossible for the company to apply to the Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of incorporation or – in the event of liquidation – through its liquidators (see Agrotexim and Others , referred to above, § 66; CDI Holding Aktiengesellschaft and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 37398/97, 18 October 2001; Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia , no. 32283/04, § 66, 17 June 2008; and Veselá and Loyka v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 54811/00, 13 December 2005) or where the acts or decisions complained of related to the actions of persons such as a liquidator acting on the company ’ s behalf (see G.J. v. Luxembourg , no. 21156/93 , § 24, 26 October 2000) .

55. As to the latter type of situation, the Court reiterates that the case of Olczak v. Poland (cited above) concerned a bank in which the applicant held 98% of the shares. It was in very serious financial difficulties and the National Bank took over its management to prevent it from going bankrupt. The Court distinguished that case from the approach followed in Agrotexim and Others v. Greece , having regard , firstly, to the nature of the measures taken in that case. It noted that in the Agrotexim case the prohibition to build and the institution of expropriation proceedings were such that it was the company itself which was the direct victim, whereas in the Olczak case the measures complained of consisted of the cancellation of certain shares, including those belonging to the applicant; they were thus directly aimed at the applicant ’ s rights as a shareholder. Accordingly, it was the applicant ’ s rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which were directly affected.

56. Moreover, in the Agrotexim and Others case the measures complained of were to the detriment of the company, whereas in the Olczak case their purpose was, on the contrary, to prevent the bank from becoming insolvent. Consequently, the bank was to benefit from them, whereas the applicant ’ s interests suffered. The Court was satisfied that in the circumstances the applicant could claim to be a victim of a breach of the Convention.

57. The Court notes that in the present case, in so far as the Government relied on the Court ’ s approach in the case of Agrotexim and Others , the applicants did not complain about an actual loss of value of their shares in the affected Institutions. The thrust of their complaint was that, as a result of the series of legislative measures complained of, their powers resulting from their membership in the Institutions and powers to influence the Institutions ’ status and operations had been very seriously limited. While it is true that they also submitted that under the legislation complained of the Institutions themselves had lost all independence, this argument constitutes only a background to their essential complaint. The Court therefore considers that this limb of the Government ’ s objection as to the applicants ’ victim status is closely related to the substance of their complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It should therefore be joined to the merits of the case.

58. The Government also argued that the capit al increase and the further 136 billion forints that had been given by the State to the Integration Organisation (directly to the Integration Fund) also constituted a part of the Institutions ’ savings capital. Those amounts had to therefore to be considered as compensation because such a contribution decreased the business risk and increased the profitability of the Institutions.

59. The applicants argued that the increase only related to the economic situation of the Institutions and had not in any way improved the procedural situation regarding the exercise of their rights as shareholders to influence the Institutions ’ operations.

60. The applicants also argued that the amounts provided by the State towards the capital of the whole integrated system composed of various institutions had neither been directly nor indirectly provided to them themselves, but to the Savings Bank and to the Integration Organisation, over which they had no power or say. They therefore could not be considered as compensation; the Constitutional Court judgment relied on by the Government had mentioned compensation to the shareholders of the Savings Bank but not to them.

61. The Court considers that the Government ’ s objection in so far as it relates to the capital increase of the Savings Bank is also closely linked with the substance of the applicants ’ case and should therefore be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Shesti Ma i Engineering OOD and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 17854/04, § 68, 20 September 2011).

C. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

62. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to raise their complaints in the ordinary courts. They should have had recourse to a compensation claim to establish the civil liability of the legislature in respect of their complaints. The new Civil Code which had entered into force on 15 March 2015 had opened the door for them to such claims.

63. They also argued that the Integration (Amendment) Act which had entered into force on 30 November 2013 (see paragraph 14 above) had opened various avenues for legal remedies against the instructions of the Savings Bank and against individual decisions of that Bank and the Integration Organisation given pursuant to the Integration Act.

64. They also submitted that shareholders of Mohacsi and Kinizsi had sought a remedy in the domestic courts against the adoption of the new articles of association in respect of their Institutions, imposed on them under the provisions of the Integration Act. On 12 March 2015 the Pecs Regional Court of Appeal sitting as an appellate court had found for the plaintiffs in the case brought by Mohacsi shareholders. It had held that the articles of association issued by the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation could not in any way deviate from the mandatory provisions of the Companies Act. A judgment in the same vein had been given in a case brought by shareholders of Kinizsi by the Vesprem Re gional Court sitting as a first ‑ instance court on 30 March 2015. In both cases the articles of association challenged by the shareholders had been annulled.

65. The Government averred that several further sets of proceedings were pending before Hungarian courts in which Kinizsi or Mohácsi or their shareholders had sought a remedy against unspecified decisions of the Savings Bank or the Integration Organisation given on the basis of the Integration Act. That fact, in the Government ’ s opinion, clearly demonstrated that there were effective remedies in place.

66. They also argued that the National Association of Savings Cooperatives (OTSZ) had also initiated proceedings against the State, Hungarian Post, the Savings Bank, the Integration Organisation, the National Bank and the National Development Bank challenging the legislation concerned. The Budapest High Court had dismissed the claim, but had expressly declared that the State did not enjoy immunity for legislative acts. The proceedings were apparently still pending.

67. The applicants disagreed. They submitted that there was no remedy available for them under domestic law. They stressed that their complaints were related to violations which had arisen directly from the entry into force of the provisions of the Integration Act, not from any subsequent specific decisions or regulations given in respect of individual institutions on the basis of that Act. Certain applicants had challenged the offending provisions of that Act before the Constitutional Court, but to no avail.

68. As to the Government ’ s reliance on the 2013 Civil Code, the applicants submitted that the Government had neither referred to a concrete provision of that Code expressly providing for liability in tort in respect of damage caused by legislation nor provided any concrete examples of domestic judicial practice to the effect that the legislature could effectively be held liable in tort for such damage, either before the Code ’ s entry into force in 2015 or afterwards.

In any event, it was decisive that Article 54 of that Code ’ s transitional provisions expressly provided that the legislature ’ s liability in tort under the provisions of that Code could only arise in respect of acts following the Code ’ s date of entry into force, 15 March 2015. In the present case the damage complained of by the applicants had arisen in 2013 when the Integration Act had entered into force. It had therefore been impossible for them to claim any damages from the State under the Code for legislative damage caused to them by that Act.

69. The applicants also argued that the remedies referred to by the Government were only available to the Institutions themselves, not to the applicants as their shareholders, and, importantly, only in respect of situations where the actual measures taken on the basis of the Integration Act had not complied with that Act or with the policies or decisions issued by the Savings Bank or Integration Organisation. In the cases relied on by the Government the challenged measures had been repealed by the courts exclusively because they had found that the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank had exceeded the scope of the Integration Act when drafting the model statute and, as a result, the contested articles of association contained provisions contrary to the Companies Act.

70. In the applicants ’ view, neither those remedies nor the actual cases relied on by the Government (see paragraph 62 above) were legally relevant for their grievances before the Court. They could not offer redress for the alleged violations contained in and arising directly from the Integration Act itself which were at the core of the applicants ’ case before the Court. Moreover, since the entry into force of the 2013 Civil Code, which allowed derogation from the provisions of the Companies Act, the powers of the Savings Bank and Integration Organisation had become even wider in terms of determining the content of the articles of association.

71. The Court reiterates that it is a fundamental feature of the machinery of protection established by the Convention that it is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the Convention. It should not take on the role of Contracting States, whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected on a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is based on the assumption – reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged violation. The rule is therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of protection (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia [GC], no. 17153/11, § 69, 25 March 2014).

72. States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among many authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions , 1996 IV, and Vučković and Others , cited above, § 70).

73. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others , cited above, § 66, and Vučković and Others , cited above, § 71). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 46, ECHR 2006 II).

74. In the present case the Court observes that the crux of the applicants ’ complaint was that the violation of their rights guaranteed by Articl e 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had arisen directly from the provisions of the Integration Act as amended in November 2013 in so far as it had brought about a situation in which their position and rights as shareholders and members of the Institutions to influence the Institutions had been negatively affected by that Act. The relevant provisions of that Act were challenged before the Constitutional Court, which confirmed the compatibility with the Constitution of that legislation (with the exception of certain provisions concerning the joint and several liability of the Institutions). Hence, this challenge proved unsuccessful.

75. In so far as the Government referred to the judicial remedies available to the Institutions, those remedies do not concern the applicants ’ rights, but those of the Institutions.

76. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that it is possible under domestic law for the shareholders of the Institutions to judicially challenge individual decisions affecting the functioning of the Institutions issued by bodies created under the Integration Act. It further notes the Government ’ s argument that proceedings launched by certain shareholders of Kinizsi and Mohacsi were apparently still pending before the domestic courts. However, not only did the Government not submit any details concerning the judgments given in those cases to the Court, but also no arguments were advanced to counter the applicants ’ argument that only claims which could successfully be raised in such proceedings are those which contest the compatibility of the contested decisions with the Integration legislation itself. Hence, they do not provide for the shareholders a suitable avenue for the purposes of challenging the Integration Act as such, in so far as it negatively impacted their membership and shareholder rights in a manner incompatible with the guarante es of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

77. In particular, the Government failed to show how a civil action for damages, without a preliminary finding of unconstitutionality of the contested provisions, could have been successful in the light of the domestic case-law, according to which damage potentially resulting from legislation did not create a relationship of civil liability between the lawmaker and the alleged victim (see Vékony v. Hungary , no. 65681/13, § 17, 13 January 2015, and Erményi v. Hungary , no. 22254/14, § 28, 22 November 2016 ). It is noted in this connection that in any event the judgment of the Constitutional Court essentially upheld the compatibility with the Constitution of the Integration Act, save for the provisions concerning the order of joint liability of the Institutions for the debts incurred by other members of the Integration Organisation.

78. It has not been shown that any further remedies were available to the applicants to complain against the effects that the Integration Legislation had on their rights.

79. It follows from the above that the Government objection concerning non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.

D. Conclusion

80. The Court considers, in the light of the parties ’ submissions, that the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits, at which stage the Court will also address the question of whether the applicants may claim to be “victims”, under Article 34 of the Convention, of the facts complained of.

81. The Court concludes therefore that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 1 of the Convention;

Decides to join the examination of the second and third limb of the Government ’ s objection about the lack of the applicants ’ victim status to the merits of the case;

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

Done in English and notified in writing on 27 April 2017 .

Marialena Tsirli Ganna Yudkivska Registrar President

Appendix

N o .

Firstname LASTNAME

Birth date

Place of residence

Józsefné ALBERT

17/04/1935

Szentjakabfa

Judit Terézia ÁDÁMNÉ GÁSZ

18/11/1968

Kecskemet

Zoltán AGG

26/07/1975

Mohács

Erzsébet AMBERGNÉ SCHUMACHER

11/04/1948

Nagyvázsony

József AUTH

02/12/1943

Somberek

Józsefné AUTH

12/09/1945

Somberek

Katalin BALI

31/05/1941

Mohács

Gábor BARTA

11/11/1951

Véménd

Antalné BAUMGARTNER

01/12/1951

Véménd

József Antal BECK

27/07/1954

Babarc

József BECKER

03/07/1961

Babarc

Mihály BELVARACZ

13/07/1939

Mohács

Józsefné BICSERDI

22/06/1947

Lánycsók

Ádámné BODA

19/11/1949

Kisnyárád

Márta BOGDÁN

22/08/1958

Zánka

Endre BOKAY

25/05/1954

Pécs

Istvánné BOKROS

24/12/1951

Somberek

István BUBREG

08/11/1942

Mohács

Istvánné BUBREG

26/01/1946

Mohács

Krisztina BUBREGNÉ HARIS

28/08/1977

Mohács

Eszter BUCHER

14/11/1977

Pécs

Tamás BUCHER

30/03/1986

Mohács

Gyula CSANÁDI

23/12/1940

Mohács

László Gyula CSANÁDI

28/04/1967

Mohács

Ferenc CSEH

10/12/1947

Szentantalfa

Eszter CSIZMADIA

22/05/1968

Pécs

Gergely DARDAI

09/05/1952

Véménd

Gergelyné DARDAI

31/07/1956

Véménd

Istvánné DÁVID

12/02/1959

Palotabozsok

Gyula DOMBAI

17/11/1939

Somberek

Imre László DOMONKOS

05/03/1962

Keszü

Andrea DOMONKOSNÉ GÁSZ

18/09/1965

Vemend

Dezső EJHINGER

23/09/1935

Ajka

Éva GELLÉRT

08/10/1954

Mohács

Endre Bertalan FABIAN

22/04/1951

Nemesvámos

Istvánné FACSKO

17/08/1935

Mohács

László FADDI

23/08/1961

Pécs

Mária Márta FEKETE DR.

17/12/1940

Budapest

József Attilane FIRÉNYI

03/04/1955

Lánycsók

György FISCHER

28/03/1956

Dunaszekcső

Gábor FLODUNG

22/03/1970

Palotabozsok

Bence FLORIÁN

18/03/1983

Veszprém

Dóra FLORIÁN

22/12/1978

Veszprém

Gyula György FLORIÁN

10/12/1943

Veszprém

István Flórián FODOR

11/08/1946

Tótvázsony

András FOLBERT

23/04/1959

Mohács

József FRISCHMANN

12/10/1951

Mohács

Andrásné GASZ

17/09/1942

Véménd

Judit GERGELY

22/12/1964

Mohács

Tibor GERGELY

16/04/1960

Mohács

Orsolya Erzsébet GILLY

05/03/1964

Mohács

Péter István GINTER

20/08/1938

Palotabozsok

Györgyi GROB

09/07/1952

Mohács

Éva Irén GYIMESI

01/12/1962

Bonyhád

Jánosné GYIMESI

05/02/1942

Palotabozsok

József GYŐRI

17/11/1934

Somberek

József János HADRA

03/01/1959

Lánycsók

Zsolt HAFNER

15/05/1970

Mohács

István HAGEN

06/04/1972

Mohács

János István HAGEN

20/08/1938

Mohács

Ernő HARCZ

06/04/1944

Mohács

Zoltán Elek HARDI

Öcs

Károly HEGYI

12/05/1942

Ajka

Zoltán András HEILIG

01/03/1956

Tótvázsony

Hanna HEIRICH

05/07/1982

Véménd

József HEIRICH

26/03/1962

Véménd

Józsefné HEIRICH

27/09/1956

Véménd

József HELLEBRAND

19/09/1961

Palotabozsok

Józsefné HELLEBRAND

17/04/1965

Palotabozsok

János HENGL

13/11/1954

Mohács

József HIGLI

Balatoncsicsó

Györgyne HOFFMANN

23/02/1932

Babarc

Józsefné HOLOCSI

17/09/1943

Somberek

Etele Péterne HORVÁTH

21/01/1959

Véménd

Judit HUNYADINE TOTH

03/12/1955

Mohács

László György HUPPERT

09/10/1955

Majs

Konrad HÃœTTNER

31/05/1951

Lánycsók

Bence Ferenc ILLÉS

12/12/1989

Lánycsók

Zsuzsanna ILLÉSNÉ HENGL

19/01/1964

Lánycsók

József JAKAB

07/04/1944

Szebény

László Sándor JÓNÁS

16/10/1949

Mohács

Attila JORDAN

03/05/1970

Palotabozsok

Klára Katalin JORDÁNNÉ KOVÁCS

09/12/1974

Palotabozsok

Krisztina JORDÁNNÉ KRESZ

16/01/1970

Palotabozsok

Béla JUHOS

29/12/1940

Mohács

Béláné JUHOS

24/08/1942

Mohács

Erzsébet JUNG

10/12/1954

Veszprém

Ferenc KAISER

18/03/1948

Székelyszabar

Anita KAJTAR

26/07/1972

Pécs

Csaba KAJTAR

31/10/1974

Pécsvárad

István KAPONYI

09/06/1942

Mohács

Kálmánne KARADI

26/11/1962

Pécs

László Józsefné KERN

27/03/1955

Lánycsók

Attila KESZLER

04/05/1969

Romonya

Gyöngyi Anna KETTNÉ ROTT

13/05/1963

Mohács

Gyuláné KINCSES

13/05/1926

Veszprém

Klára Ilona KINCSES

25/05/1953

Veszprém

Károly KIS

07/04/1953

Mohács

István KISS

17/08/1947

Palotabozsok

Sándor KISS-SEBOK

22/07/1946

Balatonfüred

Zoltán György KLIEBERT

29/09/1952

Babarc

Attila KOSTYAK

01/04/1979

Mohács

Gábor KOVÁCS

12/11/1945

Szentantalfa

Gábor Attila KOVÁCS

22/11/1979

Szentantalfa

Gáborné KOVÁCS

14/10/1952

Szentantalfa

János KOVÁCS

25/08/1940

Mohács

Miklós KOVÁCS

13/12/1951

Göröcsönydoboka

Andrásné KRAFT

22/09/1949

Himesháza

Ádám KRAMMER

30/08/1953

Bátaszék

Rita KULTNE MATYAS

09/03/1956

Mohács

Sándor KURUCZ

13/11/1965

Veszprém

Antal LAKATOS

06/08/1963

Veszprém

Antal LAKATOS

13/11/1986

Veszprém

Balazs LAKATOS

04/09/1990

Veszprém

Eszter LAKATOS

15/07/1985

Budapest

Éva LAKATOS

24/11/1960

Budapest

Judit LAKATOS

17/12/1986

Budapest

Péter LAKATOS

29/06/1985

Budapest

László Antalné LESCHING

10/09/1949

Mohács

János LINK

28/06/1960

Geresdlak

Ádám LOVÁSZ

17/04/1992

Bóly

Ildikó Anna LOVÁSZ

13/06/1964

Bóly

József LOVÁSZ

26/04/1961

Bóly

József MARKOVICS

16/03/1943

Mohács

Lazarne MARTON

28/07/1951

Gárdony

Attila Vince MATRAI

22/12/1953

Mohács

Zoltán MEZEY

19/07/1947

Mohács

Lajos MOD

02/10/1942

Mohács

Károly MOLNÁR

29/01/1945

Dunaszekcső

Mártonné MOLNÁR

21/02/1953

Veszprém

János MORO

17/03/1954

Zánka

Jánosné MORO

25/10/1956

Zánka

Ambrus MÃœLLER

01/12/1938

Mohács

János MUTH

22/04/1952

Geresdlak

Béláné NAGY

11/02/1952

Lánycsók

Emilné NAGY

26/02/1936

Pécs

Gáborné NAGY

Nemesvámos

Lajos NAGY

26/10/1939

Kapolcs

László József NAGY

30/04/1957

Nagyvázsony

Norbert NAGY

08/04/1982

Mohács

Sándor Imrene NAGY

26/09/1955

Mohács

István NÉMETVARGA

13/02/1962

Homorúd

Gabriella NYÍRŐNÉ PANGHY

22/10/1960

Somberek

István Gábor NYÚL

22/09/1968

Mohács

István János NYÚL

24/12/1940

Mohács

István Jánosné NYÚL

28/12/1938

Mohács

Zoltán István NYÚL

17/02/1967

Pécs

Robert PAIZS

20/01/1978

Pécs

Zoltán PAKUSZA

29/08/1954

Székelyszabar

Endre Kálmán PAP

10/07/1941

Budapest

Endre Tamás PAP

26/04/1972

Budapest

Zita Mária PAP

Budapest

Gábor PAPP

03/10/1972

Veszprém

Gáborné PAPP

28/08/1979

Veszprém

László PAVEL

21/05/1963

Mohács

Gábor PAVKOVICS

11/10/1969

Mohács

Tamás PAVKOVICS

31/07/1968

Mohács

Erika Anna PAVKOVICSNÉ HEGEDŰS

10/08/1969

Mohács

Gitta Szilvia PAVKOVICSNÉ SZÜCS

28/01/1971

Mohács

Gyuláné PÉTER

15/03/1959

Somberek

József PÉTER

24/02/1939

Palotabozsok

Alexandra PETHES

21/10/1989

Véménd

Csaba PETHES

25/06/1985

Véménd

Csaba Sándor PETHES

01/06/1958

Véménd

Csaba Sándorne PETHES

19/08/1967

Véménd

Balazs PETHŐ

17/03/1977

Balatonfüred

Csaba PETHŐ

09/06/1979

Balatonfüred

Jenő PETHŐ

Balatonfüred

Ágnes PETHŐNÉ SCHULCZ

23/08/1956

Balatonfüred

Éva Mária PETZ

01/03/1961

Mohács

Balazs PINTÉR

04/04/1977

Balatonfüred

Péter PINTÉR

03/05/1975

Aszófő

Sándor PINTÉR

21/03/1945

Aszófő

Renata Ildikó PONGRACZNE KOVÁCS

25/11/1977

Szentantalfa

Györgyne PURMANN

04/01/1958

Somberek

Edina Zsuzsanna RAPPAL

12/11/1962

Mohács

Benjamin RITZL

11/12/1991

Somberek

Jánosné RITZL

11/03/1957

Göröcsönydoboka

József RITZL

29/06/1968

Somberek

Anita RITZLNÉ AUTH

27/02/1971

Somberek

Albert ROSTA

15/10/1951

Ajka

Szilvia SAJNOVICSNÉ PAPP

09/08/1973

Pécs

András SCHAFFER

27/06/1984

Mohács

Judit SCHAFFER

04/09/1987

Mohács

Robert SCHAFFER

23/08/1954

Mohács

Ferenc János SCHAUER

03/10/1948

Somberek

András SCHMALCZ

30/11/1984

Pécs

Ádámné SCHMIDT

04/08/1952

Mohács

Éva SCHMIDTNÉ MARI

03/05/1971

Dunaszekcső

Dezső SCHWOY

26/10/1960

Mohács

Zsolt Dénesné SIMONYI

31/01/1950

Pécs

Ákos STADLER

20/02/1979

Veszprém

Emese Gabriella STADLER

15/05/1969

Veszprém

Ferenc János STADLER

10/07/1946

Nemesvámos

Gábor STADLER

26/05/1970

Veszprém

László STEIXNER

26/05/1946

Szentjakabfa

Jánosné STOLCZ

23/01/1959

Geresdlak

Antal STRENNER

12/07/1963

Veszprém

Zoltánné STRENNER

04/10/1935

Veszprém

István SVEGER

27/08/1952

Mohács

Lajos SZALAY

28/01/1939

Balatonszőlős

Zoltán Tamás SZARKA

11/01/1967

Pécs

Béláné SZEKERES

08/11/1946

Révfülöp

Károly Péter SZIROM

02/04/1953

Pécs

József SZOMBATI

10/01/1943

Nagyvázsony

Józsefné SZOMBATI

27/01/1949

Nagyvázsony

János Tiborné TAKÁCS

28/10/1953

Lánycsók

László TAKÁCS

02/04/1964

Palotabozsok

Ferencné TAKÁCS NAGY

27/04/1964

Somberek

Márianna TAKÁCSNE HIGLI

13/09/1966

Veszprém

Katalin TAKÁCSNE OBERT

08/10/1964

Palotabozsok

Jánosné TILL

19/01/1953

Véménd

Gábor Tamás TORJAY

03/12/1969

Mohács

Gábor TÓTH

03/02/1955

Révfülöp

Gabriella TÓTHNE NYÍRŐ

13/07/1981

Szekszárd

József TRAPP

21/01/1957

Palotabozsok

Józsefné TRAPP

17/04/1960

Palotabozsok

József TROSZT

23/11/1961

Göröcsönydoboka

Gabriella TUTTINE MERKLER

28/09/1967

Kölked

Lászlóné VAJDA

25/09/1959

Veszprém

György Sándor VARGA

29/07/1948

Lánycsók

LÅ‘rinc VARGA

Nemesvámos

Péter Ferenc VARGA

12/06/1952

Mohács

Antalné VÁRHEGYI

17/01/1947

Lánycsók

Gyula VASS

Zánka

Gyuláné VASS

27/11/1954

Zánka

László VEINER

09/05/1980

Zánka

Tivadar VILLÁNYI

29/04/1958

Veszprém

György János WERNER

29/09/1950

Mohács

János WERNER

14/04/1954

Himesháza

Jánosné WERNER

09/04/1959

Himesháza

István ZAB

21/04/1963

Lánycsók

Orsolya ZEILER

13/01/1973

Romonya

Mihály ZOMBIK

24/07/1954

Nemesvámos

Nóra ZOMBIK

26/03/1987

Nemesvámos

Györgyné ZSIFKOVICS

03/03/1939

Lánycsók

János ZSOLDOS

Balatonszepezd

[1] At the time of lodging the application the exchange rate was 1 EUR = 298 HUF.