FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 73944/11 Lyudmyla Konstyantynivna KANEVSKA against Ukraine

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 17 November 2020 as a Chamber composed of:

Síofra O ’ Leary, President, Ganna Yudkivska, Jovan Ilievski, Lado Chanturia, Ivana Jelić, Arnfinn Bårdsen, Mattias Guyomar, judges, and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 November 2011,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Ms Lyudmyla Konstyantynivna Kanevska, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Odessa. She was represented before the Court by Mr V. Voronkov, a lawyer practising in Odessa.

2 . The Government were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr I. Lishchyna.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . On 15 July 2003 Mr M. became the owner of a two-room flat in Odessa following a deed of gift from his mother. As he lived in Mykolayiv, he chose to let the flat.

5 . On 19 December 2003 a person, who presented himself as Mr M. and produced to a notary in Odessa a passport in confirmation thereof, gave a power of attorney to a certain Mr Shch., authorising him to dispose of the flat in question. The notary certified that power of attorney and then entered its data in the register of powers of attorney.

6 . Meanwhile, at the end of 2003, the applicant and her husband decided to sell their flat in the city centre and to buy a cheaper one on the outskirts. The applicant had twice undergone surgery for cancer by that time and needed money to continue her treatment. Furthermore, her doctors had recommended that she move to a ground floor flat given her state of health.

7 . On 26 January 2004 Mr Shch., using the above power of attorney and a duplicate of Mr M. ’ s title document (deed of gift), sold the flat to Ms Sh. A notary certified the relevant transaction and Mr Sh. then registered her title to the flat with the Bureau of Technical Inventory (“the BTI”), a local real-property registration authority at the material time.

8 . On 5 March 2004 Ms Sh. in turn sold the flat to the applicant and her husband. In accordance with domestic law, the applicant and her husband thus became its co-owners as spouses. According to the applicant ’ s domestic submissions, the flat was in a dilapidated condition and they invested in repairs to it more than five times the price for which they had bought it. On the same day the applicant certified the above contract with a notary and on 12 March 2004 registered her property title to the flat with the BTI.

9 . On 11 March 2004 Mr M. visited the flat and found out, to his surprise, about the above transactions. He complained to the police that he had never authorised anyone to sell the flat. He submitted that he had been living in another city and his tenant had kept telling him that everything had been fine until a few months earlier when Mr M. had not been able to reach him. As a result, a criminal case was opened in respect of fraud.

10 . In August 2005 Mr M. lodged a claim with the Suvorovskyy District Court of Odessa (“the District Court”) against Mr Shch., Ms Sh., the applicant and her husband, seeking the invalidation of the above-mentioned contracts of sale, removal of obstacles to the exercise of his rights as the owner and eviction of the applicant and her husband. Mr M. stated, in particular, that the power of attorney given to Mr Shch. had been signed by an unspecified person with a forged passport.

11 . On 6 March 2007 a forensic handwriting analysis concluded that the signature on the power of attorney of 19 December 2003 had not belonged to Mr M. The identity of the person who had presented himself as Mr Shch. was not established. The whereabouts of the tenant to whom Mr M. had rented the flat were unknown.

12 . On 7 November 2011 the criminal investigation was stayed as it appeared impossible to identify the perpetrators. On 19 October 2012 the prosecutors quashed the decision to stay the investigation and gave relevant instructions to the investigators. As is apparent from the applicant ’ s submissions there has been no final decision in the criminal proceedings.

13 . On 25 July 2007 the District Court rejected Mr M. ’ s claim. It heard evidence from the three notaries who had certified the power of attorney to Mr Shch. and the two contracts of sale, and who had not discerned any irregularities. The court considered that Mr M. had himself been negligent as regards the flat tenancy. This circumstance also meant that Mr M. had lost possession of the flat of his own free will and with his knowledge. Furthermore, given that the criminal investigation into the matter had not been completed, there was no conclusive evidence that the flat had been disposed of by fraud, as alleged by Mr M. At the same time, it was not disputed that Ms Sh. and the applicant and her husband were bona fide purchasers of the flat.

14 . On 6 November 2007 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the judgment of 25 July 2007 and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. Following an appeal in cassation against the ruling of 6 November 2007 lodged by the applicant ’ s husband ’ s representative, Ms B., on 9 April 2008 the Supreme Court quashed it and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination. On 6 June 2008 the latter court again quashed the judgment of 25 July 2007 and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. Following an appeal in cassation lodged by Ms B. against the ruling of 6 June 2008, on 14 January 2009 the Supreme Court quashed it and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination.

15 . On 15 July 2009 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 25 July 2007 and adopted a new one allowing Mr M. ’ s claim. It stated that the lower court had wrongfully decided that Mr M. had lost possession of the flat lawfully, on the basis of the tenancy contract, because that contract had not provided for a transfer of property title to the object of the tenancy. It had also erred in concluding that the flat had left Mr M. ’ s possession of his own free will, with his knowledge and owing to his own negligence. It noted that it had been established that on 19 December 2003 an unspecified person had presented himself as Mr M. and had given the power of attorney to Mr Shch., who had then sold it to Ms Sh., who had in turn sold it to the applicant. The whereabouts of the above person and Mr Shch. had not been established. The court further referred to Article 388 § 1 (3) of the Civil Code, which entitled the owner of the property to recover it from the bona fide purchaser in certain cases (see paragraph 28 below). It also relied on Article 391 of the Code, under which the owner of the property could demand the removal of obstacles to the exercise by him or her of the right to use and dispose of that property. It thus allowed the claim, invalidated the contracts of 26 January and 5 March 2004 and obliged the applicant and her husband “not to put obstacles [to Mr M. ’ s] use of the flat”.

16 . On 24 July 2009 Ms B., the applicant ’ s husband ’ s legal representative, appealed in cassation against the above judgment, submitting that the applicant and her husband had not breached the law, the disputed flat was their only accommodation and that they had no means for buying another one. She also relied on the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of 28 April 1978 (see paragraph 36 below), arguing that it was a duty, rather than right, of the court which invalidated a contract also to order restitution under that contract. However, the Court of Appeal had not resolved the questions of restitution, of the possibility to order it in the present case and, more generally, of the return to the applicant and her husband of the money they had paid for the flat. Lastly, Ms B. submitted that Mr M. had lost his passport on an unspecified date, but had informed the police thereof only in May 2004. She argued therefore that in December 2003, when the power of attorney had been given, his passport had been used with consent, even if not by himself.

17 . On 25 May 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal in cassation, holding that the Court of Appeal had correctly found that Mr M. had not concluded the contract of sale of 26 January 2004 with Ms Sh., under which the latter had become the owner of the disputed flat. Therefore the disputed flat had left Mr M. ’ s possession against his will and he was entitled to recover it from the bona fide purchaser. The court did not address the issue of recovery of the price paid.

18 . As the applicant and her husband refused to leave the flat, Mr M. asked the Court of Appeal to adopt an additional decision ordering their eviction. He also stated that the bailiffs had not been able to carry out their eviction because the judgment of 15 July 2009 had not contained an eviction order.

19 . On 26 October 2011 the court allowed his application. It held that Mr M. had not withdrawn his claim in respect of the eviction of the applicant ’ s family during the examination of the case and the issue of their eviction had been examined by it. However, as that issue had not been included in the operative part of the judgment of 15 July 2009, in its additional decision it had ordered the eviction of the applicant ’ s family from the flat.

20 . On 17 November 2011 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the above-mentioned decision and informed the applicant and her husband that they had to leave the flat voluntarily by 2 December 2011, failing which they would be forcedly evicted from it.

21 . On 25 November 2011 the applicant appealed in cassation to the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court (“the Higher Specialised Court”) against the additional decision of 26 October 2011.

22 . On 30 November 2011 the latter court suspended the enforcement proceedings in respect of that decision pending the examination of the applicant ’ s appeal in cassation against it.

23 . In her observations on the admissibility and merits of the case the applicant claimed that on 30 December 2011 she and her husband had been forced to surrender the keys to the flat to unspecified “criminals” – who had allegedly been acting on the instructions of Mr M. ’ s wife – and to leave the flat. They had since been living with their friends or acquaintances. It is not clear from the applicant ’ s above submissions whether she had complained about the events of 30 December 2011 before any domestic authority and, if so, what the outcome had been.

24 . On 11 May 2012 the Higher Specialised Court allowed the applicant ’ s appeal in cassation against the additional decision of 26 October 2011, quashed it and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination. It noted that in that decision the Court of Appeal had not provided persuasive reasons for its conclusion that the judgment of 15 July 2009 had resolved the question of eviction. Although that decision had stated that the said question had been examined by the Court of Appeal, the reasoning of the above-mentioned judgment did not contain any substantiation as to the necessity to evict the applicant ’ s family. Nor did that judgment refer to any provisions of domestic law in that connection.

25 . Following a fresh examination of the case, on 11 September 2012 the Court of Appeal rejected Mr M. ’ s application for an additional decision. It found that Mr M. had subsequently amended his initial claim, that the audio records of the hearing of the court which had adopted the judgment of 15 July 2009 had not contained any information that the issue of eviction had been examined by the court and that no conclusion had been made in that connection in the reasoning of that judgment.

26 . By a letter of 9 November 2012, the regional prosecutor informed the applicant that, even though on 17 November 2011 the bailiffs had opened enforcement proceedings for her and her husband ’ s eviction, on 19 December 2011 they had suspended them pursuant to the Higher Specialised Court ruling of 30 November 2011. Given that on 11 May 2012 the Higher Specialised Court had quashed the additional decision of 26 October 2011, on 7 June 2012 the bailiffs had terminated the enforcement proceedings. Therefore, owing to the quashing of the decision of 26 October 2011, which had ordered the applicant ’ s family ’ s eviction, no action could or would be taken by the bailiffs to enforce that decision.

27 . Article 216 § 1 of the Code provides that an invalid contract does not create any legal consequences, except for those related to its invalidity. Should a contract be declared invalid, each party must return to the other party the proceeds received under that contract.

28 . Article 388 § 1 (3) deals with rei vindicatio claims ( віндикаційний позов ; recovery of property by its owner from a bona fide purchaser) and provides that if the property has been purchased for a price from a person who had no right to alienate it, and the purchaser was unaware and could not have been aware of that (a bona fide purchaser), the owner is entitled to recover that property from the purchaser only if it left the owner in the absence of intention on her or his part to divest her or himself of it.

29 . Article 390 § 4 provides that a bona fide purchaser is entitled to claim from the owner of a recovered property the cost of improvements he or she made to that property, if those improvements cannot be separated from the property .

30 . Section 5 of the Act, as worded at the material time, provided, inter alia , that a notary was obliged to facilitate the exercise by individuals of their rights and protection of their interests, and to refuse to perform a notarial act if it was not in conformity with domestic law or international treaties.

31 . Section 43 provided that in performing a notarial act a notary was obliged to check the identity of an individual or his or her representative, who requested the performance of the notarial act. Such identification was to be done by passport or other documents, which would exclude any doubts as to the identity of the relevant individual.

32 . Section 45 provided, inter alia , that in notarising a deed a notary was obliged to check the authenticity of the signatures of its participants and other persons who requested the performance of a notarial act.

33 . This Regulation (“the 2002 Regulation”; adopted on 7 February 2002; lost force on 14 December 2012), as worded at the material time, set out the procedure for registration of rights to real property in Ukraine and provided that it was aimed at ensuring the recognition and protection of such rights (section 1.1). The registration of real-property rights was compulsory and was carried out by bureaux of technical inventory (communal enterprises) and their registrars (sections 1.3 and 1.5). At its core, a BTI registrar made an entry in the register of real-property rights following the emergence, existence or termination of such rights (section 1.4). The register was maintained by the Ministry of Justice (section 1.9). In registering real-property rights the BTI registrar was obliged to establish the conformity of the claimed rights and submitted documents with legal requirements as well as the absence of contradictions between the claimed and already registered rights to real property or of other grounds for refusing the registration of such rights, following which he or she adopted a decision on the registration or refusal of the registration of real-property rights (section 3.1).

34 . On 1 July 2004 Parliament adopted the State Registration of Real Property Rights Act, which defined the State registration of real-property rights as an official recognition and confirmation by the State of the facts of emergence, transfer or termination of such rights by way of making a relevant entry in the register (section 2). On 11 February 2010 the Act was amended to provide that the State guaranteed the veracity of the registered real-property rights (section 3). On 1 January 2016 the Act was amended again to provide that the State guaranteed the objectivity, veracity and completeness of the data concerning registered real-property rights (section 3).

35 . On 17 May 2004 the 2002 Regulation was amended to the effect that the words “registration of real-property rights” contained in its title and text were amended into “State registration of real-property rights”. On 28 July 2010 it was further amended. In particular, it contained the same definition of the State registration of the real-property rights as that in the 2004 Act.

36 . In its Resolution on the court practice in cases concerning invalidation of contracts of 28 April 1978 (“the 1978 Resolution”) (lost effect on 6 November 2009) the Plenary Supreme Court stated that some courts did not take into account that questions of invalidation of contracts and application of relevant consequences had to be resolved in the same proceedings, owing to which they did not indicate in their judgments such consequences. It thus held that in allowing a claim for invalidation of a contract the court had, in the same judgment, to rule on the consequences provided for by law and, unless otherwise provided for by law, to oblige each party to return to the other one everything received under the contract.

37 . In the Analysis ( узагальнення ) of the court practice concerning invalidation of contracts of 24 November 2008 (“the 2008 Analysis”) the Supreme Court held that in invalidating contracts the courts had to ensure the legal consequences specified in Article 216 § 1 of the Civil Code. It further held that in allowing a rei vindicatio claim, the courts had to resolve the question of recovery in favour of a bona fide purchaser of the outlay in purchasing a property. The expenses had to be recovered from a party who had received money under the invalidated contract.

38 . As the domestic case-law shows, in allowing a rei vindicatio claim some courts resolve, in the same judgment, the question of the recovery in favour of bona fide purchasers of their outlay in acquiring the property. Thus, in its decision of 21 November 2012 (case no. 52/250) the Higher Commercial Court quashed the lower courts ’ decisions to allow a rei vindicatio claim and remitted the case for fresh examination. Referring to the 2008 Analysis, it held that in allowing a rei vindicatio claim the courts had to resolve the question of the recovery in favour of a bona fide purchaser of the outlay in purchasing a property. Also, in a judgment of 10 June 2019 (case no. 607/20777/18), upheld on appeal on 6 November 2019, the Ternopil City Court allowed a rei vindicatio claim and, referring in substance to the 2008 Analysis, ordered recovery in favour of a bona fide purchaser of the money he had paid for a flat to its seller. Other courts considered that, in cases allowing a rei vindicatio claim, a bona fide purchaser was entitled to lodge a separate claim against a seller of the property, either under Article 661, which provided for the responsibility of a seller in cases of reclamation of goods from a buyer (Resolution no. 5 of the Plenary Higher Specialised Court on the court practice in cases concerning the protection of property rights of 7 February 2014) or under Article 1212 of the Civil Code, which dealt with the acquisition or keeping of property without sufficient legal grounds (decision of 16 May 2018 adopted by the Supreme Court in case no. 761/9171/15-ц).

COMPLAINTS

39 . The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that her “right to home” had been breached on account of the annulment of the contract of sale of 3 March 2004 and, in substance under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that she had been deprived of the flat, which she had acquired in good faith and in accordance with domestic law. The applicant also raised a related complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.

THE LAW

40 . The Court considers that, in view of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 23 - 26 above, the complaint regarding the flat falls to be examined only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

(a) The Government

41 . With reference to Article 388 § 1 (3) of the Civil Code, the Government submitted that the Court of Appeal had found that Mr M. had lost possession of the disputed flat as a result of unlawful actions. They further submitted that as under Article 216 of the Code (see paragraph 27 above) an invalid contract did not create any legal consequences for its parties, the courts had therefore invalidated the relevant contracts of sale. Accordingly, Ms Sh. and the applicant had never acquired the property title to the flat at issue on a lawful basis and the applicant could not claim that she had victim status for the purposes of her complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

42 . The Government furthermore noted that the appeals in cassation against the rulings of 6 November 2007 and 6 June 2008 (see paragraph 14 above) had been lodged by Ms B., the applicant ’ s husband ’ s representative, and not by the applicant. There was no power of attorney in the case file issued by the applicant in respect of her husband or Ms B. to represent her interests. The Government thus argued that the applicant ’ s complaint had been “manifestly groundless” since she had not appealed in cassation against the above decisions and had not exhausted all domestic remedies. Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies also because she had not lodged a counterclaim against Mr M. with a demand for pecuniary compensation. Accordingly, she had not provided the domestic courts with an opportunity to examine the claim for compensation for damage inflicted as a result of invalidation of the contract of sale. The Government thus invited the Court to reject the applicant ’ s complaint as inadmissible.

(b) The applicant

43 . The applicant submitted that she had been registered as an owner of the flat and had been a co-defendant in the case. The fact that the appeals in cassation against the rulings of 6 November 2007 and 6 June 2008 had been lodged by her husband ’ s representative in respect of the defence of their common property (as viewed by domestic family law), and thus their common interest, had meant that she had exhausted all domestic remedies. She also suggested that her husband had lodged the above appeals himself because he had wanted to protect her from the stress related to the court proceedings. As to the Government ’ s argument that she should have lodged a claim for compensation against Mr M., the applicant stated that she had not been entitled to lodge such a claim, because the price paid by her for the flat had been received by “third persons”.

44 . The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government ’ s objections regarding victim status and exhaustion of domestic remedies, given that the complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the reasons stated below.

46 . Turning to the present case, the Court notes that in deciding on the property dispute between several private parties, Mr M., Ms Sh., the first bona fide purchaser, and the applicant, to whom Ms. Sh. sold the flat and herself a bona fide purchaser, the domestic courts in essence had to balance conflicting private interests over the disputed property. In doing so, they relied on Article 388 § 1 (3) of the Civil Code (see paragraph 28 above), which the domestic legislature, acting within its wide margin of appreciation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, had chosen to introduce into domestic civil law in order to regulate situations like that in the present case (that is to say a situation in which both the initial owner of the property and its bona fide purchaser have competing rights to it). Bearing in mind that the Court ’ s jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and applied is limited and it is not its function to take the place of the national courts (see, for instance, Mindek, cited above, § 80 ), the Court discerns nothing in the instant case for it to conclude that the domestic courts applied the above provision manifestly erroneously or so as to reach arbitrary conclusions .

47 . Furthermore, the Court does not consider – and the applicant did not claim otherwise – that Article 388 § 1 (3) of the Civil Code, allowing the owner of the property to recover it from its bona fide purchaser if the former lost it against his or her will, is as such contrary to Article 1 of Protocol n o. 1. Indeed, in all States Parties to the Convention the legislation governing private-law relations between individuals includes rules which determine the effects of these legal relations with respect to property and, in some cases, compel a person to surrender a possession to another. Such rules cannot in principle be considered contrary to the above provision unless a person is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of property in favour of another (see Zagrebačka banka d.d. , cited above, § 251). As noted above, no arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness is apparent in the application by the domestic courts of Article 388 § 1 (3) of the Civil Code in the present case. Accordingly, the Court considers that the fact that the domestic courts eventually found in favour of the initial owner of the flat (and not the applicant as its bona fide purchaser), as a result of the application of the latter provision, does not as such engage the responsibility of the State under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

48 . The Court next considers that, where the State has chosen to set up a system of the compulsory registration of real-property transactions, including those between private individuals, the preventive measures required from it under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 also include an obligation to provide and maintain an effective and reliable regulatory framework for the registration of such transactions. In this respect, the Court notes, as a matter of concern, that the relevant legal framework which existed at the material time did not provide for the principle of veracity of the data entered in the real-property registry. Indeed, it was in 2010 and 2016, respectively, that the State provided for in the domestic legislation the guarantees of veracity of the registered real-property rights and of the objectivity, veracity and completeness of the data concerning registered real-property rights (see paragraph 34 above). However, the Court considers that, in any event, the above obligation by the State cannot be interpreted as including a requirement to put in place a regulatory framework which would prevent any fraudulent act from happening at all in the course of registration of real-property transactions. In the Court ’ s view, that obligation rather includes a requirement to put in place a regulatory framework which would provide for remedial measures when fraud occurs. Accordingly, the Court will next examine whether the applicant had any measures which would remedy the situation in which she found herself in the present case.

49 . In this connection, the Court notes that, as is apparent from the domestic case ‑ law, the applicant had the possibility to lodge a claim against Ms Sh., the person from whom she and her husband purchased the flat, for recovery of the price paid for the flat, either under Article 661 or under Article 1212 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 38 above). She could have done so either in the framework of the 2005-2011 proceedings brought by Mr M. (by way of lodging a claim against Ms Sh.) or upon their completion (by way of lodging a separate claim against Ms Sh.). The applicant did not argue that she had not had such an opportunity under the domestic law (see, mutatis mutandis , Malayevy v. Russia [Committee], no. 35635/14, § 29, 18 July 2017) . In these circumstances, the applicant ’ s argument that the Supreme Court did not reply to the request made in her husband ’ s cassation appeal (see paragraph 16 above) based on the 1978 Resolution (see paragraph 36 above) is not decisive, seeing that it remained open to her to claim recovery of the price paid.

50 . The Court also notes that under Article 390 § 4 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 29 above) the applicant could have claimed from Mr M., who had recovered the flat from her, the cost of the repairs she had made to the flat. According to her domestic submissions, the applicant had invested in the repairs to the flat more than five times the price she had paid to Ms Sh. The applicant did not argue that that there was any obstacle preventing her from claiming the cost of these repairs from Mr M., either by way of a counterclaim in the 2005-2011 proceedings or separately after that.

51 . In the light of the above and given, in particular, the opportunities which existed for the applicant under domestic law, the Court considers that the authorities cannot be held responsible for arbitrary or unlawful acts or for failing to discharge their positive obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It is true that the applicant found herself in a difficult situation in the circumstances of the present case; however, she had at her disposal legal remedies to protect her rights at the domestic level, with the appropriate legal advice if necessary.

52 . Accordingly, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention .

53 . The applicant lastly complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, stating that she had not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of her above complaints. The above provision reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

54 . The Government did not comment on the above complaint, but submitted that the whole application was inadmissible.

55 . The Court notes that it declared the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 manifestly ill-founded. It follows that her complaint under Article 13 of the Convention cannot be considered “arguable” for the purposes of the latter provision. It further follows that this complaint is also inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof (see, for instance, Zagrebačka banka d.d. , cited above, § § 283 and 284).

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible .

Done in English and notified in writing on 10 December 2020 .

             Victor Soloveytchik Síofra O ’ Leary Registrar President