AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 28970/95

                      by Nicholas PHILIS

                      against Greece

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 17 October 1996, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 A. WEITZEL

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 28 November 1994

by Nicholas PHILIS against Greece and registered on 24 October 1995

under file No. 28970/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Greek citizen born in 1937. He is an engineer

residing in Athens. This is his twenty-sixth application to the

Commission.

I.    DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS

      The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicant, may be summarised as follows:

A.    Between 1971 and 1978 the Autonomous Organisation for Labour

Housing (Aftonomos Organismos Ergatikis Katikias, hereinafter AOEK),

a public body enjoying immunity form execution, entrusted the applicant

with a number of projects. Between 1978 and 1982 the applicant lodged

thirteen civil actions against the AOEK claiming the minimum fees

prescribed by law, instead of the fees agreed between himself and that

body. Another eight actions were brought on behalf of the applicant by

the Technical Chamber of Greece (Tehniko Epimelitirio Ellados,

hereinafter TEE), which had at the time, by virtue of the royal decree

30/1956, exclusive capacity to bring proceedings on behalf of engineers

for the recovery of fees owed to them.

      On 13 April 1983 Law 1346/83 came into force providing that

engineers who had concluded an agreement with the AOEK should be

remunerated in accordance with the terms of each contract. The

provisions of Law 1346/83 notwithstanding, on 17 January 1989 the Court

of Cassation pronounced in favour of the applicant in one of the

actions brought on his behalf by the TEE. The courts applied the law

in five other actions to reject them and the applicant and the TEE

discontinued the remaining fifteen  actions.

      Between 1984 and 1986 the TEE lodged on behalf of the applicant

four civil actions based on Law 1346/83. However, only one of these

actions could result in an enforceable judgment (katapsifistiki

agogi). The other three were declaratory actions, the applicant having

refused to pre-pay the court fees. The first action and two of the

declaratory actions were rejected by the Court of Cassation on

17 January 1989, 7 March 1989 and 1 May 1989 on the ground that the

applicant's claims were statute-barred. The court considered that the

dates of  introduction of the original actions, ie those brought

between 1978 and 1982, could not be taken into consideration because

these actions had a different legal basis. The fourth action is still

pending.

      On 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986 the

applicant lodged three actions which could give rise to enforceable

judgments against the AOEK in which his thirteen original actions were

grouped. In the first action the applicant claimed 26,600,724 drachmas,

in the second 28,133,280 drachmas and in the third 36,178,312 drachmas.

      On 1 April, 15 April and 13 May 1986 the First Instance Civil

Court of Athens decided to adjourn the hearing of the above-mentioned

actions for 27 May 1986 and 10 June 1986. However, no progress was made

in the proceedings on these dates either, the court being forced to

apply Article 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that

the hearing is cancelled when the parties are not present or do not

participate regularly.

      On 29 May 1989 the applicant lodged another action against the

AOEK claiming 63,850,515 drachmas in respect of interest due and

112,063,183 drachmas for losses he had allegedly incurred until that

date because of the inflation and the depreciation of the currency. On

1 December 1989 the applicant lodged a further action against the AOEK

claiming 67,299,761 drachmas in respect of fees for supervision work

and damages.

      On 13 December 1989 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens

rejected the applicant's action of 29 May 1989 on the ground that he

had not pre-payed the court fees. On 11 April 1990 the same court

rejected the applicant's action of 1 December 1989 Athens on the same

ground.

      On 12 December 1991 the applicant lodged an action against the

AOEK, the TEE and the State claiming 1,062,820,534 drachmas. Relying

on the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991 of the European Court of Human

Rights, the applicant re-introduced all the actions which had been

brought by the TEE on his behalf in the past.

      On 16 December 1991 the applicant summoned the AOEK to appear

before the First Instance Civil Court of Athens on 7 April 1992 in

connection with the three actions (katapsifistikes agoges) he had

introduced on 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986.

However, the hearing of 7 April 1992 had to be cancelled under

Article 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the applicant did not

participate regularly in the proceedings, not having pre-paid the court

fees. The hearing of the action instituted by the applicant on

12 December 1991 was also adjourned on that date for the same reasons.

      These actions are still pending, the applicant not having taken

any initiative towards fixing a new hearing date, as he is required to

do under Greek law.

      On 1 October 1993 the applicant appealed against the decisions

of the First Instance Court of 13 December 1989 and 11 April 1990.  The

applicant has not taken any initiative towards fixing a new hearing

date, as he is required to do under Greek law.

B.    Between 1979 and 1982 the applicant lodged a series of criminal

complaints against officials of the AOEK which led to the institution

of criminal proceedings against them. In the context of these

proceedings the applicant addressed a letter to the Court of Appeal of

Athens as a result of which he was charged in 1986 with insulting the

judicial authorities. He was finally acquitted in 1991.

      Moreover, in 1982 disciplinary proceedings were instituted

against the applicant by the TEE for improper behaviour in that he had

introduced civil proceedings against the TEE and criminal proceedings

against its officials. The applicant was finally acquitted in 1993.

C.    In 1984 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the

Pendeli Children's Hospital. His action was dismissed in 1987 by the

Athens Court of Appeal on the ground that the TEE had exclusive

competence to sue for the recovery of fees. The TEE instituted such

proceedings on behalf of the applicant in 1989. On 19 July 1993 the

Athens Court of Appeal refused to grant the applicant permission to

intervene in the proceedings relying, inter alia, on the precedent

created by its 1987 decision which had not been set aside, in the

opinion of the domestic court, by the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991

of the European Court of Human Rights.

II.   APPLICATIONS BEFORE THE COMMISSION CONCERNING THE ABOVE

      PROCEEDINGS

Application No. 12750/87

       On 5 January 1987 the applicant complained to the Commission,

inter alia, of the enactment of Law 1346/83 which in effect cancelled

the dispute between the AOEK and himself which had been submitted to

the courts prior to the enactment of that law, compromised the

independence and impartiality of the courts, deprived him of his claims

and discriminated against him. The applicant further complained that

he did not have direct access to a tribunal, since it was the TEE which

had exclusive competence to sue for the recovery of his fees. He also

complained of the length of the proceedings which had been instituted

by him or on his behalf by that date. The applicant invoked Articles 6

and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 7 December 1988 the Commission declared the complaint

regarding access to court admissible. The remainder of the above-

mentioned complaints were declared inadmissible. The Commission

considered that it lacked competence ratione temporis to examine

complaints concerning events, such as the enactment of Law 1346/83,

which had occurred prior to 19 November 1985, date on which the

recognition by Greece of the right of individual petition came into

effect. It further considered that the complaints concerning the length

of the proceedings were either incompatible ratione temporis, or not

introduced within the six-months period, or manifestly ill-founded.

      On 27 August 1991 the European Court of Human Rights considered

that the applicant's inability to sue directly for the recovery of his

fees amounted to a violation of his right of access to a court under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. It ordered Greece to pay the

applicant 1,000,000 drachmas for non-pecuniary damage and

6,800,000 drachmas for costs and expenses.

      On 11 March 1994 the royal decree 30/1956 was amended to give

engineers the right to institute proceedings themselves for the

recovery of their fees.

      On 5 December 1994 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of

Europe declared that it had exercised its functions under Article 54

of the Convention following the European Court of Human Rights'

judgment of 27 August 1991.

Application No. 15068/89

      On 10 April 1989 the applicant complained to the Commission,

inter alia, of the enactment of Law 1346/83 and of the rejection of the

actions lodged by the TEE on his behalf after the enactment of the

above-mentioned law. He also complained of the length of the

proceedings instituted by him or on his behalf until that date and of

the effects of the alleged violations of the Convention on his private

life. The applicant invoked Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 5 November 1990 the Commission declared the application

inadmissible. The applicant's complaints concerning the outcome of the

proceedings instituted by him or on his behalf prior to the enactment

of Law 1346/83 were considered to be essentially the same as complaints

which had been rejected in application No. 12750/87. The applicant's

new complaint concerning the outcome of the proceedings instituted on

his behalf after the enactment of Law 1346/83 was rejected as

incompatible ratione temporis. The Commission considered that the

prescription of the applicant's claims was the direct consequence of

the entry into force of Law 1346/83 on 13 April 1983 and of the court

judgments rejecting the original actions. The applicant's complaints

regarding the length of the proceedings which had bene terminated by

the decisions of the Court of Cassation of 17 January 1989,

7 March 1989 and 1 May 1989 were rejected as manifestly ill-founded.

The Commission further considered that there was no appearance of a

violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

Application No. 18989/91

      On 16 October 1991 the applicant complained to the Commission,

inter alia, that the AOEK, relying on its immunity from execution, had

refused to comply with the decision of 17 January 1989 of the Court of

Cassation and had paid the TEE a sum of money which, in the applicant's

view, did not correspond to the sum which the court had awarded. He

also complained of the application of Law 1346/83 in his case, of the

length of the proceedings which were pending at the time and of his

obligation to pre-pay the court fees. He invoked Articles 6, 8, 14 and

17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 12 October 1994 the Commission (First Chamber) declared the

application inadmissible. The complaint regarding the alleged refusal

of the TEE to comply in full with the decision issued in the

applicant's favour was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The dispute

between the applicant and the TEE concerning the calculation of the

amount awarded by the Court of Cassation had not been submitted to the

courts and, as a result, there was no interference with the applicant's

rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Insofar as the applicant

complained that the TEE had exclusive competence under Greek law to

institute proceedings in this connection, this was an issue which had

been already examined by the European Court of Human Rights. The

complaint regarding the application of Law 1346/83 was rejected as

being substantially the same with complaints which had been rejected

in applications No. 12750/87 and 15068/89. The complaint concerning

discrimination was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. So was the

complaint regarding the length of the fourth set of proceedings

instituted by the TEE on behalf of the applicant between 1984 and 1986

which were still pending and the length of the proceedings instituted

by the applicant on 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986, 7 February 1986,

29 May 1989, 1 February 1989 and 12 December 1991, since the applicant

had either failed to provide sufficient information or had been himself

responsible for the delays. Finally, the  complaint concerning pre-

payment of the court fees was rejected as manifestly ill-founded, since

the applicant had not been arbitrarily denied access to court.

Application No. 19773/92

      On 15 January 1992 the applicant complained to the Commission,

inter alia, of the enactment of Law 1346/83 and the resultant

prescription of the three civil actions brought on his behalf against

the AOEK, of the effects that the disciplinary and criminal proceedings

against him had on his right to a fair hearing in the criminal

proceedings he had instituted against AOEK officials and of the length

of the criminal and disciplinary proceedings against him. He invoked

Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 31 August 1994 in a partial decision on the admissibility of

the application the Commission (First Chamber) rejected the complaint

concerning the enactment of Law 1346/83 and the resultant prescription

of the three civil actions as being substantially the same as

complaints which had been rejected in applications No. 12750/87 and

15068/89. The complaint regarding the effects of the criminal and

disciplinary proceedings was rejected as manifestly ill-founded, since

the applicant was not inhibited from instituting and pursuing criminal

proceedings against AOEK officials.

      On 24 May 1995 the Commission declared the complaint concerning

the length of the proceedings admissible. On 16 January 1996 it

expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the criminal and

disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. On 6 May 1996 the case

was brought by the Greek Government before the European Court of  Human

Rights.

Application No. 19988/92

      On 18 November 1992 the applicant complained to the Commission

that the action he had lodged on 12 December 1991 against the AOEK, the

TEE and the State lacked any prospects of success because Greek law

required that court fees be pre-paid, allowed for the enactment of

retroactive legislation and did not provide for enforcement proceedings

against the State and public bodies. He invoked Articles 6, 8, 14 and

17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 27 March 1992 the Secretariat of the Commission advised the

applicant of the limited prospects of success of his application.

      On 1 July 1993 the Commission, sitting as a Committee by virtue

of Article 20 para. 3 of the Convention, declared the application

inadmissible on the ground, first, that it was not competent to examine

in abstracto the question of conformity of national law with the

Convention and, secondly, that the proceedings were still pending and,

as a result, the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a

violation of the Convention.

Application No. 23202/94

      On 20 September 1993 the applicant complained to the Commission,

inter alia, that the Athens Court of Appeal, by rejecting his

intervention on 19 July 1993, failed to ensure effective respect for

his right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

      On 5 May 1996 the Commission (First Chamber) rejected the

complaint as manifestly ill-founded. In the light of certain

developments after the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991 of the

European Court of Human Rights, the Commission considered that it  had

not been established that the applicant did not have direct access to

a court for the determination of his civil rights.

Application No. 26809/95

      On 7 December 1994 the applicant complained to the Commission of

the enactment of Law 1346/83, the decisions of the Court of Cassation

of 17 January 1989, 7 March 1989 and 1 May 1989 rejecting his claims

as statute- barred, the royal decree 30/1956 which gave the TEE

exclusive competence to sue for the recovery of engineers' fees, the

law requiring the pre-payment of court fees in the case of actions

which could result in enforceable judgments and the law granting the

AOEK immunity from execution. He invoked Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the

Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      On 22 December 1994 the Secretariat of the Commission advised the

applicant of the limited prospects of success of his application.

      On 29 June 1995 the Commission, sitting as a Committee by virtue

of Article 20 para. 3 of the Convention, rejected the application as

inadmissible considering that, insofar as the matters complained of had

been substantiated and were within its competence, they did not

disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set

out in the Convention or its Protocols.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

of interferences with his right to have his civil claims determined by

the courts in the proceedings he instituted against the AOEK, the TEE

and the State on 12 December 1991 and in the proceedings he instituted

against the AOEK on 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986, 7 February 1986,

29 May 1989 and 1 December 1989. He submits in this connection that the

royal decree 30/1956 which had been found to be in breach of Article 6

para. 1 of the European Convention in the Philis judgment of

27 August 1991 had not been changed until 11 March 1994. Law 1346/83

continues to be in force and may be applied in his case. The Greek

courts continue to consider as valid under domestic law the decisions

they had issued in his case before the Philis judgment of

27 August 1991 of the European Court of Human Rights, including the

decisions of the Court of Cassation of 17 January 1989, 7 March 1989

and 1 May 1989 rejecting the actions brought on his behalf by the TEE

as statute-barred. Disciplinary or criminal proceedings of inordinate

length  may be instituted against him because of the actions he has

lodged. The AOEK, the TEE and the State enjoy immunity from execution.

Parliament can enact a law and cancel the dispute. He has to pre-pay

the court fees. The length of the proceedings is unreasonable.

      The applicant also complains that his inability to obtain

satisfaction in the above-mentioned proceedings amounts to an

unjustified interference with his property rights under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 of the

Convention. He submits that the claims he has submitted for

adjudication by the courts are sufficiently established to amount to

possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These

claims would have been awarded to him, if the above-mentioned

violations of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention had not occurred.

      Finally, the applicant complains under Article 8 of the

Convention of the consequences of the above-mentioned violations on his

professional and personal life.

THE LAW

      The applicant complains under Articles 6, 8 and 14

(Art. 6, 8, 14) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) about his inability to have his claims against the AOEK, the TEE

and the State determined by a court.

      The Commission has carefully examined the application and the

separate complaints as they have been submitted by the applicant

including the complaint regarding the length of the proceedings, which

remain stagnant since 7 April 1992 and 1 October 1993, as a result of

the applicant's failure to take any steps towards fixing a new hearing

date.

      The Commission has also considered these complaints against the

background of the applicant's previous applications Nos. 12750/87,

15068/89, 18989/91, 19773/92, 19988/92 and 26809/95. The Commission

notes that the subject matters of these applications are essentially

similar or related to each other, since they all concern various

domestic court proceedings instituted by or on behalf of the applicant

with a view to obtaining the recovery of fees which the AOEK allegedly

owes to him.

      It also notes that, further to the Philis judgment of

21 August 1991 of the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant has

obtained redress in respect of his main grievance which concerned his

inability to sue the AOEK himself. The applicant's other complaints

about the proceedings for the recovery of the fees which the AOEK

allegedly owes to him have been rejected as inadmissible, often as

being substantially the same as matters already examined by the

Commission and containing no relevant new information within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention.

      The Commission further notes that since January 1987, when he

lodged Application No. 12750/87, the applicant has had ample

opportunity to acquaint himself with the procedure of the Commission.

Furthermore, on numerous occasions, the applicant has been informed in

detail, in the Secretariat's correspondence and in personal discussions

with members of the Secretariat, of the operation of the Convention.

All these communications, as well as the Commission's decisions on the

admissibility of his previous applications, must have made it clear

to him that the claims he has submitted to the domestic courts cannot

be regarded as sufficiently established to amount to possessions within

the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). They must have also

made clear to the applicant that the present application is either

substantially the same as the matters already examined by the

Commission and contains no relevant new information within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention, or that it

is manifestly ill-founded or incompatible with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      Having regard to this, the Commission finds that the applicant

has abused his right of petition within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2), in fine, of the Convention. It refers in this

connection to Nos. 5070/71, 5171/71 and 5186/71, Dec. 10.7.71,

Collection 42 p. 58, No. 5332/72, Dec. 2.4.73, Collection 43 p. 172 and

No. 13284/87, Dec. 15.10.87, D.R. 54 p. 214, in which the Commission,

declaring the applications to be inadmissible, made the following

statement:

      "It cannot be the task of the Commission, a body set up under the

      Convention to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken

      by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention to deal

      with a succession of ill-founded and querulous complaints,

      creating unnecessary work which is incompatible with its real

      functions, and which hinders it in carrying them out."

      The Commission finds that the same considerations apply to the

present applicant. It follows that the present application constitutes

an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                        of the First Chamber