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M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 11864/85 • ECHR ID: 001-609

Document date: January 24, 1986

Inbound citations: 0
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Cited paragraphs: 0
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Outbound citations: 2

M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 11864/85 • ECHR ID: 001-609

Document date: January 24, 1986

Cited paragraphs only

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 24

January 1986, the following members being present:

MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

G. SPERDUTI

J. A. FROWEIN

G. JÖRUNDSSON

S. TRECHSEL

B. KIERNAN

A. WEITZEL

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. H. C. KRÃœGER Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 25);

Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1985 by

N.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 November 1985

under file N° 11864/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1945. He lives in

Staffordshire and describes himself as a company director.

The facts of the application, as they have been submitted by the

applicant and may be deduced from the documents supplied by him, may

be summarised as follows:

In 1980, the applicant's company was sued by another company ("the

plaintiff company"). The applicant, claiming a personal interest in

the action, was added as a second defendant. The trial took place on

21 May 1984, when judgment was given against the applicant's company

and against him.

The applicant applied to have the Order of 21 May 1984 set aside, but

that application was refused on 10 August 1984 as the applicant should

have appealed formally. A notice of appeal dated 30 November 1984 was

submitted in which the applicant also requested an extension of time

in which to appeal. A single judge of the Court of Appeal considered

the evidence and the judge at first instance's decision and found on

15 February 1985 that the appeal would have no realistic chance of of

success at all and that leave to appeal out of time should not be

granted. The full Court of Appeal on 29 April 1985 agreed with the

single judge.

On 24 October 1985 a further hearing was held in which a judge in

chambers first refused an application for the original order of 21 May

1984 to be dismissed (there being no power to make such an order). A

request for a committal order against the plaintiff company's lawyers

and an unnamed officer of the court in the Leeds District Registry was

also refused. That second application was by way of an appeal from an

order of a District Registrar which itself dismissed a summons by the

applicant requesting an indemnity for the applicant from the plaintiff

company's lawyers in respect of costs.

As a corollory to the above proceedings, the applicant is being

pressed by the bankers to his company for payment of various sums in

connection with guarantees made by the applicant in respect of his

company's lending from the bank.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of the hearings before the various courts from

1984 to 1985. He also alleges a conspiracy on the part of the bank in

that the bank is also banker to the plaintiff company.

The applicant alleges violations of Arts. 8 (art. 8), 13 (art. 13) and

14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

THE LAW

To the extent that the applicant complains about the activities of his

company's bank, the Commission recalls that, under Art. 25, para. 1 of

the Convention (art. 25-1), it may only admit an application from a

person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, where

the applicant alleges a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of

the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and where that party

has recognised the competence of the Commission. The Commission may

not, therefore, admit applications directed against corporate bodies

such as a bank. In this respect the Commission refers to its

consistent case-law (see e.g. Dec. Nos. 172/56, Yearbook I, p. 211

and 3925/69, Collection 32 p. 36, 58). It follows that this part of

the application is incompatible ratione personae with the Convention

within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (art. 27-2).

The applicant also complains about the proceedings in which he has

been involved before the United Kingdom courts.

However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the

facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation

of the Convention as Art. 26 of the Convention (art. 26) provides that

the Commission "may only deal with a matter ... within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken". According

to the Commission's consistent case-law the "final decision" within

the meaning of Art. 26 (art. 26) refers solely to the final decision

involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the

generally recognised rules of international law. In particular, only

a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for

this purpose (see e.g. Dec. No. 918/60, Collection 32 pp. 108-110 and

No. 654/59, Yearbook IV, p.277, 283).

The Commission finds that, in the present case, the applicant's

request on 30 November 1984 for an extension of time in which to

appeal which was refused on 15 February 1985 and all subsequent

hearings could not constitute an effective remedy under the generally

recognised rules of international law because they were all brought

either out of time or in circumstances in which there was no

competence to consider them. Consequently, the decisions regarding

these further applications and summons cannot be taken into

consideration in determining the date of the final decision for the

purposes of applying the six months time limit laid down in Art. 26

(art. 26). The final decision regarding the applicant's disputes with

the plaintiff company is accordingly the decision of the judge of

first instance of 21 May 1984, whereas the present application was

submitted to the Commission only on 31 July 1985. Furthermore, an

examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special

circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of

that period.

It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out

of time and must be rejected under Art. 27, para. 3 of the Convention

(art. 27-3).

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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