AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 11356/85

by Irka CEDERBERG-LAPPALAINEN

against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 4 March 1987, the following members being present:

              MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  J. A. FROWEIN

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  B. KIERNAN

                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J. C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

                  F. MARTINEZ

              Mr.  J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1984

by Irka Cederberg-Lappalainen against Sweden and registered on

14 January 1985 under file No. 11356/85;

        Having regard to:

-       the Commission's decision of 2 December 1985 to bring the

application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them

to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits;

-       the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

7 March 1986 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant

on 23 May 1986;

-       the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure

of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows:

        The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1942 and resident

at Malmö.  She is an information secretary by profession.  The

applicant's child, born on 1 October 1977, was attending a nursery

school in Malmö at the time of the introduction of the application,

which concerns a peace demonstration in which the children of the

school were supposed to participate.

Domestic law and practice

        Provisions on freedom of expression and freedom to

        arrange demonstrations

        The constitutional safeguards concerning fundamental, human

rights and freedoms are contained in the 1974 Instrument of Government

(regeringsformen).  Under Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument,

every citizen is, in relation to the community, guaranteed the right

to freedom of expression and the freedom to arrange and participate in

any demonstration on public grounds.

        According to Section 12 of the same chapter, the right to

freedom of expression and the right to arrange and participate in any

demonstration can be subject only to such limitations as are

prescribed by law and, inter alia, necessary for a purpose which is

acceptable in a democratic society.  Such a limitation may never be

extended so far as to constitute a threat to the free formation of

opinions.

        According to Chapter 2 Section 2 every citizen shall, in

relation to the community, be protected against, inter alia, any

compulsion to make known his opinion in any political, religious,

cultural or other such matter, or to participate in any demonstration

or other expression of opinion.

        Provisions concerning public social services

        The goals of the public social service, as well as the basic

means by which these goals are to be reached, are outlined in the

1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620).  According to

Section 2 of the Act, each municipality carries the responsibility for

social services within its own territory.  For the purpose of

fulfilling this obligation, there shall be in each municipality a

Social Council, cf.  Section 4 of the Act.

        All forms of care provided for in the Act are, with a few

exceptions, offered on a voluntary basis.  The Act has taken the form

of a general, goal-oriented framework legislation, which leaves leeway

for the municipalities in forming and organising, having regard to

their own particular conditions and requirements, the services to be

offered.

        According to Section 1 of the Act, public social services are

to be established on the basis of democracy and solidarity.  Under the

same Section, one of the goals of such services is to promote, while

paying due respect to the individual's right to self-determination and

privacy, active participation in the life of the community.  In

respect of children and young persons, Section 12 further provides

that social services should, inter alia, promote, in close

co-operation with their families, a comprehensive personal development

as well as a favourable physical and social development.

        As regards children, who have not reached compulsory school

age, the Act enjoins the municipalities to organise the pre-school

activities, cf.  Section 13.  Each municipality shall have a plan for

its pre-school activities, adopted by the publicly elected

Municipality Council and covering a period of at least five years,

cf.  Section 17.  The Social Council shall endeavour to ensure that

children avail themselves of the opportunity of attending the

pre-school activities and shall also inform the parents of the

activities and their purposes, Section 16.

        The Act does not contain any provisions in respect of the

substance of the pre-school education.  According to the travaux

préparatoires, one goal of pre-school activities should be to lay the

foundation of children's desire to seek and use knowledge with a view

to improving the living conditions for themselves and others (SOU

1972:27, p. 24).

        The 1980 Compulsory School Curriculum is not directly

applicable to pre-school activities.  However, regarding the goals of

the education, the curriculum points to the necessity of making the

pupils realise the importance of international relations and

co-operation and explicitly designates "peace education" as a proper

element of the educational programme.

        Decisions by the Social Council are taken at a meeting.

Minutes shall be taken of the meeting containing, among other things,

a brief description of each subject matter dealt with and also any

decision taken at the meeting.  Upon completion, the minutes shall be

verified by the chairman, and notice of the minutes shall be posted on

a public noticeboard, cf.  Section 28 of the Social Services Act and

Chapter 2 Sections 10 and 25 of the 1977 Act on Local Government

(kommunallag 1977:179).  A decision by the Social Council may be

appealed, under a special appeal procedure laid down in Chapter 7 of

the Act on Local Government, to the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) by a citizen of the municipality.  The grounds that may

be invoked in support of such an appeal are that the decision

-       has not been taken in the legally prescribed manner

-       conflicts with existing laws or regulations

-       falls outside the competence of the local government in

        any other way

-       infringes on the individual rights of the complainant or

-       is otherwise based on unjust grounds.

        A judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal may be

appealed, as a last resort, to the Supreme Administrative Court

(regeringsrätten).

        The particular facts of the case

        On 3 May 1983 the Social Council's Committee for Pre-school

and Leisure Home Activities in the municipality of Malmö

(socialnämndens delegation för förskole- och fritidshemsverksamheten i

Malmö kommun) approved a proposal to arrange a peace demonstration for

around 3,000 children attending the pre-school and leisure home

activities of Malmö municipality.  The peace demonstration was to take

place on 15 and 16 June 1983 in connection with the annual "People's

Park Days" (Folkets Parkdagar) which were arranged on the theme of

peace.  The intention was that on both days the activities should

commence with a peace demonstration with the participation of the

children, the personnel and the parents, who wished to and had the

possibility of attending.  The participants should meet at a place

outside the park and then walk in a peace march to the park.  Further,

the intention was that the children should prepare, in advance, flags,

peace doves and other symbols of peace to be carried during the

demonstration.  In the decision it was further stated that "the

parents will be informed of the peace march and the children will only

participate with the consent of the parents".

        The Government have submitted that the Social Council's

decision to arrange a peace demonstration was formally made known to

the public in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Social

Services Act and the 1977 Act on Local Government.  In addition the

Government have submitted that, according to the information procured

from the official in charge of the child care activities in the

municipality of Malmö, each pre-school was informed in writing of the

decision and that no child was to be engaged in the demonstration

unless the consent of the parents was obtained.  In view of the almost

daily contacts between the pre-school staff and the parents, the

ultimate responsibility of informing the parents and obtaining their

positions on the matter was placed upon each individual pre-school.

        The applicant has stated that she was never asked by her

child's nursery school about the demonstration.  She was informed,

however, at the beginning of June, that the Administration had sent

out instructions to the nursery schools that the parents had to be

informed and asked about their children's participation in the

demonstration.

        The applicant lodged a municipal appeal (kommunalbesvär) with

the Administrative Court of Appeal of Gothenburg which in a judgment

of 8 June 1983 rejected the appeal.  The applicant appealed to the

Supreme Administrative Court, which on 29 May 1984 rejected the appeal

with the following reasoning:

        "In the appealed decision, the Social Council's

Committee for Pre-School and Leisure Home Activities of Malmö

municipality approved that the children involved in these

activities, with personnel and parents, should participate in a

so-called peace march in connection with the arrangement in the

People's Park on the theme of peace.  The idea was that in the

march the children should carry flags, peace doves and other

peace symbols which they had made in advance.  An express

condition for the decision was that the parents were asked about

the participation of the children.

(The applicant's) submissions first raise the issue whether it is

at all compatible with the intended pedagogic activity in nursery

schools and leisure homes to engage children in activities for

peace.  It is to be observed that there are no regulations for

the pedagogic activities in the nursery schools and leisure

homes.

An overriding objective for the nursery school is to lay the

foundation for the child being willing to seek and use

knowledge in order to improve its own living conditions and

those of other people (SOU 1972:27 p. 24).  This appears to be

entirely compatible with the aim of creating in the child,

through its own activities, a wish for peace in the world.  In

the curriculum for the basic school (grundskolan) it is said:

'It is necessary to choose, at school, material which allows

the children to realise our society's international dependence

and the importance of international contacts and international

co-operation' (Lgr 80 p. 31).  Peace education is furthermore

indicated as an example of issues which the individual school

may take up in its working plan (Lgr 80 p. 59).  Against this

background it is clear that the activity at the leisure homes

could also comprise activities for peace.

According to Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument of

Government every citizen is, in relation to the community,

guaranteed the freedom to arrange and participate in a

demonstration in a public place.  A municipal organ may also be

considered to have the right, in a matter which falls within

its competence, to arrange a demonstration provided it is done

with objectivity and in a positive spirit.  The Committee

cannot be considered to have, from the said points of view,

exceeded its competence by approving the arrangement of a peace

march.

Every citizen is, according to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the

Instrument of Government, in relation to the community, protected

from compulsion to participate in demonstrations.  It can be

questioned whether it was entirely compatible with this provision

that a child, who had not attained such an age at which it could

be assumed to have an opinion of its own on the peace issue, was

allowed to participate in the peace march.  This, however, is a

question for the judgment of the parents.

In view of the fact that the participation of the children had

been made dependent of the consent of the parents the decision

of the Committee cannot be considered to have been in conflict

with the provisions of Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of

Government.

In summary, the Supreme Administrative Court finds that what (the

applicant) has submitted does not lead to the conclusion that the

the Committee through the appealed decision, can be considered

to have exceeded its competence or that the decision is otherwise

unlawful on any ground laid down in Chapter 7 Section 1 of the

Act on Local Government."

        One of the five judges dissented, considering that the

appealed decision should be quashed, mainly since the request for

consent from the parents could constitute an interference with the

parents' right not to be forced to disclose their opinion in political

or other matters.

        Prior to the above decision, on 22 September 1983, the

Parliamentary Ombudsman (JO) had stated that the peace march did not

call for any further action on his part since it had been arranged

with the consent of the parents.

        The applicant's child did not attend the peace demonstration.

The applicant took a week's holiday and stayed at home with her child.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicant invokes Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the

Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

1.      She alleges that the use of pre-school children in a

demonstration is a violation of the child's right to respect for its

integrity.

2.      She complains that the request for permission from the parents

violates the parents' right to respect for their private and family

life, to freedom of thought and conscience and to freedom of

expression.  Moreover, it encourages the parents to violate the

child's right to respect for its integrity.

3.      The applicant also complains that the parent is forced to

disclose his/her opinion regarding an issue which has been the subject

of substantial political debate.

4.      The applicant furthermore complains that the authorities have

failed to respect the right of the parents to ensure such education as

is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical

convictions.

5.      The applicant finally complains that the action of the

authorities' violates the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.  She

submits that "freedom" must include the right to abstain from acting.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 9 November 1984 and

registered on 14 January 1985.

        On 2 December 1985 the Commission decided to bring the

application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite

them to submit written observations on the application.

        The Government's observations were submitted on 7 March 1986.

        After the grant of an extension of the time-limit the

applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 23 May 1986.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        The Government

        The Government have submitted that the applicant's answer as

to whether or not her child could participate in the peace

demonstration was obtained in accordance with the applicable

provisions of the Social Services Act and the Act on Local Government

as well as in accordance with instructions given to the pre-school

staff having the ultimate responsibility for informing her.

        However, even assuming that the applicant was not informed in

this manner this should be of no relevance when considering whether

her rights under the Convention and Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

were infringed.  The applicant did in fact, and this she admits,

have access to all relevant information concerning the prerequisites

of the demonstration.  Given her position at that time as an

information secretary, employed by the Social Council of Malmö and

working at its information department, her knowledge of these

prerequisites must have been well known by all officials involved in

the matter.  Furthermore, in view of the actions taken by the

applicant to have the decision revoked, it must also have been clear

to them that informing her would have been of no use since she had

already clearly demonstrated that she was not going to let her child

take part in the manifestation.

        The Government have furthermore submitted that they will not

go beyond what is required by the facts of the applicant's case in

answering the issues raised but that they have no objections to

considering any possible interference with the applicant's son's

rights under the Convention or under Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

as equally infringing the applicant's rights.

Re Article 8 of the Convention

        The Government fail to see that the facts presented by the

applicant could at all be viewed so as to involve any right guaranteed

by this Article.  Under all circumstances, and since the reasons

invoked in support of the Government's position as regards the alleged

violation of Article 9 of the Convention apply with equal force in

respect of the present Article, the Government, with reference to the

following arguments, submit that the complaint under this Article is

manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 9 of the Convention

        The Government first observe that the only manner, in which

the purpose and shaping of the demonstration was defined, was that it

was supposed to be a "peace demonstration".  In the Government's view,

this would appear to entail no constraint as regards the positive

aspects of the applicant's right to freedom of thought in respect of

the question of peace.  This is so since, while the basic topic of the

participant's manifestation was given, each individual participating

in the manifestation was free to express his or her own ideas and

opinions on the topic.

        The participation in the peace demonstration was, as by the

way the attendance of the pre-school and leisure home activities in

general, entirely voluntary.  There was no obligation for the

applicant and her child to state any reasons whatsoever for their

decision not to take part in the demonstration, and this decision did

not entail any form of sanctions or other negative effects.  The

applicant was well aware of this voluntary character of the

demonstration and she availed herself of the opportunity not to let

her child take part in it.  If she had decided to join the

demonstration herself, she would have done so as an individual, free

to express her own opinions on the topic, and not in the capacity of

spokesman for any public establishment.  The same applies, if she had

decided to let her child participate.

        In view of this, the Government maintain that the facts

presented by the applicant fall short of suggesting any interference

with her, or her son's rights under Article 9 of the Convention.

        In case the Commission would consider that the applicant's

right under Article 9 para. 1 has been interfered with, the Government

submit that this interference was justified under para. 2 of the

Article.  The right to arrange demonstrations is laid down in Chapter

2 Section 1 of the Instrument of Government.  This right is of vital

importance as an element of the freedom of expression, and an

indispensable feature of a democratic society, also guaranteed by

Article 10 of the Convention.  In the Government's view, therefore,

any possible interference with the applicant's rights under Article 9

para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as necessary for

the effective protection of the rights of others under Article 10 of

the Convention to freedom of expression.  It should be added that not

even the applicant has asserted any interferences in excess of those

allegedly following as a necessary consequence of the very fact that

the demonstration was arranged.

        In view of this, the Government submit that the complaint

under Article 9 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 10 of the Convention

        The Government maintain that the reasons invoked in support of

their position as regards the alleged violation of Article 9 of the

Convention apply with equal force in respect of Article 10.

Consequently, with reference to the above submissions, the Government

submit that the complaint under this Article is also manifestly

ill-founded.

Re Article 11 of the Convention

        The Government take, in respect of the alleged violation of

Article 11 of the Convention, the same position as in regard to the

complaint under Article 8.  Consequently the Government maintain that

the complaint under Article 11 is also manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

        With reference to what has been said above, the Government

first submit that the organising of the demonstration did not in any

way involve an expression of views that could possibly give rise to

any conflict with the applicant's religious and philosophical

convictions.

        Even in case the Commission does not share this view, the

Government, for the following reasons, maintain that the complaint

under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded.

        The applicant's allegations are apparently founded on the

assumption that the present Article requires a State under all

circumstances to refrain from including in education and teaching any

religious and philosophical views.  In the Government's opinion, this

assumption is inaccurate.  In the case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and

Pedersen (Eur.  Court H.R., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen, Pedersen judgment of

7 December 1976, Series A No. 23) the European Court of Human Rights

adopted the view that teaching or education imparting information or

knowledge of a religious or philosophical kind would violate the

present Article only when they were not carried out in an objective,

critical and pluralistic manner, but rather assumed the character of

indoctrination (p. 26, para. 53).  With reference to what has been

said above, the Government submit that the demonstration in the

present case was in fact carried out in precisely the manner thus

alluded to by the Court and that it bore no stamp of indoctrination.

As regards this point, the Government further observe that no other

view appears to have been expressed by the applicant.  In this

context, the Government would finally like to draw attention to the

facts that the demonstration was an exceptional and transitory element

of the educational programme and that, as has been pointed out above,

it was entirely voluntary.

        The applicant

        In the applicant's view the Government do not seem to realise

the difference between the administrative aspects of demonstrations -

such as security, traffic and timing, in which the Government have a

proper role to play - and every citizen's right to freedom of

expression and demonstration.

        If the Government start arranging, sponsoring and supporting

political demonstrations, this limits the individual citizen's right

to demonstrate, particularly if the Government provide the

demonstrators through government-controlled institutions.  These

actions, in themselves, are sufficient to violate the rights cited in

this case.  Further, to claim that the participants, children of

pre-school age, were freely exercising their rights is illogical.

        According to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of

Government every citizen shall, in relation to the community, be

protected against, inter alia, any compulsion to make known his

opinion in any politicial, religious, cultural or other such matter, or

to participate in any demonstration or other expression of opinion.

When the Government state that the ultimate responsibility of

informing the parents and obtaining their positions on the matter was

placed upon each individual pre-school, they admit that the

authorities asked or were supposed to ask each parent of his or her

opinion.

        The action described above necessarily violates the rights

secured under both the Instrument of Government and the Convention,

since the freedom of speech and expression includes the right not to

be compelled, either directly or indirectly, by any government body to

express an opinion on certain matters.

        The Government's position reveals some misunderstanding

regarding political demonstrations and their purpose.

        The Government assert that no constraint was placed on

individual participants since they could express their own ideas on

the basic topic of peace.  If no constraint at all is manifested by

the general topic of a demonstration, then there is no purpose for it.

If there is no purpose, then there is no need for the demonstration.

The Government's reasoning reduces the right to demonstrate to an

absurdity.  Individuals participate in demonstrations in order to

manifest a political opinion.  A "peace" demonstration is necessarily

a political demonstration which manifests the opinions of the

participants - at least with regard to those who are mature enough to

have formed an opinion.  If the participants are too young, as the

children in the present case, they are going to reflect, on the whole,

the opinions of the adult participants who in this case were the

pre-school personnel.  So it is quite naive to say the children were

free to express their own opinions.

        In addition, since it was a normal workday many parents would

have to take time off from work in order to be able to "freely"

express their opinions or "freely" influence their children, if their

views differed from those of the authorities.

        The demonstration was admittedly voluntary in the narrow

sense.  However, if the term is compared to what voluntary means in

relation to normal demonstrations which are arranged and sponsored by

private organisations or individuals, a parent of a potential

participant is not required to "avail" herself of the opportunity not

to let her child participate.  In this sense, it was not voluntary.

        Furthermore, voluntary in the broader sense also means that

nobody will be asked by the Government about their participation.  Nor

will anybody be required by the Government to approve or disapprove of

their child's participation.  Participation here is as voluntary as

participation in the pre-school system in general.  For some people it

might be entirely voluntary, but for most people it is a question of

economic necessity.

        Finally, being forced to state a position regarding

participation is enough to constitute a violation of the right to

privacy and freedom of speech etc, which again is not remedied by the

assertion that "this decision did not entail any form of sanctions or

other negative effects".  The latter assertion has nothing to do with

the question of whether or not a violation occurred.

        The ideas presented by the Government regarding the right to

demonstrate are at least unique, if not absurd.  Fortunately the

Government recognise the right to demonstrate as a vital element of

freedom of expression.  Unfortunately the Government go on to assert

that "any possible interference with the applicant's rights under

Article 9 para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as

necessary for the effective protection of the rights of others under

Article 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression".

        It is true that in some sense the Government have a right, or

more accurately a duty, to assist the organisers of a demonstration

regarding the practical arrangements of the demonstration.  However,

in most countries which are Parties to the Convention this presumably

does not mean that the Government have somehow obtained the right to

demonstrate.  Each citizen is guaranteed this right and the Government

do not have a right to interfere with the citizens' right in order to

protect the rights of the local Government.

        The assertion that any interference of the rights guaranteed

was necessary in order to protect the rights of the local Government

is absurd, since the purpose of this Section of the Instrument of

Government and of various Articles of the Convention is to protect

citizens from the Government, and not the other way around.

        Finally, the very fact that the Government arranged, sponsored

and financed the demonstration, in addition to providing the bulk of

the demonstrators, that is the employees and the children from the

pre-school, also violated the Convention in a more general way since

the freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate imply some form

of competition between various ideas.  If governments have a right to

demonstrate which is equal to that of the individual citizens, this

freedom will become meaningless for most people.

        The demonstration was not objective, since demonstrations are

not the place for objective, critical and pluralistic transmissions of

philosophical views.  The whole purpose of a demonstration is to

manifest already existing views which participants share.  Since most

of the participants were children, the main views expressed were

necessarily those of the pre-school personnel.  Since the Government

did not limit the demonstration to presenting an "objective" view of

"peace", the demonstration was not objective.

        The Government assert that "the demonstration was an

exceptional and transitory element of the educational programme".  The

"exceptional and transitory" nature of the demonstration is irrelevant

as a defence regarding the issue of a violation of the rights

guaranteed by the Convention.  In fact, it may indicate that the

Government have recognised that they should not participate in the

organisation and promotion of demonstrations.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant has complained about the fact that the

responsible local authorities in Malmö arranged a peace demonstration

in which the intention was that children attending pre-school and

leisure homes should participate.  The applicant has alleged breaches of

Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 9, 10, 11) of the Convention and

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.

        Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention provides that the Commission may

receive petitions from a "person ... claiming to be a victim of a violation

...".  It follows from this provision that normally the person who submits a

petition to the Commission must himself be the victim of the alleged violation.

An applicant cannot, however, complain as a representative of people in

general, because the Convention does not permit such an "actio popularis".  In

the present case, the applicant complains not only on behalf of herself and her

child, but also on behalf of other parents and children who might have been

affected by the proposed peace demonstration.  It follows from the above that

the applicant can only claim to be a victim insofar as she, or her child, were

affected by the peace demonstration.  In this respect the Commission notes that

the applicant's child never participated in the peace demonstration.  The

applicant chose to stay at home and take care of her child during the week when

the peace demonstration took place.  The decision of the applicant to avoid her

child's participation was in conformity with the decision of the Social Council

Committee which required the parents' consent for such participation.

Accordingly, the applicant's child was not forced to take part in the

demonstration.

        It follows that the applicant's complaint that the

participation in the demonstration violates the child's integrity

(complaint no. 1), and the right to abstain from a peaceful assembly

(complaint no. 5), are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      As regards Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), the applicant has

submitted that the authorities have failed to respect the right of the parents

to ensure such education as is in conformity with their religious and

philosophical convictions (complaint no. 4).

        The Commission notes that the participation of the applicant's

child in the peace demonstration presupposed the consent of the

applicant and that the applicant did not let her child participate in

the demonstration.  The Commission considers that by making the

participation dependent on the consent of the parents the Swedish

authorities have shown sufficient respect for the applicant's rights

as parent under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.

        It follows that this aspect of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.      It remains to examine the applicant's complaints (nos. 2

and 3) that the facts of the case disclose a violation of her right to

respect for private and family life, to freedom of thought and

conscience and to freedom of expression in that she was allegedly

obliged to disclose her opinion when keeping her child at home and not

letting him participate in the peace demonstration.  The applicant has

invoked Articles 8, 9 and 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention in this respect.

        The Commission does not agree with the applicant.  It may be

questioned whether, in a democratic state, it should be the task of

public authorities to arrange demonstrations involving children of an

age at which they cannot be assumed to have an opinion of their own.

However, the applicant's decision to keep her child at home and

thereby avoiding his participation in the peace demonstration does not

necessarily imply any views as to peace issues in general.  It is true

that the applicant's attitude could be interpreted as a disagreement

with the local authorities as to the appropriateness of arranging a

peace demonstration in which children should take part.  However, the

Commission does not find that the authorities' decision concerning the

organisation of the demonstration can for this reason be considered to

interfere with the applicant's, or her child's, rights under para. 1

of Articles 8, 9 or 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention.

        It follows that in this respect the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Deputy Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

         (J. RAYMOND)                          (C. A. NØRGAARD)