AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                  Application No. 11855/85

                  by Gösta HÅKANSSON and Sune STURESSON

                  against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 15 July 1987, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  J.A. FROWEIN

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  F. ERMACORA

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             Mr.  C. L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 3 April 1984

by Gösta HÅKANSSON and Sune STURESSON against Sweden and registered

on 15 November 1985 under file N° 11855/85;

        Having regard to

-       the first report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

        Procedure of the Commission;

-       the Government's written observations of 21 August 1986

        and the applicants' observations in reply of 2 October 1986;

-       the second report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

        Procedure of the Commission;

-       the submissions of the parties at the hearing on

        15 July 1987;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case may be summarised as follows:

        The particular facts of the case

        The applicants are Mr.  Gösta Håkansson born in 1926, resident

at Höör and a police officer by profession, and Mr.  Sune Sturesson,

born in 1931, resident at Skånes Fagerhult and a farmer by profession.

Both applicants are Swedish citizens.  They are represented before the

Commission by Mr.  Göran Ravnsborg, a lecturer of law at the University

of Lund.

        On 4 December 1979 the applicants bought an agricultural real

estate called Risböke 1:3 in the municipality of Markaryd at a public

auction (exekutiv auktion) for 240,000 SEK.  According to a valuation

made before the auction, the value of the property had been estimated

at 140,000 SEK.  The auction acquired legal force.

        On 7 January 1980 the County Administrative Board

(länsstyrelsen) of the county of Kronoberg issued a letter of purchase

(köpebrev).  In this letter the applicants were reminded that according

to Section 16 para. 1 of the Land Acquisition Act (jordförvärvslagen)

a property which has been acquired at a public auction in such

circumstances that a permit to acquire the land would have been

necessary if the land had been acquired by a voluntary purchase must

be sold within two years from the date on which the auction acquired

legal force unless the buyer has obtained a permit to retain the

property, and if the property is not sold within the said period, the

County Administrative Board shall, at the request of the County

Agricultural Board (lantbruksnämnden), order that the property be sold

at a public auction in accordance with Section 17 of the said Act.

        On 7 January 1980 the applicants submitted a request to the

County Agricultural Board of the county of Kronoberg that they be

granted a permit to retain the real estate Risböke 1:3 under the Land

Acquisition Act.

        Following an enquiry of the County Agricultural Board the

applicants were informed by a letter of 5 February 1980 that the real

estate must, in view of its size, situation and nature, be considered

as a "rationalisation" unit which ought to be used for the purpose

of strengthening real estates in the area which can be further

developed.  The Board indicated that neighbours were interested and

a refusal of the request for the permit could therefore be envisaged

under Section 4, para. 1 sub-section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Moreover, the Board indicated that there were reasons to believe that

the Board would find that the price for the real estate was too high

for redemption (inlösen).  The applicants were given the opportunity to

comment upon the letter of the Board.

        On 15 February 1980 the County Agricultural Board decided to

reject the applicants' request for a permit to retain the property

since the real estate was considered to be of importance for

rationalisation and ought to be used for the purpose of strengthening

real estates in the area which could be further developed.

        The applicants appealed to the National Board of Agriculture

(lantbruksstyrelsen) which in a decision of 5 September 1980 rejected

the appeal, stating inter alia as follows:

        "The National Board of Agriculture finds, as did the County

        Agricultural Board, that the real estate at issue lacks

        the prerequisites for remaining as a commercial unit of its

        own.  Moreover, the National Board considers that a new

        establishment on the real estate would be likely to make it

        more difficult for the active farmer in the area to develop

        his business."

        From the decision of the National Board of Agriculture it

appears that the property at issue has no buildings.  It has an area

of 41 hectares of which 18 hectares are forest and eight hectares are

pasture.  It furthermore appears that Mr.  Sturesson owns and runs a

real estate of an area of 10 hectares of pasture and 63 hectares of

forest.  This property is situated approximately 25 kilometres from the

property bought by the applicants.  It furthermore appears from the

decision of the National Board that the applicants' intention when

acquiring the property was to build up units which at present create

opportunities of employment and which subsequently can become

financially sound real estates for the applicants' children.  It

moreover appears that the property at issue is situated in an area

where in the opinion of the County Agricultural Board there is only

room for one active farmer and that the neighbouring property is at

present rented by Mr.  MB who also rents his parents' estate which

comprises five hectares of pasture and 42 hectares of forest.  Mr.  MB

had shown great interest in the property at issue.

        The applicants appealed to the Government (Ministry of

Agriculture) which in a decision of 26 February 1981 rejected the

appeal.

        Following a new request dated 4 January 1982, the County

Agricultural Board of the county of Kronoberg rejected an

application from the applicants for a permit to retain the real

estate Risböke 1:3.  In the decision, which is dated 25 January 1982,

the County Agricultural Board stated that the real estate at issue was

considered to be a unit suitable for rationalisation purposes which

ought to be used for the strengthening of properties within the area

which could be further developed.  It furthermore stated that the

Board was not prepared to redeem the real estate at the price of

240,000 SEK.

        The applicants appealed against this decision to the National

Board of Agriculture which, after having inspected the property,

rejected the appeal on 15 November 1982.

        The applicants submitted a further appeal to the Government

which on 27 October 1983 rejected the appeal.

        In a letter of 11 January 1985 the applicants requested

the Government to reconsider their decision of 27 October 1983.  In a

decision of 14 March 1985 the Government decided not to take any

measures in respect of the applicants' request.  In their decision,

the Government recalled that the appeal case had been finally decided

by the Government on 27 October 1983.

        The applicants then brought proceedings before the Real Estate

Court (fastighetsdomstolen) of the District Court (tingsrätten) of

Växjö requesting that the state redeem the real estate in accordance

with Section 14 of the Land Acquisition Act.  In a judgment of

11 December 1982 the Court rejected the applicants' claim.  They

appealed to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt) which on 1 July

1982 confirmed the judgment of the District Court.  On 14 July 1983

the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen) refused to grant leave to appeal.

        At the request of the County Agricultural Board, the County

Administrative Board, on 10 November 1983, ordered that the real

estate Risböke 1:3 should be sold at a public auction.  In a decision

of 19 April 1984 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten)

indicated that the real estate had a value of 125,000 SEK. The

applicants appealed against this decision to the Göta Court of Appeal

which in a decision of 4 June 1984 dismissed the appeal stating that

it was not possible to appeal against the decision of the Enforcement

Office as it was only a preparatory stage for a subsequent decision on

the sale of the real estate.  The applicants appealed against this

decision to the Supreme Court which on 23 August 1984 refused to grant

leave to appeal.

        According to subsequent valuations by experts, the property

was considered to have a value of 172,000 SEK.

        The public auction took place on 18 June 1985.  It was noted

that the real estate had been assessed at a value of 172,000 SEK and

that the taxable value was 107,000.  The lowest bid which could be

accepted would be 172,000 SEK.  At the public auction, only one offer

of 172,000 SEK was submitted.  The offer was made by the County

Agricultural Board.  The offer was accepted by the Enforcement Office.

        The applicants appealed against the public auction to the Göta

Court of Appeal which in a decision of 3 July 1985 rejected the

appeal.

        The applicants submitted a further appeal to the Supreme

Court which on 20 August 1985 refused to grant leave to appeal.

        Relevant Swedish law

        The acquisition of real estate, which is assessed for tax

purposes as an agricultural holding, is subject to the regulations

of the 1979 Land Acquisition Act.  The Act was enacted in 1979 -

replacing an Act of 1965 on the same issue - in order to implement the

new agricultural guidelines adopted by the Riksdag in 1977 and also to

meet the policy goals of forestry and regional planning.  Among the

aims particularly to be furthered by the Act are the creation and

preservation of effective family holdings so as to strengthen the

connection between cultivation and ownership, and also the promotion

of a continuous structural rationalisation of agriculture and

forestry.

        Under Section 1 of the Act, a permit is required for the

purchase of real estate assessed for tax purposes as an agricultural

holding.  Section 2 enumerates a number of exceptions, none of which

is relevant to the applicants' case.

        When deciding on an application for a permit, it shall be

taken into account that the starting and developing of rational

holdings in agriculture, forestry and horticulture (farm holdings)

should be promoted (Section 3).  Furthermore according to Section 4,

an application for a permit shall be rejected inter alia if the

property is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture or forestry.

        Property acquired at a compulsory auction under circumstances

which, in case of an ordinary purchase, would have required a permit,

shall, according to Section 16, para. 1 of the Act, be re-sold within

two years unless the said circumstances have ceased or the purchaser

has obtained a permission from the County Agricultural Board to retain

the property.  In case of an application for such a permission, the

above mentioned provisions of Sections 3 and 4 shall apply where

appropriate.

        A decision by the County Agricultural Board not to grant

permission to retain property acquired at a compulsory auction may be

appealed to the National Board of Agriculture and ultimately to the

Government.

        In case a purchase of property becomes invalid as a result of

a denial of permission to acquire the property on the ground that it

is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and forestry, the

State is, according to Section 14 of the Act, obliged to redeem the

property at the purchase price agreed upon if the seller requests it.

However, under the same Section, no such obligation exists in case the

purchase price considerably exceeds the value of the property in

view of its yield and other circumstances, or if the terms are

unreasonable in other respects.

        In respect of property acquired at a compulsory auction there

is, unlike the situation in case of an ordinary purchase, no

obligation for the State to redeem the property.

        According to Section 14, para. 2 of the Act, an action for

redemption by the State of property shall be brought before a Real

Estate Court, whose decision may be appealed to a Court of Appeal and

ultimately to the Supreme Court.

        In case the property has not, when required under the

provisions outlined above, been sold within the prescribed time limit,

the County Administrative Board shall, according to Section 16,

para. 1, order that the property be sold by the Enforcement Office at

a public auction.

        The basic provisions to be observed in case of such an auction

appear in Section 17 of the Act and, by reference in this Section, in

Chapter 12 of the 1981 Code of Enforcement (utsökningsbalken).

No sale may be effected unless the purchase price offered amounts at

least to the estimated value set on the property prior to the auction

(Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and Chapter 12, Section 3 of

the Code of Enforcement).  This estimated value is to be fixed by the

Enforcement Office or, in case of a timely request by the owner of the

property for a special evaluation, by valuers appointed by the County

Administrative Board (Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act).

        Decisions by the Enforcement Office in respect of a public

auction may, according to Chapter 18, Section 1 of the Code of

Enforcement, be brought before a Court of Appeal and, ultimately, the

Supreme Court.  However, according to Section 6, para. 2 of the same

Chapter, an appeal against a decision merely constituting a

preparation for a future determination may, in general, be made only

in connection with an appeal against that determination.

        As regards the procedure in case an appeal is made, the rules

of the 1942 Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken) are, as far

as is relevant to the present case, applicable by virtue of a

reference in Chapter 18, Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement.  Under

Chapter 52, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure a party or

any other person may, when this is deemed necessary, be orally heard

before the Court of Appeal.  The same provision applies in respect of

proceedings before the Supreme Court (Chapter 56, Section 12).

        Under Capter 54, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure,

the Supreme Court may only grant leave to appeal

        "1. if it is of importance for the guidance of the

        application of the law that the case should be examined

        by the Supreme Court;  or

        2. if there are extraordinary reasons for such an

        examination, such reasons being, for instance, that there

        are grounds for re-opening the procedure (resning) or that

        there have been procedural mistakes (domvilla) or that the

        outcome in the Court of Appeal obviously is due to a gross

        mistake or gross negligence."

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicants submit that the the refusal to grant them a

permit to retain the real estate was a determination of the

applicants' civil rights and that they were therefore entitled to the

guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention.  The applicants allege that

since there was no court review available to them, there has been a

breach of Article 6 of the Convention.

2.      The applicants also complain about the decisions to attach

to the real estate a certain market price at different stages of

the proceedings.  This market price varied between 100,000 SEK and

172,000 SEK.  The applicants submit that these artificial market

prices are serious interferences with the applicants' rights under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.

The applicants submit that the fact that the State at the initial

public auction sold the real estate to the applicants at the price of

240,000 SEK in December 1979 and the fact that the State repurchased

the property in June 1985 at the price of 172,000 SEK, must be

regarded as a confiscation of property which cannot be justified under

the terms of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  The applicants also complain

about the fact that the State was not ordered by decisions of the

competent courts to redeem the real estate as the applicants had claimed.

3.      The applicants further allege that the fact that the

appeals against the public auction in June 1985 were examined by the

Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court without any oral hearing is an

interference both with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and with Article 6

of the Convention.  The applicants also submit that the appeals to

these courts in these matters show that there existed no effective

remedy as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

4.      The applicants also allege a violation of Article 14 of the

Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in view of

the fact that the applicants' request for a permit to retain the real

estate was rejected simply because the applicants were not residents

in the area in which the real estate was situated.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 3 April 1984 and registered

on 15 November 1985.

        On 12 May 1986 the Commission decided to invite the Government

to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the

application limited to the complaints under Article 6 of the

Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

        The Government's observations were received by a letter dated

21 August 1986 and the applicants' observations in reply were dated

9 October 1986.

        On 12 December 1986 the Commission decided to grant legal aid

to the applicants.

        On 4 March 1987 the Commission decided to invite the parties

to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.

        At the hearing which was held on 15 July 1987 the parties were

represented as follows:

The Government

Mr.  Hans CORELL      Under Secretary for Legal and Consular Affairs

                     Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Agent

Mr.  Rolf STRÖMBERG   Permanent Under-Secretary and Chief Legal

                     Officer, Ministry of Environment and Energy,

                     Adviser

Mr.  Håkan BERGLIN    Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Adviser

The applicants

Mr.  Göran RAVNSBORG  University Lecturer

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A.      The Government

1.      The admissibility

        The Government have no objection to make under the domestic

remedies' rule in Article 26 of the Convention.

        However, the Government submit that the complaint concerning

the decision not to grant the applicants permission to retain the

property should be declared inadmissible for failure to comply with

the six months' rule .  They further submit that any complaint

relating to the redemption procedure is inadmissible for failure to

comply with the six months' rule.  Moreover, the complaint concerning

the public sale of the property is inadmissible for being manifestly

ill-founded.

        The complaint turns on three different sets of proceedings,

namely those concerning the question whether to grant the applicants

permission to retain the property, those concerning redemption by the

State of the property and those concerning the public auction at which

the property was ultimately acquired by the County Agricultural Board.

The final decisions in respect of the three proceedings were taken on

26 February 1981, 14 July 1983 and 20 August 1985 respectively.  The

application was lodged with the Commission on 3 April 1984.  The

question therefore arises whether the applicants, in respect of those

parts of the complaint that relate to issues dealt with in the two

first mentioned proceedings, have complied with the six months' rule of

Article 26.  In the Government's opinion the question has to be

answered in the negative.

        The three sets of proceedings raised different issues which

were to be resolved on the basis of different sets of facts and by

applying different rules of law.  The outcome resulting from the

second and third sets of proceedings did not affect, and could not

have affected, any of the previous determinations.  The proceedings

were conducted under different rules and the two first sets of

proceedings were initiated by the applicants whereas the third one

was, and could only have been, initiated by the State.  Under these

circumstances the Government submit that the three sets of proceedings

must be considered separately when applying the six months' rule in

Article 26 of the Convention.

        The Commission has in its case-law consistently called

attention to the close relationship between this rule and the domestic

remedy rule contained in the same Article and construed the term

"final decision" so as to refer exclusively to the final decision

required to be obtained for the purpose of complying with the domestic

remedy rule.  The Commission has consistently refused to take into

account, for the purpose of calculating the six months' period,

decisions taken in the course of attempts to exhaust domestic remedies

which need not be exhausted.

        In the present case it is clear that the third set of

proceedings, i.e. those resulting in the final decision of 20 August

1985, could not be a remedy in respect of the decisions of 26 February

1981 and 14 July 1983 that needed to be exhausted before a complaint

relating to those decisions could have been admitted by the

Commission.  It may suffice to observe that no possible violation of

the Convention relating to those decisions could in any manner have

been redressed in the course of the proceedings resulting in the

decision of 20 August 1985 and that, in fact, the applicants lacked

the legal capacity of instituting those proceedings.  Consequently,

when applying the six months' rule in respect of the decisions of 26

February 1981 and 14 July 1983, the decision of 20 August 1985 should

not be taken into account.  Accordingly, as regards the two first

decisions, the Government submit that the applicants have failed to

comply with the six months' rule.

        The proceedings concerning the question whether to grant the

applicants permission to retain the property call for some further

comments in view of the fact that this issue subsequent to its final

determination on 26 February 1981 was reconsidered at the request of

the applicants.  In considering this aspect, the Government first

observe that the decision of 26 February 1981 was final in the sense

that, except for the possibility of extraordinary proceedings, no

domestic remedy was legally provided for by which the decision could

have been challenged on any grounds.  The six months' rule laid down

in Article 26 was clearly intended to require an applicant to decide

whether or not to bring his case before the Commission within a period

of six months after his position had been finally determined on the

domestic level.  In view of this the Government submit that, in respect

of the proceedings concerning the question whether to grant the

applicants permission to retain the property, the decision of 26

February 1981 constitutes the "final decision" for the purposes of

Article 26.

        Consequently, the decision of 27 October 1983, following the

application to have the issue reconsidered, should not in the

Government's opinion be taken into account when calculating the six

months' period.  However, and in particular with regard to the wording

of this decision, it still remains to be considered whether the

decision as such, and regardless of the decision of 26 February 1981,

could be viewed as constituting a new "final decision" for the

purposes of Article 26.  In the Government's opinion the question has

to be answered in the negative.  Following the public auction on

4 December 1979 the applicants were under an obligation to sell the

property within two years from the date when the auction became

legally valid unless they had obtained permission from the County

Agricultural Board to retain it.  No appeal against the auction having

been made, this period of two years was to be calculated from 18

December 1979 and, consequently, expired on 18 December 1981.  By that

latter time, rather than having obtained a permit to retain the

property, the applicants' request for such a permit had been finally

rejected by the Government on 26 February 1981.  Consequently, the

final date for fulfilling the obligation of reselling the property as

required by Section 16, para. 1 of the Land Acquisition Act was 18

December 1981.  The proceedings now in question were not initiated

until 4 January 1982 when the applicants asked the County Agricultural

Board to reconsider the case.  Under these circumstances the

Government submit that the proceedings thus initiated could only be

viewed as extraordinary proceedings which may under special

circumstances lead to a reopening of a case already finally settled.

To take another view would render the six months' rule of Article 26

illusory in respect of any decision which, like that of 26 February

1981, did not have the effect of res judicata.

2.      The merits

2.1     The refusal to grant the applicants permission to

        retain the property

        The applicants have alleged that the refusal to grant them

permission to retain the property involved the determination of their

"civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention and that the proceedings resulting in that determination

did not satisfy the requirements set forth in the said Article.

        The Government contest that the applicants' "civil rights"

were determined.  They submit that there are particular features of the

present case.  It has characteristics distinguishing it from the

Ringeisen case (Eur.  Court H.R., Ringeisen judgment of 16th July 1971,

Series A no. 13), the case which would appear to be the one most in

line with the present one.  In the present case the property was

acquired at a public auction and not through an ordinary purchase from

a private seller.  Furthermore, the legal consequences of the relevant

decision were considerably more far-reaching in the Ringeisen case in

that it rendered the purchase null and void.  In the present case the

decision not to grant permission to retain the property entailed an

obligation to sell the property.  The purchase as such was not

affected.  In the Government's opinion these characteristics carry

considerable weight when considering whether the proceedings should be

viewed as involving determination of "civil rights" within the meaning

of Article 6 para. 1.

        In case the Commission would find that the present decision

did amount to the determination of the applicants' "civil rights"

within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1, the Government admit that the

applicants were not entitled to take proceedings meeting the

requirements of the said Article.

2.2     The decision not to redeem the property

        Given that the applicants do not seem to directly assert any

separate violation of the Convention or Protocol No. 1 in respect of

this decision or the proceedings preceding it, the Government only

observe that no requirement could possibly be read into the Convention

or Protocol No. 1 to the effect that a State would be under an

obligation to redeem property in the way here requested by the

applicants.  Consequently, to the extent the applicants' allegations

on this point could be viewed as a separate complaint, the Government

submit that it should be rejected for falling outside the scope of the

Convention and Protocol No. 1.

        Furthermore, given that the decision in no way affected the

applicants' legal or actual position in respect of the property, any

complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded.

2.3     The public sale of property

        2.3.1   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

        According to the applicants, the determination prior to the

auction on 18 June 1985 of an estimated value of the property of

172,000 SEK and the public sale of the property at that price

constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since the

applicants had acquired the property at a price of 240,000 SEK.  The

evaluation of the property was no more than a preparatory step taken

in view of the subsequent auction.

        The Government admit that the applicants were "deprived of

(their) possessions" within the meaning of the second sentence of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the contested public sale of

the property.  However, for the following reasons the Government

submit that this interference with the applicants' rights was

justified under the terms of the said Article.

        It follows from the wording of the second sentence of Article 1

that for a deprivation of property not to constitute a violation of

this Article, it has to be carried out "in the public interest" and in

accordance with "conditions provided for by law and by the general

principles of international law".  Furthermore, as construed by the

European Court of Human Rights in the Case of James and others (Eur.

Court H.R., James and others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A

no. 98, p. 29, para. 37), the second sentence is to be viewed in the

light of the general principle enunciated in the first sentence of the

Article.  This latter provision, in turn, in the case of Sporrong and

Lönnroth (Eur.  Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23

September 1982, Series A no. 52), as well as in the case mentioned

above and the case of Lithgow and others (Eur.  Court H.R., Lithgow and

others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102), has been construed

by the Court so as to require that, in case of an otherwise justified

interference, a fair balance should be struck between the demands of

the public interest concerned and the necessity of protecting the

individual's fundamental rights.

                "In the public interest"

        The Land Acquisition Act, forming the legal basis for the

public sale of the applicants' property, was enacted for the purpose

of implementing the policy goals of agriculture, forestry and regional

planning.  The contested auction was carried out as a means of

enforcing provisions of the Act aimed at developing rational and

effective farm holdings.  In view of this, and considering that the

European Court of Human Rights has viewed the notion of "public

interest" as a "necessarily extensive" concept and also afforded the

national authorities a "margin of appreciation" in assessing the

public needs and the appropriate measures to be taken to satisfy them,

the Government submit that the interference with the applicants'

rights was done "in the public interest" within the meaning of the

second sentence of Article 1.  The Government also observe that no

other opinion on this point appears to have been expressed by the

applicants.

                "Conditions provided for by law and by the general

                principles of international law"

        The Government firstly observe the absence of any allegation

before the Commission to the effect that the auction was not carried

out in accordance with relevant provisions of Swedish statute law.

However, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently construed

the terms "law" and "lawful" in the Convention and Protocol No. 1 as not

merely referring to domestic law but also as relating to "the quality of

the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law".  Although

the exact meaning of this requirement may still be open to some doubt,

and also vary depending on the circumstances, it may reasonably be

deduced from the Court's case-law that in the present context the law,

in order to satisfy the requirements of the second sentence, would need

to afford a reasonable protection against arbitrary interferences and,

in particular, to provide adequate guidance as to the circumstances

under which, and the conditions on which, an interference may be carried

out.

        When considering the facts of the present case in view of

these observations, the Government submit that the requirement

that the interference be subject to "conditions provided for by law"

was also clearly satisfied.  Thus, except for the price at which the

property was ultimately to be sold, every significant material as

well as procedural aspect of the public sale was regulated by written

law readily available to the applicants.  Furthermore, there is

nothing to indicate that they were not also in fact fully informed of

these regulations and their potential consequences.  Finally, the

publicly announced estimated market value of the property at the time

the applicants acquired it - 140,000 SEK - provided clear guidance

as to the possible price in case of a subsequent public sale in

accordance with these regulations.

        As regards the reference to "general principles of

international law", the Government observe that both applicants are

Swedish citizens.  Therefore, and in view of the fact that the

European Court of Human Rights has found these principles to be

applicable only in respect of non-nationals (see the case of James and

others judgment, op. cit., pp. 38-40, paras. 58-66), no separate issue

arises in respect of this particular requirement.

                A fair balance between the public interest

                and the protection of the individual's right

        In the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights this

requirement has been construed to mean that any interference, in order

to be justified under Article 1, need to be "both appropriate for

achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto" and that,

accordingly, the balance required will not be found in case the

individual concerned would have to bear "an individual and excessive

burden" for the present case.  This would appear to call for an

examination of, firstly, whether the public sale of the applicants'

property in itself was appropriate in view of the aim sought to be

achieved and, secondly, whether the applicants under the circumstances

had to suffer undue economic burdens.

        The policy goals of agriculture and forestry could scarcely be

achieved without imposing appropriate restrictions on the right to

acquire and hold land suitable for agriculture and forestry.  The

framing and administration of such restrictions naturally offer a

variety of possible measures to be taken, some of which necessarily

involve serious interferences with the individual's right to property,

including depriving him of his property.

        As regards the choice between such possible measures, the

concept "in the public interest" clearly suggests that the discretion

afforded to States is considerably wider in scope than under other

similar provisions of the Convention, for instance Articles 8-10,

where the notion "necessary in a democratic society" is used.  In

applying Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Commission has viewed the

former concept as "clearly (encompassing) measures which would be

preferable or advisable, and not only essential, in a democratic

society" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Comm.  Report, 30.9.75,

para. 167).

        In view of the wide discretion thus afforded to a State as

regards the particular measures to be taken in order to implement

legitimate policy goals, it could not reasonably be held that the

measures taken in the present case were not appropriate in relation to

the goals sought to be achieved.

        As regards the question of whether the applicants had to

suffer undue economic burdens, the Government first observe that the

property had a fixed value for tax purposes of 107,000 SEK.  This

value is, as a matter of law, intended to correspond to 75 per cent of

the market value.  Furthermore, at the time of the public auction of

4 December 1979 at which the applicants acquired the property, the

estimated market value was publicly announced to be 140,000 SEK.

Finally, prior to the public sale on 18 June 1985 the property was

assessed, at the request of the applicants and by independent valuers

appointed by the County Administrative Board (see e.g. the applicants'

writ to the Supreme Court of 24 July 1985), at a value of 172,000 SEK,

at which price it was also ultimately purchased by the County

Agricultural Board.  In view of this, the Government submit

that the applicants were fully compensated in the sense that they were

in fact afforded an amount corresponding to the full market value of

the property.

        However, the applicants acquired the property at a

considerably higher price than that at which it was ultimately sold at

the public auction of 18 June 1985.  In view of this, it could be

argued that they were not fully compensated.  Based on this line of

reasoning, the applicants have asserted that the public sale amounted

to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  For the following

reasons, the Government, even assuming that the price at which the

applicants acquired the property would be considered to reflect its

market value, are unable to share this view.

        At the outset, the Government observe that Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 as it stands does not at all call for any form of

compensation in case of deprivation of property in the public

interest.  Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights has

consistently held that the taking of property by the State without any

form of compensation would normally be inconsistent with the

requirements of the said Article (see e.g.  James and others judgment,

op. cit. p. 36, para. 54, and Lithgow and others judgment, op. cit.,

pp. 50-51, paras. 121-122).  In doing so, however, the Court has

explicitly rejected the idea that the State would be obliged under all

circumstances to fully compensate the property owner.  Rather, all

that is required, according to the Court, would appear to be that the

compensation should be "reasonably related to" the market value.  In

addition, as regards the determination of the compensation the Court

has observed the necessity of allowing the State a "wide margin of

appreciation".

        In view of this, the Government submit that the applicants

were adequately compensated as required by Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1.

        As to the economic losses actually suffered by the applicants,

the Government add the following.  Legislation aimed at implementing

policy goals such as those concerned in the present case would hardly

serve its purpose without, at least occasionally, giving rise to

situations in which the individual would have to bear what at first

sight might be viewed as considerable burdens.  In recognising that

such burdens cannot always be avoided, the European Court of Human

Rights has accepted that, in principle, it is for the national

legislator to assess the advantages and disadvantages involved in the

legislative measures concerned, provided only that the measures

ultimately taken would not be "so unreasonable as to be outside the

State's margin of appreciation" (James and others judgment, op. cit.,

p. 42, para. 69).

        When applying this formula to the present case, the Government

maintain that, in view of the policy goals pursued, there is nothing

in the legislation as such that could reasonably render it

unacceptable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  In particular, the

Government observe that the mechanism provided for in the legislation

does not inherently, and in practice all but never, lead to situations

like the one in the present case.  Furthermore, the grievances

suffered by the applicants were to a large extent the result of what

in the Government's opinion might fairly be viewed as highly risky

undertakings consciously entered into by the applicants themselves.

As will be recalled, although well aware of the facts that they might

not be granted permission to retain the property and that the property

might ultimately be sold at a public auction, they nevertheless chose

to acquire it at a price which at the time of the acquisition exceeded

the publicly announced, estimated market value by 100,000 SEK, i.e. by

more than 70 per cent.  Under these circumstances, the Government

submit that the present case does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 even when considering the

economic losses actually suffered by the applicants.

        To sum up, while admitting that the public sale constituted an

interference with the applicants' right to property, the Government

submit that the interference was clearly justified under the

conditions laid down in the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1.  Consequently, the Government maintain that the complaint on

this point is manifestly ill-founded.

        2.3.2  Article 6 of the Convention

        The applicants have also in respect of the public sale alleged

violations of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention on the ground that

their appeal was decided upon without an oral hearing.

        As regards the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 to the

present proceedings, the Government take the same position as in

respect of the refused permission to retain the property.  In case the

Commission would find Article 6 para. 1 applicable, the Government

submit that the requirements of that Article were satisfied in the

present case.

        The Government firstly observe that Article 6 para. 1 as it

stands does not seem to necessarily call for a public hearing for the

determination of civil rights and obligations.  Rather, it merely

provides that everyone is entitled to such a hearing.  In the

Government's opinion, this clearly indicates that the right to

proceedings in public could be waived.  The European Court of Human

Rights has also adopted this view and, furthermore, recognised that

the waiver could be tacit (see e.g.  Eur.  Court H.R., Deweer judgment

of 27 February 1980, Series A No. 35, p. 25, para. 49, and Eur.  Court

H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981,

Series A no. 43, para. 59).

        In the present case, the contested auction as such was carried

out in public.  Furthermore, every decision related to the public sale

could be, and some of the decisions were in fact, brought before courts

competent to review every aspect of the matter in respect of questions

of law as well as questions of fact.  The rules governing such appeal

proceedings do comprise provisions according to which parties and

witnesses could be orally heard before the Court of Appeal as well as

the Supreme Court.  However, no request for such a hearing was ever made

by the applicants, nor was there any indication that they, nevertheless,

did expect a hearing to be held or that in any possible way they could

be expected to benefit from a hearing.  Under these circumstances the

Government submit that the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 were

satisfied and that, accordingly, the application on this point is

manifestly ill-founded.

        In case the Commission does not share this view, the

Government question, even in case an oral hearing is requested by the

party concerned, whether at all Article 6 of the Convention calls for

oral proceedings regardless of the character of the issues involved.

The Commission has in numerous decisions dealt with the concept of a

"fair and public hearing" in a manner that seems to indicate that all

that would be required would be that a party is provided appropriate

facilities for presenting and arguing his case and that the opposing

party is not put in a more favourable position with regard to the

possibilities of presenting his position.  It certainly goes without

saying that the circumstances in a case might be such as to call for

an oral hearing for these requirements to be fulfilled.  However, in

the Government's opinion it would seem to be equally conceivable that

a party under certain circumstances could be given a perfectly fair

chance to present his case, even though he were not afforded the

possibility of doing this at an oral hearing.  Thus, a civil case

involving no disputed facts but only pure legal issues would seem to

be as appropriately presented and argued in writing as at an oral

hearing.

        In this context the Government draw the attention to the

Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No. 1169/61

(Dec. 24.9.63, Yearbook 6, p. 520) in which the Commission expressed

the opinion that when the character and mode of living of an applicant

were not directly relevant to the formation of the Court's opinion,

proceedings wholly in writing might meet the requirements of Article

6 para. 1 of the Convention.

        In the present case the only issue brought before the courts

was a question of law, namely what principles to be applied when

assessing the value of the property (see the applicants' appeals to

the Göta Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court).  Consequently, there

was no dispute as regards the facts of the case and the character and

mode of living of the applicants were of no relevance to the formation

of the courts' opinions.

        The Government also draw attention to the important principle

under Swedish law of general access to official documents

(offentlighetsprincipen).  According to this principle - which is laid

down in the Freedom of the Press Act (tryckfrihetsförordningen) forming

part of the Swedish Constitution - anybody has the right to have access

to the written submissions to Swedish courts (the principle is subject

to a limited number of exceptions provided for in the Secrecy Act, none

of which is relevant to the present case).  This means that there is full

publicity about court proceedings even if there is no oral hearing and,

accordingly, that there could be no material before the courts that is

not readily available to the parties as well as the public.  Clearly,

this public nature of the proceedings provides a substantial guarantee

against arbitrary decisions by enabling the parties and the public to

verify and scrutinise the manner in which the administration of justice

is carried on.  The Government maintain that this specific feature of the

Swedish legal system should be given special regard when considering

Swedish court proceedings in view of the requirements of Article 6,

para. 1 of the Convention.

B.      The applicants

1.      Introduction

        In order to simplify an analysis of the different legal and

procedural problems raised in this particular case it may be convenient

to distinguish between three different issues:

        a. the purely administrative procedure which was initiated by

the applicants with a view to obtaining a permit to retain the

property, a procedure which terminated in unfavourable decisions by

the Government in 1981 and 1983,

        b. the proceedings before the courts initiated by the

applicants with a view to having the State ordered to redeem the

property, proceedings which terminated in an unfavourable decision by

the Supreme Court in 1983,

        c. the proceedings before the courts initiated by the

applicants with a view to having the compulsory sale of the

property quashed, proceedings which ended in an unfavourable decision

by the Supreme Court on 20 August 1985.

        The applicants submit that this distinction of three

different issues can only be accepted for the sake of argument.

In reality these three legal proceedings must be looked at as a whole,

instituted by the applicants with the aim of defending and retaining

their property.

2.      The six months' rule

        The legal actions in which the applicants have been involved

must be viewed in their entirety.  As regards the Government's decision

not to grant the applicants a permit to retain the property the

applicants submit that they have complied with the six months' rule of

Article 26 of the Convention.  In their opinion there exists a close

relationship between the different proceedings in this case.  Even if

the applicants had confined themselves to appealing against the

decision of the Supreme Court of 20 August 1985 within the six months'

period laid down in Article 26 of the Convention such an application

would effectively have included both the Supreme Court's decision of

14 July 1983 and the Government's decision of 26 February 1981 as well

as the Government's decision of 27 October 1983.  In their submission

the Government contradict their own decision of 27 October 1983.  In

their decision of 14 March 1985 the Government stated: "The appeal was

finally rejected by the Government's conclusion on 27 October 1983.

The appeal cannot be reviewed again by the Government."

        Even if the Commission would not accept an application based

on the decision of the Supreme Court of 20 August 1985 as effectively

covering the decision of the Supreme Court of 14 July 1983 as well as

the Government's decisions on 26 February 1981 and 27 October 1983,

the applicants find that the application insofar it refers to the

Government's decision of 27 October 1983 fully complies with the six

months' rule since it was introduced on 3 April 1984.

3.      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

        The applicants consider that the compulsory public auction on

19 June 1986 constitutes a violation of their property right as

provided for by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

        The Government have admitted that the applicants were deprived

of their possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a result of the sale at the public

auction.  The applicants are unable to accept the Government's

statement that this interference was justified under the terms of

Article 1.  The applicants find no fair balance between the demands of

the alleged public interest concerned and the necessity to

protect the applicants' fundamental rights.  On the contrary, the

public sale was planned by the bureaucracy in order to place an

excessive burden on the applicants in a discriminatory manner, both

absolutely and in comparison with the previous owner and the

subsequent owner.  The Government in their submissions use the concept

"public sale" and "auction" in a deceitful way when they describe the

way in which  the property was forcibly sold away from the applicants

on 18 June 1985.  The price had already been decided upon in an

administrative way by the County Agricultural Board of the county of

Kronoberg at 172,000 SEK without appeal.  Nobody was allowed to make

bids except the County Agricultural Board which for security reasons

prior to the public sale had refused to grant any of four serious

prospective buyers a permit to acquire the real estate in question.

        Before the public sale on 18 June 1985 the property had

undergone three valuations, one by the National Board of Forestry

(skogsvårdsstyrelsen) of the county of Kronoberg of February and March

1984, another by the Senior Land Surveyor (överlantmätaren) of the

county of Kronoberg of April 1984 and a third by a specially appointed

valuer of October 1984.

        The first valuation was made in the absence of the applicants

who had the right to attend but were never invited.  The value of the

estate was decided at 100,000 SEK. In its letter of 15 March 1984 the

National Board of Forestry indicated to the Enforcement Office of

Växjö that "nothing more can be said except that when the property was

sold at a compulsory auction some years ago there appeared some

prospective buyers who were ready to bid more than 200,000 SEK. From

that time the real estate prices have been on the same level in

current value.  A certain felling of low producing forest and

subsequent forestry has taken place on the property.  With this

background and despite small felling possibilities it is not

unbelievable that one may find prospective buyers who would be

prepared to buy for more than the estimated value of 100,000 SEK.

However, it is considered less likely that anybody is prepared to

pay more than 200,000 SEK."

        The next administrative valuation was made by the Senior Land

Surveyor in the absence of the applicants who had the right to

attend but who were never invited.  This time the value of the estate

was decided to amount to 125,000 SEK although this valuation referred

back to the previous one of February and March 1984.  The third and

final administrative valuation was made in October 1984 by two

specially appointed valuers in the presence of the applicants.  This

valuation refers to the previous two but nevertheless the value was

decided to amount to 172,000 SEK which was the price to be applied at

the public auction in June 1985.

        The applicants made two general and critical remarks

about the three valuations.  First, the site quality of the estate is

consistently underestimated to only half of the real quality and,

secondly, the comprehensive forestry on the property in which the

applicants engaged during 1980-1983, including the planting of

roughly 26,000 spruce plants, is completely ignored, although all those

plants were on the spot before the valuations were made in 1984.  The

age of those plants is now four to seven years and they must soon be

thinned out.  This means that the land owner of the property, within

the next three to four years, must take away 15,000 - 16,000 young

trees.  This can be done without the slightest effort of the landowner.

He can sell those young trees as standing forest for at least 20 SEK a

piece as Christmas trees to be cut down and taken away by the

wholesaler.  Such a transaction will in not more than two to three

years' time give the landowner a net income of more than 300,000 SEK,

depending on the high site quality and the very intensive forestry and

the hard work of applicants and their family members for which they

received no compensation.  Taking into account this extraordinary high

net income within only a few years and the fact that after this

necessary thinning out the landowner will possess a fertile soil with

widespread and strongly grown young trees for timber, it seems

shocking that the Government and the Supreme Court forced the

applicants to sell for 172,000 SEK in 1985 what they had bought in

1979 for 240,000 SEK. In the follow up of the forced auction on

18 June 1985 the applicants find some other interesting and revealing

features of the Government's public interest, namely that the County

Agricultural Board in the four cases of rejected applications for a

permit to acquire the property at the public sale of June 1985 insists

on its unrealistic value of the estate and that after the forced sale

in June 1985 the County Agricultural Board sold the property for

125,000 SEK to the two brothers MB and TB who were prepared to buy

exactly the same property at the compulsory auction in December 1979

for 230,000 SEK.

        There can only be one reason for the County Agricultural Board

to maintain its absurd valuation of the property amounting to 86,000

SEK. If that valuation could be accepted as the starting point it may

appear as if the applicants were decently compensated, instead of

ruthlessly underpaid in a discriminatory manner, when they were

allowed to get 172,000 SEK at the compulsory auction in June 1985, and

at the same time it may appear as if the subsequent buyers MB and TB

had to purchase the property at a normal market price when as a matter

of fact they were considerably subsidised, to a considerable part at

the expense of the applicants.  The applicants are certain that all

this happened in the so-called Swedish public interest.  However, the

applicants submit that the argument as to the Swedish public interest

is a most risky one.  The Land Acquisition Act was enacted in order to

implement some new agricultural guidelines and to meet policy goals of

forestry and regional planning.  Soon after the enforcement of this Act

the public debate made it the target of heavy criticism concerning not

only the policy goals but also the administrative means to reach those

goals.  The predominating Swedish opinion now finds the policy goals

as defined by this Act to a large extent outdated and for that reason

among others not worthy of the administrative means which the Act

still leaves open for abuse by a powerminded and injudicious

Swedish bureaucracy.  In view of this it is really a venture into an

adapted mine field to vindicate the opinion that what has happened to

the property and the applicants as the owners thereof is in itself in

the public interest.

        To summarise the facts, the compulsory auction in December

1979 where the applicants bought the property at the price of 240,000

SEK left the previous owner with a net profit of about 100,000 SEK. After

four years of intensive forestry on the property, including the planting

of 26,000 spruce plants which activities should roughly have doubled

the market value of the property from the time of the compulsory auction

of December 1979 to the middle of 1985, the applicants were forced to

sell the property at a price decided by the administration at 172,000

SEK to the County Agricultural Board of Kronoberg which by rejecting

all applications for a permit to acquire the property excluded all

other buyers, thereby extinguishing all hopes for the applicants to

obtain a sale at a market value.  Subsequently the County Agricultural

Board sold the property in question to new owners at a highly

subsidised price, 125,000 SEK.

        The applicants lost more than 300,000 SEK as an immediate and

unavoidable result of the public auction.  The applicants consider

that Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable.  The

Government's submissions do not justify the actions taken by the

administration and by the courts.  Those actions involve violations of

the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as

guaranteed by Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1.  The Government's

references to the public interest do not outweigh the seriousness of

the violations alleged.

4.      Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention

        The issue of the permit to retain the property was a

determination of a dispute in regard to the applicants' civil

rights.  Article 6 para. 1 as applicable and the applicants' right to

access to a tribunal have been violated.

        As regards the issue of the State's obligation to redeem the

property the access to court was in fact no effective remedy for the

applicants since the right to claim that the State redeem the

property is by law given only to the seller in a deal which is quashed

by the administration by means of rejecting the buyer's application

for a permit to acquire the real estate in question.  For that reason

the buyers of real estate at compulsory auctions as a group are by law

put in a much more hazardous situation than the sellers.  The

applicants view this situation as one concerning a civil right and a

determination and dispute in that respect.  Articles 6 para. 1, 13 and

14 of the Convention are applicable.  The applicants conclude that

there have been violations of the applicants' rights set forth in

those Articles.

        The next issue is that of the imposed price of 172,000 SEK.

The use of this price at the public auction of 18 June 1985 when the

property was forcibly sold placed a most excessive burden upon the

applicants in a discrminatory manner both absolutely and in comparison

with the local inhabitants.  The previous owner could withdraw from

the compulsory auction in December 1979 with a net profit of 100,000

SEK and the successive owners obtained the property for a most

profitable and highly subsidised price where the greater part of the

subsidy was in fact paid by the applicants.

        The Court's refusal to quash the public auction sale of

18 June 1985 leaves the applicants without access either to an effective

domestic remedy or to a fair and public hearing by an independent and

impartial tribunal.

THE LAW

1.      The applicants complain of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1), in particular because at the public auction in December 1979

the State sold the property to the applicants at a price of 240,000 SEK,

then refused them a permit to retain the property, and finally bought

it in June 1985 at a new public auction at a price of 172,000 SEK.

        The Government submit that the complaint concerning the

decision not to grant the applicants a permit to retain the property

as well as any complaint relating to the redemption procedure should

be rejected for failure to comply with the six months' rule in Article

26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.  In the alternative, they submit that the

complaint relating to the redemption procedure is incompatible ratione

materiae with the provisions of the Convention.  In all circumstances,

they submit that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is

manifestly ill-founded.

        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads (P1-1):

        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

        enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

        his possessions except in the public interest and subject to

        the conditions provided for by law and by the general

        principles of international law.

        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

        impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems

        necessary to control the use of property in accordance with

        the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or

        other contributions or penalties."

        The Commission considers that the applicants' complaint under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) that they have been deprived of their

property forms a whole which relates to several facts and sets of

proceedings.  The public sale of the applicants' property, which

became final when the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal

on 20 August 1985, must be taken as the starting point when

calculating the six months' period.  The application was introduced

with the Commission on 3 April 1984 and registered on 15 November 1985.

        Accordingly this aspect of the application cannot in any part

be rejected for failure to comply with the six months' rule in Article

26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

        The Commission considers that the applicants' complaint under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) raises difficult questions of fact and

law, which are of such complexity that their determination should

depend upon an examination of the merits.  This part of the application

is therefore not manifestly ill-founded and must be declared

admissible, no other ground for declaring it inadmissible having been

established.

2.      The applicants also complain that they did not have access to

a court review of the decisions relating to the refusal to grant them

a permit to retain the property.  They allege a violation of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention.

        The Government submit that this complaint should be rejected

for failure to comply with the six months' rule.  They further submit

that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the

provisions of the Convention since the decision not to grant a permit

to retain the property did not involve a determination of the

applicants' civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.  In the event of the Commission finding that the

applicants' "civil rights" were determined, the Government admit that

no procedure satisfying the conditions of Article 6 (Art. 6) was open to the

applicants.

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention reads:

"1.     In the determination of his civil rights and

obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is

entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time

by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

        As regards the six months' rule, the Commission recalls that

the applicants' first request for a permit to retain the property was

finally determined on 26 February 1981 by the Government.  Their

second request was finally determined on 27 October 1983, and their

request to the Government for a reconsideration of the decision of

27 October 1983 was answered on 14 March 1985, the Government finding

no reason to take any measures since the matter had been finally

decided on 27 October 1983.

        The Commission considers that the last decision of the

Government of 14 March 1985 cannot be taken as the starting point for

calculating the six months' rule.  The question which arises is

whether the final decision on the second request for a permit to

retain the property should be taken into account, or whether those

proceedings are to be regarded as being an ineffective remedy not to

be taken into account.  In this respect the Commission notes that the

first decision did not have the effect of res judicata and that the

second set of proceedings involved a fresh examination of the merits

of the applicants' request, although reference was made to the

previous decision.  It further notes that at least the applicants were

of the opinion that there were new facts to examine in the second set

of proceedings.  Moreover, the fact that the National Board of

Agriculture in the second set of proceedings inspected the property

suggests that new circumstances had arisen which warranted a further

examination of the case.  In these particular circumstances the

Commission accepts that the "final decision" for the purpose of

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention was the decision of the Government of

27 October 1983.  Taking this date as the starting point for

calculating the six months' rule, it follows that the applicants'

complaint cannot be rejected for failure to comply with that rule.

        The subsequent issues to be decided are whether the decision

to refuse the applicants a permit to retain their property was a

"determination" of the applicants' "civil rights" within the meaning

of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and, if so, whether the applicants had the

possibility of bringing the refusal of the permit before a "tribunal"

satisfying the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

        The Commission has made a preliminary examination of these

issues in the light of the parties' submissions.  It considers that

these issues are of such an important and complex nature that their

determination requires an examination of the merits.  This complaint

must therefore be declared admissible.

3.      Insofar as the applicants complain that the redemption

procedure failed to meet the conditions of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention, the Commission notes that this procedure terminated on

14 July 1983 when the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

Since the application was introduced on 3 April 1984, which is more

than six months after the said decision, it follows that in this

respect the application is inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

4.      The applicants also complain of the absence of an oral hearing

before the Göta Court of Appeal when it determined the applicants'

appeal concerning the public auction.

        The Government submit that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded.

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention guarantees to everyone

the right to a "fair and public hearing" in the determination of his civil

rights and obligations.

        The Commission considers that the question as to the

applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) to the proceedings before the Court of

Appeal and the question whether the applicants were entitled to a

hearing in those proceedings raise issues of such an important and

complex nature that their determination requires an examination of

the merits.  This complaint must therefore be declared admissible.

5.      The applicants moreover complain that also the procedure

before the Supreme Court, when it refused to grant leave to appeal,

violated Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, since the

Supreme Court did not hold a hearing.

        According to Chapter 54 Section 10 of the Code of Judicial

Procedure, the Supreme Court may only grant leave to appeal if it is

important in order to create a precedent that the Court examine

the case, or if there are specific reasons for such an examination,

such as grounds for re-opening the procedure, or if an obvious mistake

has been made in the Court of Appeal.

        An examination as to whether leave to appeal shall be granted

is, in the Commission's opinion, only an examination as to whether the

conditions of Chapter 54 Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

are satisfied and not an examination of the merits of the appeal.  The

Commission refers to its previous case-law according to which a leave

to appeal examination by the Swedish Supreme Court does not involve a

determination of "civil rights or obligations" (cf.  No. 11453/85, Dec.

7.7.86, unpublished).

        It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione

materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected

pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

6.      The applicants have also complained of violations of Articles 13 and 14

(Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.  These complaints are closely linked to those

parts of the application under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention, which the Commission has found to be admissible

above.  Accordingly, these complaints must also be declared admissible.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES INADMISSIBLE