AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY

Application No. 10825/84

by R. and W. HOWARD

against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

16 July 1987, the following members being present:

                MM.  C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                     J.A. FROWEIN

                     S. TRECHSEL

                     F. ERMACORA

                     E. BUSUTTIL

                     A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                     A. WEITZEL

                     J.C. SOYER

                     H.G. SCHERMERS

                     H. DANELIUS

                     G. BATLINER

                     H. VANDENBERGHE

                Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

                Sir  Basil HALL

                MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                     C.L. ROZAKIS

                 Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1983

by R. and W. HOWARD against the United Kingdom and registered on

27 February 1984 under file No. 10825/84;

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having regard to:

-       the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure

        of the Commission;

-       the Rapporteur's request of 25 October 1984 pursuant to Rule

        40 (2)(a) of the Rules of Procedure for information from the

        respondent Government and the information submitted by the

        respondent Government on 21 November 1984;

-       the Commission's decision on 4 December 1984 to request the

        respondent Government pursuant to Rule 42 (2)(b) of the

        Rules of Procedure to submit written observations on the

        admissibility and merits of the application;

-       the observations of the respondent Government dated

        20 March 1985 and the observations of the applicants in reply

        dated 19 June 1985;

-       the Commission's partial decision on admissibility of

        18 October 1985 and the Commission's decision to invite the

        parties to submit further observations in writing on the

        admissibility and merits of the remaining part of the application;

-       the further observations submitted by the respondent

        Government on 25 February 1986 and the further observations

        submitted by the applicants' representatives on 16 September 1986;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts, as they have been submitted on behalf of the

applicants, British citizens and brothers born in 1910 and 1919

respectively, by their solicitors, Raley & Pratt of Barnsley, and

which are apparently not contested by the respondent Government, may

be summarised as follows.

        The applicants were the owners and occupiers of a house (Rose

Cottage, also known as Garden Cottage) and surrounding land with a

total area of approximately 6,000 square yards at Cope Street,

Barnsley, South Yorkshire.  The house was built in 1830 and was the

home of the applicants for over 50 years.

        In 1982 the Barnsley Metropolitan District Council ("the

local authority") issued a compulsory purchase order in respect of the

applicants' property under Section 112 (1) of the Town and Country

Planning Act 1971 as amended by Section 91 (1) of the Local Government

Planning and Land Act 1980 (1).

        The applicants' property, at the time the compulsory purchase

order was made, was surrounded by existing urban development.  The

local authority decided to improve the area by making public money

available for this purpose to improve existing dwellings and by

permitting and encouraging new development.

________________

(1)     Section 112 (1) and (1A) Town and Country Planning Act 1971

        as amended provides:

        (1)     "A Local Authority to whom this section applies

                shall on being authorised to do so by the

                Secretary of State, have power to acquire

                compulsorily - (a) any land which is

                required in order to secure the carrying out

                of one or more of the following activities,

                namely development, redevelopment and improvement;"

        (1A)    "A Local Authority and the Secretary of State

                in considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)

                above whether land is suitable for development,

                redevelopment or improvement shall have regard -

                (a) to the provisions of the development plan, so

                far as material;

                (b) to whether planning permission for any development

                on the land is in force;  and

                (c) to any other consideration which, on an

                application for planning permission for development

                on the land, would be material for the purpose of

                determining that application."

        The compulsory purchase of the applicants' property, together

with some adjacent land, was implemented with a view to demolishing

the applicants' house so as to make the land available for the

construction of new dwellings.  The applicants objected to the

compulsory purchase order as did one other person affected, and a

public enquiry was held by an inspector on 18 and 19 January 1983.

The applicants were represented by Counsel.

        Although the applicants had originally objected to the

compulsory purchase order on various plots of land, they finally

agreed, at the enquiry, to drop their objections to the compulsory

purchase of all their land, except area 11, which included their home

and its immediately adjacent land, provided that they could retain

adequate access from the adjacent public highway.

        The inspector's report to the Secretary of State for the

Environment, dated 28 February 1983, examined the possibility of

whether the area the applicants sought to retain could be excluded

from the compulsory purchase order, or whether even a part of that

area could be so excluded.

        The inspector's report found that if area 11 was not included

it would leave in the centre of the redevelopment area "an element

which is undoubtedly most unsightly with its high corrugated iron

fence and heaps of scrap".  It was further stated that it would leave

the General Improvement Area incomplete, the development would be more

difficult and probably nearly all of the sheltered accommodation would

have to be eliminated from the scheme because no other low lying land

was available.

        The inspector's report took into account the applicants' small

scale scrap cardboard business and the consideration that the

applicants were elderly and would naturally wish to live the remainder

of their days in the house they had lived in for so long.  The

inspector's report, however, found that these considerations did not

outweigh the requirement for the land to carry out redevelopment and

improvement.  The inspector's report stated that attempts had been

made to negotiate a voluntary purchase from the applicants but these

negotiations had failed.  The inspector's report recommended that the

compulsory purchase order be confirmed concluding that "there is not

only a need, but an urgent need for the order land to be redeveloped".

        The Secretary of State followed the recommendation of the

inspector, and confirmed the compulsory purchase order on

27 June 1983.

        The applicants contend that any further appeal against this

decision is restricted by Section 25 of the Acquisition of Land Act

1981 (1).  This provision prevents any challenge to the order,

except under Section 23 (1) and (2) of the Acquisition of Land Act

1981, which provide for an appeal if the order was not authorised  by

_______________

(1)     Section 25 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 provides:

        "Subject to the preceding provisions of this Part of this

        Act, a compulsory purchase order ... shall ... not ... after

        it has been confirmed ... be questioned in any legal

        proceedings whatsoever."

a statute, or where any relevant requirement has not been complied

with in relation to the order.  The applicants have been advised, and

accept, that it cannot be contended that the order was not authorised

by statute, nor that any relevant requirement was not complied with on

this narrow, formal, legal basis provided by Section 23 (1) and (2).

In addition, the validity or legality of the Town and Country

Planning Act or the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 themselves cannot be

challenged in the United Kingdom.

        The local authority made a vesting declaration under the

Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 which had the

effect that the applicants' home and land became the property of the

local authority on 30 November 1984.  The local authority took

possession of the land and the applicants' home on 19 November 1986

and the house was demolished in December 1986.

        The applicants are entitled to compensation under the Land

Compensation Act 1961 for the market value of their land and home and

related losses, such as removal expenses, and are entitled to be

rehoused by the local authority.  Three offers of alternative

accommodation have been made, but refused by the applicants.  The most

recent has been to rehouse the applicants in a newly built four-

bedroomed house with a large garden, adjacent to their former home.

The applicants were offered a tenancy of this property at a rent of

£30 per week.

COMPLAINTS

        The outstanding matter about which the applicants complain

under Article 13 of the Convention is that Section 25 (1) Acquisition

of Land Act 1981 prevents them from challenging in the national

jurisdiction the decisions to purchase their house and land

compulsorily either on their merits, or on the grounds that they

infringe the rights guaranteed by the Convention.  They complain that

they would have been better able to challenge the necessity for the

interference with their right had their property been compulsorily

purchased under other statutory provisions.  The applicants refer to

statutory provisions which permit the compulsory purchase of houses on

the ground that they are unfit for human habitation or that the land

is required to satisfy a housing need and cite the Town Department Act

1952, the Housing Act 1957, the New Towns Act 1965 and the Housing Act

1969.PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 9 November 1983 and

registered on 27 February 1984.  On 25 October 1984, the Rapporteur

requested information from the respondent Government pursuant to Rule

40 (2)(a) of the Rules of Procedure concerning the imminency of

enforcement measures against the applicants.

        The respondent Government replied on 21 November 1984.  The

Commission examined the admissibility of the application on

4 December 1984 and decided, in accordance with Rule 42 (2)(b) of the

Rules of Procedure, to invite the respondent Government to submit

written observations on its admissibility and merits.  After an

extension of the time limit by two weeks granted by the President, the

respondent Government submitted their observations on 20 March 1985.

        The applicants' submissions in reply were received on

19 June 1985, three weeks after the expiry of the time limit.

        On 18 October 1985 the Commission decided to declare

inadmissible the applicants' complaints under Article 8 of the

Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to adjourn its

examination of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention

concerning the alleged inadequacy of the available remedies.  The

Commission decided at the same time to invite the respondent

Government pursuant to Rule 42 (3)(a) of the Rules of Procedure to

submit further written observations on the admissibility and merits of

the applicants' adjourned complaint.

        The respondent Government's observations were submitted on

25 February 1986 and communicated to the applicants' then

representative, who was invited to submit before 18 April 1986

observations in reply.  After an exchange of correspondence with the

applicants' representative, during which an extension of this time

limit until 30 June 1986 was requested, the Commission was informed

by telex on 8 July 1986 that the applicants had appointed their

current representative.  The latter confirmed this position by letter

of 5 August 1986 and requested a further extension of the time limit

for their reply to the respondent Government's observations.

        On 13 August 1986 the President granted the extension

requested until 23 September 1986.  The applicants' observations are

dated 16 September 1986.

WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARTIES

1.      The respondent Government

a)      Domestic law and practice

        The order authorising the local authority to acquire the

applicants' property was made and confirmed under Section 112 (1) of

the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 as amended by Section 91 (1) of

the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980.

        The procedure governing the exercise of these compulsory

purchase powers is contained in the Acquisition of Land Act 1981.

This requires a local authority to submit an order in a presented form

to the Secretary of State.  For two successive weeks prior to this, a

notice must advertise the proposed order in a local newspaper, giving

details and explaining how objections may be made.  If an objection is

made, the Secretary of State must hold a public local inquiry or

afford objectors another opportunity of making representations.

        Where, as in this case, an inquiry is held, the procedure is

governed by the Compulsory Purchase by Public Authorities (Inquiries

Procedures) Rules 1976.  Forty-two days' notice must be given to all

concerned and the local authority must provide each objector with the

written reasons for making the order by 28 days before the inquiry.

At the inquiry, objectors may make representations and examine

witnesses either in person or through their legal representatives.

        The inspector makes a written report to the Secretary of

State, which includes the findings of fact and his recommendations.

The Secretary may not differ from his findings of fact without

allowing further representations from interested parties.  His

decision must be notified in writing to each objector and a copy of

the inspector's report provided if requested.

        A right of appeal against the Secretary of State's decision

is afforded by Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981.

        The case-law on this provision illustrates that an order may

be quashed where the Secretary has taken into account something he

ought not to have done, where he has not taken into account something

he ought to have done, where he has misdirected himself in law, where

he has given reasons unsupported by the facts, or where there has been

a breach of natural justice.  Further appeal to the Court of Appeal,

and with leave, to the House of Lords is possible on a point of law.

        The order and the decision of the Secretary of State may also

be challenged at certain stages and in appropriate circumstances by an

application for judicial review pursuant to Order 53 of the Rules of

the Supreme Court.  Judicial review may lie where it is alleged that

an irrelevant consideration has been taken into account, or a relevant

consideration disregarded, or where the decision is one which no

reasonable Secretary of State could properly have reached.

        The procedure for a compulsory acquisition by a local

authority therefore reveals seven stages.

        The first stage is the resolution of the local authority that

it will make a compulsory purchase order.  Second, there is the

sealing of the order whereby the local authority actually makes the

order and seals it.  Third there is the advertisement of it.  Fourth,

the objections are lodged.  Fifth, the public inquiry is held.  Sixth,

the confirmation by the Minister, and seventh the notice of

confirmation.

        The case-law submitted by the respondent Government

illustrates that an application may be made for judicial review to

challenge the decision of a local authority to resolve to make a

compulsory purchase order (R. v.  Camden London Borough Council, ex

parte Comyn Ching & Co. (London) Ltd (1984) 47 P & CR 417).

        From the second stage onwards a person affected by the

compulsory purchase order which has been made may object and

thereafter participate in the public enquiry before the inspector.

In the words of Woolf J giving judgment in that case:

        " would fully investigate the case, hear

        evidence orally, and conduct a much more detailed inquiry

        than it is possible for this court to do."

        In these circumstances, and at this stage of the proceedings

judicial review would therefore not normally be available in the light

of the availability of an alternative remedy (the inquiry) and the

terms of Section 25 Acquisition of Land Act 1981.  However, Section 23

Acquisition of Land Act 1981 provides the opportunity for any person

aggrieved by an order to question its validity on the ground that the

authorisation of the order is not empowered to be granted under the

Acquisition of Land Act 1981.

        An owner of land subject to compulsory purchase is also

entitled to receive compensation, assessed on the open market value.

Detailed provisions are laid down in the Land Compensation Acts 1961

and 1973 and in the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965.  Depreciation in

value as a result of the order is disregarded for this valuation and

the owner is entitled to compensation for removal and other associated

expenses.  Where an owner is displaced from residential accommodation,

and suitable alternative residential accommodation on reasonable

terms is not otherwise available, the local authority has a duty to

rehouse.

b)      Article 26 of the Convention

        The respondent Government submit that the application is

inadmissible by reason of the applicants' failure to exhaust domestic

remedies both under Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 and

by an application for judicial review.  They contend that the issues

raised in this application could have been raised in the course of

either or both of those proceedings.

c)      Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention

        The respondent Government submit under Article 13 that,

insofar as the complaint concerns the making of the order by the local

authority, the applicants had a remedy in that they were able to make

their objections known to the inspector who, though unable to make a

decision, is able to present these objections to the Secretary of

State in his report.  The Secretary of State has the power to overrule

the inspector's recommendation, to confirm an order, or to impose

modifications.

        The applicants were also able to challenge the Secretary of

State's confirmation of the order by way of judicial review (Rules of

the Supreme Court Ord. 53) and by way of appeal under Section 23 of

the Acquisition of Land Act 1981.  In this connection the respondent

Government refer to No. 9261/81, Dec. 3.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 177, where

the Commission found that, in proceedings to quash a compulsory

purchase order and the Secretary's decision, the High Court and the

Court of Appeal must have taken into account the applicant's right to

respect for her home, by balancing her rights against the public

interest in assessing the legal reasonableness of the inspector's

report and the Secretary of State's decision.  If the present

applicants had challenged the order and the Secretary's decision in

either of these proceedings, the court would have similarly been able

to take into account the applicants' right to respect for their home

and property, reviewed the rejection of the omission of the property

from the scheme and the reasons on which the decision was based, and

finally have quashed the decision, had they found for the applicants.

        The respondent Government further submit that the procedure

under the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 is sufficient to comply with

Article 6 of the Convention in that the applicants were entitled to,

and in fact enjoyed, a fair and public hearing within a reasonable

time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  The

respondent Government also argue that these procedures together with

the compensation provisions previously described comply with the

requirements of Article 13 of the Convention that the applicants

should have an effective remedy before a national authority.

        In addition to the statutory procedures the respondent

Government state that the applicants could have sought judicial review

either of the local authority's decision to make the compulsory

purchase order, or of the Secretary of State's decision to confirm it,

using the procedure laid down in Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court.  The basis of this review would be that the discretion used by

a public authority must be exercised reasonably.  As already stated,

the reasonableness of the exercise of such a discretion may be

challenged where an irrelevant consideration has been taken into

account or a relevant consideration disregarded, or where the decision

is one which no reasonable person or authority could properly have

reached.

        The respondent Government state that there are several

examples of cases involving compulsory acquisition where judicial

review proceedings have been brought.  In Islington London Borough

Council v.  Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (1980)

43 P & CR 300 the court held that it had jurisdiction to review a

decision of the Secretary of State not to confirm a compulsory

purchase order.  Similarly in Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council

v.  Secretary of State for the Environment and Others (1980) 43 P & CR

300, the court held that the local authority could apply for judicial

review of the Secretary of State's decision not to confirm part of a

compulsory purchase order and then quashed his decision after

considering the merits.  Another example is the case of R. v.  Camden

London Borough Council ex parte Comyn Ching & Co. and Another (1984)

47 P & CR 417 (supra) in which the court exercised its powers in

judicial review proceedings where a local authority had passed a

resolution to make a compulsory purchase order.  The court quashed the

council's decision on various grounds including that the council had

adopted the wrong approach to the construction of the relevant

legislation and that its resolution was defective in various respects.

        Another more recent example of a compulsory acquisition case

where the court exercised its jurisdiction in judicial review

proceedings is R. v.  Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte

Melton Borough Council (17 January 1985, unreported) in which the

local authority sought to quash a decision of the Secretary of State

whereby he refused to confirm a compulsory purchase order.

        The respondent Government submit that from these examples it

can be seen that the courts are prepared to exercise their

jurisdiction by way of judicial review in compulsory purchase cases.

There is a further right of appeal from the decision of the High Court

to the Court of Appeal and to the House of Lords.  This protection

fortifies the statutory remedies available to the applicants.

        Taken as a whole, it is submitted, by the respondent

Government, that the available remedies fully comply with both

Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.

2.      The applicants

        The applicants do not accept that they could have appealed

under Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 or that they

could have sought judicial review in connection with their complaint

since such appeal or review is only feasible on very limited grounds,

i.e., where the Secretary of State has misdirected himself in law,

where he has taken into account irrelevant considerations or

disregarded relevant considerations, where he has reached a decision

no reasonable person could properly have reached, or where there has

been malice, bad faith or a breach of natural justice.

        The applicants do not complain of any of the above and such

proceedings would inevitably fail.

        It is further emphasised that as an appellate procedure the

scope of judicial review is strictly limited.  It does not involve an

investigation of the merits or even a consideration of whether the

original decision was right or wrong.  Judicial review is simply an

examination of the original decision-making process to ascertain

whether or not it complied with certain broad criteria which are

largely of a procedural nature.  These criteria include: were relevant

matters considered, were relevant matters ignored, were the parties

given a fair hearing, was the correct procedure followed, was the

decision based on an erroneous view of the relevant law, was the

decision of a type permitted by the relevant statute?  Provided that

these limited criteria are satisfied the decision will be upheld.  An

assertion that the decision was wrong or should not have been reached

on the evidence is not an admissible ground of review.  Judicial review

controls the making of decisions in the exercise of a discretion by

ensuring that that exercise is procedurally correct;  it is not

concerned with the content or substance of the decision itself.

THE LAW

        The applicants complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention

that Section 25 Acquisition of Land Act 1981 prevents them challenging

in the national jurisdiction the decisions affecting them in so far as

those decisions may be challenged either on their merits or on the

grounds that they infringe the rights guaranteed by the Convention.

They complain that had their property been compulsorily purchased

under other statutory provisions, they would have been better able to

challenge the necessity for interference with their rights.

        Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides:

        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

        Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

        before a national authority notwithstanding that the

        violation has been committed by persons acting in an

        official capacity."

        The respondent Government contend that the applicants have

failed to exhaust their domestic remedies and thus failed to comply

with the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention in that they

have not challenged the validity of the compulsory purchase order

under Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, nor have they

sought judicial review of the local authority's exercise of its

compulsory purchase power or of the Secretary of State's decision to

confirm the compulsory purchase order.  The respondent Government

contend that both the statutory remedy under Section 23 of the

Acquisition of Land Act 1981 and judicial review are effective

remedies in compliance with Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

        The applicants do not accept that they could have appealed

under Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 against the

confirmation of the order or that they could have sought judicial

review of the order.  They submit that the statutory remedy under

Section 23 and judicial review only provide a remedy in respect of

procedural defects, rather than a substantive review of

proportionality and necessity for the interference with their rights.

The applicants state that they have no complaint against any of the

procedural matters but that their complaint is concerned with the

content or substance of the decision itself, a matter which neither

judicial review nor the statutory remedy is concerned with.  The

applicants contend that, had proceedings been brought under different

statutory provisions, greater scope would have been available to them

to challenge the merits of any compulsory purchase order.

        The Commission notes the various stages in the compulsory

purchase process as it applied in this case.  At the different stages

different remedies are available to a person who wishes to challenge a

proposed compulsory purchase; these remedies were available to the

applicants.  At the first stage, where the local authority has

resolved to make a compulsory purchase order, it appears that judicial

review is available to challenge the basis for such a decision.  The

criteria upon which such review would be exercised include the

question whether the authority has acted in accordance with its

statutory powers as well as the question whether it has taken into

account an irrelevant matter, failed to take a relevant matter into

account or has reached a conclusion which no reasonable authority

could reach.

        After a compulsory purchase order has been made, the

availability of judicial review appears to be limited by the terms of

Section 25 Acquisition of Land Act 1981.  However, at this stage a

person affected by a compulsory purchase order which has been made by

the local authority has the right to object to the order and thereby

secure a public inquiry in the order.  Such an inquiry is conducted by

an inspector who can fully investigate the case and hear oral

evidence.

        In the present case the applicants did object to the order

affecting their house and land and took part fully at the public

inquiry which was subsequently held and at which they were also

legally represented by Counsel.  The inquiry lasted for two days and

was substantially concerned with the applicants' objections, there

being only one other objector.  As the inspector's conclusions

illustrate, the inquiry was able to consider not only the applicants'

objections to the compulsory purchase of any of their land, but also

the possibility that they retain only the land immediately adjacent to

their house and the house itself.

        The subsequent stage in the compulsory purchase process is the

consideration by the Secretary of State of the inspector's conclusions

and his decision to confirm or not to confirm the order.  It appears

that where an order is not confirmed, judicial review may lie to

challenge the Secretary of State's decision.  From the domestic

case-law established in this respect it emerges that, when a public

authority wishes to acquire the land of a private citizen

compulsorily, it is the duty of that acquiring authority to prove that

there is a necessity for that step (Brown v.  Secretary of State for

the Environment (1978) 40 P & CR 285).

        A person aggrieved by the confirmation of the compulsory

purchase order may also pursue the statutory remedy provided by

Section 23 Acquisition of Land Act 1981.

        The Commission notes that this Section provides:

        "(1)  If any person aggrieved by a compulsory purchase

        order desires to question the validity thereof, or of

        any provision contained therein, on the ground that the

        authorisation of a compulsory purchase thereby granted

        is not empowered to be granted under this Act or any

        such enactment as is mentioned in section 1(1) of the

        Act, he may make an application to the High Court.

        (2)  If any person aggrieved by (a) a compulsory purchase

        order desires to question the validity thereof on the

        ground that any relevant requirement has not been

        complied with in relation to the order he may make an

        application to the High Court."

        The Commission further notes the interpretation given to this

section by the English courts as submitted by the respondent

Government.  An order may be impugned if the Secretary of State has

taken into account something he ought not to have done, or failed to

take into account something he ought to have done, or he misdirected

himself in law, or has given reasons which on the facts cannot stand.

        The Commission recalls that the applicants had the opportunity

of requiring a public local inquiry following the making of the

compulsory purchase order.  During this, the applicants were afforded

the opportunity of making representations to the inspector which were

then communicated in his report to the Secretary of State.

        The Commission also takes account of the fact that the

applicants could clearly have tested the lawfulness of the Secretary

of State's decisions under the terms of the statutory remedy afforded

by Section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981.  Furthermore,

compensation for full value is available to the applicants under the

Acquisition of Land Act 1981 and the applicants were offered

alternative accommodation by the local authority before their

eviction.  In addition, judicial review proceedings would  have been

available to the applicants at certain stages of the procedure.

        The Commission finds, in view of the remedies that were in

fact open to the applicants, and after fully examining the application

as it has been presented, that it does not reveal any appearance of a

violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.  It follows that this

aspect of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  Secretary to the Commission                President of the Commission

         (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (C.A. NØRGAARD)