AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 12959/87

                      by S.

                      against the Federal Republic of Germany

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 3 May 1988, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  J.A. FROWEIN

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  F. ERMACORA

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 19 May 1987 by

S. against the Federal Republic of Germany and registered on 27 May

1987 under file No. 12959/87;

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The applicant is a German citizen born in 1944 and living in

Bernkastel-Kues.

        In 1975 the applicant was admitted to the Bar in the district

of the District Court (Amtsgericht) at Bernkastel-Kues and the Regional

Court (Landgericht) at Trier.

        On 10 October 1984 the President of the Koblenz Court of

Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) as an organ of the judicial administration

revoked the applicant's admission to the Bar on the ground of mental

deficiency ( Schwäche der geistigen Kräfte).  This decision was taken

in accordance with Section 14 (1) No. 4 which provides:

        (1) A lawyer has to be disbarred ...

        (No. 4) if due to physical defects or a weakness of

        his mental capacity he is definitely unfit to exercise

        the profession in a correct manner and if otherwise he

        would be a danger to the administration of justice.

        The decision was based on a medical expert opinion according

to which the applicant had developed a paranoic syndrome and there

were little chances to cure him.  The expert opinion had been submitted

by Prof.  G. in criminal proceedings against the applicant who had been

accused of having made insulting and slandering remarks.

        The applicant took the matter to the Disciplinary Court for

Lawyers (Ehrengerichtshof) in Rheinland-Pfalz which dismissed his

action on 11 November 1985.  The applicant lodged an appeal to the

Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof).  This remedy was rejected on

8 December 1986.

         According to the findings of these courts the applicant is

notorious for his verbal aggressiveness and for insulting or defaming

adverse parties, their legal representatives, judges, public

prosecutors etc.  In 1978 and 1981 he was convicted of having made

slanderous remarks (üble Nachrede) in relation to a judge and two

police officers.  Several further and similar charges were no longer

determined as on 18 January 1984 the District Court at Bernkastel-Kues

acquitted the applicant on the ground that possibly he was not

responsible for the offences on account of psychic disturbances

(seelische Abartigkeit = Querulanz).

        The Federal Court noted that the subject matter of the latter

criminal proceedings had been the applicant's submissions between July

1978 and October 1982 in various civil court proceedings.  The applicant

had represented two creditors who had previously accepted a settlement

proposed by the debtor, a private company.  The applicant argued in

these previous civil court proceedings that the settlement had been

reached by dishonest means.  In this context he accused, inter alia,

the director of a bank of "fraudulent manipulations, unequalled

impudence, misuse of his position, complete failure, conspiracy,

deceit, blackmail" etc.  The District Court at Bernkastel-Kues found

however that the bank director in question had acted correctly and in

the best interests both of the business firm and of its creditors.

        With regard to another adverse party the applicant had inter

alia submitted that his opponent tried to reach unjustified advantages

by "malice, lies, deceit and other shabby means".  He qualified the

submissions of his opponent's counsel as "juridical nonsense" which

would not turn into a bright idea just because it was produced by a

renowned law firm.

        The applicant had also accused a tax adviser of "fraud, large

scale deceit of creditors committed with unequalled impudence".  These

accusations were likewise found to be totally unfounded.

        In connection with the last criminal proceedings against him,

the applicant had also written to the President of the Koblenz Court

of Appeal stating, inter alia, that "arbitrariness was covered by the

President, that his (the applicant's) accusation of misuse in office

had been rejected on the basis of mere assumptions and of unjustified

fictions which made it clear that the President did not act in the

interests of justice.  Such practice could not be distinguished from

that of fascist or communist systems".

        The Federal Court further stated that several disciplinary

proceedings had been instituted against the applicant.  He had been

fined on 10 September 1979 for prohibited advertising and on 24

November 1979 for a violation of his professional duty to report to

the Bar Association in a case where he acted as trustee in bankruptcy.

Other disciplinary proceedings on account of statements made by the

applicant which were considered of insulting or defamatory character

were discontinued in view of criminal convictions relating to the same

matter or in view of the applicant's above mentioned acquittal on

account of his assumed lack or responsibility under criminal law.

        The Federal Court also pointed out that the applicant

distinguished himself by lodging numerous unfounded hierarchical

complaints.  Between June 1980 and February 1985 he had also lodged 18

unsuccessful constitutional complaints.  In two cases he was imposed a

fine for having misused the right of petition (Missbrauchsgebühr).  In

connection with these complaints he had written numerous letters to

the Federal Constitutional Court challenging judges, or accusing them

of deliberate "perversion of justice, high treason and law breaking".

Inter alia he compared the Federal Constitutional Court justice Prof.

Zeidler to the ill-famed former President Freisler of the Nazi

People's Court (Volksgerichtshof).

        In view of the facts established and the further medical

expert opinions submitted in the proceedings the Federal Court agreed

with the Disciplinary Court for Lawyers in Rheinland-Pfalz that the

applicant's removal from the Bar roll was justified under Section 14(1)

No. 4 of the Federal Lawyers' Act (BRAO) because he was unfit to

exercise the profession of a lawyer constituting a danger to the

proper administration of justice on account of mental deficiency

(Schwäche der geistigen Kräfte).

        The Federal Court first considered the applicant's complaint

that the administrative decision of 10 October 1984 disbarring him was

signed by the President of the Koblenz Court of Appeal who had also

been a victim of the applicant's verbal aggressions and had therefore

laid criminal charges against the applicant.  It was true that from the

applicant's point of view this could raise doubts as to the

President's impartiality.  The Federal Court nevertheless considered

that this circumstance was not of such importance as to affect the

validity of the decision disbarring the applicant.  The Federal Court

noted in this context that the President did not have any

discretionary power in the applicant's matter as Section 14(1) No. 4

BRAO required cogently the removal of a person from the Bar roll when

the conditions set out in the provision were fulfilled.

        The Federal Court pointed out that Section 14(1) No. 4 BRAO does

not require debility or mental illness (Geisteskrankheit, geistige

Schwäche) within the meaning of Section 6(1) No. 1 of the Civil Code

(BGB) or Section 20 of the Criminal Code (StGB).  What mattered was

whether or not a lawyer had mental defects (geistige Mängel) of such

nature and importance that he was no longer fit to exercise his

profession in an adequate manner and without being a danger to the

proper administration of justice.

        In the Federal Court's opinion the applicant's voluminous

and numerous memorials and other submissions conveyed even to a person

without medical and psychiatric qualifications the impression that his

behaviour did not correspond to the image one has of a normal lawyer.

In view of the manner, the extent and the gravity of his blunders as

compared with the underlying causes the applicant was mentally no

longer capable of exercising the profession of a lawyer in a correct

manner.  This impression which could be gained from a mere reading of

the documents in the files was corroborated by the expert opinions of

Prof.  G. and Prof.  E. It was not refuted by the two counter-opinions

submitted by the applicant.  It was true that Prof.  F. saw no

indication of a mental deficiency.  On the other hand Prof.  M. admitted

that there existed symptoms of graphomania and escalating verbal

aggressiveness which however he considered not sufficient for a

diagnosis of a querulous mania (Querulantenwahn).

        Considering that the striking off the roll of the Bar is a

very serious interference the Federal Court underligned that despite

the negative evidence already existing it tried to obtain further

expert opinion because the applicant had refused to be examined by the

experts G. and E.  Therefore it was decided at the oral hearing of 26

May 1986 to obtain a further expert opinion.  However, the applicant

subsequently withdrew his consent to be examined by another expert.  He

even lodged a constitutional complaint against the order of 26 May

1986 (this complaint was rejected on 21 July 1986 as being

inadmissible).  He also rejected a further proposal to name four

medical experts among whom the court could choose.  Rather he informed

the court that he was no longer willing to undergo an examination by a

medical expert.  Therefore the Federal Court could do no more than to

invite the four experts who had previously established expert

opinions to explain their opinions at an oral hearing.  At the hearing

three of the experts, namely E., M. and G., had agreed that the

applicant's querulous development had to be located at the interface

between normal and abnormal behaviour and constituted a serious

personality disorder.  The opinion of the expert Prof.  F. did in the

Federal Court's opinion not refute the finding of the existence of a

mental deficiency.  The expert did not deny that the applicant was a

querulous person.  He only considered that his behaviour was not an

expression of mental illness.  However, so the Federal Court

underligned again, Section 14(1) No. 4 BRAO did not require mental

illness.

        Contrary to the applicant's arguments the Federal Court

considered that in view of the great number of his blunders one could

no longer consider them to be deliberate provocations caused by the

circumstances of particular situations.  Rather they were the

expression of a continuous and deep rooted personality disorder.  This

disorder had been caused by the permanent failure in his legal

affairs.  However, even assuming that some of the cases decided against

the applicant's clients could have been judged in a different manner

there was no indication of perversion of justice on a large scale as

the applicant submitted which could have justified his behaviour.

        The Federal Court consequently concluded that the applicant's

personality disorder rendered him unfit to exercise the profession of

a lawyer.  A lawyer had to be able to distinguish between his own

views and the objective requirements of the law in order to evaluate

objectively the chances of success of a remedy.  Guidelines for his

behaviour had to be the rule of law and the observance of realistic

objectivity.  The applicant's mental disorder was such that he no

longer offered the guarantee of advising clients in an objective and

reasonable manner.  This followed from his behaviour in general.

        In this context the Federal Court also took into account that

the applicant had lodged numerous constitutional complaints which were

all rejected as being inadmissible.

        This proved that he was no longer able to judge a legal issue

from another point of view than his own.  His aggressiveness was not

limited to the pending case but led him to attack judges personally

and to insult them as law breakers or traitors.  Such attitude could

not further the cause of his clients.  His inaptness to exercise the

profession of a lawyer was in the Federal Court's opinion not of a

provisional character.  The experts M. and G., so the Court pointed

out, considered that an amelioration of the applicant's condition

could hardly be expected although it could not be excluded.  Given

that the applicant's verbal aggressiveness had developed and

intensified during the last eight years with an increasing circle of

persons affected by his defamations, such as adverse parties and their

representatives, colleagues, witnesses, judges of various courts and

the judiciary as such, it could hardly be expected that his

behaviour would improve within a foreseeable future.

        Lastly, the Federal Court considered that the principle of

proportionality was not violated by the fact that the applicant was

disbarred instead of being prosecuted first by way of disciplinary

proceedings.  The Federal Court considered that the outcome of

disciplinary proceedings would also have been the striking off the

roll of the Bar.

        The applicant's constitutional complaint against the Federal

Court's decision of 8 December 1986 was rejected by a group of three

judges of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bunderverfassungsgericht)

on 23 March 1987 partly as being inadmissible and partly as offering

no prospects of success.

        The alleged violations of Article 2 para. 2 (personality right)

and Article 103 para. 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Basic Law

(GG) were considered to be unsubstantiated and therefore

inadmissible.  The alleged violations of the right to choose one's

profession (Article 14 para. 1 GG) and of the right to freedom of

opinion and of expression (Article 5 para. 1 and para. 2 GG) were

assumed to be admissible but to be in any event clearly ill-founded.

The Federal Constitutional Court considered that the Federal Court's

interpretation of Section 14 (1) No. 4 BRAO, namely that important

mental defects of a lawyer were sufficient to disbar him, did not

violate any basic rights.  The Federal Court's proposal to have the

applicant examined by a medical expert whom the Federal Court intended

to choose among four experts named by the applicant himself was

likewise not considered to be objectionable.  The Federal Constitutional

Court also pointed out that the Federal Court in the decision complained

of recognised the right of a lawyer to defend his client's interests

vis-à-vis the authorities, courts, colleagues and adverse parties in a

committed and energetic manner.  In these circumstances there was no

indication of a violation of the rights invoked by the applicant.

        Insofar as the applicant had complained that no ex officio

counsel had been appointed for his defence the Federal Constitutional

Court stated that the applicant had not alleged that, for financial

reasons only, he had been deprived of the right to choose a defence

counsel to defend his case.  Furthermore the application of Section 14

(1) No. 4 BRAO only meant that he was unfit to represent others but

not himself.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicant is of the opinion that he was wrongly struck off

the roll of the Bar and that his action contesting the legality of

this measure was not decided in a fair manner.  He submits, inter alia,

that the presiding judge of the Disciplinary Court for Lawyers was a

lawyer who had been involved as counsel of creditors in the civil

proceedings in which he, the applicant, was accused of having acted in

violation of his professional duties.  Futhermore he submits that he

was invited at the end of September 1985 only to attend three days of

hearing in November before the Disciplinary Court.

        His request for an adjournment was rejected, therefore his

counsel was unable to attend and he had to defend his case himself.

However, as he was considered to be unfit to act as a lawyer and as

his case was of a complex and difficult nature his requests for

legal aid should have been granted.

        As regards the proceedings before the Federal Court he submits

that this court disregarded that he always defended clear and

unequivocal legal positions of his clients whereas courts and

authorities committed perversion of justice to his own and his clients'

detriment.  He considers that contrary to the opinion of the medical

experts and without taking into account his legal arguments the Federal

Court manipulated the facts in order to arrive at a finding that he

was suffering from a personality disorder.  He also complains of the

length of the proceedings and invokes Articles 3, 6 para. 1, para. 2,

8 para. 1, 9 para. 1, 10 para. 1 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1

of the First Protocol, all provisions also read in conjunction with

Article 14 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant has complained that he was wrongly struck off

the roll of the Bar.  He has also complained of the court proceedings

concerned.

        With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant

complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19

of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the

obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.  In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention.  The Commission refers, on this point, to its constant

case-law (see e.g.  No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236;

No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77;  No. 7987/77,

Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

        It is true that in this case the applicant also complains

that he was not given a fair trial in the proceedings which he

instituted against the administrative decision disbarring him.  He

submits, inter alia, that he should have been granted legal aid.  He

also submits that the presiding judge of the Disciplinary Court for

lawyers was biased.  In this connection he alleges a violation of

Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention.

        However, even assuming that Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2)of the

Convention applies to the proceedings in question and that the

applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of all these

particular complaints, the Commission first notes that the right to

legal aid in civil proceedings is not as such granted by Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicant has not shown

that he made a request to be granted legal aid and that such a request

was rejected in an arbitrary manner.  As regards the fairness of the

proceedings in general and the impartiality of the judges, the

Commission notes that the applicant's case was carefully examined by

the Disciplinary Court for Lawyers and, in second instance, by the

Federal Court.  The applicant has not substantiated his claim that any

of the judges were biased.  The Federal Court heard four medical

experts and proposed to the applicant that a fifth expert opinion be

obtained from an expert who would have the possibility of examining

the applicant personally.  The applicant withdrew, however, his

consent to this proposal.  The Federal Court also heard the applicant

personally.  In these circumstances it cannot be found that the facts

as presented by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation

of the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention.

        The Commission further notes that the proceedings before the

Disciplinary Court for Lawyers in Rheinland-Pfalz and subsequently

before the Federal Court lasted two years.  Both courts heard medical

experts and examined the case in a very careful and extensive manner

as is evidenced by the detailed reasons stated in their decisions.

There is nothing to show that the examination of the case was in any

way unreasonably delayed.  It follows that in this respect there is

likewise no appearance of a violation of the right to speedy

proceedings as guaranteed by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

2.      The applicant has also alleged violations of Articles 8, 9 and

10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention.  However, the exercise of the

rights guaranteed by these provisions may, according to their second

paragraph, be subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by law

and are necessary in a democratic society, inter alia, for the

protection of the reputation or rights of others, and, insofar as the

right to freedom of expression is concerned (Article 10 para. 1

(Art. 10-1) of the Convention), for maintaining the authoritiy and

impartiality of the judiciary.

        In the present case the decision to strike the applicant off

the roll of the Bar was based on Section 14 (1) No. 4 of the Federal

Lawyers' Act (BRAO) and was thus prescribed by law.

        As to the question of necessity of the interference complained

of, the Commission notes that the applicant is a member of a profession

that exercises important functions in respect of the administration of

justice.  The members of this profession can and must therefore be

expected not to suffer from any personality disorder that affects the

exercise of their profession in a negative manner.  Such personality

disorder was, however, found to exist in the applicant's case.  The

Federal Court stated that it was evident from the files, i.e. the

applicant's submissions in various court proceedings over the years,

that his aggressive and defamatory attitude could no longer be

considered as a deliberate provocation caused by the circumstances of

particular situations.  It was more the expression of a continuous and

deep-rooted personality disorder.  These findings were also based on

several expert opinions.  In this context it has also been noted that

the applicant declined to have himself examined by a further medical

expert.

        In these circumstances the decision to strike him off the roll

of the Bar was justified as being necessary in a democratic society,

both for the protection of the rights of others and for maintaining

the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, within the meaning of

paragraph 2 (Art. 8-2, 9-2, 10-2) of the Articles in question.

3.      The applicant has also invoked Article 1 of the First Protocol

(P1-1) and Articles 14 and 17 (Art. 14, 17) of the Convention.  The

Commission finds, however, that his submissions in this respect

likewise do not disclose any appearance of a violation.

        It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission               President of the Commission

   (H.C. KRÜGER)                               (C.A. NØRGAARD)