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SKÄRBY v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 12258/86 • ECHR ID: 001-240

Document date: May 9, 1988

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

SKÄRBY v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 12258/86 • ECHR ID: 001-240

Document date: May 9, 1988

Cited paragraphs only



                        PARTIAL

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 12258/86

                      by the Estates of Mr. and Mrs.  SKÄRBY

                      and their heirs and children

                      against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 9 May 1988, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 26 June 1986 by

the Estates of Mr. and Mrs.  Skärby and their heirs and children

against Sweden and registered on 30 June 1986 under file No. 12258/86;

        Having regard to;

  -     the Government's written observations dated 18 June 1987;

  -     the applicant's written observations in reply dated

        7 September 1987.

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties'

submissions, may be summarised as follows:

        The applicants are the Estates of Mr.  Christian Skärby and

Mrs.  Maria Skärby and their heirs and children namely:

-       Mrs.  Ingegärd Skärby, born in 1909 and resident at Nyhamnsläge,

-       Mrs.  Rigmor Skärby, born in 1910 and resident at Ambjörby,

-       Mrs.  Majken Skärby, born in 1912 and resident at Nyhamnsläge,

-       Mr.  Bertil Skärby, born in 1914 and resident at Nyhamnsläge,

-       Mr.  Rolf Skärby, born in 1919 and resident at Kisa,

-       Mrs.  Lena Hedman, born in 1921 and resident at Höganäs.

        The applicants are Swedish citizens.  They are represened

before the Commission by Mr.  Bertil Grennberg, a patents consultant

practising in Stockholm.

        The particular facts of the case

        In 1913 Mr.  Christian Skärby and Mrs.  Maria Skärby, who are

now deceased, bought a farm in the south of Sweden.  The property was

bought with a view to lodging and partly nourishing the family.  In

1915 a fire destroyed the house and a new one was built.  The property

has been the family home of the Skärby family ever since.  Originally,

the property consisted of three different parts called Flundrarp 4:9,

Stubbarp 8:17 and Stubbarp 8:18.  The total surface is around eight

hectares.  In 1960 Christian and Maria Skärby bought a new area of

land adjacent to the property.  It was joined with Flundrarp 4:9 and

was thereafter named Flundrarp 12:1.

        The property is situated on the shore of Skälderviken, a bay

outside the western coast of the province of Skåne in southern Sweden.

The surroundings are considered to be one of the most beautiful in

Sweden.  In the Act on the Preservation of Natural Resources (lagen om

hushållning med naturresurser m m), which entered into force on 1 July

1987, this area is mentioned among those which, according to the Act,

are considered of national interest with regard to natural and cultural

values.

        In 1962 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of

Malmö confirmed a building plan, which is still in force regarding the

main part of Flundrarp 4:9.  According to that plan the part of the

property situated closest to the shore should be preserved as a natural

park.  The area further up should be used partly for agriculture and

partly as a garden to the main building.  On the land around the main

building new constructions are prohibited.  The plan does not prevent

the applicants from preserving the main building and the two outhouses

on the area intended as a garden to the main building.  Nor does the

plan prevent the applicants from pulling down the main building and

erecting a new one on the same spot.  On the area planned for agriculture

farm buildings may be erected.

        On the property there are five different buildings.  Apart

from the main building there is a store building containing one room

which is used as a dwelling.  Besides these two buildings there are

three small buildings within the area.  One is situated within the

part of the property where, according to the plan of 1962, no new

buildings are allowed.  The remaining two buildings are situated

within the area which is reserved as a natural park.

        In 1964 the County Administrative Board confirmed a building

plan regarding the remaining part of Flundrarp 4:9 and Stubbarp 8:17

and 8:18.  According to this plan the land owner was allowed to erect

two or, depending on the size, three buildings for recreation purposes

on Flundrarp and about 15 such buildings on Stubbarp 8:17 and 8:18.

No buildings have yet been erected according to this plan.  However,

new constructions within the area covered by this building plan were

prohibited under Section 110 of the Building Act (byggnadslagen)

until water supplies and sewerage systems are provided.  The main

reason for this prohibition was that lack of subsoil water makes a

coordination necessary when providing water supplies and sewerage

systems for the area.

        In 1983 to 1984 a new building plan was proposed regarding a

part of Flundrarp 12:1.  This proposed plan was made following a

request from the Skärby family.  In this proposal one plot was planned

for the main building and one for the store building.  Three more

plots were planned, two of which would be situated within the part of

the area where, according to the existing plan of 1962, no new

buildings may be erected.  The third plot would be situated in the

area intended for agriculture.  The natural park was extended to cover

also the area which, according to the plan of 1964, was meant for the

two or three buildings for recreation purposes on Flundrarp 12:1.

        This proposed plan was approved by some of the parties to the

estate of Christian and Maria Skärby, but some of them did not

approve of the development agreement (exploateringsavtal) which the

municipality proposed.  The municipality considered that an agreement

was necessary in order to approve the proposed alteration of the

building plan.  The agreement should inter alia regulate how the costs

for the planning should be paid and how the water supply system and

the sewerage system should be provided in regard to these three new

plots.  This was considered necessary in order to lift the building

prohibition in force.

        In 1986 Bertil Skärby applied to the Building Committee

(byggnadsnämnden) of Höganäs for a building permit to erect a house

and two garages on Flundrarp 12:1.

        In a decision of 24 March 1986 the Building Committee rejected

the application on the ground that the buildings proposed would not

comply with the building plan in force.  The decision also meant that

the Committee found no reason for granting an exemption from the plan.

        Insofar as the decision involved a decision to refuse an

exemption from the building plan, no appeal was possible.

        Today the main building on the property is inhabited by

Mrs.  Majken Skärby who is retired.  She is severely ill, suffering

from Parkinson's disease and a decalcification of her skeleton.  The

house is badly insulated and draughty.  The applicants consider that

it is no use repairing it.  In addition, the situation of the house on

the property has become unsuitable as a result of the noise from the

traffic on the road which has been constructed nearby.  For medical

reasons and in view of the great risk that she will soon need a

wheelchair in order to move around, Mrs.  Skärby is not able to stay

very long in this house.  She is in great need of a new house.

        Mr.  Bertil Skärby is also retired and lives at present in the

above-mentioned store building.  It is a simple house where, the

applicants submit, the hens were previously kept.  The house has no

running water and no stove.  He is therefore also in great need of a new

house on the property which he is exploiting.

        Relevant legislation

        This case relates to the consequences of an adopted building plan.

        If an area has become densely populated or if such a situation

is expected to emerge in the area, but this situation does not call

for a town plan, the municipality must see to it that a building plan

is drawn up, to the extent necessary for the regulations of the

planning of the area.

        A building plan must delineate and state the limits of the

areas intended to be used for various purposes in the plan, such as

land intended for building purposes, as well as roads and other public

places.  If special regulations relating to the development or the use

of the areas concerned are required, such regulations must also be

incorporated in the plan.  Such planning regulations can relate to the

use of building land for certain purposes, a prohibition on the

development of a certain part of the building land, the number of

buildings on a certain site, the size of the site, the surface area

of the building, its height and the number of storeys, etc.

        A building plan must be approved by the Municipal Council

(kommunfullmäktige).  The matter can also be delegated to the Building

Committee.   Before acquiring legal force, decisions of approval must

be confirmed by the County Administrative Board.  An owner of land

affected by a County Administrative Board decision approving a

building plan has a right of appeal against the Board's decision to

the Government.

        If the question has been raised of the drawing up of a

building plan for a certain area, or of such a plan being altered, the

County Administrative Board - if the municipality so requests - can

prohibit new constructions in the area.  Such a prohibition may be

issued for, at most, one year but can be extended by the County

Administrative Board for, at most, two years at a time (Section 109

of the Building Act).  A County Administrative Board's decision on

the prohibition of new constructions or on the extension of such a

prohibition can be appealed to the Government.

        According to Section 110 first paragraph of the Building Act,

a new construction may not take place in contravention of a building

plan.  Under the second paragraph of that Section, a County

Administrative Board can prescribe that new constructions in an area

covered by a building plan may not take place without the Board's

permission before adequate roads, water-supplies and sewerage systems

have been provided.

        Exemptions can be granted from the prohibitions to construct

in individual cases.  Such a decision is taken by the County

Administrative Board or by the Building Committee if the County

Administrative Board has delegated competence to grant exemptions to

that Committee.  Nearly all municipalities have such authorisation.

        A condition for granting an exemption from a building

prohibition in contravention of a building plan is that the Building

Committee approves the exemption from the plan.  This means that the

municipality has a right of veto in respect of exemptions from a

building plan.

        The costs for developing a building plan are paid by the

municipality.  However, the property owners concerned shall compensate

the municipality for the costs in proportion to the acreage of the

property, if the plan is considered to be of considerable use to the

owner (Section 101 of the Building Act).  Such compensation is often

stipulated in an agreement into which the municipality enters with the

property owners concerned.

        It is for the owners of the land to see to it that roads and

other amenities are completed within an area covered by a building

plan.

        A building plan can be altered if required.  According to

Section 23 of the Building Ordinance (byggnadsstadgan), the provisions

concerning the adoption and confirmation of building plans shall, in

principle, also apply to the alteration or withdrawal of such plans.

There are, however, no rules that indicate the material pre-conditions

determining how alteration or confirmation is to be decided.

        A decision of the Building Committee under the Building Act or

the Building Ordinance, for example regarding a building permit, may

be appealed to the County Administrative Board and further to the

Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) and ultimately to the

Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten).  A decision to refuse

an exemption from a confirmed building plan cannot be appealed

(Section 71 of the Building Ordinance).

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicants complain that they have not have had a fair and

public hearing before a court in respect of their claim for a right to

build a new house on their property.  They allege that Article 6 of

the Convention has been violated.

2.      The applicants maintain that they have been denied the right

to live in decent houses on their own property where they have worked

for seventy-three years in order to make the property more beautiful

and pleasant.  They submit that this is in breach of Article 8 of the

Convention.

3.      The applicants also submit that Article 17 of the Convention

has been violated because public power has been used beyond the limits

permitted under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

4.      The applicants also allege that Article 18 of the Convention

has been violated in that the real purpose of the local authorities

has been to acquire the applicants' property at a low price in order

to sell it to holiday-makers.

5.      Finally, the applicants allege that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

has been violated since the applicants are no longer allowed to live

in a decent manner on their property where they have lived for a long

time and which they wish to continue exploiting.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 26 June 1986 and registered

on 30 June 1986.

        On 4 March 1987 the Commission decided to invite the

Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application.

        The Government's observations were, after an extension of the

time-limit, received by letter dated 18 June 1987 and the applicant's

observations in reply were dated 7 September 1987.

        At the request of the Rapporteur the applicants submitted a

document by letter dated 22 October 1987.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A.      The Government

1.      The facts

        The Government observe that if an individual who applies for a

building permit submits that an exemption from a building plan is not

necessary for obtaining a building permit - alleging that the building

12258/86

will be erected in accordance with the plan - the decision of the

Building Committee can be appealed.  Such an appeal should be made to

the County Administrative Board and ultimately to the Government.

However, no appeal lies in respect of a decision not to grant an

exemption from a building plan.

        The reason why it is not allowed to make an appeal, as regards

decisions to refuse exemptions from building plans, is that the

suitability of the plan has once been decided upon when the plan was

confirmed.  At that time it was possible to make an appeal against

that decision.  It should not be possible to have the same issue

examined all over again every time an application for a building

permit, which implies an exemption from the building plan, is examined.

        The present complaints to the Commission concern the decision

of the Building Committee of Höganäs to refuse an exemption from the

existing building plan.  The new dwelling and the two garage buildings

would be located within the area of Flundrarp 12:1 which according to

the building plan is regarded as a natural park within which there

exists a prohibition to erect new buildings.

        Accordingly, the issue is not whether the applicants shall be

allowed to build a new house on the property, but where upon the

property concerned the new houses shall be situated.  In the plan

proposed in 1983-1984 the municipality offered the applicants four new

sites upon which buildings may be erected according to that plan.

They are located at the property within an area which the parties to

the estate approved upon in 1984.  However, an adoption of the

proposed plan implies that they accept to contribute to the costs of

the municipality for altering the building plan and for sewerage and

water supply systems.  The location of the new sites proposed by the

municipality is very close to what the applicants wish.  They are

situated less than 200 meters from what was suggested in Bertil

Skärby's application for a building permit which was rejected on 24

March 1986.  However, in the Building Committee's opinion the location

proposed in the plan is far better with regard to the landscape and

the general interest.

        The applicants' allegation that the Superior Land Surveyor

(överlantmätaren) and the Architect of the County (länsarkitekten) in

1961 declared that the plan of 1962 would not be an obstacle to the

construction of new buildings is contested.  It is most unlikely that

these two officials stated anything to this effect.  This would imply

that they declared that the plan adopted should not be followed which

would be against the law.

        2.      The admissibility

        2.1     In general

        The Government have several objections as to the admissibility

of this application.

        The estates of Maria and Christian Skärby are the owners of

the property concerned.  These estates are claiming to be victims of a

violation of the Convention.

        According to Swedish procedural law an estate of a deceased

person can bring an action before a court provided that all the

parties to the estate agree upon such a measure.  This is because the

estate forms a legal person.  A court order concerning the estate

is binding on the whole estate.

        The power of attorney for Mr.  Grennberg appended to the

application of 18 December 1986 has been signed by Mr.  Bertil Skärby on

behalf of the estates of Christian and Maria Skärby.  Bertil Skärby is

authorised to act on behalf of the estates according to a power of

attorney signed on 28 February 1969.

        Since there seems to be disagreement between the parties

to the estates as to whether the development agreement proposed by the

municipality should be accepted or not and since the power of attorney

for Bertil Skärby was signed 18 years ago it would be appropriate to

ascertain that the complaints before the Commission are supported by

all parties to the estates of Maria and Christian Skärby.

        If this is not the case the application should be declared

inadmissible ratione personae as far as the estates are concerned,

since the complaints cannot be brought before the Commission on behalf

of the estates if the complaints are supported only by certain parties

to the estates.

        In this context it is noted that it was not the estates but

Bertil Skärby who applied for a building permit, which application was

rejected by the Building Committee in its decision of 24 March 1986.

        The Government also maintain that the applicants have not

exhausted domestic remedies.

        The decision of 24 March 1986 to refuse an exemption from the

building plan relates to the building plan which was confirmed by the

County Administrative Board in 1962.  No appeal was lodged against

that decision by the Skärby family.  Such an appeal could have been

lodged with the Government.

        Nor has there been an appeal against the decision of 24 March

1986.  It is true that an appeal cannot be lodged against the

decision as far as an exemption from the building plan is concerned.

However, it is possible to appeal against the decision claiming that an

exemption was not necessary for a certain reason or that the issue was

not handled properly for some reason.  Appeals should be made to the

County Administrative Board and further to the Government or to the

Administrative Court of Appeal.

        According to Section 108 of the Building Act the applicants

also have the possibility to turn directly to the County Administrative

Board requesting it to alter the plan in the way they wish provided

that they can prove that there is a need for an alteration of the plan

and that the municipality has failed in its duty in this regard.  A

decision on such a request can be appealed to the Government.  In the

present case such a request will probably be rejected but the possibility,

which has not been used by the applicants, forms a safeguard against a

municipality which fails in its duty towards the common interests as

well as the interests of individuals.

12258/86

        The Government also submit that the applicants have prevented

a further examination of the matter by not accepting the development

agreement proposed by the municipality.  If signed, this agreement

would not have entered into force until the alteration of the plan was

confirmed by a decision of the County Administrative Board.  Against

such a decision an appeal could have been lodged and the plan thus

could have been examined with regard to general and individual

interests.  The applicants could have claimed an extended right to

erect buildings or a possibility to build on other parts of the

property concerned.  When examining such an appeal it rests upon the

County Administrative Board to consider whether the interests of the

individual have been taken into account to a reasonable extent.  The

development agreement and its conditions could have been examined in

this context.

        Even if the plan proposed had been confirmed, the applicants

had the possibility of having the fairness of the development

agreement examined by the general courts if they wished.  Before a

general court they could have claimed that the agreement was not valid

because it must be considered unfair.

        As regards the information which the applicants allege was

given by the Superior Land Surveyor (överlantmätaren) and by the

Architect for the County (länsarkitekten) the applicants seem to

submit that this information was a main reason for Christian Skärby

not to lodge an appeal against the plan decision of 1962.  Assuming

that such information was given, which the Government contest, the

applicants could have requested the Supreme Administrative Court to

set a new time limit for an appeal against the decision of the County

Administrative Board so that an appeal against that decision could be

lodged (återställande av försutten tid).  This they could have done as

soon as they realised that they had received false information.  In

their submission to the Supreme Administrative Court they could have

stated that, due to that information, they had abstained from making

an appeal against the decision.  This possibility has apparently never

been tried.

        As far as the six months rule is concerned the Government

maintain that it is the decision of 1962 to confirm the building plan

which forms the basis for the restrictions made regarding construction

on the property.  The decision of 24 March 1986 is only a logical

consequence of the plan decision of 1962.  In reality the complaints

concern the decision of 1962 which is more than twenty years old.

This means that the six months rule has not been observed.  Should the

Commission consider the decision of 1986 to refuse an exemption from

the plan as the final decision from which the six months period should

be calculated, the Government have no objection in this regard.

2.2     Article 6 of the Convention

        The Government maintain that the complaints do not fall within

the scope of Article 6.  This Article would only be applicable if the

case concerned a determination of the civil rights of the applicants.

12258/86

        However, the issue is not whether the applicants should be

allowed to build another house on the property, but on what spot

within the property the houses (which they are allowed to build)

should be situated and whether they should be allowed to build an

increased number of houses without contributing to the municipality's

costs for planning, water supply and sewerage systems.

        In the Government's view this question does not relate to a

civil right within the meaning of the Convention.  The location of a

new building must be considered within an area regulated by other

considerations than purely legal views.  A main issue is the effect on

the landscape caused by the building.  Considerations in this regard

have been dominant in the present case.  They can hardly be examined

by a court.  In the Government's view considerations of this kind were

never meant to fall within the scope of the expression "civil rights".

This view is in line with the wording of the text and is also

supported by the travaux préparatoires to the Convention.  The

Government refer to a decision of the Commission in a case against

Sweden (No. 10977/84, Dec. 1.7.85).

        Planning is a matter which the inhabitants of a municipality

can influence by ordinary political means.  That is why a plan is

originally adopted by a political body, namely the Building Committee

of the municipality.  In the political debate a building plan can be

an issue of major importance.

        The question whether Article 6 is applicable in a case like

the present one is of great importance to the Swedish Government.  If

the provision is considered applicable in regard to decisions on

planning, the conditions for the whole Swedish system of planning

would be changed drastically.

        The possibility of having decisions on planning examined by

courts is something quite alien to the system of planning.  This

system is based on the idea that the municipality is responsible for

the use of land and the building activities within the municipality,

and that the state control of how the municipalities carry out their

obligations is exercised by the County Administrative Board and the

Government.

        Before a plan is adopted, landowners and others concerned

are duly consulted and the proposed plan is exposed at a public

planning-exhibition in the municipality.  Decisions on planning are

carried out speedily by the County Administrative Boards and the

Government, since such decisions often concern great economic

interests of public as well as private nature, and even short delays

can cause great losses.  As a rule, such decisions also concern a

great number of persons.  If those were granted the right to have

decisions on planning examined by a court in accordance with Article 6

of the Convention, which i.a. prescribes public hearings, such a

procedure would entail a great risk that the whole planning-procedure

would be delayed for a considerable time.  Any such delay may lead to

serious consequences for the municipality, exploiters and others.

There is also an inherent risk that there may be those who would use

the possibility to go to court in order to delay planning-decisions

which they are not prepared to accept for political, ideological or

other reasons not relevant in this context.

        The Government maintain that the complaints under Article 6

fall outside the scope of the Convention.  The application should

therefore in this regard be declared inadmissible for being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

2.3     Article 8 of the Convention

        The Government maintain that the right to respect for a

person's private and family life, home and correspondence does not

include a right to a certain standard of a dwelling.  The complaint in

this regard falls outside the scope of Article 8 and should be declared

inadmissible for being incompatible ratione materiae with the

Convention.  In any event, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded.

2.4     Other Articles invoked

        The Government submit that the complaints under Articles 17

and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the

Convention are inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded.

Reference is made to what is said below on the merits.

        3.      The merits

3.1     Article 6 of the Convention

        If it is assumed that the decision of the County Administrative

Board to confirm the building plan of 1962 involves a determination of

civil rights and obligations the Government admit that there is no

possibility to have this decision examined by a court.  As regards the

decision of the Building Committee of 24 March 1986 the Government

submit that there is a possibility to have issues regarding building

permits examined by a court to a certain extent.

        The Government observe that officials who have taken part

in a decision which is considered unlawful are responsible for this

decision and they can be prosecuted for abuse of office or for

careless abuse of office according to the Penal Code (brottsbalken).

However, in this case the Government see no reason to question the

lawfulness of the decisions taken.

3.2     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

        In the Government's view this case does not concern a

categoric refusal to allow the applicants to build a new house on

their property.  On the contrary, the Skärby family has been granted

extended rights to erect buildings.  The present situation is caused by

the fact that certain members of the family are not prepared to accept

the development agreement, which is connected with an alteration of

the existing building plan.  The conditions under this agreement

cannot be considered unreasonable.

        The municipality's costs for planning the area amount to about

59.000 SEK.  The agreement stipulates that the applicants should pay

30.000 SEK of these costs.  Of this amount 10.000 SEK have already

been paid.

        The costs for a municipal sewerage and water supply system

for the new plots planned amount to 20.000 SEK for the two plots in

the north west and to 125.000 SEK for the plot in the north east.

These sums should be paid by the applicants according to the agreement.

        It is not unreasonable to require a person who intends to erect

buildings on his property to contribute to these kinds of costs.  It is

not possible to let the municipalities themselves be answerable for

all these costs.  Sewerage and water supply-systems must be provided

for all dwellings.  Areas, covered by a building plan or a town plan,

are or will become densely populated, and for health and environment

reasons sewerage and water supply-systems must be provided jointly for

all estates within such an area.  This is all in the interest of the

property owner and the inhabitants of the municipality.

        The necessity of planning as regards housing has been

recognised in other cases before the Commission.  The Government admit

that the system as such interferes with the rights of the individual

to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

        However, a planning decision does not deprive anyone of his

property.  It only limits a person's possibility to use his property

for example for building purposes.  No other effect appears in this

case.  The planning decision and the decision of 24 March 1986 are

both based on an Act enforced in order to control the use of property.

Thus, it is the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which

is applicable to the case.

        It remains to examine whether a fair balance was struck

between the public interest and the protection of the individual's

rights.

        The consideration underlying the plan decision and the

Building Committee's decision of 24 March 1986 is to preserve the

unique area as a natural resource for the future.  This certainly is

an aim in the public interest.

        The Government maintain that the interests of the individual

have been taken into account to a reasonable extent.  The applicants

have not been totally refused permission to erect buildings on the

property.  Instead they have been given this opportunity but on certain

conditions which they have refused to accept.  These conditions cannot

be considered unfair.  The location of the site according to the

proposed plan of 1983-1984 must be considered acceptable.  The present

buildings on the property may be in a very bad condition.  However,

nothing has prevented the applicants from repairing the buildings at

an earlier stage when this was still possible.  The plan decision has

not prevented the owners therefrom.

        When looking at the situation as a whole it may be observed

that the authorities have taken several measures in order to meet the

needs of the applicants, far beyond what they were obliged to do

according to the legislation in force.  The decisions taken were

lawful and cannot be said to contravene the general principles of

international law.

        The Government are of the opinion that there is no violation

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that the complaints are manifestly

ill-founded.

3.3     Articles 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention

        Regarding Article 8 of the Convention the Government maintain

that the right to respect for private and family life does not apply

to the standard of a dwelling.  The applicants have not been denied

the right to live on their property.

        The Government fail to see how the use of public power in this

case can give rise to an allegation that Article 17 of the Convention

has been violated.  The applicants allege that the local authorities

intended to create a situation which could make it possible for the

authorities to purchase the applicant's property at a low price in

order to sell it to holiday makers.  Such a way of acting would

probably be regarded as an abuse of office.  Any allegation in this

regard is contested.

        The Government maintain that the complaints under Articles 17

and 18 are manifestly ill-founded.

        4.      Conclusions

        The position of the Government in this case is

        concerning the admissibility:

        that the application should be declared inadmissible, partly

ratione personae, for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, for

failure to observe the six months rule laid down in Article 26 and,

as regards Articles 6 and 8, ratione materiae, and finally as regards

Articles 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

for being manifestly ill-founded, and

        concerning the merits:

        that there is no violation of the Convention as far as

Articles 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 are concerned.

B.      The applicants

1.      The facts

        The applicants recall that the legislation relevant to the

present case has changed practically every year.  In the beginning

there were only a few regulations in the law concerning buildings

necessary for agriculture.  This freedom has gradually been restricted

through legislation.

        Partly as a result of the efforts of the family, the property

has become very beautiful and in 1958, when the municipality wished to

make a building plan for the area, the responsible architect wanted to

make a natural park of the area.  Subsequently a new plan was exposed

in the local school and in that plan a large part of the land of

Flundrarp 12:1 was marked as a natural park.  The Skärby family asked

the responsible local authorities about the legal significance of the

reservation of the land as a natural park because they wished in all

circumstances to be able to build on the property in order to satisfy

the needs of the family.  The house in which they lived was not of

first quality since it had been constructed long ago and it was

envisaged at the time that the new construction should be carried out

in a not too distant future.  However, the responsible local

authorities could not reply to this request but advised the family to

submit an enquiry to the County Administrative Board of Malmö.  As a

result, in 1961, Mr.  Christian Skärby, accompanied by his two children

Majken and Bertil, went by car to the County Administrative Board of

Malmö and they were received by the Superior Land Surveyor and by the

Architect of the County.  These public officials declared clearly that

the plan would not be an obstacle to the construction of the houses

which the family might be in need of in the future, if the family did

not object to the plan proposed.  It is submitted that the authorities

thus gave clear assurances that if the children were to construct a

new house on the territory marked "natural park" this would be

acceptable.  As a result the family decided not to lodge an appeal

against the proposed plan.  In 1968, after the death of Mr.  Christian

Skärby, the children wanted to construct a new house and accordingly

asked for a preliminary decision from the municipality.  It then

appeared that the previous promises and assurances did not have any

value and it was even questioned whether they had ever existed.

        The applicants point out that it appears from the Government's

submissions as if the 1962 building plan pre-supposes a use of the part

of the property called natural park, similar to that envisaged for

land declared protected natural area.  However, such a declaration of

a piece of land pre-supposes the payment of compensation for the

damage suffered by the proprietor and a declaration under Section 118

of the Building Act.  Such a declaration has never been made.

        It is true that the word natural park is not found anywhere in

the legislation.  It may then be assumed that the intention of the

authorities at the time when this terminoloy was used was precisely what

was explained orally to the owners, i.e. the applicant's father, on

the occasion of his visit to the County Administrative Board for

further information.  The applicants insist that the meeting in 1961

really took place and Mr.  Skärby and Mrs.  Skärby who were present at

the meeting could give evidence under oath.

        In view of the extended right to construct for agricultural

properties at that time it appears that, as time has gone by, there

has been a transformation unfavourable to the applicants.

        It is true that the municipality has proposed places for the

constructions.  However, the applicants are of the opinion that these

places have been chosen precisely because the authorities knew that

they were unacceptable to the applicants.  For instance the authorities

have proposed that the applicants should construct on the small court

yard between the present dwelling and the out-buildings which would

destroy the value of the said out-buildings.

        The applicants allege that there has been a discrimination

between the applicants and the neighbour owners.  In respect of a

property situated near to the applicants, the applicants point out

that the civil servant responsible for the questions of protection of

the nature had to decide on the use of the land.  The land was owned

by a foundation and it was intended to construct a golf course and a

group of leisure houses as well as houses for permanent dwellings.

The civil servant who had to decide on the case received at the same

time from the foundation an amount of 57,000 SEK for private research

purposes.  This development of the land was very controversial and

there was reason to suspect corruption.  A Member of Parliament

brought a complaint and notified the Minister of Justice and the

fiscal authorities.  This case has not yet been settled.

2.      The admissibility

        The applicants agree to introduce the present application

before the Commission.  In support the applicants refer to a new

letter of authority dated 30 May 1986.  The applicants also refer to a

declaration made by the three successors who have signed the

development agreement.  They declare that they thought that this

agreement was the only possibility to change the blocked situation in

the negotiations with the municipality, even if they thereby had to

content themselves with what they considered to be an injustice.

        As regards exhaustion of domestic remedies the Government have

argued that the applicants could have appealed against the decision of

1962 and then against the decision of 1986 and that they could request

a reinstatement in proceedings when they realised that the information

given by the authorities in 1961 was incorrect.  Furthermore, the

Government maintain that the applicants could have requested an

amendment of the plan.

        The reason why the applicants did not appeal against the

building plan of 1962 was that the plan as presented by the authorities

did not put any obstacles to the construction of houses to satisfy the

needs of the family.

        The decision of 1986 was not revisable unless it was illegal.

Illegality could however not be seriously invoked and accordingly an

appeal was useless.  A request for reinstatement in proceedings is not

counted as a domestic remedy under the general principles of

international law.  Moreover, the Supreme Administrative Court has a

strict practice concerning such appeals to the effect that such a

remedy must anyway be regarded as ineffective.

        As regards the possibility of requesting a change in the plan

this is precisely what the applicants have tried.  The authorities

have made a new plan which was contrary to the applicants' wishes.

Furthermore, they requested the payment of 30,000 SEK for the plan.

The Government admit that an appeal against such a new plan would be

ineffective but they hold the opinion that it could nevertheless have

been tried.  The ineffectiveness, which has been admitted, dispenses

the applicants from trying this remedy.

        If it were admitted that there was a failure to exhaust

remedies in respect of the 1962 decision the applicants point out that

any such decision was only a preliminary decision in respect of the

applicants' request for a building permit which is the object of the

application.

        In conclusion, the municipality has refused a dispensation from

the building plan and has rejected the request for a building permit.

As a result of the necessity of having a dispensation from the

building plan the possibilities of an appeal have been cut off.  There

is no remedy against the decision of the Building Committee in this

respect.  The applicants have therefore satisfied the conditions of

Article 26 of the Convention.

3.      The merits

3.1     Article 6 of the Convention

        The Government seem to admit that the Building Committee is

not to be regarded as a tribunal in Sweden.  The case dealt with by

the Building Committee concerned a permission to construct a house

whose placement and details of construction were indicated in the

application.

        It is evident that the use of such a house falls within the

private and civil sphere.  Building activities are private and civil

activities.  The applicants point out that the municipality's fees for

the planification and the water and sewage system were not at issue in

the case.  The Government submit that the question of the location of

the new building must be considered to fall within an area regulated

by other considerations than purely legal views.  They submit that the

main issue is the effect on the landscape caused by the building.  The

applicants fully agree with the latter point.  However, they find it

incomprehensible why this should be a reason to exclude the tribunals

from determining any disputes in that respect.  The applicants

consider that this is a question which must be considered in the

context of the preamble to the Convention which speaks of the rule of

law, the opposite being arbitrariness and unlimited power given to

municipal civil servants.  The rule of law means that the laws and

other regulations should be decided by an elected body but that they

should be applied by impartial and independent bodies.

        This is well in line with the decision referred to by the

Government (No. 10977/84).  The argument which the Government wish to

push forward in that decision loses much of its force in the present

case where the regulations are applicable and interpreted by a

municipality which itself engages in real estate business, and not

by the State as the supreme authority.

        The applicants recall that the purpose of Article 6 of the

Convention has been clearly explained by the Court in a number of

cases, in particular the Golder case (Eur.  Court H.R., Golder judgment

of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18) and the Ringeisen case, (Eur.

Court H.R., Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13).

Moreover, in the Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment (Eur.  Court H.R.

judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52) the Court stated that

it is of little consequence that the contestation (dispute) concerned

an administrative measure taken by the competent body and the exercise

of public authority.

        The fact that a dispensation is legally possible weakens the

position of the Government.  It is in the nature of things that a plan

cannot regulate everything.  It is not in the nature of things that

such derogations should be given by a municipal committee of a

municipality which finds at the same time a financial interest

therein.  It can thereby try to reduce the value of the property in

order to force an owner to sell his land to the municipality which, at

a later stage, can practically revaluate the land by lifting the

prohibitions.  Accordingly, it is necessary to allow disputes in

relation to such dispensations to be determined by independent and

impartial bodies.  Otherwise it would be possible to use a law so as

to remove the substance of the guarantees of Article 6 in situations

where one of the parties in the dispute is the State or a body on

which the State has conferred a privileged situation.

        Consequently the applicants consider that the question whether

they should be permitted to build or prohibited from erecting a house

on a place chosen by them concerns a dispute regarding their civil

rights and obligations.

        The Government also invoke the theoretical possibility

of introducing criminal proceedings against the responsible civil

servants in the municipality.  The applicants cannot understand how

a tribunal could possibly find criminal the use by a democratically

elected body of political power regularly conferred on them by the

legislation.

        Finally, the Government submit that it would be impractical if

a land-owner could have the possibility to have his rights examined by

a tribunal when it concerns planification.  The applicants find the

reasoning astonishing.  First, it is notorious that it is the State

and not the individuals who have the habit of delaying for the purpose

of depriving owners of their property.  The applicants refer to the

case of Sporrong and Lönnroth.  Secondly, Article 6 does not only give

the right to have the case heard by a tribunal but also to have the

case heard within a reasonable time.  If the Government find it

appropriate to speed up the procedure concerning questions of

planification it would be simple to provide that the tribunals to

which one refers such cases should treat them rapidly with a minimum

of delay.  The Government are well placed to introduce such a system

and they are also obliged to do so by the Convention, in particular,

since the Government find themselves that the delays are not

reasonable.

3.2     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

        The applicants accept the Government's submissions that there

has been no prohibition to construct on the property as such.  However,

what has been proposed by the municipality has each time been unacceptable.

The exploitation agreement was unacceptable for a number of reasons,

inter alia the following:

        The municipality proposes a take it or leave it solution where

all problems with for instance water and sewage have been solved.  The

applicants, however, wish to have the freedom to choose although at

the same time respecting the requirements of the health care

authorities and concerning electricity but they wish to make the works

themselves.  It is for instance clear that the sub-soil water is

acceptable and that no law in Sweden prohibits the construction and

use of wells.  Only a few agriculturalists use the municipal water.

Moreover, it is excessive to give away to the municipality, land

necessary for the erection of a transformer and an adjacent parking

place.

        Furthermore, the applicants cannot accept to construct a new

house on the court yard between the existing house and the out houses.

        The applicants consider that the municipality has been

practising blackmail against them in order to get hold of their

property on which the municipality would wish to build holiday houses.

        The Government admit that there has been an interference with

the applicants' right to the use and the peaceful enjoyment of their

possessions.  However, the Government do not admit that the

planification involves a deprivation of their property.  The applicants

disagree.  They admit that it may appear from the judgment in the

Sporrong and Lönnroth case (loc. cit., p. 24, paras. 62 - 63) that it

may be a question only of reducing the possibility to use the possession

and that that is not a deprivation of property.  However, such an

interpretation does not take due account of the realities of the

disputed situation.  The interferences suffered by the applicants are

different in nature from those in the Sporrong and Lönnroth case.

        The applicants find it natural that there is a regulation on

the use of their property for the purpose of maintaining the beauty of

the nature.  They consider that they have proven that their own

actions also have this objective.  They would even have been glad if

this aim had been pursued better in the region near to their land.

        As regards the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

the applicants recall that the word law presupposes a certain quality

of the law making it possible for a tribunal to apply it.  It appears

from the Government's reply that they do not wish to regulate the use

of property by the introduction of laws but prefer to give such powers

of decision to the local elected bodies.  This is not what the authors

of the Convention wanted when in the Preamble to the Convention they

reaffirmed their profound belief in the fundamental freedoms which are

the foundation of justice, and the rule of law.  The rule of law is

not compatible with conferring such unlimited powers on local elected

bodies.

        The Government consider that a fair balance has been

struck between the interest of the applicants and the general

interest.  It is obvious that even if the Government find that the

municipality has abused its power they will not admit it before the

Commission.

        In short the applicants submit that the Government and the

municipality have manifestly and abusively disrespected the

applicants' right to property.  Whether the interference should be

characterised as a deprivation of property or as a regulation of its use

is not of great importance.  In both cases the rule of law has not been

respected.  The applicants consider that they have shown that there

has been no fair balance struck between the general interest and the

applicants' interest.

3.3     Article 8 of the Convention

        The applicants' allegation under Article 8 of the Convention

is based on the fact that the authorities have put up insurmountable

obstacles against the efforts of the Skärby family to live together on

their own property and land as was the wish of old Mr.  Skärby.  There

is a disrespect for family life as protected by Article 8.

3.4     Article 17 of the Convention

        In the present case this Article raises two issues.  One is

based on the fact that it is the municipality which carries the

responsibilities for the violations suffered.  The other issue relates

to the provision "aimed at .... their limitation to a greater extent

than is provided for in the Convention".

        Disputes concerning civil rights and obligations must be heard

by a body having the quality of a tribunal.  It appears that the

Government do not wish to respect this obligation.  The Convention

does not provide for any limitation of this right which is necessary

to ensure the rule of law.  To put the municipality in a position of

judge and party at the same time should be severely condemned by the

Commission since it has nothing to do with a true political democracy,

being contrary to the respect for human rights.

        The applicants point out that there have been no efforts from

the side of the Swedish State to avoid the alleged violations.

3.5     Article 18 of the Convention

        It is notorious in Sweden that several municipalities have the

habit of not doing any planification necessary to construct houses

except for land which has already been acquired by the municipality.

To buy at a low price and sell at a high price that is the normal aim

for every commercial activity.  When it is practised by a municipality

with the help of public power such a commercial activity can only look

strange.

4.      Conclusions

        The applicants conclude that they have exhausted domestic

remedies in all circumstances in relation to the decision of 24 March

1986.  They consider Article 6 of the Convention to be applicable,

since the case concerns a dispute decisive for the applicants' civil

rights and obligations.  They also consider Article 8 of the

Convention to be applicable.  The applicants conclude that there have

been violations of Articles 6, 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention and of

Protocol No. 1.

THE LAW

1.      The applicants allege that their right to the peaceful

enjoyment of their property has been restricted in a way contrary to

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, and that they

have, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, not

had access to a tribunal to examine the dispute as to whether they

should be granted a building permit.  The applicants also invoke

Articles 8, 17 and 18 (Art. 8, 17, 18) of the Convention.

        The Government express doubts as to whether all the parties to

the applicant estates support the application to the Commission and

submit that, if this was not the case, the application should be

declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione persone with the

provisions of the Convention.

        In their written observations the applicants have submitted a

new power of attorney and an explanatory note from those three parties

to the estates who had signed the development agreement with the

municipality.

        In the light of these documents, which have been notified to

the Government,  the Commission now finds that there is no reason to

reject the application for being incompatible with the Convention on

the ground invoked by the Government in their earlier submissions.

2.      The Government submit that the applicants have failed to

exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention.  They refer to the fact that the applicants did not appeal

against the building plan which was adopted in 1962.  They also submit

that if the applicants have failed to appeal against that plan as a

result of incorrect information allegedly given by the authorities

they could have asked for the time-limit for an appeal to be restored.

The Government also submit that the applicants could ask the County

Administrative Board to alter the building plan.  They further

maintain that the applicants have themselves prevented a further

examination of the matter since they have not accepted the development

agreement proposed by the municipality.  Finally, the Government submit

that the applicants have not appealed against the decision of the

Building Committee of 24 March 1986.

        The Commission notes that the application is not directed

against the adoption of the building plan in 1962, but against the

decision of the Building Committee of 24 March 1986 refusing the

applicants' request for a building permit.  The remedies referred to

by the Government with regard to the building plan and the development

agreement cannot be considered as remedies against this decision.

        The only submission of non-exhaustion which remains to be

examined is the allegation that the applicants could have appealed

against the decision of the Building Committee to the County

Administrative Board, had they considered that an exemption from the

building plan was not necessary or that the issue had not been

properly handled.  The Government admit that no appeal lies against

the decision insofar as it relates to the refusal to grant an

exemption from the building plan.  However, the applicants do not make

any submission to the effect that the application for a building

permit was incorrectly dealt with or that an exemption from the

building plan was unnecessary.  The applicants appear to admit that

such an exemption was required.

        In these circumstances, the Commission  cannot find that there

was an effective remedy which the applicants failed to exercise.  It

follows that the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of

domestic remedies.

3.      The applicants complain that the restriction of their right to use

their property violates Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. P1-1) reads as follows:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems

necessary to control the use of property in accordance with

the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or

other contributions or penalties."

        The Commission considers that the refusal of a building permit

may, in the circumstances of the present case, be regarded as an

interference with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of

their possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

        The Commission considers that the applicants were not

"deprived" of their property within the meaning of the second sentence

of the first paragraph of Article 1(Art. 1).  The interference falls

to be considered under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) as being a measure to "control the use of property".

        Consequently, the Commission must examine whether the

interference with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of

possessions was justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of

Protocol No.1 (P1-1).  This means that it must consider whether the

refused building permit was "necessary to control the use of property

in accordance with the general interest".  The task of the Convention

organs in this context is to supervise the lawfulness, purpose and

proportionality of the decisions taken by the domestic authorities

(cf. e.g.  No. 10378/83, Dec. 7.12.83, D.R. 35 p. 235).  The question

of proportionality requires a determination as to whether there was a

reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim sought

to be realised or, in other words, whether a fair balance has been

struck between the demands of the general interest and the interest of

the individual.  In determining whether a fair balance exists, the

Contracting State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard

both to choosing means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the

consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for

the purpose of achieving the object of the measure in question (Eur.

Court H.R., Agosi judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p.

18, para. 52).

        The Commission finds that the Building Act was a law enforced

in the general interest.  It is satisfied that the refusal of the

building permit had a basis in Swedish law and therefore finds that

the decision was lawful.

        As to the "general interest" pursued by the refusal of the

building permit, the Commission notes that the purpose was to refuse

construction of buildings in conflict with a building plan, which did

not envisage buildings in the places proposed by the applicants.  The

buildings proposed would have been situated in an area which in the

plan was reserved as a natural park.  The Commission is satisfied that

the interests which were thus pursued by the decision refusing the

building permit served the "general interest".

        As regards the proportionality between the interference with

the applicants' property rights and the general interest pursued, the

Commission recalls the following.

        The right to construct new buildings on the applicants'

property is regulated in the Building Act and the Building Ordinance

as well as by the building plans which were adopted in 1962 and 1964.

Under Swedish law the applicants would have a right to build on their

property provided that the proposed construction did not run counter

to any confirmed plan and that it satisfied technical demands on

construction.

        However, the constructions proposed by the applicants did not

comply with the building plans adopted for the area.  Consequently,

the applicants do not under Swedish law have any right to construct

the buildings proposed in their application for a building permit.

They could only obtain such a right if the Building Committee

exercised its discretion and granted an exemption from the building

plan.  However, the Building Committee has refused such an exemption.

        The Commission further observes that the restriction on the

applicants' property derives from the adoption of the building plan in

1962, i.e. more than 20 years ago.  The Commission is not called upon

to examine the suitability of the building plans adopted in 1962 and

1964, nor whether or not the applicants, at the time, were correctly

informed about the implication of the said plans.

        The Commission, moreover, recalls that the building regulations

presently in force for the applicants' different properties do not

totally prevent the applicants from constructing new buildings, but

the possibilities of construction are severely limited.

        In 1983 to 1984 a new building plan was proposed by the

municipality at the request of the applicants.  The adoption of the

proposed new plan was dependent on whether the applicants were

prepared to accept a development agreement proposed by the

municipality.  The applicants have in detail explained the reasons why

they consider that the development agreement was unacceptable to them.

The Commission notes these reasons, but it also notes that the

authorities have made certain proposals to meet the applicants'

wishes.   The applicants' wish to maintain and improve their property

which has been in the hands of the family for a long time must be

considered as legitimate and relevant.

        Nevertheless, in view of the wide margin of appreciation

enjoyed by the Contracting States in this area, the Commission finds

that the Building Committee's decision to refuse a building permit for

the specific constructions proposed in the applicants' request for

such a permit cannot be considered to be disproportionate to its

legitimate purpose.  Consequently, the interference with the

applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was

justified under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

        It follows that in this respect the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

4.      The applicants also allege a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention since they cannot have the question of an exemption

from the building plan examined by an impartial tribunal.

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence reads as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

        The Government submit that the decisions relating to the

planning of the building activities and the decision of the Building

Committee of 24 March 1986 did not involve any determination of a

dispute which related to the applicants' "civil rights" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.  They argue

that this part of the application is therefore inadmissible as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

In case the Commission finds that the complaint is not incompatible

with the Convention, the Government admit that there is no possibility

for the applicants to have the building plan of 1962 examined by a

court.  As regards the decision of the Building Committee of 24 March

1986 they submit that issues regarding building permits can be

examined by a court to a certain extent.

        The main issues to be determined under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) are whether the decision of the Building Committee of 24

March 1986 was decisive for the applicants' "civil rights" and, if so,

whether the applicants had at their disposal a procedure satisfying

the requirements of this provision in regard to that decision.

        The Commission has made a preliminary examination of these

issues in the light of the parties' submissions.  It considers that

these issues raise questions of fact and law which are of such an

important and complex nature that their determination requires an

examination of the merits.  The complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6)

must therefore be declared admissible, no other ground for declaring

it inadmissible having been established.

5.      The applicants also allege a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention, which inter alia protects the right to respect for

private life, family life and home.  The applicants submit that this

provision has been violated as a result of the insurmountable

obstacles raised by the authorities against the applicants living

together on their property.

        The Government submit that this complaint is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or manifestly

ill-founded.

        The Commission considers that the applicant estates cannot in

the circumstances of the present case invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.  In this respect the application is incompatible ratione

personae with the provisions of the Convention.

        Insofar as this complaint is brought by the individual

applicants as natural persons, Article 8 (Art. 8) can be invoked.

However the Commission refers to its reasoning under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) above.  It finds that the Building Committee's

refusal of a building permit cannot be considered as an interference

with the said applicants' right to respect for their private life,

family life or their home within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27) of the

Convention.

6.      The applicants have also invoked Articles 17 and 18 (Art. 17,

18) of the Convention.

        However, the Commission finds no separate issues under these

Articles.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the

        applicants' complaint that they did not have available a

        procedure satisfying Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in

        relation to the Building Committee's decision of 24 March 1986;

        DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

        Secretary to the Commission     President of the Commission

              (H.C. KRUGER)                   (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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LEXI

Lexploria AI Legal Assistant

Active Products: EUCJ + ECHR Data Package + Citation Analytics • Documents in DB: 400211 • Paragraphs parsed: 44892118 • Citations processed 3448707