Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 12175/86

by P. H. and

H. H.

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 12 May 1988, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 4 September

1985 by P. H. and H. H. against the United Kingdom and registered on

22 May 1986 under file No. 12175/86;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first applicant, Ms. P. H. is a British citizen, born in

1948, and resident in London. She is a press and broadcasting

secretary by profession. In the 1983 general election she was a

parliamentary candidate for the Labour Party.

The second applicant, Ms. H. H. is a British citizen, born in

1950 and resident in London. She is a solicitor and Labour Member of

Parliament.

Both applicants are represented, in the proceedings before the

Commission, by Ms. Madeleine Colvin, Legal Officer, National Council

for Civil Liberties (NCCL).

The application arises out of the alleged surveillance of the

applicants by a branch of the Security Service (MI5). The facts as

submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.

The first applicant was General Secretary of the NCCL between

September 1983 and May 1984. The second applicant was employed as

legal officer by the NCCL from 1978 until 1982.

The NCCL is an unincorporated association whose aim is to

assist in the maintenance of civil liberties, including freedom of

speech, propaganda and assembly. The Council advances measures for

the recovery and enlargement of such liberties in the United Kingdom.

Pursuant to its Constitution, the Council is a non-party and

non-denominational organisation. In order to achieve its aims the

Council takes steps such as briefing and lobbying members of

Parliament, submitting evidence to official enquiries, conducting

research, issuing publications, and taking test cases to local and

international courts. It sometimes sends impartial observers to

monitor demonstrations as part of its functions to defend the right of

freedom of assembly, but it does not sponsor or organise

demonstrations of any kind.

The United Kingdom Government established for the exclusive

purpose of the Defence of the Realm a Security Service which has

direct access to the Prime Minister. The division of that service

responsible for monitoring and combating internal subversion is known

as MI5. The activities of the Security Service are governed by the

published Directive of the Home Secretary to the Director-General of

the Service, a Crown Servant, dated 24 September 1952 ("the

Directive") as follows:

"1. In your appointment as Director-General of the Security

Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary

personally. The Security Service is not, however, a part of

the Home Office. On appropriate occasion you will have

right of direct access to the Prime Minister.

2. The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of

the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a

whole, from external and internal dangers arising from

attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of

persons and organisations whether directed from within or

without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to

the State.

3. You will take special care to see that the work of the

Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary

for the purposes of this task.

4. It is essential that the Security Service should be kept

absolutely free from any political bias or influence and

nothing should be done that might lend colour to any

suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any

particular section of the community, or with any other

matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole.

5. No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any

Government Department unless you are satisfied that an

important public interest bearing on the Defence of the

Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.

6. You and your staff will maintain the well-established

convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with

the detailed information which may be obtained by the

Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with

such information only as may be necessary for the

determination of any issue on which guidance is sought."

Members of the Security Service are public officials but

unlike, for example, police officers, immigration officers or officers

of HM Customs and Excise, they have conferred on them no special

powers whether under any law or by virtue of the Directive. Members

of the Service are Crown Servants, subject to the disciplinary control

of the Crown but are otherwise in no position different from private

citizens. Their activities are constrained by the criminal law and

the law of torts in the same way as the activities of citizens

generally are so constrained. They are thus liable to criminal

prosecution and civil proceedings in the same manner as ordinary

citizens.

As revealed by a former officer of MI5 on a television

programme broadcast on 8 March 1985 and in an affidavit dated and

sworn for the purposes of judicial review proceedings in another case

both applicants were classified as subversive and as communist

sympathisers due to their prominent participation in the activities of

the National Council for Civil Liberties.

The applicants claim that these "grave libels" were published

within MI5 and were available for publication to other agencies with

whom MI5 has a relationship. For example, the file concerning the

second applicant would have been sent to the Cabinet Office on her

election as an M.P. and would be used to assess her fitness for

inclusion on parliamentary committees dealing with highly classified

information. The files relating to the applicants recorded details of

passport applications, data from surveillance by local police Special

Branches and special agents, and references to them or by them picked

up under warrants issued in relation to other persons directly subject

to telephone or mail intercepts. Such intercepts, in the second

applicant's case, are likely to include confidential conversations

which she, as a practising solicitor, had with certain of her clients.

The first applicant's file included information about her personal

relationship with a former member of the Communist Party.

The applicants also state that surveillance of both applicants

was continued after they had left the National Council for Civil

Liberties on the basis that they were candidates for elected office.

Such surveillance, it is alleged, might hinder their political career

or other appointment to public office.

By letter dated 29 March 1985 addressed to the General

Secretary of the NCCL, the Home Secretary declined to order an enquiry

into the matters of which the applicants complain and failed to

provide an assurance that they or the NCCL is not a target of secret

surveillance.

The above allegations are neither confirmed nor denied by the

respondent Government. They point out that the policy of successive

Governments of the United Kingdom is not to disclose information about

the operations of the Security Service or to comment on particular

allegations.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that

MI5's surveillance operations have breached the applicants' right to

respect for their private lives. It has involved the recording of

personal information gathered by State agencies, indirect interception

of telephone calls and surveillance by State agents. The applicants

complain that this information appears to include false and libellous

statements, which may have been published to other State agencies.

The applicants submit that there is no legal basis for this

surveillance and that it is not necessary in a democratic society

since they are not subversive or a threat in any way to the State.

Such surveillance is not justified under Article 8 para. 2 of the

Convention.

2. The applicants also complain under Article 10 of the

Convention that the aformentioned surveillance amounts to an

interference with their right to freedom of expression. In this

regard they complain that the assessments made about them by the

Secret Service may be used to damage them in their political or

professional careers. This prospect may have a chilling effect on

their expressions of honest opinion and is a potential reprisal for

exercising their right of free speech.

3. They further complain under Article 11 of the Convention that

their freedom of association is also denied by a state agency which

imposes a special burden on those with whom they associate, namely the

prospect of being designated "subversive" by virtue of the

association.

4. The applicants finally complain under Article 13 of the

Convention that no effective remedy exists in the United Kingdom

before a national authority in respect of the aforementioned

violations. There is no general law of privacy and the security

services are exempted from data protection legislation. There is no

jurisdictional basis in domestic law whereby the applicants can apply

to a court or tribunal to obtain access to their files, correct

misstatements, limit the information collected or control the extent

of its dissemination.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 4 September 1985 and

registered on 22 May 1986. In a decision dated 2 December 1986 the

Commission decided that notice should be given to the respondent

Government of the application and that the Government should be

invited to submit observations on the admissiblity and merits of the

application in so far as it raised issues under Articles 8, 10, 11 and

13 of the Convention. These observations were submitted on 29 May

1987. The applicants' observations in reply were received on

22 December 1987.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

The respondent Government

The respondent Government note that the operations of the

Security Service, directly concerned as they are with the protection

of national security, are of their very nature secret. It has for

this reason been the consistent policy of successive Governments of

the United Kingdom not to disclose information about the operations of

the Security Service or to comment on particular allegations that are

made about its operations. Consistently with this policy, the

Government neither accept nor deny the facts on which the applicants

rely. Nevertheless, in order to enable the Commission to consider the

questions raised by the application, and for the purposes of these

proceedings only, the submissions of the Government are made on the

basis of the allegations as to fact made by the applicants.

Domestic law and practice

From June to September 1963 Lord Denning, one of the then

most senior Judges of the Supreme Court, at the request of the Prime

Minister, undertook an examination of the operation of the Security

Service in the light of the resignation of the then Secretary of

State for War. At paragraph 239 of his Report dated 16 September 1963

(Cmnd. 2152), Lord Denning, after hearing a considerable body of

evidence, found general approval that the Directive embodied the

correct principles, which principles (inter alia) he summarised as

follows:

"(1) The Head of the Security Service is responsible

directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper

working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the

Prime Minister.

(2) The Security Service is, however, not a department of

the Home Office. It operates independently under its own

Director-General, but he can and does seek direction and

guidance from the Home Secretary, subject always to the

proviso that its activities must be absolutely free from any

political bias or influence.

(3) The function of the Security Service is to defend the

Realm as a whole from dangers which threaten it as a whole,

such as espionage on behalf of a foreign Power, or internal

organisations subversive of the State. For this purpose, it

must collect information about individuals, and give it to

those concerned. But it must not, even at the behest of a

Minister or Government Department, take part in

investigating the private lives of the individuals except

in a matter bearing on the Defence of the Realm as a whole.

(4) The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime

Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and

delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has

any direct responsiblity for the Security Service. He has

certainly none in day-to-day matters. It would be a

mistake for the Prime Minister to take such responsibility

because he cannot in practice exercise adequate supervision,

and he has not the secretariat for the purposes."

Lord Denning, at paragraph 240 of his Report, noted that "the

result of these principles is that, if the Director-General of the

Security Service is in doubt as to any aspect of his duties - as, for

instance, when he gets information about a Minister or senior public

servant indicating that he may be a security risk - he should take the

responsibility for further action, that is to say, whether to take

steps to eliminate the security risk or to put up with it. If a

mistake is made, it is the Home Secretary who will be responsible to

Parliament."

Article 8 of the Convention and

Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8

In the light of the Court's judgment in the Leander Case

(Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 22 March 1987, Series A no.

116) and without prejudice to the merits of the applicants' claims

under this head, the Government do not contest the admissibility of the

applicants' complaint under Article 8 of the Convention or under

Article 13 of the Convention with respect to their claims under

Article 8.

Article 10 of the Convention

The Government point out that the Court in the Leander Case

unanimously held that there had been no interference with the

applicant's freedom to express opinions as protected by Article 10,

holding that it was access to the public service and not freedom of

expression which lay at the heart of the issue before the Court (see

paras. 72 and 73).

It is submitted that the applicants' allegations likewise

disclose no interference with their right to freedom of expression.

The applicants have at all times been free to express opinions whether

of a political nature or otherwise, and no evidence has been adduced

to suggest that the exercise of such freedom has been made subject to

any "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties" or to any

other interference by a public authority: no evidence has been

adduced to show that any of the alleged measures complained of were

aimed at punishing the applicants for exercising their right to

express political or other opinions (cf. No. 10628/83, Dec. 14.10.85

to be published in D.R. 44). In so far as complaint is made that

public statements or expressions of opinion by the applicants may have

been "noted" or "collected" by the public authorities, it is submitted

that such recording of public statements, even if established as a

matter of fact, would not disclose any relevant interference with the

applicants' right to freedom of expression. In so far as complaint is

made that private expressions of opinion by the applicants have been

similarly noted and collected, consistently with the Commission's

approach in the Leander case, the complaint properly falls in any

event to be considered under Article 8 as an interference with the

applicants' right to respect for private life and not under Article

10, Article 8 being the lex specialis in relation to the

protection of the right to privacy.

In so far as the applicants' complaint under Article 10

relates to the possible use by the public authorities of expressions

of opinion by the applicants if and when considering the applicants

"for positions requiring security clearance", it is submitted that,

consistently with the reasoning of the Court in the Leander case, the

complaint discloses no relevant interference with the applicants'

freedom to express opinions, as protected by Article 10. The

applicants do not allege that they have been refused appointment to

any position requiring security clearance, still less that any such

position has been refused on the basis of opinions expressed by them,

whether publicly or privately, which were unrelated to national

security and irrelevant to their suitability for the post in question.

Nor has any evidence been adduced to show or suggest that, in breach

of the Directive, any position has been refused to an applicant on the

grounds of his or her political or other opinions when such opinions

are irrelevant to national security and to the suitability of the

applicant for the post in question.

In these circumstances the alleged fact that the opinions or

attitudes of an individual might be taken into account in determining

whether to appoint the individual concerned to a position requiring

security clearance does not constitute a relevant interference with

the exercise of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by

Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention.

Article 11 of the Convention

The Government submit that the substance of the applicants'

complaint under Article 11 of the Convention appears to be that,

through fear of being classified as "subversive" by a public authority,

other individuals might be unwilling to associate with the applicants

in the sense of being unwilling to meet or mix with them socially or

professionally.

The Government first submit that, on its true interpretation,

Article 11 para. 1 does not guarantee a right to associate in this

sense, the Article being concerned with the right to form or be

affiliated with a particular group or organisation (see No. 8317/78,

McFeeley and others v. the United Kingdom, Dec. of 18.5.80, D.R. 20

p. 98, para. 114). This complaint should, therefore, be rejected as

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

Even if the right guaranteed by Article 11 included the right

to "associate" with persons of their own choosing, in the sense of

sharing their company, it is submitted that the applicants cannot

claim to be victims of a violation of any such right by reason of the

facts alleged. No complaint is made that any measure of the

Government directly controlled, restricted or interfered with the

right of the applicants to associate freely with persons of their own

choosing: equally it is not suggested by the applicants that any

relevant measure was designed to repress the right of the applicants

to associate with such persons. In these circumstances there exists

no factual basis for the applicants' assertion that their freedom to

associate with others has been interfered with (cf. No. 7729/76, Agee

v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 17.12.76, D.R. 7 p. 164, at p. 174; No.

8118/77, Omkarananda and another v. Switzerland, Dec. 19.3.81, D.R. 25

p. 105 at p. 118). The applicants' claim, even if substantiated on

the facts, that the measures complained of had the indirect effect of

deterring other persons from associating with them is not sufficient

to give rise to any relevant interference with their right to freedom

of association for the purposes of Article 11 of the Convention.

Article 13 of the Convention

The Government submit that the applicants' complaints under

Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded as

being both unsubstantiated on the facts and giving rise to no prima

facie case of an interference with their rights guaranteed by

para. 1 of either Article. In addition, with regard to the complaint

of a breach of Article 11 of the Convention, it is the Government's

submission that the applicants' complaint is incompatible ratione

materiae with the Convention and accordingly does not concern "a right

or freedom guaranteed by the Convention".

In these circumstances the applicants' complaints under

Articles 10 and 11 disclose no arguable claim of a breach of either

Article and this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded.

The Applicants

The applicants point out that the history of NCCL demonstrates

that it has never been a subversive organisation threatening the

safety of the State or intending to undermine or overthrow

Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.

On the contrary they claim that the Council's concern has always been to

uphold the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom in relation to

individual freedom, and to draw attention to any lapse by Government

agencies in complying with obligations in the field of human rights.

Article 8 of the Convention

The applicants point out that the methods of surveillance

include, inter alia, the keeping of files on which would be placed the

fullest possible personal details, a photograph, information received

from the police special branch in the area in which the applicants

lived, a note of appearances or references to, the applicants,

which appeared in telephone and mail intercepts which were operating

against other individuals or organisations and references to the

applicants which would appear in the reports of MI5 agents.

The applicants state that NCCL has nothing whatsoever to

do with subversion or overthrowing the constitution. It has always

worked within the law in pursuing its various activities. Moreover,

the applicants have never been convicted of a criminal offence nor

deported from any country. It follows that neither the NCCL nor the

applicants individually could be described as "subversive". It is

accordingly submitted that any reliance upon paragraph 2 of Article 8

or Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention cannot justify an interference

with the rights in question.

Article 10 of the Convention

It is submitted that Article 10 of the Convention goes further

than merely outlawing governmental prohibition of the espousal of

certain views when it seeks to safeguard the right of freedom of

expression "without interference by a public authority". It must also

outlaw interference which has the effect in practice of deterring

people from expressing their views. Surveillance by the Secret

Service of certain individuals because of the views that they hold and

express has a "chilling" effect not only on them but on those they

communicate with such that both sets of people will be deterred from

expressing their true opinions and beliefs. This is compounded by the

secrecy surrounding the Security Service such that it is not possible

for an individual to know whether or not he or she is under a form of

covert surveillance. Such a deterrent effect takes two forms.

Firstly, persons with strong views in various matters may feel that

surveillance will hinder their career prospects. It is not necessary

to show that such surveillance does in fact impair their career

prospects. It is enough to show that they genuinely believe that this

could happen. Secondly, they are more generally deterred by the

feeling that their views are "outside of the norm". The

classification of people by the Security Service as "subversive"

presents them as "outside the norm".

In the alternative, the interference with the affairs of the

applicants did amount to a "formality, condition, restriction or

penalty" on the expression of certain views by the applicants. Both

applicants consider that their classification as "subversive" could

have a damaging effect on their careers and future political

ambitions, in particular if either of them should be appointed to a

post in the Prime Minister's Office at some time in the future when

they would require security clearance. Thus in practice they are

penalised for the expression of views which are in accordance with the

principles of the NCCL.

Article 11 of the Convention

The applicants claim an interference with their rights under

this provision in the following respects:

1. that the interference of the Security Service in the

present application defeats the purpose behind the NCCL by

deterring potential supporters from associating with the

applicants. This deterrence is compounded by the secrecy of

the Security Service and the potential effect that

surveillance on the association can have on the potential

careers of members;

2. the potential impact that the surveillance by the

Security Service and the classification as "subversive" will

have on their careeers means that the applicants must make a

choice between the proper functioning of the NCCL and their

own futures. In addition, surveillance by the Security

Service may prevent other potential members from

associating, thereby denying the applicants the right of

effective association. This provision entails not only

a right to associate but also that the association is

allowed to function properly. This was expressly recognised

by the Court in the National Union of Belgian Police case

(Eur. Court H.R., National Union of Belgian Police judgment

of 22 October 1975, Series A no. 19).

Article 13 of the Convention

The applicants note that the Government concede the

admissibility of the present application under Article 13 taken in

conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. However, it is

submitted that Article 13 is also breached in respect of the

complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

They point out that notwithstanding the directive issued by

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the Director-General of the Security Service

in September 1952 there exists no machinery by which the applicants

can uphold their rights or even ensure that the guidelines laid down

in that Directive are adhered to by the Security Service.

THE LAW

1. As regards Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

The applicants state that they were the subject of

surveillance by the Security Service, that information concerning

their activities is kept on files maintained by the Security Service

and that by reason of their association with the National Council for

Civil Liberties (NCCL) they were classified as subversives and

communist sympathisers by MI5 (the Security Service). They submit

that the above secret surveillance constitutes an unjustified

interference with their right to respect for private life as

guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This provision

states as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private

and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public safety

or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

The Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights

has held in the Leander case that the storing of information

concerning a person's private life in a secret police register amounts

to an interference with the right to respect for private life as

guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (see Eur.

Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p.

22, para. 48).

It further notes that the respondent Government do not contest

the admissibility of the applicants' complaints under this provision.

2. As regards Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention

The applicants complain under these provisions that the secret

surveillance of their activities also constitutes a breach of Articles

10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This

right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive

and impart information and ideas without interference by

public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it

duties and responsibiities, may be subject to such

formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are

prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,

in the interests of national security, territorial integrity

or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,

for the protection of health or morals, for the protection

of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the

disclosure of information received in confidence, or for

maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

In this context the applicants submit inter alia that as a

result of the secret surveillance to which they have been subjected

they and those with whom they are in communication will be deterred

from expressing their true opinions and beliefs. Furthermore, they

contend that being classified as "subversive" by the Security Service

may prejudice their future career prospects and political ambitions

and amounts to a penalty for the expression of particular views. They

stress, in particular, that the activities of NCCL could not in any way

be described as "subversive".

The respondent Government submit inter alia that the

applicants' allegations, even if substantiated, do not amount to an

interference with their freedom of expression guaranteed under this

provision. They point out that the applicants have at all times been

free to express their opinions and that they have failed to adduce any

evidence to show that any of the measures were aimed at punishing the

applicants for expressing their views or that they have actually been

refused any position or appointment on the basis of the opinions

expresssed by them.

Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention reads as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and

to freedom of association with others, including the right to

form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

...

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these

rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary

in a democratic society in the interests of national security or

public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

protection of health or morals or for the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent

the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these

rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the

administration of the State."

The applicants complain under this provision that, as a result

of their being labelled "subversive" by the Security Service,

potential supporters of the NCCL may have been inhibited from

associating with the applicants. They also submit that being

classified as "subversives" may have a prejudicial impact on their

careers, thereby obliging the applicants to choose between their

careers and further association with NCCL.

The respondent Government contend firstly that Article 11

para. 1 (Art. 11-1) does not guarantee a right of association in the

sense of meeting or mixing with other people socially and

professionally. Secondly, they maintain that the applicants have not

substantiated their complaint that their freedom to associate with

persons of their own choosing has been, in any respect, controlled or

restricted as a result of the measures of surveillance.

The Commission considers, in the light of the above

submissions and the fact that these complaints are based on the same

facts as the Article 8 (Art. 8) complaint, that the applicants'

complaints under Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention

raise complex issues of law and fact, the determination of which

should depend on an examination of the merits of the complaints.

3. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in conjunction

with Articles 8, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 10, 11)

The applicants submit that there exists no effective remedy

under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of their complaints

under Articles 8, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 10, 11) of the Convention. They

contend that this constitutes a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention. Insofar as the applicants complain of a breach of Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 8),

the Government have conceded the admissibility of the complaint

without prejudice to the merits of the claim. However, they contend

that the remainder of the Article 13 (Art. 13) complaint should be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded since the applicants have not

established any arguable claim of a breach of either Article 10 or 11

(Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.

The Commission considers that this part of the application

also raises difficult questions of law and fact under Article 13

(Art. 13), the determination of which should depend on an examination

of the merits of the application as a whole.

The Commission concludes that the application is, as a whole,

admissible without prejudice to the merits.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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P.H. and H.H. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

P.H. and H.H. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM