AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 11518/85

                      by Gandharv Raj CHAUHAN

                      against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 12 July 1988, the following members being present:

             MM.  C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                  J. A. FROWEIN

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission.

        Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 4 August 1984

by Gandharv Raj CHAUHAN against the United Kingdom and registered

on 3 May 1985 under file No. 11518/85;

        Having regard to:

- the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the

  Commission;

- the written observations submitted by the respondent Government on

  30 April 1987 on the admissibility and merits of the application;

- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing before the Commission

  on 12 July 1988;

- the Commission's decision of 1 December 1986 to communicate the

  application to the respondent Government under Rule 42 para. 2 (b);

        Having deliberated,

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom born in 1938

and is an electrician by profession.  He resides in London.  He is

represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Messrs.  Simons

Muirhead and Burton, solicitors, London.

        The facts as agreed between the parties may be summarised as

follows:

        The applicant had been employed as an electrician by the

Ford Motor Company since 1978.  The company had, at that time, a union

membership agreement which required an employee to be a member of a

union.   The applicant had previously been a member of the Transport

and General Workers' Union (TGWU) since 1976 but his membership had

lapsed.  He then joined the Electrical, Electronics, Telecommunication

and Plumbing Union (EETPU) as required by the union membership

agreement at the beginning of his employment with the Ford Motor

Company.  In April 1980 he allowed his membership of the EETPU to

lapse by failing to keep up his subscriptions.  From that date he has

not been a member of any trade union.  However, he continued to work

for the Ford Motor Company and it was not until three years later,

early in June 1983, that the fact of his lapsed union membership came

to light.

        The applicant claimed that he was a devout orthodox Hindu

belonging to the Radhaswami sect.  He explained that this sect divided

its religious activities into four stages and that he had progressed

to the third stage.  He considered that the religious teaching at this

stage of his religion did not permit him to be a member of a trade

union.  The applicant offered to pay to charity a sum equivalent to

his union dues.

        The applicant was subsequently invited by the Employee

Relations Manager to appeal to an independent panel, as provided for

under the union membership agreement, in order to explain the reasons

for his refusal.  He subsequently refused to have recourse to this

appeal procedure since he considered that the panel could not be

regarded as independent so long as any member of a trade union was

represented upon it.

        The applicant was subsequently dismissed from his employment

on 21 October 1983.

        The applicant then filed an application before the Industrial

Tribunal.  He complained that his dismissal was unfair since he had

genuine objections on grounds of conscience justifying his refusal to

join a trade union in accordance with Section 58 (4) of the Employment

Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (as amended).

        On 23 January 1984 the Industrial Tribunal rejected the

applicant's case, finding that he had not proved a genuine and

conscientious objection.  Accordingly, his dismissal was fair under

the 1978 Act (as amended).  The Tribunal was satisfied that the

Employee Relations Manager had explored the applicant's stated

religious objections to trade union membership and that he was

entitled to conclude that the applicant did not have a genuine

conscientious objection.

        The Tribunal added:

"In order to make a judgment on a man's beliefs and

motivations, it is necessary to take account of his actions as

well as his words.  For our own part, we find it extremely

hard to reconcile the applicant's three-year silence with his

protestations of conscience."

        The applicant appealed against this decision to the Employment

Appeals Tribunal.  This appeal was rejected on 17 December 1984.

        The applicant was advised by his lawyers that an appeal to the

Court of Appeal against this decision offered no prospects of success

and would involve him in substantial expense.

Relevant Domestic law and practice

        The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978

consolidated the unfair dismissal provisions of previous legislation,

notably the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, the Employment

Protection Act 1975 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations

(Amendment) Act 1976.  Under this legislation dismissal for not being

a trade union member was to be regarded as fair save where the

employee genuinely objected on grounds of religious belief to being a

member of a trade union.

        The Employment Act 1980 provided greater protection for

employees who refused to join a trade union.  Dismissal was to be

regarded as unfair for:

(a)  employees who genuinely objected on grounds of

conscience or other deeply-held personal conviction to

being members of any trade union whatsoever or of a

particular union;

(b)  employees who belonged to the class of employee

covered by the closed shop agreement before it took effect

and who had at no time subsequently been members of a trade

union in accordance with the agreement;

(c)  employees working under a closed shop agreement brought

into effect after 14 August 1980, but not approved by at

least 80% of the emmployees covered by the agreement voting

in favour of the agreement in secret ballot;

(d)  employees working under a closed shop agreement brought

into effect after 14 August 1980 which had been approved by

at least 80% of those employees covered by it in a secret

ballot in which the employee was entitled to vote if the

employee had not at any time since the day on which the

ballot was held been a member of the union.

        In addition, a Code of Practice was issued with the authority

of Parliament and came into effect on 17 December 1980 (subsequently

revised in May 1983).  It recommended, inter alia, that closed

shop agreements should protect basic individual rights, and be applied

flexibly and tolerantly and with due regard to the interests of

individuals as well as unions and employers.  The Code is admissible

in evidence, but imposes no legal obligations.

        The Employment Act 1982 further increased the protection of

union employees working in the closed shop as well as re-enacting the

closed shop dismissal provisions of the 1980 Act.  In particular, the

1982 Act provides that the dismissal of an employee for not being a

member of a trade union, or for refusing to join one, is automatically

unfair where the closed shop concerned is not "approved".  Up to

31 October 1984 any closed shop agreement which took effect on or

before 14 August 1980 counted as "approved".  A closed shop agreement

which took effect after 14 August 1980 only counts as "approved" if it

has been supported in a secret ballot of all employees affected in

which 80% or more of those entitled to vote voted in its favour.

These were the provisions enforced when the applicant was dismissed

on 21 October 1983.

        Since 1 November 1984 a closed shop agreement counts as

"approved" on a given date only if in the five years preceding that

date it has been supported in a secret ballot involving all the

employees affected.  The required levels of support in the ballot are

set out in the 1982 Act.

        Where a closed shop agreement is "approved" dismissal for non-

membership of a trade union is not automatically fair.  The dismissal

of certain categories of employee for not being members of a trade

union, or for refusing to join one, remains unfair even where the

closed shop agreement is an "approved" one.  The protected categories

are as follows:

(a) employees who genuinely object on grounds of conscience

or other deeply-held personal conviction to being members of

any trade union whatsoever or of a particular union;

(b) employees who belonged to the class of employees covered

by the closed shop agreement before it took effect and who

have at no time subsequently been members of a trade union

in accordance with the agreement;

(c) employees who work under an "approved" closed shop

agreement which took effect after 14 August 1980, were

entitled to vote in the first or only ballot through which

the closed shop agreement was approved, and have not since

the day when that ballot was held been members of a trade

union in accordance with the agreement;

(d) employees who at the time of dismissal either had been

found by an industrial tribunal to have been unreasonably

excluded or expelled from the trade union of which membership

was required under the closed shop agreement or who have a

complaint of unreasonable exclusion or expulsion by that

union lodged with an industrial tribunal under section 4 of

the 1980 Act;

(e) employees who have qualifications relating to their job

which make them subject to a written code of conduct and

either have been expelled from the trade union of which

membership is required because they refused to strike or

take other industrial action on the grounds that this would

have breached the code of conduct; or have refused to

belong to the union concerned on the grounds that

membership would have required them to take industrial

action in breach of the code.

        If an employee is unfairly dismissed from either an "approved"

or an "unapproved" closed shop for not being a member of a trade

union, or for refusing to join one, an industrial tribunal can order

the employer to re-employ the employee concerned where this is

practicable or to pay him compensation.  As a result of the 1982 Act,

compensation in such cases has been set at substantially higher levels

than in most other cases of unfair dismissal so as to act as a

deterrent.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicant complains that the dismissal from his employment

was due exclusively to his refusal to join a trade union because of

his religious objections.  He alleges that his dismissal was in breach

of Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 4 August 1984 and registered

on 3 May 1985.  In a decision dated 1 December 1986 the Commission

decided that notice should be given to the respondent Government of

the application and that the Government should be invited to submit

observations on the admissibility and merits of the application

insofar as it raised issues under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.

These observations were submitted on 30 April 1987.  The applicant's

observations in reply were received on 17 November 1987.  The applicant

was granted legal aid by decision of the President of the Commission

dated 20 August 1987.

        The Commission next considered the application on 8 March 1988

and decided to invite the parties to a joint hearing on the

admissibility and merits of the case insofar as it raised issues under

Articles 9, 11 and 14 (Art. 9,  Art. 11, Art. 14) of the Convention.

        The hearing before the Commission was held on 12 July 1988.

        The Parties were represented as follows:

Respondent Government

Mr.  M. C. Wood, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent

Mr.  N. Bratza Q.C., Counsel

Mr.  R. Baker, Department of Employment, Adviser

Mr.  R. Timm, Department of Employment, Adviser

Applicant

Mr.  G. Robertson, Q.C., Counsel

Mr.  B. Simons         )

                      ) Solicitors, Simons, Muirhead & Burton

Mr.  R. Mireskandari   )

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        The respondent Government

        Article 11 in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 11 + Art. 9)

of the Convention

        In the Government's submission where the complaint made is not

of direct interference by the State of the rights guaranteed by the

Convention but of a failure through its legal system to secure the

right against interference by the action of others, the Convention

requires the striking of a balance between the competing interests of

the individual and of society as a whole.  A search for this balance

is inherent in the whole of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong

and Lönnroth judgment of 22 September 1980, Series A no. 52, para.

69).

        In marked contrast to the position of the applicants in the

case of Young, James and Webster (Eur.  Court H.R., judgment of

13 August 1981, Series A no. 44) the union membership, or closed

shop, agreement within the Ford Motor Company was in full effect at

the time when the applicant joined that firm.  It is also clear that,

for a period of over two years, the applicant in fact belonged to a

trade union, first the TGWU and thereafter the EETPU.

        Quite apart from the personal position of the applicant, the

applicable law at the time of the present applicant's dismissal was

substantially different from that which was in effect at the time of

the dismissal of the applicants in the case of Young, James and

Webster and which was found by the Court to provide inadequate

protection for the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 11

(Art. 11) of the Convention.  In the submission of the Government, the

provisions of the 1980 and 1982 Acts, designed as they were to

increase the protection afforded to individual employees against

dismissal for refusing to join a union, strike a fair balance between

the rights of the individual and the right of other employees to

organise through the closed shop system.  In contrast to the position

under the 1974 and 1976 Acts, which were the subject of the Court's

judgment in the case of Young, James and Webster, it is submitted that

the form of compulsion which is permitted under the 1982 Act and to

which the applicant was subjected does not strike at the very

substance of the freedom guaranteed by Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1)

read on its own or in the light of Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, Art. 10) of

the Convention and did not give rise to a breach of that Article in

the circumstances of his case.

        The Government further contest that Article 11 (Art. 11)

confers a negative right.  The Court in the Young, James and Webster

case expressly proceeded on the assumption that the negative aspect

was not protected on the same footing as the positive aspect and that

compulsion to join a particular union was not automatically contrary

to this provision.  The Court emphasised in that case that the

dismissal stemmed from a closed shop agreement which was concluded

after the three applicants were employed by British Rail.  Such

compulsion was imposed on the applicants unilaterally and was not a

condition of their employment when they first applied for the job. In

the present case the applicant accepted the requirement that he join a

union as a condition of his employment by Ford Motor Company from the

outset.  This was an essential part of his contract of employment

which he accepted voluntarily.

        Moreover the applicant had an opportunity to submit his case

to an internal tribunal which could have granted him an exception on

the basis of his religious views.  However the applicant withdrew his

appeal because he objected to the presence of a union member.  The

Government do not accept that the presence of a union member in a

tribunal of three persons, with an independent chairman, is a good

reason for abandoning such an appeal.

        Before the Industrial Tribunal the applicant sought to invoke

the provisions of Section 58 (4) of the 1978 Act (as amended)

submitting that he had genuine objections to union membership on the

grounds of conscience or other deeply-held personal convictions.  The

applicant was represented by counsel before the Tribunal and it was

open to him to support his case by both written and oral evidence.  In

the result, the Tribunal concluded from the material before them that

the applicant had not established that he had any genuine objection to

union membership on grounds of conscience or other deeply-held

personal conviction.  In so holding, the Tribunal placed particular

reliance on the fact that the applicant had not asserted any

objections to union membership until challenged some three years after

he had allowed his membership to lapse.

        In reviewing the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and the

Employment Appeal Tribunal the Commission should limit itself to the

question whether such a determination was unfair, perverse, arbitrary

or otherwise a denial of the applicants rights (see, mutatis mutandis,

No 8378/78, Dec of 14.5.80, D.R. 20 p. 168).  However, in his

application to the Commission, no complaint is made that the applicant

was given an unfair hearing before either the Industrial Tribunal or

the Employment Appeal Tribunal or that the decision reached by either

of the Tribunals was arbitrary.  Nor is it suggested that the

decisions resulted from a misinterpretation or misapplication of

Section 58 (4) of the 1978 Act (as amended) or that no Tribunal

properly directing itself could reasonably have concluded that the

applicant had no genuine objections to union membership on grounds of

conscience or other deeply-held personal convictions.

        The Government submit that in such circumstances neither the

relevant provisions of domestic law nor the application of those

provisions by the domestic tribunals upset the fair balance required

by Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) of the Convention.

        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

        The Government submit that the applicant was given exactly the

same treatment as other persons including members of other religions

in a comparable situation.  Neither the statutory provisions in force

nor the Industrial Tribunal or Employment Appeal Tribunal treated the

applicant in any way unfairly or less favourably than an applicant of

a different religious persuasion.  This complaint should therefore

be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.

        The Applicant

        Article 11 in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 11 + Art. 9) of

the Convention

        The present application is made on the basis that United

Kingdom domestic law and practice does not afford the applicant

protection of his rights and freedoms under Article 11 in

conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 11 + Art. 9) of the Convention.  In

particular, protection against unfair dismissal does not extend to a

situation where:

(1) the applicant is a devout orthodox Hindu;

(2) the applicant refuses to join a trade union.

        The applicant points out that if the union membership

agreement at his place of work had come into effect after 14 August

1980 he would have had the opportunity to vote on its application and,

moreover, would have been protected from unfair dismissal on the

ground of non-membership if he had not been a member of a trade union

since the required ballot.  The applicant submits that in making this

provision the United Kingdom has impliedly recognised that the legal

position for union membership agreements made before 14 August 1980 is

in breach of the principle of freedom of association.  Since the union

membership agreement at the applicant's former place of work came into

effect before 14 August 1980 he has been denied the opportunity of

wider protection from dismissal on the grounds of non-membership of a

trade union.

        The applicant states that, although he knew the existence of,

and understood the provisions of, the union membership agreement when

he accepted employment with the Ford Motor Company, this cannot be

taken to imply that he either agreed with it, or that, by taking up

employment, he thereby waived any right to leave the union and seek

protection from dismissal at a later date.

        As regards questions of fact, the applicant makes the

following points:

-       that in his application to the Commission the applicant stated

that when he began his employment he joined the union under duress as

there was no legislation prevailing at that time which protected those

who did not wish to be a member of a trade union;

-       that there was at no time any legislative provision which

required him to articulate his conscientious objections to union

membership either when the membership lapsed in April 1980 or in the

period up until June 1983;

-       that the religious involvement of the applicant became more

intense between the years 1978 to 1983.  The fact that the applicant

remained a union member for two years from 1978 until 1980 does not

imply that he acquiesced to union membership since the consequences of

renouncing his membership were likely to involve his dismissal.  At

the time of seeking employment in March 1978 his religious beliefs

made him reluctant to join a trade union but they were not so strong

as to amount to an overriding conscientious objection to membership.

However by April 1980 he had progressed to a higher stage in his

religious feeling and believed that his religious views were utterly

incompatible with trade union membership.  These views stressed

non-violence, commitment to truth and freedom from any form of

extra-legal compulsion.  The applicant thus considered himself under

an absolute duty never to be associated with any false statement

through membership of a group or to be associated with any group that

espouses violent actions and, finally, not to be a party to duress

over others or to allow himself to be the victim of compulsion;

-       that the reason the applicant withdrew his appeal to the

independent panel was on the grounds that the panel could not be

regarded as independent since it included a trade union

representative.  Where a member is being judged by a trade union

member there must be a reasonable fear of bias when one is submitting

that trade union membership may involve departure from the truth and

association with acts of violence;

-       the applicant remained silent about his decision to leave the

union because this was an action taken from private beliefs and

because he would have suffered immediate victimisation and job loss.

        The applicant submits that the failure on the part of the

United Kingdom to protect the applicant against dismissal on the

grounds of his refusal to join a trade union is a breach of Article 11

para. 1 (Art. 11-1) of the Convention.  Article 11 (Art. 11) confers a

negative right not to join a trade union even where a union membership

agreement is in force.  The freedom to form or join a trade union does

not mean that one is obliged to do so.  Only that one is permitted to

do so.

Accordingly, the freedom to join a trade union must encompass a

freedom not to join.  A person cannot be free to do something unless

he or she is free not to do it.  Since freedom presupposes an element

of choice, a regime of compulsion is incompatible with the very idea

of freedom.  The closed shop as applied in the circumstances of the

applicant's case afforded him no real choice whether to join a union

or not, since his only other option entailed a loss of livelihood.

        In this connection, the tenor of the judgment of the Court in

the case of Young, James and Webster favours such a negative freedom.

Thus the majority stated that "the situation facing the applicants

clearly runs counter to the concept of freedom of association in its

negative sense ..." (loc. cit., para. 55).  Moreover, the majority

reasoned that a threat of dismissal (including loss of livelihood) is

a "most serious form of compulsion - striking at the very substance of

the freedom guaranteed by Article 11 (Art. 11)" (loc. cit., para. 57).

Such reasoning would make little sense if it was not based on a

presupposition that Article 11 (Art. 11) protects non-membership as

well as membership of a union or other association.  The compulsion

suffered by the applicant involved a threat to extinguish his

livelihood at a time of high unemployment.  In reality, the situation

of the applicant was the same as that faced by the applicants Young,

James and Webster.

        The Court in Young, James and Webster also put much emphasis

on the concept of freedom of choice.  In particular it held that:

"An individual does not enjoy the right of freedom of

association if in reality the freeedom of action or choice

which remains available to him is either non-existent or so

reduced as to be of no practical value" (loc. cit., para. 56).

        It is submitted that the applicant's choice, because of his

religious beliefs and because of the nature of the union membership

agreement, was so reduced as to be of no practical value.  This choice

was further reduced by the fact that the only alternative open to the

applicant involved loss of livelihood.  The applicant accepts that

under present United Kingdom law protection is afforded to persons not

wishing to be members of a trade union if, inter alia, their

objection is based on conscience or other deeply held personal

conviction.  However, protection under present legislation does not

extend to the situation in which the applicant finds himself, namely

an Orthodox Hindu who refuses to be in a trade union.

        In respect of the respondent Government's submission that the

applicant should be regarded as having consented to join the union

since he was aware that this was a term of his contract of employment,

the applicant points out that the Court has indicated in the Young

James and Webster case that there might be compulsion even in this

situation (loc. cit., para. 53).  Furthermore the applicant joined the

union under duress in a situation where there was limited statutory

protection for persons not wishing to join trade unions.

        Since the right not to join a trade union has been recognised

the right to leave a union, after the contract of employment is made

without the consequent loss of a job, must follow.  If the principle of

freedom of association is infringed by dismissal from employment on

the grounds of non-membership of a union it can make no logical

difference whether the union membership agreement on which dismissals

are based was concluded before or after the contract.  The mere fact

that someone has exercised his right of association does not mean

that he should forever be bound by it.

        The applicant contends that the "balancing" approach proposed

by the respondent Government is erroneous.  Once there is an

infringement of Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) there is no longer any

balance to be struck between competing interests.  Unless the

Government can bring themselves within the narrowly interpreted

exceptions in Article 11 para. 2 (Art.11-2) - which has not been

argued in this case - the applicant must succeed.

        As regards Article 11 in conjunction with Article 9

(Art.11 + Art. 9) the applicant submits firstly that the requirement that he

join a trade union irrespective of any religious beliefs he might hold

constitutes a breach of these provisions read together.  A rule that obliges an

individual to act contrary to the teachings of his religion amounts to an

infringement of religious freedom.

        Secondly Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention extends to the

freedom to change belief.  The applicant changed his belief when he

progressed to a higher stage of his faith.  It was for this reason

that he allowed his membership to lapse in 1980.  The applicant

submits, in this respect, that a system which allows his dismissal for

leaving a trade union unless he can discharge the burden of proving

his religious convictions is in breach of these provisions.  It is a

violation of religious freedom to be required, on pain of having the

dismissal upheld, to prove the genuineness of ones private religious

views particularly if one is a member of a little-understood religious

sect which imposes higher duties in the course of religious

advancement. Furthermore it is incompatible with the protection of

intimate spiritual beliefs under Article 9 (Art. 9) that an individual

should be required to expose elders of his sect or church to

cross-examination in public about innermost religious feelings, with

the risk of being held up to ridicule, as a pre-condition of

protecting his freedom of association.

        The applicant submits that, after providing an indication of

membership of his religion and of the contents of his religious belief

in the form of the Ordinances of Manu, the burden of proving that the

belief is not a genuine one ought to have been borne by the employer.

        In the circumstances of the case it is submitted that the law

with regard to unfair dismissal and its application by domestic

tribunals in the present case breached Article 11 (Art. 11) of the

Convention, considered alone or in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 9)

of the Convention.

        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

        The applicant further submits that he has suffered

discrimination in the enjoyment of his rights under Articles 9 and 11

(Art. 9, Art. 11) contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

        Those who hold religious opinions which preclude them from

joining trade unions are placed under two discriminatory burdens.

First they are subjected to duress and pressure to compromise their

religious faith.  Secondly those who are members of little-understood

religious faiths, such as the applicant, bear a much heavier burden of

explanation and proof of their creed than members of more traditional

religions whose views are well understood by tribunals.

THE LAW

        The applicant, who was dismissed from his employment because

of his refusal to rejoin a trade union, submits that union membership

was incompatible with his deeply-held religious beliefs.  He complains

under Articles 9, 11 and 14 (Art. 9, Art. 11, Art. 14) of the Convention.

        Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) of the Convention reads as follows:

"1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and

to freedom of association with others, including the right to

form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests."

        Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention reads as follows:

"1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

conscience and religion;  this right includes freedom

to change his religion or belief and freedom, either

alone or in community with others and in public or

private, to manifest his religion or belief, in

worship, teaching, practice and observance."

        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in

this Convention shall be secured without discrimination

on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,

religion, political or other opinion, national or social

origin, association with a national minority, property,

birth or other status."

        The applicant first submits that Article 11 para. 1

(Art. 11-1) contains a general negative right to choose not to be a

member of a trade union. He points out that although he knew of the

existence of a union membership agreement when he accepted employment

with the Ford Motor Company, this cannot be taken to apply that he

either agreed with it, or that, by taking up employment, he thereby

waived any right to leave the union subsequently.  He further

complains of a breach of Article 11 read in conjunction with

Article 9 (Art. 11 + Art. 9) since the requirement to join a trade union is

incompatible with his religious beliefs.  The applicant explains that he is a

devote orthodox Hindu who belongs to the Radhaswami sect and whose religious

beliefs had progressed to a higher stage when he allowed his union membership

to lapse in 1980.  These religious beliefs involved a rejection of the use of

violence, a deep attachment to the truth and freedom from duress.  In

particular, he complains that the requirement under the law of the United

Kingdom, that he should prove the genuineness of his private religious beliefs

and expose the elders of his sect to public cross-examination concerning the

intimate details of his creed, constitutes a breach of Articles 9 and 11

(Art. 9, Art. 11) of the Convention read together.

        Finally, the applicant complains that he was a victim of

discrimination in the enjoyment of his rights under Articles 9 and 11

(Art. 9, Art. 11) of the Convention in that firstly he was required to

join a union irrespective of his religious beliefs and that he was

required to bear a heavier burden of proof before the Industrial

Tribunal than other more traditional faiths.

        The respondent Government submit that the applicant accepted

voluntarily to join a trade union on taking up employment with the

Ford Motor Company.  They also point out that the applicant was given

full opportunity to establish the genuineness of his beliefs and was

represented by counsel both before the Industrial Tribunal and the

Employment Appeal Tribunal.  These bodies concluded on the basis of

the evidence before them that the applicant had not established that

he had any genuine objection to union membership on grounds of

conscience or other deeply held personal convictions.  There is no

indication that these decisions were perverse or arbitrary or

otherwise a denial of the applicant's rights under the Convention.

The Government contend, with reference to the case of Young, James and

Webster (Eur.  Court H.R., judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44),

that Article 11 (Art. 11) does not guarantee a general negative

freedom not to belong to a trade union.  Finally, the Government

maintain that the applicant has not substantiated his complaint of

discrimination and was treated in the same way as a member of any

other religion in a comparable situation.

        The Commission considers, in the light of the parties'

submissions, that the application as a whole raises complex issues of

law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which depend

on an examination of the merits of the application.

        It concludes, therefore, that the application cannot be

regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and no other ground for

declaring it inadmissible has been established.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE

        without prejudging the merits of the case

Deputy Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

         (J. RAYMOND)                            (C.A. NØRGAARD)