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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 12356/86

by Jan Åke KARLSSON

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 8 September 1988, the following members being present:

MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J. C. SOYER

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C. L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 24 March 1986

by Jan Ã…ke KARLSSON against Sweden and registered on 25 August 1986

under file No. 12356/86;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1953 and residing

at Östra Hoby, Sweden. He is a priest in the Swedish State Church.

Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Göran Ravnsborg, Lund,

Sweden.

The applicant graduated from the University of Lund in 1977

and has since held various posts in the State Church. In 1984 the post

of vicar in the parish of Örkened in the Diocese of Lund was

advertised. According to the Act on the Election of Priests (lagen om

prästval), the diocesan chapter (domkapitlet) lists a number of

qualified candidates, one of whom is chosen by the parishoners. The

applicant put himself forward as a candidate together with three

others.

The applicant is a supporter of certain religious views, so-

called "gammal kyrklighet", for which reason he is opposed to the

ordination of women. For this reason, and bearing in mind that the

parish of Örkened has two priests of which the vicar is the superior,

the Diocesan Chapter of Lund, before deciding whether the candidates

could be considered qualified, asked the applicant whether he would be

willing to co-operate with a woman clergyman as assistant priest.

In reply the applicant questioned the Diocesan Chapter's right

to request answers to such hypothetical questions and submitted that

he would carry out his task to the best of his ability.

On 22 May 1985 the Diocesan Chapter decided in a majority vote

to declare the applicant unqualified as a candidate to the post of

vicar. In its decision it stated the following:

"In summary, the Diocesan Chapter finds that, since (the

applicant) has clearly shown through his actions up to now

that he cannot be expected to co-operate with female

colleagues, he does not possess the ability and the qualities

deemed necessary for satisfactory work in a supervisory

position in a parish with more than one priest; hence it finds

(the applicant) unqualified for the office in question in

accordance with Section 6 of the Act (1957:577) of the

Election of Priests."

On 10 June 1985 the applicant appealed against this decision

to the Swedish Government claiming that it be annulled, that he be

declared qualified as a candidate for the post of vicar and that he be

put on the list of qualified candidates.

On 23 January the Government rejected the appeal. They pointed

out, however, that the applicant's views on women priests could not

disqualify him for the post but found, as did the Diocesan Chapter,

that the applicant would not co-operate with women priests in such a

way that he could fulfil his duties as vicar.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of the decision taken by the Diocesan

Chapter of Lund and upheld by the Government that he was unqualified

to obtain a post as vicar. This, in his opinion, amounts to a

violation of his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion

and his right to freedom of expression as secured by Articles 9 and 10

of the Convention, read separately as well as in conjunction with

Article 14 of the Convention.

The applicant also maintains that the refusal to allow him to

apply for election to the office of vicar exclusively by means of a

bureaucratic decision by the Government discloses a violation of

Articles 11, 13 and 18 of the Convention.

Finally the applicant alleges that the decision to disqualify

him is founded on an arbitrary and hypothetical reasoning which

cannot be reconciled with the principles of Article 6 para. 2 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the refusal to accept him as

candidate for a post as vicar constitutes a violation of his right to

freedom of thought, conscience and freedom as secured by Article 9

(Art. 9) of the Convention. The Commission notes that this complaint

concerns the decision of a State Church, confirmed on the applicant's

appeal by the Swedish Government.

Insofar as the applicant's complaint relates to the fact that

he was not accepted as being qualified for a post as vicar, the

Commission recalls the cases of Glasenapp and Kosiek (Eur. Court H.R.,

Glasenapp and Kosiek judgments of 28 August 1986, Series A, Nos. 104

and 105) where the Court expressed in distinct terms that access to

the civil service is not a right guaranteed by the Convention. The

Court futhermore stated that no interference of a right of the

Convention was at hand when the heart of the complaint raised before

the Convention organs was measures taken by the authority in order to

satisfy itself that a person applying for a post possessed the

necessary personal qualifiation for the post in question.

Nevertheless the Commission has considered the applicant's

complaint under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention as submitted by him.

Article 9 (Art. 9) provides:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

conscience and religion; this right includes freedom

to change his religion or belief and freedom, either

alone or in community with others and in public or

private, to manifest his religion or belief, in

worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall

be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed

by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the

interests of public safety, for the protection of

public order, health or morals, or for the protection of

the rights and freedoms of others."

The Commission recalls in this respect its constant case-law

according to which Article 9 (Art. 9) does not oblige the High

Contracting Parties to ensure that churches within their jurisdiction

grant religious freedom to their members and servants (cf. for example

No. 7374/76, Dec. 8.3.76, D.R. 5 p. 157). The freedom of religion

thus does not include the right of a clergyman, within the framework

of a church in which he is working or to which he applies for a post

to practise a special religious conception. If the applicant's views

on women priests and thus his intentions regarding co-operation with

female colleagues is found to be incompatible with the view generally

held by the church in question the latter is not obliged to accept the

applicant as its servant.

On the other hand if the requirements imposed upon a person by

the church should be in conflict with his convictions he should be

free to leave his office, and the Commission regards this as an

ultimate guarantee of his right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion.

In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant

holds a post in the Swedish State Church and there is nothing to show

that the applicant should fear a dismissal from his present post.

Furthermore, the applicant has not shown that he has been under any

pressure to change his views or that the has been prevented from

manifesting his religion or belief. On the contrary it appears clearly

from the decision of the Government that the applicant's views on

women priests were not held to disqualify him but that he did not

possess the necessary qualifications for the post which, however, as

set out above, is a question which falls outside the scope of Article 9

(Art. 9).

Consequently the Commission finds that the decisions

complained of did not in any way interfere with the exercise of the

applicant's rights under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention and this

part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. As regards the applicant's complaint that there has been a

breach of his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article

10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, the Commission considers that the same

reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the applicant's complaint under

this Article as to the complaint under Article 9 (Art. 9). It follows

that there has been no interference with the applicant's right as

guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10) and this aspect of the application

is therefore also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant has also complained that his case discloses a

violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in that he did not

have at his disposal an effective remedy which could rectify the

alleged violations of the Convention.

The Commission does not find it necessary in the present case

to consider whether in the light of its above conclusions the

applicant had an arguable claim necessitating a remedy under Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention but recalls that the applicant could

and did bring his complaints before the Government for consideration.

The Commission finds that this remedy for the purposes of the present

case was sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention. The applicant's complaint under this provision is

thus in any event manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4. The applicant has furthermore alleged that the refusal to

accept him as a candidate for the post in question was based on a

reasoning which cannot be reconciled with the principles of Article 6

para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that the presumption of innocence laid

down in Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) only applies in cases where an

applicant has been charged with a criminal offence. This is not the

case here. Consequently this part of the application must be rejected

as being incompatible ratione materiae under Article 27 para. 2 (Art.

27-2) of the Convention.

5. The Commission has finally considered the remainder of the

applicant's complaints as submitted by him. However, the documents and

the information submitted by him do not disclose any substantiated

facts which could justify a further examination of these complaints.

It follows that the remainder of the applicant's complaints is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art.

27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(J. RAYMOND) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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KARLSSON v. SWEDEN

KARLSSON v. SWEDEN