Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 13613/88

by D. T. W. FORSYTH

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 8 September 1988, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 11 June 1987

by D. T. W. Forsyth against the United Kingdom and registered

on 15 February 1988 under file No. 13613/88;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Douglas T. W. Forsyth, is a citizen of the

United Kingdom who was born in Reading in 1919. He is a retired farmer

and resides in the United Kingdom. The facts of the case, as

submitted by him, may be summarised as follows:

In 1930, the applicant's father had purchased a villa in

Heliopolis, near Cairo. This property was forcibly taken over and

occupied by the Egyptian army in 1956 as part of a series of reprisals

for the British military attack at Suez. On 28 February 1959, an

Agreement was entered into between the Governments of the United

Kingdom and Egypt (United Arab Republic) with a view to

re-establishing normal commercial relations which included in its

Article III an undertaking by the Government of Egypt to "return all

British Property ... to the owners thereof in accordance with the

provisions of Annex B" of the said Agreement. Annex B referred

specifically to the "handing over" of property by the Sequestrator

General to the owner or his agents.

The British Foreign Office subsequently encouraged British

nationals whose property had been sequestrated to reassume possession

of such property and the applicant's father returned to Cairo for this

purpose in 1960. However, the Egyptian occupants, who had entered

into a monthly tenancy contract with the Sequestrator General for a

"peppercorn" rent in 1957, declined to vacate the property. At this

time, the applicant's father was informed by both the Egyptian and

British authorities that, notwithstanding the terms of the 1959

Agreement, the restoration of vacant possession of the property to him

was impossible.

In 1963, following advice from a lawyer of professed

experience in such matters in both Egypt and the United Kingdom, the

applicant's father accepted a payment in the sum of £2434 under the

Foreign Compensation (Egypt)(Determination and Registration of Claims)

Order 1962 and renounced all further claims in respect of his

property. This sum, described as a payment for capital depreciation

in the value of his property occasioned by the fact that it had

remained subject to a lease at a low rent and had not been returned to

him with vacant possession, was paid out of monies (£27.5 million)

provided by the Egyptian Government under Article IV of the 1959

Agreement in full and final discharge of certain property claims.

The applicant is the heir to his father's Egyptian estate.

In 1974, no rent having been paid in respect of the property since

1960, the applicant applied to the Egyptian courts for an Eviction

Order against the remaining occupants. The case was finally decided

against him, after undergoing some sixty adjournments, on 29 March

1986. An appeal is still pending. An appeal is also pending before

the Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of an inheritance tax of

approximately £E 50,000 which the applicant alleges was unjustly

levied by the Egyptian authorities on his father's private bank

account following his death.

In response to protests by the applicant at the repeated

delays and alleged obstruction and bias of the Egyptian authorities,

the respondent Government commenced diplomatic representations to the

Government of Egypt in late 1975 with the purpose of hastening a

setlement of the dispute. The applicant accepts that the respondent

Government have been kept closely informed with regard to the said

proceedings in Egypt and that they have made diplomatic

representations at various times in respect of his claims. He

nevertheless maintains that these approaches have always been of a

superficial and token nature.

Since 1985 the applicant has therefore sought to be further

compensated by the respondent Government for the loss of possession

and enjoyment of his property in Egypt. In this respect, he has

argued that the compensation paid to his father in 1963 related

solely to capital depreciation of the property, and that the

reununciation of all further claims signed by his father at that time

did not have the effect of exonerating the Government from its

obligation to recover vacant possession of the villa in accordance

with the terms of the 1959 Agreement. The respondent Government

dispute this contention, and have replied to the applicant that should

he fail in his current action before the Egyptian courts, he retains

the option to sell the property without vacant possession.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that the United Kingdom Government

have failed to discharge their international obligations to protect

his property rights:

a) in respect of his villa under the 1959 Agreement, and

b) in respect of the inheritance tax levied by the Egyptian

authorities under general international law.

As a result, he has been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of

his property in a manner contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1.

2. The applicant also complains that his grievances are not

justiciable within the courts of the United Kingdom and that he is

therefore being denied a fair and public hearing of his claims,

contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant has complained under Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) that the Untied Kingdom have failed to perform their

international obligations under the 1959 Agreement and under general

international law to protect his property rights. He submits that the

diplomatic representations made by the respondent Government were of a

token nature.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) states, inter alia, that

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions ..."

The Commission notes that there has been no direct

interference with the applicant's possessions by the United Kingdom

authorities. The alleged expropriation of his property in Egypt is

attributed to the Egyptian authorities and therefore, in itself, is

not a matter for which the United Kingdom is responsible under the

Convention. The applicant maintains however that the United Kingdom

is obliged to take measures against Egypt to assert and protect his

property rights.

The Commission recalls that the Convention does not contain a

right which requires a High Contracting Party to espouse the

applicant's complaints under international law or otherwise intervene

with the authorities of another State on his behalf (Bertrand Russell

Peace Foundation Limited v. United Kingdom, No. 7597/76, Dec. 2.5.78,

D.R. 14 p. 117 at 123, 124; see also Kapas v. United Kingdom, No.

12822/87, Dec. 9.12.87, to be published in D.R.). The Commission has

also held that there is no such right which can be inferred from

Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention (ibid.).

In the present case the Commission notes that there is no

indication that the 1959 Agreement relied on by the applicant extends

the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for purposes of Article 1

(Art. 1) of the Convention or creates an individual property right

vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. In any event the Commission notes that

diplomatic representations have been made in respect of the property

in question and compensation for capital depreciation of the property

was made in 1963 following which the applicant's father renounced all

further claims under the 1962 Order.

The Commission therefore considers that the applicant's

complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) must be rejected as

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant has also complained that the United Kingdom

courts will not entertain an action to enforce either the 1959

Agreement or the applicant's other claims to entitlement to protection

under international law, and that he is therefore being denied a fair

and public hearing of his claims, contrary to Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) states, inter alia, that:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial

tribunal established by law ..."

The Commission recalls that this provision only applies where

there exists a "contestation" (dispute) over such civil rights and

obligations. In this connection, it is well established that the

expression "contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de caractère

civil" (disputes over civil rights and obligations) covers all

proceedings the result of which is decisive for such rights and

obligations. However, a tenuous connection or remote consequences do

not suffice for Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1): civil rights and

obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the

"contestation" (dispute) and the result of the proceedings must be

directly decisive for such a right (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Pudas

judgment of 22 October 1987, Series A no. 125, pp. 9-10, at para. 31).

In the present case the applicant seeks to enforce what he

claims to be the obligations of the respondent State under the 1959

Agreement or otherwise to compel the United Kingdom to make diplomatic

representations concerning his property in Egypt.

However, the Commission considers that such proceedings,

although they would have as their object his alleged property rights,

could not be described as being directly decisive for these rights. At

best they could only give rise to official representations in respect

of his property interests. The Commission therefore finds that the

"contestation" (dispute) in the present case is not such as to bring

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention into application.

In these circumstances, it follows that the applicant's

complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must also be rejected as

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(J. RAYMOND) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

Menu

FORSYTH v. the UNITED KINGDOM

FORSYTH v. the UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI