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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 14385/88

by Armen Rouben BAZIL

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

10 March 1989, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

J.C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

J. CAMPINOS

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 23 September

1988 by Armen Rouben BAZIL against the United Kingdom and registered

on 17 November 1988 under file No. 14385/88;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is an Iranian citizen born in 1943 and resident

in Birmingham. He is currently serving a prison sentence in H.M.

Prison Dartmoor. The applicant is represented by Mr. Antony Burton,

a solicitor. The facts as submitted by the applicant may be

summarised as follows.

On 17 April 1985, the applicant returned from Pakistan to

London and was intercepted at Heathrow by customs officers in

possession of a false bottomed suitcase containing 2,48 kg of heroin.

The applicant maintained that his own suitcase had been borrowed by R

during his visit to Pakistan and that R had provided him with another

suitcase in which, unknown to the applicant, the heroin was secreted.

On or about 19 April 1985, the applicant was assigned Mr.

Booth of Messrs. Booth Bennett as solicitor under legal aid. This

solicitor was not chosen by the applicant. On 27 June 1985, the

applicant was committed for trial. He was first visited by Mr. Booth

on 29 August 1985, followed by visits on 18 September and 31 October.

On 1 December 1985, the applicant wrote to Mr. Booth asking for the

complete contents of his file. Mr. Booth did not comply with the

request or answer the letter.

On 14 December 1985, the applicant approached Mr. Burton (who

represents the applicant before the Commission), asking him to act on

his behalf since he was in the process of dismissing his current

solicitor. Mr. Burton replied that he would be prepared to act if

the court agreed to a change in the legal aid order. On 27 December

1985, the applicant requested Mr. Booth to transfer the legal aid to

the solicitor of his choice. On 28 December 1985, the applicant

notified the clerk of the Crown Court of his desire to change his

solicitors.

The Crown Court contacted Mr. Booth requesting observations on

the applicant's application before the Court decided the matter. On

3 February 1986, Mr. Booth informed the Chief Clerk of the Court

that Counsel had now been briefed, that a considerable amount of

investigative work had been done, that costs were estimated at £1,000,

that his firm had spent 10 hours with the applicant since his

committal and that they did not understand why the applicant wished to

change.

By letter dated 5 February 1986, the Chief Clerk informed the

applicant that his application to change solicitors had been refused

because, inter alia, Counsel had been instructed and the hearing fixed

for 17 March 1986. The applicant replied on 8 February 1986 that he

had not been given the opportunity to justify his request and asked to

put his reasons before the Court. He stated that he found his

solicitor's conscientiousness questionable and the manner of handling

his case objectionable. On 13 February 1986, the Chief Clerk wrote to

the applicant cautioning him that he had made serious allegations

concerning his solicitor and that the Court would take a very serious

view if they were found to be without foundation. The Chief Clerk

also wrote to the applicant's solicitor referring to the applicant as

"this wretched man" and asking him to attempt to make him see reason.

On 14 February 1986, the applicant attended a conference with

his solicitor and barrister.

On 18 February 1986, the applicant appeared before Mr. Justice

Murchie to present his request for a change in solicitors. The judge

heard representations from the applicant and the applicant's current

solicitor. He refused the applicant's application, on the grounds

inter alia, of the proximity of the trial and that the applicant's

complaints were groundless. He also advised the applicant that his

solicitor and counsel were experienced in this type of case.

On 18 March 1986, the applicant's co-defendant applied to

adjourn the trial in order that a defence witness could be traced.

The application was granted and the case transferred to a different

Crown Court and fixed for trial on 2 June 1986.

On 2 June 1986, on the opening of the hearing, the applicant

applied to the trial judge for a change of his solicitor. Following

the refusal of his application, the applicant dismissed his solicitor

and counsel and thereafter appeared unrepresented.

At the end of the trial, the applicant was found guilty and

sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment with a recommendation for

deportation. He applied for leave to appeal, having drafted his own

grounds. His application was rejected by a single judge of the Court

of Appeal. The applicant instructed solicitors and counsel to renew

the application and leave to appeal was granted by the full court on

3 November 1987.

The appeal, presented by counsel acting for the applicant, was

heard by the Court of Appeal on 28 and 29 March 1988. The Court

dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant had failed to give

any cogent reason to support his application to change his solicitors

and that the judge had not exercised his discretion improperly in

refusing the application. The Court also held that the applicant had

acted unreasonably on the first day of his trial in dismissing his

counsel of whom he had made no criticism. The Court found no

substance in the criticisms made of the trial judge's conduct of the

trial or her summing-up. The applicant's appeal against conviction

and sentence was dismissed.

On 28 June 1988 the Court refused leave to appeal to the House

of Lords and refused to certify a point of law of general public

importance.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 3

(c) of the Convention in that he was unreasonably denied the

opportunity to be represented by a solicitor or barrister of his own

choosing or in whom he was confident and that he was unreasonably

required to conduct his trial unrepresented.

The applicant also complains that he was denied a fair trial

contrary to Article 6 para. 1 in that the prosecution had referred in

evidence to prejudicial admissions made by the applicant and that

neither the judge nor the prosecution had explained to the applicant

which evidence might have been inadmissible.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that he was denied the opportunity to be

represented by a solicitor and barrister of his own choosing contrary to

Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, which provides :

"3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

following minimum rights:

...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal

assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient

means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free

when the interests of justice so require; ..."

The Commission recalls its case-law to the effect that Article 6 para.

3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) does not guarantee the right to choose an official defence

counsel who is appointed by the Court. Nor does it guarantee a right to be

consulted with regard to the choice of an official defence counsel (see e.g.

No. 6949/75, Dec. 6.7.76, D.R. 6 p. 114). Further, where an applicant is

represented by an officially appointed defence counsel the above provision

cannot be interpreted so as to secure to the accused a right to change such

officially appointed counsel without well-founded and substantiated reasons

(No. 11349/85, Dec. 5.5.86, unpublished).

In the present case, the applicant applied to the Court before his

trial to change his solicitor. After hearing the applicant, the judge refused

the application on the ground, inter alia, that the applicant's complaints

against his solicitor were groundless. His application on the first day of his

trial was also refused by the trial judge, following which the applicant chose

to dismiss both his solicitor and counsel and to represent himself. The

Commission recalls that the applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal which,

having examined the applicant's complaints, dismissed his appeal in this

context on the ground, inter alia, that the applicant had failed to give any

cogent reason to support his application to change his solicitor.

In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the refusal to allow

the applicant to change his solicitor did not constitute a violation of Article

6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant has also complained that he was denied a fair trial

contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention since the

prosecution had referred to prejudicial admissions made by the applicant and

that neither the judge nor the prosecution had drawn to the attention of the

applicant evidence which might have been inadmissible.

With regard to the proceedings of which the applicant complains, the

Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the

Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations

undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not

competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have

been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors

might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set

out in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its

established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222,

236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec.

13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

The Commission recalls that in the present case the applicant was able

to appeal to the Court of Appeal raising his complaints concerning the

proceedings at first instance. The Court of Appeal however dismissed the

appeal, finding that these criticisms had no substance in them. The Commission

finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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BAZIL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

BAZIL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

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