NILSSON v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 13177/87 • ECHR ID: 001-1061
Document date: April 14, 1989
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 13177/87
by Mats NILSSON
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 14 April 1989, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, Acting President
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
J. CAMPINOS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 8 April 1987
by Mats NILSSON against Sweden and registered on 31 August 1987 under
file No. 13177/87;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1943. He is a
doctor of medicine and resides at Frösön, Sweden.
As from the autumn of 1981 until April 1982 the applicant's
two children participated in a day-care arrangement organised by the
social authorities of Stockholm, where the applicant lived at that
time. In April 1982, however, the applicant was informed by the
social authorities of Stockholm that his children could no longer
participate in this particular arrangement and the applicant
experienced difficulties in arranging for somebody to look after his
children on a private basis. The applicant maintains that it cost him
approximately 6,000 Swedish crowns in addition to a loss of salary as
he and his wife had to take extra holidays for this purpose.
It does not appear that the applicant contacted the social
authorities in 1982 or 1983 in order to recover their extra costs and
the family moved from Stockholm on 1 July 1983. On 11 June 1984 the
applicant submitted a request to the social authorities of Stockholm
claiming 4,600 Swedish crowns in compensation for the extra expenses
he had in connection with the special arrangements he had made in
order to have somebody to take care of his children. His request was
considered by the Stockholm Social District Council No. 14 (sociala
distriktsnämnden 14) on 7 November 1984 when it decided to reject the
applicant's request.
The applicant then submitted his case to the City of Stockholm
Law Office (Stockholms stadskansli, stadsjuristen) requesting an
evaluation of the merits of the case. He also requested information on
how to appeal against the decision of the Social District Council.
On 27 November 1984 the applicant was informed of the reasons behind
the decision of the Social District Council and that an appeal against
such decisions (kommunalbesvär) could be lodged with the
Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) within a period of three
weeks from the date of the decision. It was only possible, however,
to lodge such an appeal if the person in question was living within
the municipality of Stockholm.
The applicant complained about this information to the
Parliamentary Ombudsman (justitieombudsmannen) as he was no longer
living in Stockholm. However, on 19 June 1985 the Ombudsman informed
the applicant that he agreed with the opinion voiced, that only
persons living within the municipality of Stockholm could appeal
against its decisions.
The applicant submitted a new complaint to the Ombudsman on
5 July 1985. His decision of 10 December 1986, however, did not change
the situation.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention. He
maintains that the Social District Council, in its decision of
7 November 1984, determined a civil right within the meaning of this
provision and that he has no access to a court in order to have this
administrative decision examined.
THE LAW
The applicant has complained, under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention, that he has no possibility of having the Social District Council's
decision of 7 November 1984 examined by a court. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
first sentence reads as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention guarantees to everyone
the right of access to a court in order to determine disputes concerning his or
her civil rights. The Commission does not find it necessary, however, to
examine in the present case whether it concerns a dispute over a civil right
within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. Neither does the
Commission find it necessary to determine whether the applicant can actually be
considered as having exhausted the domestic remedies available to him as
required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, in view of the fact that he
apparently chose not to pursue the matter while he was still living in
Stockholm. Even assuming that these requirements for the admissibility of the
case have been fulfilled the Commission finds that the case is inadmissible for
the following reasons.
According to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the Commission "may
only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on
which the final decision was taken". According to the Commission's established
case-law the final decision within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) refers
only to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies
according to the generally recognised rules of international law. In
particular, only a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered
for this purpose (see for example No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60, Yearbook 4 pp. 276,
282; No. 9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155, 187).
The Commission finds that the applicant's complaint to the
Parliamentary Ombudsman was not an effective remedy under the generally
recognised rules of international law. Consequently the Ombudsman's decision
cannot be taken into consideration when determining the date of the final
decision for the purpose of applying the six months time-limit laid down in
Article 26 (Art. 26).
Furthermore the Commission has constantly held that, where no domestic
remedy is available to challenge a decision, the six months time-limit runs
from the date on which an applicant was actually affected by the decision (see
for example No. 8440/78, Dec. 16.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 138). It is true that the
applicant does not complain of the decision of the Social District Council as
such but of the fact that there was no remedy at his disposal in which he could
challenge this decision.
The applicant appears to suggest that the six months time-limit in
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is inapplicable to this complaint since
he is referring to a continuing violation of Article 6 (Art. 6)
in that there is now, and continues to be, no court remedy available to him.
The Commission has frequently held the six months time-limit to be
inapplicable in cases where the applicant has alleged himself to be the victim
of a continuing violation of his rights under the substantive provisions of the
Convention, in circumstances where no domestic remedy was available (see for
example No. 214/56, Dec. 9.6.58, Yearbook 2 p. 215). However, in the present
case the Commission does not find that the decision taken at the domestic level
affecting the applicant gives rise to any question of a continuing situation.
The decision of the Social District Council concerned the rejection once and
for all, and at a given date, of the applicant's claim.
Where domestic law gives no remedy against such a measure, it is
inevitable that unless the law changes that situation will continue
indefinitely. However, the person affected suffers no additional prejudice
beyond that which arose directly and immediately from the initial measure. His
position is not therefore to be compared with that of a person subject to a
continuing restriction on his substantive Convention rights (cf. No. 8206/78,
Dec. 10.7.81, D.R. 25 p.147).
In the circumstances of the present case the Commission therefore finds
that the decision of the Social District Council must be regarded as the "final
decision" in relation to the applicant's complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of
the Convention. This decision finally determined his legal position at the
domestic level, in relation not only to his claims for damages but his remedial
rights as well.
The decision of the Social District Council was given on 7 November
1984, whereas the present application was submitted to the Commission on 8
April 1987, that is more than six months after the date of this decision. It
follows that the application has been introduced out of time and must be
rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE
Deputy Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(J. RAYMOND) (S. TRECHSEL)
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