Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 14170/88

by William Christopher HARWARD

against Norway

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

12 March 1990, the following members being present :

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

J. CAMPINOS

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 13 November 1987

by William Christopher Harward against Norway and registered on

31 August 1988 under file No. 14170/88;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1950. He

is a businessman and when introducing his application he was serving a

13-year prison sentence in Norway. Before the Commission he is

represented by the law firm Sears Blok, Solicitors, London.

The applicant was arrested in Sweden on 27 May 1986 and

charged with drug trafficking. On 14 August 1986 he was extradited to

Norway. On 15 August 1986 he was brought before the Oslo City Court

(byrett) where he was informed of the charges brought against him in

Norway. At the end of the court session the City Court decided on the

basis of the documents and information then available to detain the

applicant on remand in solitary confinement. This measure was

considered necessary in order to prevent the applicant from

absconding and from obstructing the gathering of further evidence in

the case. Restrictions on correspondence and visits were imposed in

accordance with Section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act

(Straffeprosessloven) which reads:

(translation)

"When under arrest or in detention everyone has the right to

uncontrolled written and oral communications with his public

defence counsel.

Otherwise the court may decide, insofar as it is necessary for

the investigation, that the detainee shall not be allowed to

receive visits or send or receive letters or other mail, or

that visits or correspondence are allowed only under police

surveillance. This does not apply to correspondence with or

visits from a public authority unless this is expressly

mentioned in the court decision. The court may also decide

that the detainee cannot have access to newspapers or

television."

Through the British Embassy in Norway the applicant's closest

relatives in the United Kingdom were informed of the procedure to

follow if they wanted to visit him while in solitary confinement. It

furthermore appears that the applicant's fiancée visited him on

17 December 1986.

The applicant was kept in detention on remand until his conviction

by the Eidsivating High Court (Lagmannsrett) on 3 November 1987.

Solitary confinement, however, ended on 15 April 1987 whereas the ban

on social visits was lifted from about the middle of March. The

applicant's case was examined by the High Court together with the case

of five other persons, all accused of drug trafficking. By the

above-mentioned judgment they were all found guilty and sentenced to

imprisonment ranging from 41/2 to 13 years.

The applicant and four of his co-accused appealed against

the judgment to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) which pronounced

judgment on 25 March 1988. In the judgment Justice Bugge stated on

behalf of the unanimous Court inter alia:

(translation provided by the applicant)

"With respect to (the applicant) ... the appeal concerns,

firstly, the application of the rules of procedure (and) ...

furthermore an appeal against the application of the law ...

I. The appeal against the application of the

procedural rules

Preliminary remarks

It is maintained by (the applicant) that a number of errors

and omissions have been committed in the handling of (his)

case, during the investigation and the preparation of the case

as well as during the main hearing before the High Court. In

(the applicant's) view, the errors entail an infringement

both of actual provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and

of the minimum requirements pertaining to the court procedure

in criminal cases listed under Art. 6 of the European

Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950, particularly

para. (3) (a)-(c) and (e). Even if each individual error

might not be of the kind to which importance may be attached

under Norwegian statutes of legal procedure, the errors must

be seen as a whole, and in (the applicant's) opinion, there is

no doubt that, in an overall sense, they may have influenced

the decision on the question of guilt (and) must lead to the

quashing of the High Court sentence, cf. the first subsection

of Section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Act. (The applicant

has) not, it is alleged, received a proper and impartial trial

here in Norway, a fair trial ...

In the light of the above, I find it necessary - before

looking at each of the representations - to give a somewhat

more detailed account of the handling of the criminal case by

the Public Prosecution Authority and the Courts of Law.

(The applicant) was arrested by Swedish police in Gothenburg on

27 May 1986, and subsequently extradited to Norway ... (He was)

charged by the Norwegian Prosecution Authority with serious

narcotics offences - the importation of a very considerable

quantity of heroin - which pursuant to the third subsection of

Section 162 of the Penal Code may carry up to 15 years'

imprisonment. The case has been the subject of an extensive

investigation. This seems principally to be a consequence of

the fact that (the applicant) has refused to make statements

to the police in order to elucidate the punishable acts ... In

order to ascertain the extent of the punishable acts, the

police (has) been obliged to carry out the painstaking task of

obtaining and checking information, partly in collaboration

with foreign police authorities.

After (his) arrest and extradition to Norway, (the applicant

has) been in custody. In order to safeguard evidence, it has

been necessary to subject (him) to a ban on letters and visits

for long periods, and for fear that (he) might abscond, (his)

release has been out of the question. The custody period up

until the judgment was protracted. This is due not only to

the extent of the investigations, but also to the fact that it

was regarded as crucial in terms of the evidence to be able to

bring the case against the convicted persons collectively ...

(T)he fixing of a date for the main hearing had to fit in with

the work schedule of the six defence counsel appointed. I

would, however, underline that, in the High Court sentence,

(the applicant has) been given full deduction from the

punishment for endured periods of detention on remand,

including time spent abroad. (He) will also be credited with

the detention on remand period from the passing of the High

Court sentence until the time of the Supreme Court decision.

Next, I would mention that from the time of (his) arrest, (the

applicant) has by his own choice had defence counsel appointed

at public expense to assist (him) not only during detention on

remand sessions in court, but also otherwise during the

investigation and the preparation of the case. During the

court sessions as well as in connection with the rest of the

prosecution, an interpreter has been placed at the disposal of

(the applicant) and (his) defence counsel. During the court

sessions and the taking of statements by the police, (the

applicant has) been informed of (his) right to refuse to make

a statement, and whenever the police have been taking

statements, the statement taken down has been translated into

English and read out to (him). During the preparation of the

case, the defence counsel have, in the customary manner, been

given the opportunity of familiarising themselves with the

documents in the case, which - and I will come back to this -

have, in part, also been translated into English.

The main hearing in the High Court began on 12 October 1987

and lasted until 30 October, a total of 15 court days. 13

witnesses were examined, and extensive documentation was made.

The six defendants appeared with their individual defence

counsel briefed at public expense. It appears from the court

records that the defence counsel for (the applicant), after

counsel for the prosecution had given an account of the

formal indictment, was allowed to address the Court with

comments relating to the preparation of the case, and that the

other defence counsel also availed themselves of their right

under the third subsection of Section 289 of the Criminal

Procedure Act, cf. Section 313, to comment in connection with

the prosecution counsel's account. It further appears that

following the examination of each witness and the reading out

of each written piece of evidence, the defendants were allowed

to comment. It has not been alleged that (the applicant was)

debarred by the Court from presenting any evidence offered by

(him). The proceedings of the High Court were, in their

entirety, given a running translation - simultaneous

translation - by court interpreters appointed. I would add

that the cost of the assistance of defence counsel and the

service of interpreters in the High Court and during the

preparation of the case was covered, in the customary manner,

by the State, (the applicant) being free of any liability for

costs.

It appears from the court records that (the applicant did not

wish) to give evidence on (his) own behalf before the High

Court ... On the 9th day of the court proceedings, 22 October,

(the applicant) was allowed to address the Court in order to

read out a declaration - 'Appeal' - containing criticism of

the procedure in the High Court under three items, demanding

that this be referred directly to the Supreme Court. In this

connection, he requested that the case be postponed until such

time as the Supreme Court had come to a decision with regard

to his complaints. The High Court did not comply with this.

I will be coming back to this declaration.

(The applicant has) also been given the opportunity of being

present during the hearing of the appeal case in the Supreme

Court, where (he was) presented from custody. Before the

Supreme Court, (he was) represented by new defence counsel,

appointed at public expense ... The appeals proceedings took

two court days. In the Supreme Court also, the entire

proceedings were given a simultaneous translation into English

by authorised interpreters.

Finally, I would stress that concerning the appeals against

the application of procedural rules, the Supreme Court has

the full competence to try both the procedural issues and the

factual basis for the appeals, according to the usual free

assessment of the evidence. The content of the court records

of the subordinate court may optionally be supplemented and

corrected using the information that is otherwise available.

The individual objections to the application of

procedural rules

As has been mentioned, a number of objections have been cited

in the declarations of appeal against the handling of (the

applicant's) case by the police and the Prosecution

Authority, partly during the early stages of the

investigation. In the case of some of the representations, it

has not been attempted to prove before the Supreme Court that

they may have been of significance to the decision made by the

High Court; thus I shall leave them out of account. The most

important complaints associated with the application of

procedural rules are, according to the defence counsel, the

ones I shall be discussing under 1-3 in the following.

1. Assistance by a British lawyer

...

2. Prejudgment

...

3. Translation of case documents

At an early stage of the investigation, (the applicant),

through his defence counsel ... presented a demand that the

documents in the case be translated into English. The demand

was put forward to the Police as well as, at a later stage, to

the Public Prosecutors of Eidsivating. (The applicant) claims

that the demand was not met, and that (he) and (his) defence

counsel were thereby prevented from preparing (his) defence in

a satisfactory manner. (He has) referred to the provisions in

Sections 242 and 264 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which

must, in (his) opinion, presuppose that any foreigner subject

to criminal prosecution, shall be allowed to familiarise

himself with the documents in the case presented in his own

language. They have further referred to Sections 2-8 of the

Prosecution Instructions and Art. 6 para. 3 (a) and (b) of the

European Convention on Human Rights, which stipulate that the

accused shall be unconditionally entitled to be informed of

the basis for the charges and the content of the same in a

language he understands, and to be given sufficient time and

opportunity to prepare his defence.

During the appeal hearing, the defence counsel has argued

partly that (the applicant) was unconditionally entitled at

public expense, to have all case documents translated into

English, and partly that the defence counsel must at least be

unconditionally entitled to evaluate what documents it was

necessary to have translated for the sake of the defence.

I find it clear that this challenge of the application of the

procedural rules is also groundless.

As has been mentioned, (the applicant's) defence counsel had

every opportunity to familiarise (himself) with all the

documents in the case during the investigation and the

preparation of the case, and interpreters have been placed at

their disposal to the extent required by the defence counsel

for the sake of communication with (the applicant). It has

also been established that the content of the charges and the

formal indictment, all court records, and important statements

made to the police by the accused, were translated into

English and placed at their disposal.

In reply to (the applicant's counsel's) request for

translations, the Eidsivating Public Prosecutors stated in a

letter of 30 July 1987:

'In your letter of 16.07.87, you ask that the case documents

be translated into English. This cannot be complied with. As

you point out, the case is an extensive one, and a complete

translation would be highly time-consuming, highly expensive,

and would, in my view, not be required out of consideration

for the accused's interests in the case. The formal

indictment will, of course, be translated into English, in

accordance with the first subsection of Sections 2-8 of the

Prosecution Instructions. If there are certain documents whose

translation is regarded as being of particular importance,

this will be considered. I expect to receive further

information in detail from you about this.'

To a renewed enquiry on the same matter, the Public Prosecutors

replied in a letter of 31 August 1987:

'Neither the Law Courts Act nor the Criminal Procedure Act

entitle a defendant to have the case documents translated into

his mother tongue. During the main hearing, an English

interpreter will of course be present. I can inform you that

simultaneous interpretation is being planned. Moreover, an

interpreter may be used during the preparation of the case to

the extent to which you find it necessary.

Thus, I see no reason to comply with your request for

translation into English of all the documents in the case.'

Sections 242 and 264 of the Criminal Procedure Act concern

the right of the suspect or accused and the defence counsel to

familiarise themselves with the case documents, at the

investigative stage and after the issue of a formal

indictment, respectively. The Act does not mention

translation in cases where the person in question does not

understand Norwegian. On the other hand, the Prosecution

Instructions contain the following provision in Sections 2-8:

'If the accused does not understand Norwegian, the Prosecution

Authority's decision on the question of prosecution, cf.

Chapters 17 to 22, or the legal remedies declaration, cf.

Chapter 27, shall be translated into a language which the

person in question can understand. The translation should

normally be in writing, unless it seems that no objections may

be raised against the content of the decision being

translated verbally when the decision is served on or

announced to the accused.

The provision in the first subsection also applies to service

of a sentence, cf. Sections 26-3, and to notification of

decisions and other court rulings.

Furthermore, the case documents shall be translated at public

expense to the extent seen as necessary in order to safeguard

the accused's interest in the case.'

In the report from the committee which prepared the revision

of the Prosecution Instructions - NOU 1984: 27 - a statement

is quoted on page 89, made by the Chairman of the Norwegian

Bar Association's Permanent Legislation Committee on Criminal

Law and Criminal Procedure, subscribed to by the Main

Committee of the Bar Association. On the question of

translation, it says here, among other things:

'Otherwise, I agree with Public Prosecutor (...) who states

that a complete translation of the documents in a criminal

case would be a task of such magnitude, both as regards time

and expense, that this should not occur as a general rule.

Anyway, it has been my experience that this is not normally

required.

On the other hand, I do not rule out the possibility that in

exceptional cases, a translation of part of the documents may

be required. I am thinking particularly of translations into

the mother tongue of the person in question of the statements

made by the accused himself during the investigation.

Thus, I would suggest that the Bar Association support the

view that the documents in a criminal case shall not

automatically be translated into the mother tongue of the

person in question, but that the opportunity shall be provided

for the defence counsel to ask for the translation of

specifically selected documents as required. This right of

the defence counsel should be anchored in a provision in the

Prosecution Instructions.'

On its own behalf, the Committee then states in the same

reference as follows:

'In the Committee's opinion, it should not be stipulated as a

general rule that all the documents in a criminal case should

be translated if the defendant does not understand Norwegian.

Such a system would lead to great financial and practical

problems, and it also seems unnecessary, cf. the statement by

the Bar Association. A concrete assessment should be made of

the degree to which the documents in a criminal case should

be translated, and, as a matter of course, importance must

here be attached to the defence counsel's views on the

subject. But the accused and the defence counsel should

probably not be given the right to demand that specific

documents be translated. The crucial factor should be to what

degree a translation is regarded as necessary in order to

safeguard the accused's interest in the case, cf. the third

subsection.'

The provision proposed by the Committee, Sections 2-20, is

identical to Sections 2-8 of the Instructions.

Thus, it is clearly presupposed in the above that the accused

or the defendant is not entitled to have all case

documents translated into his own language or into another

language that he understands. Importance should be attached

to what the defence counsel regards as required in order to

safeguard the interest of his client, and it is presupposed

that he may ask to have specially selected documents

translated. But the defence counsel and his client have no

unconditional right to demand that specific documents be

translated; the decisive factor is, as stated in the

Instructions, what is regarded as necessary in order to

safeguard the client's interest in the case. The provision

must naturally be seen in connection with the provisions of

the Act and the Instructions pertaining to the use of

interpreters in criminal cases, which I have previously

mentioned as far as this case is concerned. Moreover, the

report points out that the question of translations may be

referred to the Court at any stage of the case.

The provisions of the Prosecution Instructions on this point

must be assumed to meet the requirements set up by the

European Court of Human Rights relating to the requirement for

translation of documents in criminal cases under Art. 6 of

the Convention. In Paul Sieghart: The International Law

of Human Rights, the following is quoted on p. 298, with

reference to several decisions:

'EHR 6 (3) (a) requires that any summons served on an accused

person should be accompanied by a translation in a language

which he understands. It does not, however, give a general

right for the accused to have the court files translated, but

only those procedural documents which are necessary for his

defence.'

In view of the above, there seems to me to be no doubt that

the standpoint adopted by the Eidsivating Public Prosecutors on

the question of translation in their letters of 30 July and

31 August 1987, was in accordance with the rules in force. The

defence counsel (was) informed that (he) could expect special

documents which (he) might regard as being of special

importance to be translated. What the defence counsel had

demanded, and what is argued in the appeal case, is, however,

that provisions should have been made for all the case

documents to be translated - a highly demanding task,

incidentally, in a case where the number of document pages has

been given as approx. 1,100. No request was made for

specially selected documents, beyond the ones already available

in translation, to be translated, which has also been admitted

by the defence counsel. Also, the question of the magnitude

of the translation work was not raised at any stage of the

proceedings with the Examining and Summary Court or with the

High Court.

...

In view of the above, I cannot see that any error has been

demonstrated in the application of procedural rules in the

criminal case against (the applicant), or that there is any

foundation for the assertion that (he) has not received a fair

trial in the High Court. Consequently, the appeal lodged

against the application of procedural rules must be

rejected."

COMPLAINTS

1. Under Article 6 para. 3 (a) of the Convention the applicant

complains that he was not informed promptly, in a language which he

understood and in detail, of the cause of the accusation against him.

He also complains, under Article 6 para. 3 (b) of the Convention, that

he was not given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of

his defence. The applicant bases this complaint on the refusal of the

prosecution to translate the case documents and on his limited

possibilities of obtaining these documents.

2. The applicant furthermore complains that the regime to which

he was subjected while in detention on remand was in violation of his

right to respect for his private and family life and for his

correspondence contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.

3. Finally the applicant maintains that his solitary confinement

from 14 August 1986 until 15 April 1987 violated his right to freedom

of association with others within the meaning of Article 11 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant has complained that he was not informed

promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him as guaranteed to him by

Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention. Under Article 6

para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention the applicant has also

complained of inadequate time and facilities for the preparation of

his defence; he has referred to the lack of possibilities of obtaining

documents and the lack of translation of the case file. As regards

the translation of documents the Commission has considered these

complaints not only under the provisions invoked by the applicant but

also under Article 6 para. 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) of the Convention, which

guarantees the free assistance of an interpreter if the accused cannot

understand or speak the language used in court.

The European Court of Human Rights has observed in the Kamasinski

case (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Kamasinski judgment of 19 December 1989,

Series A no. 168, para. 74):

"74. The right, stated in paragraph 3 (e) of Article 6

(Art. 6-3-e)), to the free assistance of an interpreter

applies not only to oral statements made at the trial

hearing but also to documentary material and the pre-trial

proceedings. Paragraph 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) signifies that a person

charged with a criminal offence who cannot understand or

speak the language used in court has the right to the free

assistance of an interpreter for the translation or

interpretation of all those documents or statements in the

proceedings instituted against him which it is necessary for

him to understand or to have rendered into the court's

language in order to have the benefit of a fair trial (see

the Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç judgment of 28 November 1978,

Series A no. 29, p. 20, para. 48).

However, paragraph 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) does not go so far as to

require a written translation of all items of written evidence or

official documents in the procedure. The interpretation

assistance provided should be such as to enable the defendant

to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend

himself, notably by being able to put before the court his

version of the events."

The Commission recalls that the applicant was extradited to

Norway on 14 August 1986 after the extradition procedures had come to

an end. Even assuming that the applicant was unaware, until then, of

the charges brought against him in Norway the Commission recalls that

the reasons for his arrest and subsequent detention were thoroughly

explained to him with the assistance of an interpreter in the Oslo

City Court the following day. The Commission also notes the judgment

of the Supreme Court of 25 March 1988 which thoroughly sets out the

applicant's possibilities of obtaining a translation of documents and

the assistance of interpreters. It appears that interpreters were

placed at the applicant's and his counsel's disposal as required by

them for the sake of communication and the contents of the charges,

the formal indictment, court records as well as important statements

made to the police by the applicant were translated into English and

placed at their disposal.

The Commission is satisfied that, in these circumstances, the

applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) and

(e) (Art. 6--3-e) were respected (cf. also No. 8361/78, Dec. 17.12.81,

D.R. 27 p. 37). It follows that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

With regard to the applicant's complaint under Article 6

para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) it is true that the applicant's access to the

case file was limited. However, a system whereby the right to inspect

the file is restricted to the defendant's lawyer is not in itself

incompatible with Article 6 para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention

(cf. above-mentioned Kamasinski judgment para. 88). Furthermore it

follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court that the applicant's

defence counsel had every opportunity to familiarise himself with all

the documents in the case during the investigation and the preparation

of the case, that the applicant could freely communicate with his

counsel during this period and could receive translations of documents

which he found would be of importance. Furthermore, the Commission

recalls that the pre-trial period was more than one year.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant

had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence

and it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant has complained that his detention on remand

violated Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, i.e. his right to respect for

his private and family life and his correspondence. The Commission

assumes that the applicant in particular intends to refer to the fact

that he was placed in solitary confinement from 14 August 1986 until

15 April 1987 and that restrictions under Section 186 of the Criminal

Procedure Act were imposed during most of this period.

The Commission considers that while detention, lawful under

Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, is by its nature a limitation on

private and family life, it is an essential part of a prisoner's right

to respect for family life that the authorities assist in maintaining

effective contact with his close family members (mutatis mutandis No.

9054/80, Dec. 8.10.82, D.R. 30, p. 113). Furthermore, as regards the

applicant's correspondence the Commission recalls the judgment of the

European Court of Human Rights in the case of Silver and Others

(judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61) in which the Court set

out general principles from which it appears that the Contracting

States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the

matter of the imposition of restrictions on correspondence.

Nevertheless, the aim of preventing disorder or crime may justify

wider measures of interference in a case of a person held on remand

and against whom inquiries with a view to bringing criminal charges

are being made since in such a case there is often a risk of collusion

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Schönenberger and Durmaz judgment of 20 June

1988 Series A no. 137, p. 13, para. 25).

In the present case the Commission recalls first of all that

during the period of time to which the applicant refers he was not

serving a sentence but was placed in detention on remand pending

trial. The applicant had been charged with grave narcotics offences

and the solitary confinement and the restrictions on visits and mail

had been imposed on him by the courts as being necessary to prevent

him from escaping or impeding the investigations by removing evidence or

by warning or influencing others. Furthermore, the Commission is

satisfied that the restrictions imposed were lifted when they were no

longer deemed necessary and, finally, visits by close family members

were not excluded.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that there were

sufficient grounds for justifying the restrictions imposed and that

the authorities cannot be considered as having gone beyond the margin

of appreciation left to them. The limitations on the applicant's

private and family life and on his correspondence were therefore in the

Commission's view proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and

necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder or

crime within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention

(cf. also No. 10263/83, Dec. 11.3.85 unpublished as regards Article 8,

(Art. 8) otherwise D.R. 41 p. 149). It follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant has finally complained, under Article 11

(Art. 11) of the Convention, that his right to associate with others has

been violated during his solitary confinement from 14 August 1986

until 15 April 1987.

However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or

not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within

a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was

taken".

In the present case the applicant's solitary confinement ended

on 15 April 1987 whereas the application was submitted to the Commission

on 13 November 1987, that is, more than six months later. Furthermore,

an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the

running of that period.

It follows that this part of the application has been

introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

Menu

HARWARD v. NORWAY

HARWARD v. NORWAY