A. v. THE NETHERLANDS
Doc ref: 12728/87 • ECHR ID: 001-877
Document date: April 10, 1991
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 12728/87
by A.
against the Netherlands
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 10 April 1991, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber
G. SPERDUTI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Mr. F. MARTINEZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 February 1987
by A. against the Netherlands, and registered
on 12 February 1987 under file No. 12728/87;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1955. He is
at present detained in a prison in The Hague. In the proceedings
before the Commission he is represented by Mrs. G. Later, a lawyer
practising in The Hague.
The facts, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows:
On 18 January 1983 the applicant was arrested and charged with
incitement to murder. He was accused of having promised money and
heroin to another person, for helping him to kill someone, and of having
supplied a description and the address of the person to be killed.
On the same day he was detained on remand.
By judgment of 17 May 1983 the Regional Court
(Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague convicted the applicant and
sentenced him to twelve years' imprisonment less the time already
spent in prison pending trial.
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of
The Hague. By judgment of 29 August 1983 the Court of Appeal upheld
the judgment of the Regional Court.
The applicant introduced a plea of nullity to the Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad). By judgment of 15 January 1985 the Supreme Court
quashed the Court of Appeal's judgment on technical points and
referred the case to the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam.
On 31 May 1985 the Procurator General at Amsterdam Court of
Appeal issued a summons against the applicant. The Court of Appeal
heard the case on 28 June 1985. The applicant's request to suspend
his detention on remand was refused by the Court but his request to
suspend the hearing was granted. Before granting the suspension, the
President referred the applicant and his lawyer to Article 277a of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that, if the suspect is in
pre-trial detention and the hearing is suspended, the court will as a
rule set the suspension at no more than one month. If there are
compelling reasons, however, it can set a longer period; in such cases
the reasons should be stated in the official report. The President
informed the applicant and his lawyer of the existence of a compelling
reason affecting the length of the suspension, namely that the Court
of Appeal's calendar would not permit the hearing to be resumed before
20 September 1985. The lawyer agreed to this on behalf of the
applicant.
The Court of Appeal resumed its hearing on 20 September 1985.
It refused a new request by the applicant to suspend his detention on
remand.
By judgment of 4 October 1985 the Court of Appeal convicted
the applicant and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment less the
time already spent in prison pending trial.
The applicant introduced a plea of nullity to the Supreme
Court. He submitted, inter alia, that the length of the proceedings
exceeded "a reasonable time" within the meaning of Articles 5 para. 3
and 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
By letter of 4 February 1986 the applicant requested the Court
of Appeal of Amsterdam to suspend his detention on remand for several
weeks pending his Supreme Court appeal. The Court of Appeal suspended
his detention on remand for two weeks in April 1986. On 3 June 1986
the applicant requested the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam to suspend
his detention on remand for an additional two weeks, and for one
week-end every month. The Court of Appeal suspended the detention on
remand for two weeks in July 1986, but rejected the request to suspend
the detention on remand for one week-end every month.
On 15 September 1986 the documents concerning the case were
received by the Registry of the Supreme Court.
On 10 October 1986 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal
to release him from detention on remand, invoking, inter alia,
Articles 5 para. 3 and 6 para. 1 of the Convention. In the
alternative, he asked for suspension of the detention on remand. By
decision of 29 October 1986 the Court of Appeal rejected the requests.
By judgment of 19 May 1987 the Supreme Court dismissed the
applicant's plea of nullity. It held in respect of the period between
29 August 1983 and 15 January 1985 and the period between 15 January
1985 and 4 October 1985 that the applicant had not raised a complaint
of the length of proceedings before the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam.
Nor was the Court of Appeal bound to make an ex officio investigation
into the reasonableness of the length of proceedings, merely because
these proceedings lasted a particular length of time. It held in
respect of the period after 4 October 1985 that Articles 5 para. 3 and
6 para. 1 of the Convention had not been violated.
The applicant submitted on 4 June 1987 a request for a pardon,
which was refused on 12 November 1987 by the Deputy Minister of
Justice.
An application for review, which the applicant lodged on 28
December 1987, was declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court on 6
December 1988.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that he has been detained on remand
for more than four years. He invokes Article 5 paras. 1 (c) and 3 of
the Convention.
2. The applicant complains that his detention on remand amounts
to inhuman treatment. He submits that during his detention on remand
he could not regularly be with his family, which is possible during
detention after conviction. The applicant invokes Article 3 of the
Convention.
3. The applicant complains that the determination of the criminal
charge against him did not take place within a reasonable time. In
particular, the first proceedings before the Supreme Court took more
than sixteen months and the proceedings before the Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam more than eight months. In addition, the applicant submits
that under Section 433 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure the
documents concerning his case should have been sent to the Supreme
Court within a maximum of 54 days from the day of the decision of the
Court of Appeal. In the present case the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam
took its decision on 4 October 1985, but the documents concerning the
applicant's case were not received by the Registry of the Supreme
Court until 15 September 1986, i.e. more than eleven months later.
The Supreme Court took its final decision on 19 May 1987, i.e. more
than nineteen months after the decision of the Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam. The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 9 February 1987 and
registered on 12 February 1987.
On 13 April 1989 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government and invite them to submit
written observations on the admissibility and merits of the
application limited to the issue under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention concerning the length of the proceedings.
The Government submitted the observations on 22 September
1989 and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on
19 December 1989.
On 26 February 1991 the Commission decided to refer the
application to the Second Chamber.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he has been detained on remand
for more than four years. The applicant invokes Article 5 paras. 1
(c) and 3 (Art. 5-1-c, 5-3) of the Convention, which read insofar as
relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
....
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;
....
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial."
The Commission notes that the applicant was arrested on
18 January 1983 and was convicted at first instance on 17 May 1983.
His conviction was set aside on 15 January 1985. The applicant was
again convicted on 4 October 1985.
The Commission recalls that, for the purposes of the
Convention, a detention on remand after conviction while an appeal is
pending is detention "after conviction" within the meaning of Article
5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a), even if the detention continues to be
considered as detention on remand under domestic law (cf. as the most
recent authority the B v. Austria judgment of 28 March 1990, Eur.
Court H.R., Series A No. 175, paras. 35-40). In the present case,
therefore, the applicant's detention on remand, under Article 5 para.
1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c), ended on 17 May 1983 when he was convicted by the
Regional Court. Subsequently he was detained as a convicted person
under Article 5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a). On 15 January 1985 his
conviction was quashed by the Supreme Court and a new period of
detention under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) commenced - cf.
Herczegfalvy v. Austria, Comm. Report 1.3.91, para. 193. This
period lasted until 4 October 1985, when the applicant was again
convicted.
The Commission does not find that the period of four months
between the applicant's arrest and his first conviction exceeded a
"reasonable time" in the sense of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the
Convention.
With regard to the period of eight months and 19 days between
the Supreme Court's judgment of 15 January 1985 and the applicant's
second conviction the Commission notes that, on 31 May 1985, the
Procurator General issued a summons against the applicant; that the
Court of Appeal heard the case on 28 June 1985 and granted the
applicant's request for an adjournment; that the new date fixed by the
Court (20 September 1985) was agreed with the applicant; that the
hearing was resumed on that day; and that the applicant was convicted
on 4 October 1985. In these circumstances the Commission does not
find that the second period of detention under Article 5 para. 1 (c)
(Art. 5-1-c) exceeded a reasonable time. The Commission notes
furthermore that the time the applicant was detained on remand has
been deducted from his sentence.
The Commission concludes that his complaint concerning his
detention on remand is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention that his detention on remand amounted to inhuman treatment.
He submits that during his detention on remand he could not regularly
be with his family, which is possible during detention after
conviction.
The Commission finds no issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) nor,
concerning family life, under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
This complaint must therefore also be rejected as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant furthermore complains under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the determination of the criminal
charge against him did not take place within a reasonable time. In
particular, the first proceedings before the Supreme Court took more
than sixteen months and the proceedings before the Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam more than eight months. In addition, the applicant submits
that under Section 433 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure the
documents concerning his case should have been sent to the Supreme
Court within a maximum of 54 days from the day of the decision of the
Court of Appeal. In the present case the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam
took its final decision on 19 May 1987, i.e. more than nineteen
months after the decision of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) states, insofar as relevant:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing
within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal ..."
The Government submit that the applicant did not raise this
complaint during the cassation proceedings against the judgment of
29 August 1983 of the Appeal Court of The Hague nor in the proceedings
before the Appeal Court of Amsterdam after the case had been referred
back by the Supreme Court. He only raised this complaint in the
second proceedings before the Supreme Court. In its decision of
19 May 1987 the Supreme Court rejected this complaint. In the
Government's opinion, this means that the applicant did not exhaust
the remedies available under Dutch law.
The applicant submits that it is not necessary to raise this
complaint in each instance of the case, and states furthermore that
the delay became all the more unreasonable with the passing of
time. He refers in particular to the period between 29 August 1983
(judgment of the Court of Appeal of The Hague) and 15 January 1985
(first judgment of the Supreme Court) (more than sixteen months); the
period between 15 January 1985 (judgment of the Supreme Court) and
4 October 1985 (judgment of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam) (more
than eight months); and the period between 4 October 1985 (judgment of
the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam) and 19 May 1987 (second judgment of
the Supreme Court) (more than nineteen months).
The Commission notes that the applicant raised his complaint
concerning the length of the proceedings in his plea of nullity to the
Supreme Court against his conviction and sentence of 4 October 1985.
The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 19 May 1987, rejected this
complaint partly on the ground that the applicant had not raised it
before the Court of Appeal and partly as being ill-founded. The
judgment does not indicate that the sentence might have been
mitigated if the length complaint had been raised before the Court of
Appeal as required by the Supreme Court.
The Commission considers that the length of the proceedings
against the applicant must be examined as a whole. The applicant has
raised this issue before the Supreme Court.
His complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) can therefore
not be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 and Article 26 (Art. 27-3, 26)
of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Commission further notes that the period to be taken into
consideration under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) began on the day when the
applicant was substantially affected by the proceedings against him
and ended on the day of his final conviction (cf. No. 9132/80, Dec.
12.12.83, D.R. 41 p. 13). In thus started with the applicant's arrest
on 18 January 1983 and ended with the Supreme Court's decision of 19
May 1987, lasting altogether 4 years, 4 months and 1 day.
The Commission, having regard to the parties' submissions
under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention concerning the
length of the proceedings, considers that this complaint raises
complex issues of fact and law which can only be resolved by an
examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot,
therefore be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds
for inadmissibility have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission by a majority
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits
of the case, the applicant's complaint under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention concerning the length of the
proceedings;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Secretary to the President of the
Second Chamber Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
