G. v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 12976/87 • ECHR ID: 001-1156
Document date: October 9, 1991
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PARTIAL
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 12976/87
by H.G.
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 9 October 1991, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission,
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 5 December 1986
by H.G. against Austria and registered on 20 May 1987 under
file No. 12976/87;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant, born in 1944, is an Austrian citizen and
resident in Vienna. Since 23 August 1990 the applicant has been
represented by Mr. R. Proksch, a lawyer practising in Vienna.
The applicant's earlier application No. 9561/81 was declared
inadmissible on 4 October 1982.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
On 15 November 1985 the Salzburg Regional Court (Landes-
gericht) issued a warrant of arrest against the applicant. The
Regional Court found that there was a strong suspicion that on
25 October 1985 in Salzburg the applicant had committed a grave theft,
namely broken into a car and stolen leather bags. The Regional Court
referred to oral information given by the Salzburg Federal Police
Department (Bundespolizeidirektion). It also noted that the applicant
had been seen and been recognised on a photograph. As the applicant's
whereabouts were unknown and he risked a considerable punishment, the
Regional Court assumed a danger of absconding.
On 14 May 1986 the Salzburg Regional Court amended the above
warrant of arrest against the applicant, who had meanwhile been
arrested in the Federal Republic of Germany and was detained on remand
at a Munich prison. The Regional Court found that there was a strong
suspicion that on 25 October 1985 in Golling the applicant had
committed a further grave theft by having broken into a car and stolen
various objects. It referred to the investigations of the Salzburg
Federal Police Department as well as the Golling Police Station
(Gendarmerieposten), in particular the statements of witnesses who had
recognised the type of car used on the occasion of both offences as
well as the applicant when they were shown criminal identification
photographs. The Regional Court, referring to S. 175 para. 1 of the
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung), confirmed
the danger of absconding as the applicant had no residence in Austria
and was detained on remand in the Federal Republic of Germany. Having
regard to the record of the applicant's previous convictions and his
recidivism, it also assumed a danger of repetition.
On 24 June 1986 the applicant was extradited to Austria and
taken into detention on remand in the Prison at the Salzburg Regional
Court on 25 June 1986.
On 2 July 1986 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's request to be released from detention on remand. Referring
to S. 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Regional Court
confirmed the strong suspicion against the applicant that he had
committed theft on two counts, and the danger of repetition. A danger
of absconding could, however, no longer be assumed. The applicant's
appeal against the Regional Court's decision was dismissed by the Linz
Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 16 July 1986.
On 13 August 1986 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's renewed request for release from detention on remand.
Referring to the earlier review proceedings, the Regional Court found
that the applicant had not made any new relevant submissions.
On 27 August 1986 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the
applicant's appeal. As regards the applicant's complaints about his
extradition, the Court of Appeal noted that, in the Federal Republic
of Germany, the applicant had been detained after a conviction until
24 June 1986. He had then been extradited without formal extradition
proceedings.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 1986, Mr. W., a lawyer practising in
Salzburg, was appointed as the applicant's official defence counsel.
On 18 August 1986 the applicant wrote a letter to his defence
counsel and gave it in a sealed envelope to a prison officer for
delivery. According to the applicant, he had sealed the letter in
presence of the prison officer. On the same day the officer returned
the letter to the applicant on the ground that, until the indictment
had been served upon him (Zustellung der Anklageschrift), also letters
to defence counsel had to be passed on unsealed. He referred, in this
respect, to a prison instruction (Dienstverfügung) of 1983.
Thereupon, on the same day, the applicant lodged a complaint
with the President of the Salzburg Regional Court, and also laid
charges against the Director of the Salzburg Prison.
On 26 September 1986 the Salzburg Public Prosecutor's Office
(Staatsanwaltschaft) preferred the indictment (Anklageschrift) against
the applicant concerning theft on two counts in October 1985, on one
count in April 1986 and an attempted theft also in April 1986. The
bill of indictment was served upon the applicant on 30 September 1986.
On 30 October 1986 the trial was opened before the Salzburg
Regional Court. The applicant contended inter alia that the criminal
proceedings against him were unlawful on the ground that his
extradition from the Federal Republic of Germany had been based on an
incorrect warrant of arrest. He also complained about his detention
on remand and in particular about the refusal of the prison
authorities to deliver sealed letters to his defence counsel. He
considered that thus any correspondence with his defence counsel had
been rendered impossible, and his defence rights considerably
restricted. In this respect, the Presiding Judge noted that he was
competent for the control of the applicant's correspondence and had
not seen any correspondence with counsel for some time.
Furthermore, the Regional Court, at the trial, ordered
the applicant's detention on remand to continue.
On 10 November 1986 a visit of the applicant's life companion,
a witness for the defence, was terminated when their conversation
turned to questions of evidence at the trial. Likewise, on 11
November 1986 the Presiding Judge stopped part of the applicant's
letter of 31 October 1986 to his life companion and took it to the
file on the ground that it referred to the criminal proceedings, in
particular to the testimony to be given by her.
On 19 November 1986 the President of the Salzburg Regional
Court, referring to the applicant's complaint of 18 August 1986,
instructed the Director of the Salzburg Prison about the procedure
concerning correspondence of remand prisoners with defence counsel, in
particular S. 45 para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Straf-
prozeßordnung) in the version in force at that time (amendment in
force as from 1 January 1988). In the circumstances of the
applicant's case, his correspondence with his defence counsel was not
subject to any further control and could, after control for prohibited
money or other objects, be sealed in the presence of a prison officer
and then be delivered. Any other correspondence had to be delivered
unsealed. The applicant should be informed that this procedure would
be respected in future, as it had been respected in the past. The
applicant was so informed on 29 November 1986.
On 27 November 1986 the Salzburg Regional Court convicted the
applicant of theft on two counts and attempted theft on a further
count, and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. The Regional
Court found that the applicant had broken into two cars at different
places near Salzburg on 25 October 1985 and had attempted to steal
objects from a car near Vienna on 25 April 1986.
The Regional Court proceeded from the evidence of several
witnesses, the victims of the offences in question, who had first
recognised the applicant on criminal identification photographs and
then, at the trial, had described the car used by him. The witnesses
had appeared to be very reliable. Some slight divergences between
their statements in court and earlier statements before police
authorities had been explained at the trial. The Regional Court
dismissed several requests by the defence to take further evidence. It
considered that thereby the applicant's defence rights were not
affected as the applicant's guilt could be clearly established on the
basis of the evidence obtained at the trial. As regards the various
requests, in particular the taking of technical and expert evidence,
the inspection of a locality, the hearing of a police officer, the
Regional Court gave detailed reasons that such evidence was
unnecessary and irrelevant to the case.
After pronouncement of the judgment the applicant lodged a
plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) and an appeal against
sentence (Berufung).
It appears from records of the Salzburg Prison that the
applicant further corresponded with his defence counsel in December
1986 and in the beginning of 1987.
On 28 January 1987 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed various
complaints of the applicant, insofar as they concerned alleged
irregularities by the criminal courts. The Court of Appeal found in
particular that the Investigating Judge had not violated the
applicant's rights of defence. The applicant had not substantiated
his claim that the Investigating Judge had impaired the applicant's
correspondence with his official defence counsel: there were no such
indications in the file, e.g. submissions of counsel. The assessment
of evidence, including alleged irregularities concerning the
identification photographs, was the task of the trial court.
Furthermore, there was nothing to indicate that the Presiding Judge
had hindered the defence in putting questions to the witnesses: it
appeared from the record of the trial that at the end of a testimony
no further questions had been put to the witness concerned. Moreover,
the Court of Appeal confirmed that the visit of the applicant's life
companion had been lawfully terminated and that part of his letter to
her had been lawfully stopped.
On 20 March 1987 the applicant filed the reasons for his plea
of nullity and for his appeal. Referring to S. 281 para. 1 (4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, he submitted in particular that he had
been refused to comment immediately upon the statement of one witness,
and had subsequently not been invited to comment upon the statements
of each witness. Furthermore, the applicant's defence rights had been
impaired in that during the period from 18 August until 27 November
1986 he could not correspond with his defence counsel. He described
the incident on 18 August and alleged that the contents of the
envelope concerned had been controlled before he sealed it. He also
complained about the refusal to take further evidence. The applicant's
further submissions concerned the reasoning of the judgment.
On 5 May 1987 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof)
rejected the plea of nullity. The Supreme Court considered that the
applicant's rights of defence had not been unduly restricted.
The Supreme Court considered in particular that the applicant
had been able to put questions to the witnesses and comment
immediately upon their statements; only a further general comment upon
the statement of a witness had been correctly refused. The alleged
problems concerning the applicant's correspondence with his defence
counsel had not been subject of a request at the trial and could not
therefore be raised under S. 281 para. 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Regional Court's taking of evidence and the reasoning
of its judgment could not be objected to.
On 26 May 1987 the Supreme Court, upon the applicant's
appeal, reduced his sentence to two years and nine months'
imprisonment.
In the course of his detention on remand, twice disciplinary
sanctions of fifteen and ten days' solitary confinement (strenger
Hausarrest) respectively had been imposed on the applicant. His
complaints in this respect were dismissed by the President of the
Salzburg Regional Court. Furthermore, in May and June 1987 the
President of the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed various complaints
lodged by the applicant about the conditions of his detention, inter
alia, about the delayed delivery of letters, several refusals of
particular magazines as well as other material. The applicant's
complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof)
concerning some of these matters was dismissed in summary proceedings.
In June 1988 the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof)
rejected the applicant's complaints in this respect on the ground that
he was no longer a remand prisoner.
On 7 September 1988 the Federal Ministry of Justice
(Bundesministerium der Justiz) dismissed complaints concerning the
applicant's detention, inter alia, the prison food, the length of
visits, and the delayed delivery of mail. The applicant's
constitutional complaint was dismissed in summary proceedings. On 6
February 1989 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's
request for free legal aid to pursue these complaints on the ground
that they lacked any prospect of success.
On 16 September 1988 the Federal Ministry of Justice dismissed
the applicant's complaint that on 29 November 1987 a letter to his
mother had been stopped. The Ministry found that the letter contained
instructions to the applicant's mother to send various goods and money
to several other prisoners. The applicant had thus intended to trade
in goods which would have contravened the prison order. At the same
date numerous other complaints of the applicant concerning other
detention matters were also dismissed.
On 13 November 1988 the applicant addressed a complaint
marked "private" to the Federal Minister of Justice, which was
returned to him on 17 November 1988, acceptance having been refused.
On 29 November 1988 a Member of Parliament, upon the applicant's
request, transmitted the submissions in question to the Federal
Minister of Justice, who passed them on for further action. The
letter in reply from the Member of Parliament to the applicant, dated
30 November 1988, was opened by a prison officer and controlled before
delivery.
On 12 May 1989 the Krems Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's request to institute criminal proceedings against the
prison officer who had opened the above letter from the Member of
Parliament. The Regional Court found that under S. 90 of the
Enforcement of Sentences Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz) only letters to
privileged addressees, inter alia, Members of Parliament, were exempted
from any control, whereas any incoming mail could be opened.
On 9 June 1989 the Federal Ministry of Justice dismissed the
applicant's complaint that mail addressed to the applicant by the
European Commission of Human Rights had been opened. The Ministry,
referring to S. 90 of the Enforcement of Sentences Act, considered that
even correspondence from privileged addressees such as the Commission
had to be opened in order to stop unlawful sending of money or other
objects.
The applicant also unsuccessfully filed numerous applications
to have criminal proceedings instituted against judges, prison and
police officers and the witnesses involved in the criminal proceedings
against him.
The applicant served his sentence until 24 March 1989. His
requests for conditional release at earlier dates had remained
unsuccessful.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
S. 45 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozeßordnung) in the version in force until 1 January 1988
concerns correspondence of a remand prisoner with his defence counsel.
It provides that the correspondence of the remand prisoner with his
defence counsel is subject to control by the Investigating Judge (S.
187) only until communication of the bill of indictment, and only if
he is detained inter alia or exclusively for danger of collusion.
S. 187 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that, notwithstanding S. 45 of this Code and SS. 85 and 88 of the
Enforcement of Sentences Act, remand prisoners may correspond with and
receive visits from all persons who are not likely to prejudice the
purpose of the detention on remand. Paragraph 2 regulates limitations
on correspondence of an exceptional volume, and also provides that
letters likely to prejudice the purpose of detention or giving
rise to the suspicion that through them an offence is being committed
may be withheld, save SS. 88 and 90 para. 4 of the Enforcement of
Sentences Act on correspondence with authorities and counsel, or
letters to national bodies or the European Commission of Human Rights.
According to S. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the
Investigating Judge is in general competent for the control of
correspondence and all other orders and decisions concerning the
contact of remand prisoners with the outside world.
S. 90 of the Enforcement of Sentences Act (in the version in
force until 1 January 1988), which also applies to remand prisoners
(S. 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), provides in paragraph 1
that all correspondence of convicted prisoners may be controlled to
the extent necessary to hold back unlawfully sent money or other
objects. According to paragraph 4 of this provision, correspondence
with and from particular bodies and persons mentioned in S. 88
para. 1 (1), (2) and para. 2, for instance domestic public
authorities, the European Commission of Human Rights, lawyers, defence
counsel, should not be held back.
S. 119 et seq. of the Enforcement of Sentences Act govern the
prisoners' right of complaint about conditions of their detention
(S. 119) or acts of prison staff allegedly violating their rights
(S. 120 para. 1). Complaints have to be lodged with the competent
officer of the prison concerned (S. 120 para. 2). Such complaints are
examined by the Director of the Prison, or by the Federal Ministry of
Justice, if the complaint is directed against the Director of the
Prison and he did not give redress (S. 121). The decisions of first
instance are subject to review by the Administrative Court and the
Constitutional Court in accordance with SS. 130 and 144 of the Federal
Constitution (Bundesverfassungsgesetz).
On 30 June 1983 the Director of the Prison at the Salzburg
Regional Court issued an instruction (Dienstverfügung) according to
which the inmates of that prison had to hand in their correspondence,
without exception, unsealed to the division officer, and likewise all
incoming correspondence would be handed to them opened. Remand
prisoners' correspondence with their defence counsel, provided they
have received the bill of indictment, could, after control of their
contents for unlawful sendings of money or other objects, be sealed in
the presence of a prison officer and handed over. Correspondence from
counsel would be opened in the presence of a prison officer and, after
control for unlawful sendings of money or other objects, the prisoner
concerned could keep it. Prison officers had to control mail to the
extent necessary to stop unlawful sendings of money or other objects.
The instruction further stated that the contents of remand prisoners'
correspondence could only be censored by the Investigating Judge;
however, the prison officer had to control it in respect of unlawful
enclosures.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 of the Convention that
he was unlawfully detained on remand following unlawful extradition
proceedings. He alleges that the warrant of arrest of May 1986
contained factual statements which were at variance with the results
of the investigations.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 paras. 1, 2
and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention about his conviction by the
Salzburg Regional Court on 27 November 1986 and also about the conduct
of the criminal proceedings concerned.
He submits that the presumption of innocence was violated
during the investigation of the case. Some formulations of the court
decisions concerning his detention on remand showed that he was
already considered guilty.
He claims that he did not have a fair trial by an impartial
court and that his rights of defence were disregarded as the Salzburg
Regional Court dismissed his request to take further evidence, and
based its judgment on unproven and incorrect facts and assumptions.
He also submits that he was not allowed to comment immediately on the
statements of each witness.
He finally complains that the preparation of his defence was
restricted by the refusal of uncontrolled correspondence with his
defence counsel prior to the trial.
3. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention
about the control and delays in prison of his correspondence with his
defence counsel, his relatives, with public authorities and a Member
of Parliament.
4. The applicant considers that he did not have an effective
remedy before a national authority, as required by Article 13 of the
Convention, in respect of the control of his correspondence, and
generally regarding complaints concerning the prison conditions.
5. The applicant moreover complains under Article 25 para. 1 in
fine of the Convention that the Austrian authorities hindered the
effective exercise of his right to petition the Commission by
withholding necessary documents, depriving him of the application
form, and opening letters to him by the Commission.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 5 December 1986 and
registered on 20 May 1987.
On 14 December 1989 the Commission decided to bring the
application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them
to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.
The Government's observations were submitted on 30 March 1990.
On 18 May 1990 the Commission decided to grant the applicant
legal aid.
On 28 May 1990 the time-limit for submission of the
applicant's observations in reply was suspended pending determination
of his representative in the proceedings before the Commission. His
observations were submitted on 20 December 1990.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that his extradition and subsequent
detention on remand in Austria were unlawful. This complaint relates
to Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law: ...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so; ..."
The Commission finds that according to the warrant of arrest
issued by the Salzburg Regional Court in May 1986 as well as the
Regional Court's subsequent decisions on the applicant's detention on
remand, there was a strong suspicion that he had committed several
criminal offences, in particular theft, and that there was a danger of
repetition. In its decisions the Regional Court, referring to the
relevant provisions of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, duly
considered the results of the investigations and trial, respectively.
There is nothing in the applicant's submissions, in particular
as regards the preceding extradition procedure, to suggest that his
detention on remand was not lawful and not in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by Austrian law, within the meaning of
Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 paras. 1, 2
and 3 (b), (c) and (d) (Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3-b , 6-3-c, 6-3-d) of the
Convention about his conviction by the Salzburg Regional Court on 27
November 1986 and also about the conduct of the criminal proceedings
concerned.
a. With regard to the judicial decision of which the applicant
complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with
Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the
observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the
Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an
application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by
domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have
involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3
pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77;
No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).
b. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the
Convention that in the course of the investigation proceedings he was
already treated as guilty.
The Commission, assuming that the applicant has exhausted
domestic remedies in this respect, considers that the decisions and
measures taken by the Austrian authorities against the applicant
before his conviction do not disclose any disregard of the principle
of the presumption of innocence. In particular, the warrant of arrest
of May 1986 as well as the Regional Court's decisions on the
applicant's detention on remand give reasons for the strong suspicion
against the applicant. There is no formulation containing already a
finding of guilt.
c. The applicant further complains that he did not have a fair
trial by an impartial court and that his rights of defence were
disregarded on the grounds that the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed
his request to take further evidence, and based its judgment on
unproven and incorrect facts and assumptions. He also submits that he
was not allowed to comment immediately on the statements of each
witness.
The Commission finds that the conduct of the criminal
proceedings by the Salzburg Regional Court leading to the applicant's
conviction do not disclose any appearance of lacking impartiality.
The Regional Court's taking and assessment of evidence does not appear
incorrect or arbitrary. In particular, the refusal to take further
evidence as requested by the applicant was based on the lack of
relevance of the evidence concerned and cannot be objected to under
Article 6 (Art. 6).
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the defence
rights of the applicant, who was represented by counsel, concerning
the questioning of witnesses in court were restricted, or that he did
not have a fair opportunity to put forward his arguments in respect of
the statements of these witnesses.
It follows that these complaints are also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention about control and delays in prison of his correspondence
with his relatives, with public authorities and a Member of
Parliament. Article 8 (Art. 8) provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
The Commission recalls that the control of prisoners'
correspondence, while an interference with their right to respect for
correspondence, is not in itself incompatible with the Convention
(Eur. Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March 1983, Series
A no. 61, p. 38, para. 98; Campbell v. the United Kingdom, Comm.
Report 12.7.90, paras. 41 - 48 with further references).
The Commission notes that on 11 November 1986 the
Investigating Judge decided to stop the part of the applicant's letter
to his life companion of 31 October 1986 which referred to the trial
pending against the applicant, where his life companion was called as
a witness for the defence. The Commission finds that this
interference could be regarded as necessary in a democratic society
for the prevention of disorder and crime, and was thus justified under
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
Furthermore, the Commission finds that, as the applicant's
letter of 13 November 1988, submitting a complaint to the Minister of
Justice marked "private", was returned in application of procedural
rules governing complaints by prisoners, there is no indication of a
violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
As regards the opening of a letter from a Member of Parliament
to the applicant, the Commission, assuming exhaustion of domestic
remedies, notes that the letter in question was not stopped or delayed
in any way. In these circumstances and having regard to Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention.
Furthermore, the Commission, having considered the applicant's
general complaints about delays and control of his other
correspondence with relatives and public authorities, finds that his
submissions in these respects do not disclose a violation of his right
to respect for correspondence.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
4. The applicant considers that he did not have an effective
remedy before a national authority, as required by Article 13
(Art. 13) of the Convention, in respect of the control of his
correspondence with relatives, public authorities and a Member of
Parliament, as well as generally regarding complaints concerning the
prison conditions.
Article 13 (Art. 13) reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) secures an
effective remedy before a national "authority" to anyone claiming on
arguable grounds to be the victim of a violation of his rights and
freedoms as protected in the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,
Plattform "Ärzte für das Leben" judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no.
139, p. 11, paras. 25, 27).
In the circumstances of the present case, the applicant's
complaints, insofar as they are related to Convention rights, do not
show any appearance of a violation and cannot, therefore, be regarded as
arguable claims within the meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13).
This part of the application is, therefore, also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
5. Moreover, the applicant complains that prior to the trial
he was denied uncontrolled correspondence with his defence counsel,
and that thereby the preparation of his defence was impaired. He
refers in particular to the stopping of a sealed letter to his defence
counsel on 18 August 1986. He invokes Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 6, 8) of
the Convention. Furthermore, he claims that he did not have an
effective remedy in this respect, as required by Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention.
He also complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
that correspondence from the Commission was opened by the prison
authorities.
a. As regards the applicant's complaint about the stopping of a
sealed letter to his defence counsel on 18 August 1986, the Commission
notes that the President of the Salzburg Regional Court did not take a
formal decison upon the applicant's complaint about this incident. On
19 November 1986 he sent instructions to the Director of the Salzburg
Prison concerning the legal provisions on the control of
correspondence from remand prisoners, and their application in the
applicant's case. He assumed that these rules would be correctly
applied in the future, as in the past. The applicant was informed
about the letter on 29 November 1986.
In these circumstances, the Commission, taking in particular
the delayed information of the applicant into account, considers that
the action taken by the President of the Salzburg Regional Court upon
the applicant's specific complaint did not give redress. With regard
to the control of his correspondence with defence counsel, the
applicant may, therefore, still claim to be a victim of a violation of
his Convention rights within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1
(Art. 25-1) of the Convention.
b. The Government contend that the applicant failed to exhaust,
as required under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the remedies
available to him under Austrian law with regard to his complaint about
the control of his correspondence with his defence counsel. The
Supreme Court had not examined this complaint lodged in the
applicant's plea of nullity on the ground that it had not been raised
at the trial.
The Commission recalls that the burden of proving the
existence of available and sufficient domestic remedies lies upon the
State invoking the rule (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Deweer judgment of 27
February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26).
The Commission notes that the applicant did not only lodge a
complaint with the President of the Salzburg Regional Court about the
stopping of the letter to his defence counsel. He also raised the
issue of correspondence with counsel and resulting restrictions of his
defence rights at the trial on 30 October 1986. The Government did
not show to what extent the applicant could have made a further
particular request at the trial, which could have been subject to
review by the Supreme Court.
The Commission finds that in this respect the applicant has
exhausted the domestic remedies available to him under Austrian law.
c. The Commission considers that the applicant's complaints about
the control of his correspondence with his defence counsel and with
the Commission as well as the absence of an effective remedy in this
respect raise difficult issues of fact and law which are of such
complexity, that their determination should depend upon a full
examination of the merits. These complaints cannot, therefore, be
declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them
inadmissible has been established.
6. The Commission has further considered the applicant's
(Art. complaint under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) in fine of the
Convention that the Austrian authorities hindered the effective
exercise of his right to petition the Commission by withholding
necessary documents, depriving him of the application form, and
opening letters to him from the Commission. Article 25 para. 1
provides: (Art. 25-1)
"The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming
to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been
lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the
Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High
Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."
As the Commission has found that the matter of opening of its
letter to the applicant by the prison authorities raised a prima facie
issue under Article 8 (Art. of the Convention, it considers that the
applicant's complaint under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) should also
be further examined.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the applicant's complaints about
the control of his correspondence with his defence counsel and
resulting restrictions on his defence (Articles 6 and 8
(Art. 6, 8) of the Convention) and the absence of an
effective remedy in this respect (Article 13 (Art. 13) of
the Convention), as well as his complaint about the opening
of a letter from the Commission (Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention), without prejudging the merits;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application;
DECIDES TO EXAMINE FURTHER whether the applicant was
hindered in the effective exercise of his right of petition
under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) in fine of the Convention.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)