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K. v. THE NETHERLANDS

Doc ref: 15928/89 • ECHR ID: 001-1750

Document date: May 13, 1992

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

K. v. THE NETHERLANDS

Doc ref: 15928/89 • ECHR ID: 001-1750

Document date: May 13, 1992

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 15928/89

                      by J.K.

                      against the Netherlands

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 13 May 1992, the following members being present:

             MM.  S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

             Mrs. G. H. THUNE

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  L. LOUCAIDES

                  J.-C. GEUS

                  A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO

             Mr.  K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 6 December 1989

by J.K. against the Netherlands and registered on 20 December 1989

under file No. 15928/89;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1964 and is residing

in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.  She is represented before the

Commission by Mr. H.G. Kersting, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.

      On 9 October 1986, on the platform of the Amsterdam Central

Station where a special "Olympic" train carrying an official delegation

was bound to leave for Lausanne, the applicant, without any permission

thereto from the Railway authorities, started to unfold a banner with

the words "No Olympics" in order to protest against the candidature of

Amsterdam for the 1992 Olympic Games.  At that point in time the

applicant was, together with others, removed from this platform by

Railway Police officers assisted by Municipal Police Officers. The

applicant was not prosecuted.

      In 1988 the applicant started civil proceedings before the

District Court (Kantongerecht) of Amsterdam against the Mayor of

Amsterdam and the Dutch Railway Company.  She requested the Court to

award her 1.992 Dutch guilders for non-material damages for the alleged

unlawful police action and to declare Article 5 paras. 1 and 3 (f) of

the General Transport Regulations (Algemeen Reglement Vervoer-Stbl.

1966, 566), which prohibits, inter alia, the display of objects at a

railway station without prior permission by the railway authorities in

order to prevent disturbance of the order, safety or the good running

of operations, as invalid for being contrary to, inter alia, Articles

9 and 10 of the Convention. The General Transport Regulations are based

on the Passenger Transport Act (Wet Personenvervoer).

      The District Court rejected the applicant's requests on 30 June

1989.  The District Court considered, inter alia, that the mere fact

that the applicant was denied the opportunity to express her opinion

at a specific place on a specific point in time did not constitute such

an infringement of her right to freedom of expression that it would

create damage to be valued in terms of money.

      Against this decision no appeal was possible.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention

that by forcibly removing her from the station platform, whereas she

did not disturb public order, the authorities did not limit her rights

under these provisions but completely deprived her of these rights.

THE LAW

      The applicant complains under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) of

the Convention that the police, by forcibly removing her from the

station platform, completely deprived her of her rights under these

provisions.

      Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) provides:

      "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience

      and religion; this right includes freedom to change his

      religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in

      community with others and in public or in private, to

      manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

      practice and observance."

      In this case, the Commission notes that the applicant wished to

protest against the candidature of Amsterdam for the 1992 Olympic Games

by, inter alia, unfolding a banner with the words "No Olympics".

      The Commission recalls that Article 9 (Art. 9) primarily protects

the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the area

which is sometimes called the forum internum.  In addition, it protects

acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes such as acts of

worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or

belief in a generally recognised form (cf. No. 11308/84, Dec. 13.3.86,

D.R. 46 p. 200).

      The Commission does not find that the applicant, although her aim

may be of an idealistic nature, was manifesting a belief ("conviction")

within the meaning of Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention.

The applicant's removal from the platform by the police did, therefore,

not constitute an infringement of her rights under Article 9 para. 1

(Art. 9-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      The applicant also relied on Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention, which provides:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This

      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive

      and impart information and ideas without interference by

      public authority and regardless of frontiers [...].

      2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with

      it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such

      formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are

      prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic

      society, in the interests of national security, territorial

      integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder

      or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the

      protection of the reputation or rights of others, for

      preventing the disclosure of information received in

      confidence, or for maintaining the authority and

      impartiality of the judiciary."

      The Commission considers that the facts complained of by the

applicant must be considered as an interference with the exercise of

her right to freedom of expression.

      The question then arises whether this interference was justified

under the terms of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2).

      The Commission notes that the applicant had no prior permission

to demonstrate on the departure platform as required by the General

Transport Regulations. The Commission observes that the aim of

requiring such a permission is the prevention of a disturbance of the

order, safety or good running of operations in railway stations. The

Commission further notes that the applicant was not prosecuted for

having demonstrated and that the applicant does not complain that she

has been prevented from protesting at another place.

      The Commission considers the requirement of a prior permission

as referred to in the General Transport Regulations to be a formality,

condition or restriction as prescribed by law and which can be regarded

as necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder.

      The Commission is, therefore, of the opinion that the

interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10 para. 1

(Art. 10-1) of the Convention was justified under para. 2 of this

provision.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)

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