AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 17101/90

                      by Mohamed Al FAYED, Ali FAYED

                      and Salah FAYED

                      and the House of Fraser Holdings plc

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

15 May 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 F. ERMACORA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

           Sir   Basil HALL

           MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 30 August 1990 by

Mohamed Al FAYED, Ali FAYED and Salah FAYED and the House of Fraser

Holdings plc against the United Kingdom and registered on 30 August

1990 under file No. 17101/90;

      Having regard to:

-     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the

Commission;

-     the Government's written observations of 10 June 1991 to which

the applicants replied on 15 November 1991;

-     the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 15 May 1992;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first three applicants are Egyptian citizens, born in 1933,

1943 and 1939 respectively.  They are brothers and businessmen.  The

fourth applicant is a limited public company which is owned by the

brothers.  The applicants are represented before the Commission by

Messrs. Herbert Smith, Solicitors, London.

      The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties, may

be summarised as follows:

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      The application arises out of an investigation into the affairs

of the fourth applicant by Inspectors appointed by the Secretary of

State for Trade and Industry, pursuant to section 432 (2) of the

Companies Act 1985, and the publication of the Inspectors' report in

its entirety by the respondent Government.

      In March 1985, the first three applicants acquired ownership of

House of Fraser plc (HOF).  HOF was then and is now one of the largest

groups of department stores in Europe and includes one particularly

well-known London store, Harrods.  The brothers acquired ownership of

HOF through the fourth applicant, the House of Fraser Holdings plc

(HOFH), which at all material times was owned by the brothers.  It had

previously been known as the Al Fayed Investment Trust (UK) Limited and

assumed its present name in December 1985.

      Prior to the HOF takeover, in or about early November 1984, on

professional advice, the brothers appointed Broad Street Associates to

act as their public relations advisers and, with their assistance, the

brothers and their advisers led the press to receive and present a

positive picture of their origins, wealth, business interests and

resources.  Upon the basis of this picture, which they had a part in

painting, they enjoyed, for a time, an esteem or reputation which was

highly valuable to them.  Between 2 and 10 November 1984 the first

applicant gave separate interviews to The Observer, The Sunday

Telegraph and The Daily Mail.  The applicants' public relations

consultants played a part in making the arrangements.  A further

interview, involving the brothers, arranged by the consultants, took

place on 10 March 1985.  In these interviews the brothers described a

wealthy, distinguished and established family background.  They gave

a similar picture to Mr. MacArthur of their merchant bankers Kleinwort

Benson.  Mr. MacArthur accepted it and, acting on their behalf,

conveyed that picture by a press release in November 1984 and in a

television interview in early March 1985.  There were other press

interviews about the family background for which the applicants were

responsible.  They thus took active steps to promote their own

reputations in the public domain.  The acceptance of the brothers by

the City of London and by Government was later considered to be crucial

to an understanding of the events surrounding their takeover of HOF.

      The takeover was vigorously but unsuccessfully opposed by Lonrho

plc (Lonrho) and, in particular, its Chief Executive, Mr. Rowland, a

former business associate, turned rival, of the applicants.  In 1984

Lonrho had sold its near 30 % share in HOF to the applicants, but when

their directors were obliged to resign from HOF's Board and the

applicants bid to take over HOF completely, relations between Lonrho

and the applicants deteriorated.  Lonrho proceeded to launch an

acrimonious campaign against the applicants.  In opposing the

applicants' bid for HOF, Lonrho had made submissions to Ministers

concerning unfair competition and the undesirability of HOF falling

into foreign hands.  It was alleged that the applicants were

fraudulently claiming that the funds for the acquisition were theirs

personally.  Lonrho alleged that the brothers were lying about their

money and themselves and that they should not be permitted to acquire

HOF without a thorough inquiry.  However, the applicants' bid was

cleared and accepted, but Lonrho single-mindedly campaigned on through

the media and other publications, and in particular through its

newspaper, The Observer.  The applicants instituted three libel actions

against The Observer in 1985 and 1986 for articles written about them.

In March 1987 Lonrho commenced legal proceedings against the applicants

and their bankers alleging wrongful interference with business,

conspiracy and negligence in connection with HOFH's acquisition of HOF.

These proceedings are to date apparently still pending.  Lonrho was

refused leave to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State's

refusal to refer the applicants' acquisition of HOF to the Monopolies

and Mergers Commission (MMC).

      After two years of powerful and unrelenting pressure by Lonrho

upon the United Kingdom Government, on 9 April 1987, the Secretary of

State for Trade and Industry appointed two Inspectors to investigate

the affairs of HOFH and, in particular, the circumstances surrounding

the acquisition of shares in HOF in 1984 and 1985.  The appointment of

the Inspectors was made by the Secretary of State under section 432 (2)

of the Companies Act 1985 (the 1985 Act).

      The Inspectors stated that their investigation was an unusual one

and that in order to establish what had occurred during the takeover

they had been obliged to make findings on contested issues of fact.

      The principal questions which they addressed when investigating

the affairs of HOFH were as follows:

      "(i)       Were the Fayeds who they said they were, and if not

                 who were they?

      (ii)       Did they acquire HOF with their own unencumbered

                 funds?

      (iii)      Did they deliberately mislead, whether directly

                 or indirectly, those who represented them to the

                 authorities and the public?

      (iv)       If so, did they seek to frustrate those who tried

                 to establish the true facts, and if so how?

      (v)        What steps did the Board of HOF and its advisers

                 and the Fayeds' financial and legal advisers take

                 before they gave the comfort that they appeared

                 to give to those who relied on their words or

                 actions?

      (vi)       Were the authorities - the officials of the OFT

                 (Office of Fair Trading) and the DTI (Department

                 of Trade and Industry) and, eventually, Ministers -

                 or the public misled about the Fayeds?  If so,

                 how and why?"

      (The Inspectors' report, para. 1.11).

      The Inspectors also stated that, throughout their investigation,

they were not concerned solely with simple questions relating to the

direct control of the purchase money which was used to buy HOF.  They

were concerned about the statements which the applicants made, or which

they allowed others to make on their behalf, which had the effect of

influencing people to act favourably towards them.

      During the course of the investigation, the Inspectors identified

matters upon which they wished to receive evidence.  If any uncertainty

or issue arose in relation to the provision of such evidence, these

were discussed in the course of meetings or through correspondence

between the Inspectors' staff and the applicants' solicitors.

Thereafter, information was provided to the Inspectors by way of

memoranda, together with copy documentation.  In addition, the

Inspectors received oral evidence by interviewing witnesses.  They

interviewed Mohamed and Ali Fayed on 14 October 1987 and again on

8 and 9 March 1988.  All proceedings were conducted in private.  There

was no opportunity for the applicants to confront or to cross-examine

witnesses, it being well-established as a matter of English law that

the Inspectors were not obliged to afford such an opportunity to

anyone.

      It was agreed between the Inspectors and the applicants that,

having assimilated the factual information supplied, the Inspectors

would notify the applicants of the provisional conclusions they had

reached and the material upon which they had relied in reaching such

conclusions.  The Inspectors would then consider such submissions as

the applicants might make in respect of these conclusions.

      Respect for personal privacy was a matter of particular concern

to the brothers.  It was not in dispute that they had occupied a

position as trusted and confidential advisers to Heads of State.  This

fact made respect for the privacy of their affairs especially

important.  They claimed that loss of confidence in their ability to

maintain privacy would put in jeopardy their relationships, as

businessmen and confidential advisers, with Heads of State and other

important and influential individuals.

      The Inspectors' approach to matters of privacy and

confidentiality is summed up at paragraphs 26.44 - 26.45 of their

subsequent report as follows:

      "We were aware of the Fayeds' concerns about privacy.

      However, if private people incorporate a company, in

      which they become directors, and which makes public

      representations about their affairs, Inspectors who

      are appointed to investigate the truth of those

      representations must balance their concern to preserve

      the directors' privacy as far as practicable (in

      Chapter 12 for instance we have deliberately refrained

      from making detailed findings in respect of many of

      the Fayeds' private companies whose accounts we have

      seen) against their duty to do the job which they

      were appointed to perform.

      If the Fayeds had chosen to say nothing this might

      have created evidential difficulties for us.  But

      because they wished us to make findings in their

      favour they brought witnesses to see us ...

      and gave us evidence about their private affairs

      which it was then our duty to test."

      At the start of the investigation the brothers expressly accepted

that the Inspectors were entitled to enquire into the accuracy of

statements which had been made by them or on their behalf.  These were

the statements at the heart of the enquiry.  Only at the very end of

the enquiry did they alter that stance and challenge the Inspectors'

entitlement to enquire into certain aspects of their private life.  The

Inspectors rejected the challenge and gave their reasons for so doing.

The Inspectors were entitled to seek confidential information from

third parties, but before doing so they gave the brothers an

opportunity to satisfy them as to the accuracy of the statements "in

whatever manner was least obtrusive to their privacy" (report paras.

16.2.5 and 16.6.2).  The law did not permit them to compel the brothers

to produce personal bank statements (which would have gone far to

confirm or refute the accuracy of the statements) nor, save to a very

limited extent, did the brothers consent to such production.  The

Inspectors considered that the brothers were in breach of their duty

to give all the assistance which they were reasonably required to give.

The Government stated that the Inspectors were entitled to certify to

a court that the brothers were refusing to answer questions, produce

documents or to give such assistance as they required (section 436 of

the 1985 Act).  The court could then have taken steps to sanction the

brothers if, after hearing evidence, it was satisfied that they were

in breach of their duty.  The Inspectors, however, were of the opinion

that they could complete their task without the need to resort to such

a serious measure and chose to pursue the matter without making such

a certificate.

      In October 1987 and thereafter Lonrho publicly criticised the

conduct of the investigation by the Inspectors and sought an additional

two month period in which to assemble and submit evidence to them.

Through its lawyers Lonrho submitted that the rules of natural justice

required the Inspectors to allow Lonrho access to the information the

Inspectors had received from the applicants because Lonrho's commercial

reputation would suffer if the Inspectors dismissed the complaints

which it had made so publicly.  The Inspectors dismissed Lonrho's

application for access to the applicants' evidence, but permitted

Lonrho to have a longer period in which to adduce evidence to them,

relating primarily to the personal background of the brothers and their

family.  The applicants' solicitors protested to the Inspectors

vigorously about this decision.  The Inspectors accepted that Lonrho

and its directors had pursued their ends in a remarkably single-minded

manner.

      The Inspectors' provisional conclusions were made available to

the applicants on 12 April 1988 and, after much correspondence, it was

agreed that the applicants could make final submissions to the

Inspectors by 15 July 1988.  On 23 July 1988, the Inspectors delivered

their Report to the Secretary of State.  The Inspectors concluded that

the applicants had dishonestly misrepresented their origins, their

wealth, their business interests and their resources to the Secretary

of State, the OFT, the Press, the HOF Board and HOF shareholders and

their own advisers; that during the course of their investigations, the

Inspectors had received evidence from the applicants, under solemn

affirmation and in written memoranda, which was false and which the

applicants knew to be false; in addition, that the applicants had

produced a set of documents they knew to be false; that this evidence

related mainly, but not exclusively, to their background, their past

business activities and the way in which they came to be in control of

enormous funds in the Autumn of 1984 and the Spring of 1985.  The

Inspectors were satisfied that the main thrust of Lonrho's attack on

the applicants was well founded on a sound basis of substantiated fact

(report para. 1.20).  However, the Inspectors did not reject the

entirety of the applicants' evidence and praised part of their work.

Thus the report included, for example, findings that "... the departure

of the Lonrho directors and their replacement by the Fayeds brought

harmony to a board where previously discord had existed" (report para.

6.6.9); and that "the Fayeds' considerable ability to identify assets

with a potential for capital appreciation has undoubtedly been an

important element in their business success" (report para. 12.6.10).

In relation to the valuation of the brothers' banking interests the

Inspectors rejected the evidence of an Observer journalist and accepted

the figure which they advanced.  In the final chapter of the report the

Inspectors make complimentary findings of fact and express favourable

opinions about HOFH.  In the concluding paragraph the Inspectors made

it clear that their concerns "have been principally centred on the

specific matters we were appointed to investigate, and not on anything

which has occurred since March 1985".  They regarded the management of

HOF since its acquisition as, subject to certain reservations,

"law-abiding, proper and regular".

      The Secretary of State passed the report to the Director of

Public Prosecutions (the DPP) and the Director of the Serious Fraud

Office (the SFO).  On 29 September 1988, the Department of Trade and

Industry (DTI) issued a press release stating that publication of the

report would be delayed until the SFO had completed its investigations.

After consideration of the report and the accompanying evidence, the

Director of the SFO and the DPP jointly referred the matter to the

Metropolitan Police on 24 November 1988 and asked for necessary

inquiries to be carried out.  In the summer of 1988, the Secretary of

State also sent copies of the report to the Bank of England, the

Takeover Panel, the Inland Revenue, the OFT and the MMC.

      In early November 1988, Lonrho sought judicial review of the

Director General of Fair Trading's failure to advise the Secretary of

State with regard to a possible referral to the MMC.  This application

was withdrawn when the Director General subsequently tendered his

advice to the Secretary of State.  On 9 November 1988, the Secretary

of State announced that, consistent with the advice of the Director

General of Fair Trading, he had decided against the referral of HOFH's

acquisition of HOF to the MMC, even though the report did disclose new

material facts.  Also in November 1988, Lonrho made an unsuccessful

application for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decisions

(i) not to publish the report immediately and (ii) not to refer the

acquisition to the MMC in the light of the report.  On 30 March 1989,

the day of Lonrho's Annual General Meeting, The Observer newspaper

published a 16 page special midweek edition devoted solely to extracts

from and comments on a leaked copy of the report.  On the same day,

Lonrho posted between 2,000 and 3,000 copies of the special edition to

persons named on a mailing list to whom Lonrho had been regularly

sending propaganda literature hostile to the applicants.  The High

Court immediately granted injunctions, on the applications of the

Secretary of State and HOFH, restraining any further disclosure of the

report or its contents.  On 10 April 1989, before Lonrho's appeal in

its unsuccessful judicial review application was before the House of

Lords, Lord Keith of Kinkel raised the question whether the publication

of the special edition and its posting to, inter alia, four members of

the House of Lords who were due to hear Lonrho's appeal, was a contempt

of court by Lonrho, Mr. Rowland or the editor of The Observer.

Subsequently, the House of Lords held (<1989> 3 WLR 535) that the

publication of the special edition did not in the circumstances create

any risk that the course of justice in the appellate proceedings

challenging the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision to

defer the publication of the report would be impeded or prejudiced, and

they dismissed the contempt proceedings.

      During the course of an interview broadcast on BBC Radio 4's news

programme, Today, on 4 April 1989, the Secretary of State stated, prior

to its publication, that the Inspectors' report "clearly disclosed

wrongdoing".  This gave rise to substantial press reports.

      On 1 March 1990, the Director of the SFO and the DPP announced

that their inquiries into the matter were complete and that they would

not be taking further action.  They had carefully considered the report

and the accompanying evidence.  In a joint statement issued on that

date they said:

      "The directors are now satisfied that all lines of enquiry

      have been pursued and that the evidence available is

      insufficient to afford a realistic prospect of conviction

      for any criminal offence relating to any matter of

      substance raised in the report."

      The Attorney General expressed himself satisfied that the

conclusion reached by the two directors was the correct one on the

basis of the admissible and available evidence.  On 12 March 1990, he

stated to the House of Commons, in reply to a question (Hansard, House

of Commons, 12 March 1990, column 14):

      "Whereas it was open to the inspectors to take account

      of hearsay evidence if they thought that it was reliable

      - and of course it was open to them to reach the

      conclusion that they did - it would not have been open

      to a jury in a criminal case to convict upon evidence

      of the same character.  The inspectors are entitled to take

      account of evidence covering a wider scope than that

      available in criminal proceedings in an English court ...

      ... Inquiries were pursued in every part of the world

      indicated by the inspectors' report, but the

      of the SFO and the DPP> had to conclude, as they said

      in their joint statement issued on 1 March, that there

      was insufficient evidence available for use in an English

      court in English criminal proceedings on any matter of

      substance raised in the inspectors' report to warrant

      the bringing of criminal proceedings."

      Also on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of State announced his

intention to publish the report on 7 March 1990.  It is general policy

to publish reports on public companies.  (The fourth applicant, HOFH,

is a public company.)  In this particular case the Government

considered that there were specific grounds of general public interest

justifying publication:

      There had been a complex and lengthy investigation, and the

      public were entitled to learn the result of that investigation

      unless there were compelling reasons why they should not.  There

      were important lessons to be learnt by those involved in

      takeovers from studying the report.  These were categorised under

      six headings as:  (1) the demarcation of responsibility between

      the merchant bank and the solicitor,  (2) knowledge of one's

      client,  (3) appropriate procedures for advisers in relation to

      taking on clients, taking up references, accepting and verifying

      material from other advisers, and accepting instructions from

      clients,  (4) relationships with the media,  (5) relationships

      with the regulatory authorities, and (6) loopholes in the City

      Code on Takeovers and Mergers.  The report contained a

      recommendation that certain features of part XIV of the 1985

      Act (which deals with the investigation of companies and their

      affairs) deserved to be reconsidered in the light of difficulties

      encountered by the inspectors (report para. 1.25).  (Changes were

      later incorporated in the Companies Act 1989.)  It was

      appropriate to acknowledge that the Secretary of State, the OFT,

      the DTI, certain journalists and sections of the press, the Board

      of HOF, the regulatory authorities, and the applicants'

      professional advisers had been misled by the applicants.  Lonrho

      considered that its interests and reputation had been seriously

      and adversely affected by the preparedness of the Secretary of

      State to allow the HOFH bid to go forward in March 1985 without

      a reference to the MMC.  Lonrho would have had a legitimate

      grievance if the explanation for this was suppressed without

      compelling reasons.  There was a need to dispel continuing

      speculation as to the events which had given rise to the

      investigation.  Rumours and speculation were rife.  Publication

      of the report would provide employees and creditors with

      information concerning the way in which HOF and Harrods had been

      run and might be expected to be run in future.  (The Inspectors

      were largely prepared to accept the sincerity of the brothers'

      assurances for the future.)  The brothers had been prepared

      before the Inspectors to attempt to discredit Lonrho,

      Mr. Rowland, The Observer, its editor and others.  It was deemed

      to be in the public interest to publicise both the fact that

      these attempts had been made and the conclusion of the Inspectors

      that they were ill-founded.

      On 2 March 1990, the applicants were provided with

pre-publication copies of the report in confidence, in order to enable

them to consider their position.  Throughout the period from 26 July

1988 to 7 March 1990 the possibility of applying for judicial review

to prevent publication was kept under review by the applicants and

their advisers, but the unanimous view at all stages was that such

proceedings were almost inevitably bound to fail and, accordingly, they

were not commenced.

      On 7 March 1990, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

stated to the House of Commons (Hansard, House of Commons, 7 March

1990, column 873):

      "I should explain to the House that in this matter I have

      three main responsibilities as Secretary of State: first,

      to decide whether to publish the report.  This I have now done

      as soon as possible after I was informed by the prosecution

      authorities that they had withdrawn their objection to

      publication.  Second, I had to consider whether to apply to

      the court to disqualify any director under section 8 of the

      Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  I have concluded

      that it would not be in the public interest to do so.

      Anyone who reads the report can decide for themselves

      what they think of the conduct of those involved.

      Third, I also have responsibility for decisions on

      whether to refer mergers to the Monopolies and Mergers

      Commission.  That responsibility was fully discharged

      by my predecessor.  He had six months from July 1988 in

      which to consider the findings of the inspectors' report

      and to decide whether to refer the matter.  He concluded

      in November 1988 that a reference to the MMC would not

      be appropriate ...

      No other matters require action from me.  I have passed

      the report to all those authorities concerned with

      enforcement and regulation so that they may consider

      whether to take action under their various powers."

      The Secretary of State considered that the publication of the

report and the ensuing publicity would enable people who might have

dealings with the applicants in their capacity as directors to judge

whether their interests were likely to be at risk from the type of

conduct described in the report.  The Secretary of State also publicly

expressed his own view that the Inspectors' findings were correct.  He

stated (Select Committee Report, Annex 6, page 183, paras. 938, 939,

940A):

      "... the allegations in the report have not been substantiated

      in a court of law.  We can all take our view about them and

      I think that the balance of probability is extremely strongly

      that they are accurate, but there is no proof of this.

      ...

      I am not required to say that every fact and opinion in the

      report is true.  These were outside inspectors who were

      appointed to look into these matters, and they published

      their report.  I have no means of checking it word for

      word.  I myself and I think most people are inclined to

      believe that the events revealed are correct, but we have

      no proof - that is all I am saying.

      ...

        It appears that even told

      a succession of lies to the inspectors themselves, who

      were then investigating the lies they had already told.

      Is that right?

        It so appears."

      On 28 March 1990, in the course of a debate in the House of

Lords, the Minister of State for Trade and Industry stated (Hansard,

House of Lords, 28 March 1990, columns 946-7):

      "Although the inspectors concluded that the Fayeds lied

      to the competition authorities at the time of the merger

      - I have no reason to believe that they were wrong, but

      it is for individuals to make up their own minds once

      they have read the report - the inspectors did not

      criticise the Fayeds for the way they were running the

      House of Fraser which they already owned and which

      cannot be taken away from them.  In these circumstances,

      considered that publication

      of the report, which would allow people to judge for

      themselves whether they wished to do business with

      the Fayeds, would be a severe blow to their reputation,

      as indeed I think it has proved."

      The report and its findings were widely reported on television,

radio and in the national press.  The first three applicants claimed

that it very seriously damaged their personal and commercial

reputations as the Minister had predicted.  They also felt compelled

to abandon their libel actions against The Observer newspaper and paid

the latter's £500,000 legal costs.  One month after the publication of

the report the Bank of England served notice of restrictions on Harrods

Bank Ltd in relation to the brothers' positions within that company.

A Parliamentary Select Committee considered that the Secretary of State

had not taken sufficient action against the applicants.  Lonrho

persisted with its attacks.  In May 1990 it applied for judicial review

of the Secretary of State's refusal to apply to the High Court for an

order disqualifying the first three applicants as directors.  These

proceedings are apparently still pending.

B.    The relevant domestic law and practice

      The scope of a section 432 (2) investigation

      The investigation of HOFH was conducted under section 432 (2) of

the Companies Act 1985 in relation to the circumstances surrounding the

acquisition of shares in HOF in 1984 and 1985.  Section 432 (2)

empowers the Secretary of State to appoint Inspectors to investigate

the affairs of a company and to report on them in such manner as he

directs if it appears to him that there are circumstances suggesting

wrongdoing, within the categories of wrongdoing defined in sub-sections

432 (2) (a) to (d).  Section 432 (2) defines those categories of

wrongdoing as follows:

      "(a) that the company's affairs are being or have been

           conducted with intent to defraud its creditors or

           the creditors of any other person, or otherwise

           for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or in a

           manner which is unfairly prejudicial to some part

           of its members, or

      (b)  that any actual or proposed act or omission of the

           company (including an act or omission on its

           behalf) is or would be so prejudicial, or that the

           company was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful

           purpose, or

      (c)  that persons concerned with the company's formation

           or the management of its affairs have in connection

           therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other

           misconduct towards it or towards its members, or

      (d)  that the company's members have not been given all

           the information with respect to its affairs which

           they might reasonably expect."

      The Secretary of State does not generally disclose to the company

concerned the reasons for the appointment of Inspectors to investigate

its affairs.  The Secretary of State is under no statutory obligation

to do so (Norwest Holst Limited v. Secretary of State <1978> 3 WLR 73

(CA)).  In this case, when requested by the House of Lords to do so in

the course of Lonrho's judicial review applications, the Government's

counsel stated that the Secretary of State had acted under section 432

(2) (a) in appointing the Inspectors.

      The basis for a section 432 (2) investigation

      Before appointing Inspectors, it must appear to the Secretary of

State that there are circumstances suggesting one or more of the types

of wrongdoing described in section 432 (2) (a) to (d).  The Secretary

of State is not required to limit the powers of investigation of the

Inspectors to the matters set forth in section 432 (2), and Inspectors

are not obliged, before they report, to consider whether every matter

on which they report can properly be described as falling within

section 432 (2), and to exclude it if it cannot (the Inspectors' report

in this case, para. 26.18).

      The Inspectors' powers to obtain information

      Section 434 confers wide powers upon the Inspectors to obtain

information, if necessary by compulsion, from officers and agents of

the company whose affairs are being investigated.  An answer given by

a person to a question put to him in exercise of powers conferred by

section 434 may be used in evidence against him (section 434 (5)).  By

virtue of section 436, obstruction of the Inspectors is treated as a

contempt of court, and is therefore punishable by imprisonment or fine.

      The Inspectors' duty to act fairly

      The Inspectors have a duty to act fairly and to give anyone whom

they propose to condemn or criticise in their report a fair opportunity

to answer what is alleged against them (In re Pergamon Press Ltd <1971>

1 Ch. 388 (CA)).  However, the Inspectors are not a court of law; they

are masters of their own procedure and are under no duty to act

judicially (ibid., pp. 399-400 per Lord Denning M.R.; pp. 406-07 per

Buckley L.J.).  Except for the duty to act fairly, Inspectors are not

subject to any set rules or procedures and are free to act at their own

discretion.  There is no right for a person who is at risk of being

condemned by the Inspectors to cross-examine witnesses (ibid., p. 400B

per Lord Denning M.R.).  It is not necessary for the Inspectors to put

their tentative conclusions to the witnesses in order to give them a

chance to refute them.  It is sufficient in law for the Inspectors to

put to the witnesses what has been said against them by other persons

or in documents to enable them to deal with those criticisms in the

course of the investigation (Maxwell v. Department of Trade and

Industry <1974> 1 Q.B. 523 (CA)).

      Publication of the report of the investigation

      The Secretary of State is empowered by section 437 (3) (c) to

decide whether or not to print and publish the Inspectors' report.

Although he has a very wide discretion in deciding whether or not to

publish the whole report, he is precluded by section 437 (3) (c) from

deciding to publish only parts or a synopsis of it.  Publication may,

however, be deferred if there is a possibility that criminal

proceedings may be taken, in order to avoid the possibility of

prejudice to such proceedings.

      Policy concerning the publication of Inspectors' reports

      generally

      The question of whether an Inspector's report should be published

is considered in each case on its merits.  The DTI's general policy is

to publish reports on public companies wherever possible, as being

matters of public interest.  The fourth applicant, HOFH, is a public

company.

      Companies are in a privileged legal position resulting in

particular from the limited liability which their members enjoy.

Therefore, in circumstances where the Secretary of State has decided

that the affairs of a large public company should be investigated under

the provisions of section 432 of the 1985 Act because he is satisfied

that the conditions of that section have been met and that the

circumstances are of sufficient concern to warrant the substantial cost

of an inspection, it is important that the Inspectors' report

explaining the underlying facts and the conclusions that they draw from

them should be made public unless there are overriding reasons to the

contrary.

      Privilege from defamation proceedings

      In re Pergamon Press Ltd (<1971> Ch. 388 (CA)), at page 400G,

Lord Denning M.R. stated that Inspectors

      "should make their report with courage and frankness,

      keeping nothing back.  The public interest demands it.

      They need have no fear because their report, so far as

      I can judge, is protected by an absolute privilege: see

      Home v. Bentinck (1820) 2 Brod. & Bing. 130, 162, per

      Lord Ellenborough, and Chatterton v. Secretary of State

      for India in Council <1895> 2 Q.B. 189, 191, per Lord

      Esher M.R."

      Even if, contrary to Lord Denning's observation, the Inspectors'

report is subject to a qualified rather than an absolute privilege,

neither the Inspectors nor the Secretary of State could be successfully

sued for defamation in publishing the report, except upon proof of

express malice (i.e., the desire to injure as the dominant motive for

the defamatory publication: see Horrocks v. Lowe <1975> A.C. 135 (HL),

at page 149 per Lord Diplock).

      Judicial review

      The grounds on which administrative action (such as the Secretary

of State's decision to publish the report) is subject to judicial

control are the three traditional grounds of judicial review described

by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the

Civil Service (<1985> AC 375 (HL)), at pages 410-11.  These are

illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.  "Illegality"

means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that

regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.

"Irrationality" applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its

defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible

person who had applied his mind to the question to be arrived at could

have arrived at it.  "Procedural impropriety" covers failure to act

with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the

decision.

      The Secretary of State had a duty to exercise his discretion

whether to publish the Inspectors' report by reference to relevant and

not irrelevant considerations, and in a manner which was not

unreasonable in the sense of the Wednesbury principles (Associated

Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223

(CA)).  "Irrationality" or "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is a narrowly

restricted ground of judicial review of an administrative decision.

"Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment

and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum

ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it

is the duty of the court to leave the decision of fact to the public

body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save

in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or

unconsciously, are acting perversely" (per Lord Brightman, in R v.

Hillingdon L.B.C., ex parte Puhlhofer <1986> A.C. 484 (HL), at page

528).

      No duty on the Secretary of State to give reasons for his

      decision to publish

      There is no general duty on a public body to give reasons as a

matter of administrative fairness (R v. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex

parte Cunningham, Times Law Report, 13 June 1990).  Thus, there was no

duty on the Secretary of State to give reasons for his refusal to make

a reference to the MMC of HOFH's bid for HOF (R v. Secretary of State

for Trade and Industry, ex parte Lonrho, <1989> 1 WLR 525, per Lord

Keith of Kinkel at page 539H).  Similarly, there is no duty on the

Secretary of State to give reasons for his decision to publish the

report.  The absence of any duty to give reasons for the decisions of

public authorities limits the scope of judicial review.

      The powers of the Bank of England, and safeguards for persons

      affected by their exercise

      The regulatory duties and functions of the Bank of England and

the controls placed upon them are contained in the Banking Act 1987.

The powers of the Bank of England include the power to grant or refuse

to institutions authorisation to carry on a deposit-taking business

(section 9).  The minimum criteria for authorisation of an institution

include a requirement that every director, manager and executive

shareholder and indirect controller of the institution is a fit and

proper person to hold his position (schedule 3 para. 1(1)).  In

determining whether a person is fit and proper, regard must be had,

inter alia, to his probity (ibid. para. 1(2)) and regard may be had to

any evidence that he has, inter alia, engaged in any business practices

appearing to the Bank to be deceitful, oppressive or otherwise improper

(whether unlawful or not) or which otherwise reflect discredit on his

method of conducting business (ibid. para. 1(3)(c)).  The Bank may

revoke (section 11) or restrict (section 12) the authorisation of an

institution if, inter alia, the minimum criteria for authorisation are

not met by the institution.  A party aggrieved (including, in the case

of a revocation or restriction, the individual concerned) by any

decision of the Bank may appeal to a tribunal consisting of an

experienced lawyer and two persons with experience in accountancy and

banking respectively (section 28).  The tribunal has power to confirm

or reverse the decision complained of (section 29(2)) and has to

determine whether the Bank's finding of lack of probity was not

justified by the evidence on which it was based.  There are further

rights of appeal on a point of law to the High Court, and, with leave,

to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords (section 31).

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain that the making and publication of the

Inspectors' report has

      (a)  determined their civil right to honour and reputation,

           in breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention;

      (b)  determined criminal charges against them, in breach

           of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention;

      (c)  violated the presumption of innocence, in breach of

           Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention;

      (d)  arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfered with their

           honour and reputation, protected as part of their

           right to respect for private life, in breach of

           Article 8 of the Convention;

      (e)  arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfered with the

           peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, in breach

           of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

      The applicants further complain that, in breach of Article 13 of

the Convention, there are no effective remedies before the national

authorities of the United Kingdom for any of the above Convention

claims.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 30 August 1990 and registered

on the same day.

      After a preliminary examination of the case by the Rapporteur,

the Commission considered the admissibility of the application on

7 December 1990.  It decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the

Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent

Government and to invite the parties to submit their written

observations on admissibility and merits.  The Government's

observations were submitted on 10 June 1991 after three extensions of

the time limit fixed for this purpose.  The applicants replied on

15 November 1991 after two extensions of the time limit.  On

20 February 1992 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of the

parties on the question whether Article 6 para. 1 (civil) of the

Convention had been violated.  The hearing was held on 15 May 1992.

The applicants were represented by Mr. A. Lester QC, Counsel,

Mr. P. Goulding, Counsel, Ms. L. Hutchinson, Solicitor, Messrs. Herbert

Smith, and Mr. D. Marvin, Attorney, Washington DC.  The Government were

represented by their Agent, Mrs. A. Glover, Mr. M. Baker, QC, Counsel,

Mr. J. Eadie, Counsel, Mrs. T. Dunstan, Mr. M. Osborne and

Mr. J. Moore, all three of whom were from the Department of Trade and

Industry.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants have complained about the making, contents and

publication of the Inspectors' report on the affairs of the fourth

applicant, a company.  Before dealing with the specific claims, the

Commission would first exclude the fourth applicant company from the

purview of the application.  The essence of the case concerns the

criticisms made in the Inspectors' report about the first three

applicants and the effects of the report upon their honour and

reputation.  Even though they own the fourth applicant company no

evidence of any criticism of the company or any prejudice to its

reputation has been put forward.  In these circumstances the Commission

concludes that the fourth applicant company cannot claim to be a victim

of a violation of the Convention.  It follows that, in respect of the

fourth applicant company, the application is incompatible ratione

personae with the provisions of the Convention and this aspect of the

case must, therefore, be rejected under Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.  Reference hereafter to the applicants

is a reference to the first three applicants only.

2.    Turning to the specific issues, the applicants have complained

of a denial of effective access to the civil courts in that the

Inspectors' report allegedly determined their civil right to honour and

reputation, in breach of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention, which reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

      to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

      independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

      Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public

      may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of

      morals, public order or national security in a democratic

      society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of

      the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent

      strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special

      circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of

      justice."

      The Commission finds that the complaint has two aspects:

a)    that the applicants cannot bring a civil claim against the

Inspectors or the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in order

to clear their reputations, allegedly sullied in the report;

b)    that the applicants felt obliged to withdraw libel proceedings

against The Observer newspaper because, after the publication of the

report, which partly related to matters in issue in those proceedings,

a fair hearing would allegedly have been impossible.

      The applicants have submitted that the publication of the report

resulted in massive adverse publicity in the media, the wholesale

destruction of their reputations and a general belief in their

dishonesty and criminal guilt.  They have claimed, inter alia, that

they had no effective safeguards or domestic remedies against this

because of the great breadth of the Secretary of State's and the

Inspectors' discretionary powers, the restrictive scope of judicial

review and the impossibility of suing the Inspectors or the Secretary

of State in the civil courts for defamation because they would have had

a defence of absolute or qualified privilege.  The applicants have

complained that the report hopelessly blighted the defamation

proceedings against The Observer, which they withdrew as a result.

Other such proceedings would have been futile.

      The Government have submitted, inter alia, that the applicants'

complaints about the consequences for them of the publication of the

report were exaggerated and unsubstantiated.  The extensive publicity

after the report's publication was ephemeral.  Whilst it is true that

an action in defamation against these public officials would probably

have been successfully defended on the ground of privilege, this merely

reflects the limited content of the right to reputation under domestic

law, rather than the right of access to court for determining the

applicants' civil rights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.  The Government have contended that the applicants could

have brought defamation proceedings against others, particularly

proceedings against Lonrho and The Observer, and those who worked for

them, in respect of the allegedly serious improprieties committed by

them during Lonrho's acrimonious campaign and, more particularly, in

respect of the very matters central to the Inspectors' report.  The

Government have disputed a claim made by the applicants that any jury

trial of these issues would have been biased and that they therefore

had to withdrew the defamation proceedings against The Observer.  They

have contended that the report could not be used as evidence in those

proceedings.  The Government emphasised that the decision of the

Secretary of State to publish the report was not a decision directed

against the applicants; it was a decision taken in the general public

interest, including that of freedom of expression and information,

having regard to the overall content of the report.

      The Commission considers that this part of the application raises

a serious question of fact and law which is of such complexity that its

determination should depend on an examination of the merits.  This

aspect of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it

inadmissible has been established.

3.    The applicants have next complained that the publication of the

Inspectors' report violated the presumption of innocence.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, cited above,

guarantees a fair hearing in the determination of criminal charges.

Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) provides that anyone "charged with a

criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty

according to law".

      The applicants have contended that the Inspectors' report made

statements about them which amounted to findings of criminal conduct.

However, Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention requires public

officials to refrain from declaring or pronouncing that an individual

is guilty of a criminal offence, where guilt has not been proved by a

fair judicial process satisfying the requirements of Article 6

(Art. 6) (cf. eg. Eur. Court H.R., Adolf judgment of 26 March 1982,

Series A No. 49; Deweer judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A No. 35;

and No. 7986/77, Krause v. Switzerland, Dec. 3.10.78, D.R. 13 p. 73).

      The Government have submitted, inter alia, that the applicants

were not persons who had been charged with a criminal offence within

the meaning of Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the

Convention.  The Inspectors had not conducted a criminal investigation.

They had been appointed to investigate and report on the fourth

applicant's affairs, and, in particular the acquisition of shares in

House of Fraser plc (HOF) in 1984 and 1985.  Before the Inspectors'

report was published it was clearly and publicly stated by the

competent authorities that no criminal proceedings would be brought

against the applicants.  The Inspectors had not made any findings of

criminal conduct by the applicants.  They considered that the

applicants had been dishonest over certain matters, but although

dishonesty is reprehensible, it is not a criminal offence.

      The Commission considers that while the Inspectors' report was

being studied by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the

Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the applicants could have

considered themselves affected by a possible criminal prosecution and

therefore, "charged", within the meaning of Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention (cf. the Court's aforementioned Deweer

judgment of 27 February 1990, p. 24, para. 46, and the Adolf judgment

of 26 March 1982, p. 15, para. 30).  However, once these officials had

issued their public statements on 1 March 1990 that the applicants

would not be prosecuted, there can, in the Commission's view, be no

question of the applicants being deemed to have been "charged" any

longer.  The Inspectors' report was published a week after the DPP and

SFO statements.  The report made no findings that the applicants had

committed any criminal offence, although it was critical of certain

aspects of their business affairs.  In these circumstances the

Commission concludes that the applicants' rights under Article 6 paras.

1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention in respect of the earlier

risk of criminal prosecution were not infringed.  It follows that this

aspect of the case is manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    The applicants have also complained that the making and

publication of the Inspectors' report constituted an unjustified

interference with their private lives, contrary to Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as

follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private

      ... life ...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others."

      The applicants have submitted, inter alia, that English law

provides no enforceable right to privacy and no safeguards or

limitations on the scope of investigations and reports of the kind seen

in this case.  The report referred to unwarranted aspects of the

applicants' private lives and labelled them as dishonest, which had

adverse effects on their reputation.  Even if some of the

investigations into the applicants' personal background was legitimate,

it was unacceptable and wholly disproportionate to inquire into details

of the Fayeds' family and business history, followed by the wholesale

publication of private information.  Any public interest in the

conclusions of the Inspectors or the general lessons to be learnt for

future commercial practice could have been satisfied by partial

publication of the report, but English law did not allow this.  The

report could only be published in its entirety or not at all.  Nor was

there any need to protect others' right such as those of Lonrho, by

publishing the report in its entirety, as their rights were adequately

secured by the ordinary courts.

      The Government have contended, inter alia, that the report did

not interfere with the private lives of the applicants.  They stated

that the applicants had themselves put their reputation into the public

domain before the Inspectors were appointed by the hiring of public

relations professionals for this purpose and ensuring media coverage.

The inquiries made by the Inspectors were necessary to establish

whether the applicants were who they claimed to be - longstanding

successful and wealthy businessmen.  The Inspectors were aware of the

need for privacy and proceeded in whatever manner was least obtrusive

to the applicants' privacy (cf. the Inspectors' report paras. 16.2.5

and 16.6.2, pp. 5-6 above).  Even if there had been an interference

with the applicants' private lives, it was in accordance with the law

and necessary for overwhelming reasons of public interest (pp. 9 and

13 above).  Publication was delayed until questions of criminal

prosecution had been decided, and sufficient notice was given to the

applicants at all stages of the contents of the report to enable them

to seek judicial review to prevent publication if they saw fit.

Publication was also necessary to protect the economic well-being of

the country as the report revealed weakness in the system of takeover

bids.  Publication thereby protected those operating that system in the

future.  It was also necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of

others, such as those of Lonrho, its shareholders and associates, by

confirming that their allegations about the applicants had been

well-founded.  Moreover the report was well-balanced and did not go

further than was necessary for the Inspectors' legitimate purpose.  It

was not wholly negative about the applicants but gave them credit for

their management of HOF (p. 7 above).  Even if it had been lawful, it

would have been impracticable and possibly misleading to have published

only parts of the report, particularly as extracts had been leaked to

and published by The Observer.  In all the circumstances, the

Government are of the opinion that the report itself and its

publication did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the

applicants' right to respect for privacy, and that the publication was

well within the Government's margin of appreciation.

      The Commission finds that the publication of the Inspectors'

report with certain of its findings constituted an interference with

the applicants' right to respect for private life within the meaning

of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.  However, that

interference was in accordance with the law, the publication being

authorised by section 437 (3) (c) of the Companies Act 1985.  It

pursued the legitimate aims, relied on by the Government, of protecting

the economic well-being of the country and the rights and freedoms of

others, within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.  Investigations into large scale commercial activities of

the present kind and the need to ensure honest dealings fall within the

notion of protecting the economic well-being of the country.  The

interest of the general public in being informed about matters of major

public concern can best be served by the publication of the results of

Government inquiries.  Further elements of general interest are cited

above at pp. 9 and 13.  The needs of democracy justify transparency in

such matters.  States enjoy a margin of appreciation in their decision

whether to publish reports of the present kind, provided that the

decision is not taken arbitrarily or with malice towards the particular

individuals involved.  The question is one of proportionality or

balance between the public and the individual interests.

      The Commission finds that no elements of arbitrariness are

disclosed in the present case.  Although it might be fair to say that

no investigation into the applicants' affairs would have been started

if Lonrho had not launched its campaign against them, the actual

investigation by the Inspectors and their report indicate no malice or

unreasonableness.  As a whole the report may be said to be balanced and

thorough; it is not a one-sided condemnation of the applicants and

gives them credit where credit is due for their business activities.

The investigation of certain aspects of their private lives was

necessary in view of their claims about their personal backgrounds,

which they themselves had vaunted through the media, and as a result

of which they had enjoyed a good business reputation for quite some

time; hence their success in the HOF takeover bid.  In the

circumstances of the case, therefore, the Commission finds that the

making and publication of the Inspectors' report was proportionate to

the legitimate aims enunciated above and could be regarded as necessary

within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

      The Commission concludes that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.    The applicants have further complained that there has been an

arbitrary and unnecessary interference with the peaceful enjoyment of

their possessions, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to

the onvention, which reads as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems

      necessary to control the use of property in accordance with

      the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or

      other contributions or penalties."

      The applicants have alleged that the publication of the report

constituted a measure of control of the use of their property.  It

seriously damaged their reputation and financial standing and, thereby,

harmed their economic interests in the business of HOF.  Restrictions

were put on their management of Harrods Bank.  Although the publication

of the report pursued the legitimate aim of informing the public about

the acquisition of HOF, it imposed an individual and excessive burden

on the applicants, which outweighed the general interest.

      The Government have contended that the applicants' claim was

wholly unspecific as to the nature of the harm done to any of their

economic interests.  The restrictions placed on Harrods Bank were made

by the Bank of England and were not caused by the publication of the

report.  If banking restrictions were in any way to fall within the

ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Government have

submitted that the measure fully complied with the requirements of that

provision, given the Government's margin of appreciation in ensuring

the general public interest and the proportionate nature of the

restrictions.

      The Commission finds the applicants' claim to have suffered a

breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) unsubstantiated.  No

evidence of any significant economic prejudice has been submitted to

it.  Insofar as certain management restrictions were placed on Harrods

Bank by the Bank of England one month after publication of the report,

the Commission notes that the applicants had a right of appeal to an

independent tribunal which does not appear to have been tried

(pp. 14-15 above).  In the circumstances the Commission finds that no

appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) has

been disclosed in the present case.  It follows that this aspect of the

application is also manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    Finally, the applicants have complained of an absence of

effective domestic remedies for their above Convention claims, contrary

to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.  Article 13 (Art. 13)

provides as follows:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      Examination of this complaint has two aspects.  The first relates

to the applicants' claim under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (civil) of

the Convention, which the Commission retains for an examination on the

merits, and the second relates to the rest of the applicants'

complaints which the Commission rejects as being manifestly

ill-founded.  As regards the first aspect and the applicants' claim

under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (civil), the Commission considers

that the subsidiary complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention also raises a question of fact and law which requires a

determination on the merits, no ground of inadmissibility having been

established.

      However, as regards the second aspect, the Commission recalls

that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not require a remedy

under domestic law in respect of every alleged violation of the

Convention.  It only applies if the applicant can be said to have an

"arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R.,

Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A No. 131, p. 23,

para. 52).  The Commission has found above that the applicants' claims

under Article 6 paras. 1 (criminal) and 2, Article 8 (Art. 6-1, 6-2,

8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the

Convention are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.  In the light of the reasons

upon which those findings are based, the Commission also considers that

the facts of the present case fail to disclose an "arguable claim" of

a violation of these provisions.  Consequently the applicants cannot

derive from Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention a right to a remedy

for these Convention claims.  To this extent it follows that the

applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is

partially manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE

      in respect of the complaint of the first three applicants

      under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (civil) of the Convention,

      both on its own and in relation to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

      Convention, without prejudging the merits;

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission

       (H.C. KRÜGER)                        (C.A. NØRGAARD)